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ABSTRACT 
Past studies have recognised that a country's accounting system, including 
disclosure requirements and practice, does not develop in a vacuum but is shaped 
by a number of influences. Although several studies have been undertaken to 
identify factors affecting disclosure in various countries including Jordan, 
disclosure in compliance with all related and relevant International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), factors influencing disclosure in compliance with IAS and the 
financial consequences of increased disclosure in compliance with IAS have not 
been explored. 
This research therefore has looked at the development of disclosure in compliance 
with all related and relevant IAS, the factors influencing disclosure in compliance 
with IAS and the financial consequences of increased disclosure in compliance 
with IAS in Jordan. The investigation concentrated on the empirical analysis of- 
1) The impact of IAS adoption on the Jordanian Industrial Companies (JIC) 
listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) extent of disclosure over the 
period 1995-2000, and: 
2) The impact of five company-specific factors (company size, audit firm, 
industry type, profitability, and capital structure) on the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS of JIC over the period 1995-2000, and: 
3) The financial consequences of adopting IAS, more specifically the impact 
of adopting IAS on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost 
of equity capital, and share price volatility of JIC listed on ASE over the 
period 1996-2000. 
The development of accounting reporting and regulations in Jordan in connection 
with the country economy development was reviewed by highlighting the reasons 
forced toward adopting the IAS through the Companies Act and Amman Stock 
Exchange requirements. Such a review provides relevant background to the issue 
to be investigated in this study. 
III 
A survey of accounts of 50 JIC over the period 1995-2000 was undertaken to 
investigate the influence of the IAS on the extent of disclosure in Jordan. In this 
investigation, the selected companies' extent of disclosure in compliance with the 
IAS over the years was examined by conducting both parametric and non- 
parametric tests. 
The impact of company-specific factors, on the other hand, was assessed by 
looking at the association between selected factors and the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS in the annual reports of all JIC that met the criteria required 
over six different years (1995,1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000). Both univariate 
(parametric and non-parametric statistics) and multivariate (multiple regression) 
analyses were carried out in testing the significance of the association. 
As far as the financial consequences are concerned, the study investigated the 
impact of adopting the IAS on the JIC systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility over five different years 
(1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000). For such an investigation, the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Market Model were employed. In this 
investigation, the selected companies' systematic risk, cost of equity capital, and 
share price volatility over the years was examined by conducting both parametric 
and non-parametric tests. The selected companies' unsystematic risk, however, 
was investigated by conducting the F-test. In addition, clearly it could be argued 
that the change in the cost of equity capital as a financial consequence of adopting 
the IAS might be influenced by other factors, namely: business risk and financial 
risk. Multivariate (multiple regression) analyses were carried out, therefore, in 
testing the significance of the association between the cost of equity capital and 
the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS after controlling for the variables 
business risk and financial risk. 
The study results revealed that although the adoption for the IAS started in the 
year 1998, the significant change in the extent of disclosure started before that 
year. As a consequence, it can be seen that there was a drift up in the extent of 
disclosure regarding the mandatory action in 1998 for implementing the IAS and 
not a jump up as was expected to be seen. 
IV 
The study has found that JIC were not fully adopting the IAS. Chosen company 
specific factors, therefore, were tested for possible explanation of the variation in 
the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. The results revealed that there 
were considerable variations in the extent of disclosure by JIC for each of the six 
years covered in this study. Company size and, to a lesser extent, audit firm and 
industry type appear to be the best explanatory variables in explaining differences 
in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS among JIC included in this 
study over the period 1995-2000 suggesting that JIC have been influenced by 
company-specific factors. 
Regarding the financial consequences of adopting the IAS, however, the 
systematic risk and cost of equity capital, to some extent, was found to be 
significantly influenced by the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS of JIC. 
Such an influence is described as a 'cumulative' influence. Whereas, it has not 
been found that unsystematic risk, and share price volatility was significantly 
influenced by the adoption of IAS. 
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Chapter One 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Accounting Disclosure in Developing Countries 
Past studies have recognised that accounting disclosure requirements and practices 
do not develop in a vacuum but are shaped by a number of influences (Adhikari 
and Tondkar 1992; Choi and Mueller 1992). Looking at disclosure from the 
macro perspective, Environment Determinism Theory (EDT) suggests that both 
national and international environment factors are important factors affecting 
accounting disclosure in a country. Despite the view that the accounting system in 
a country should reflect environmental factors inherent in the country (Briston 
1978; Bursal 1984), there is evidence in the literature, which suggests that 
accounting, including disclosure, in developing countries is likely to be influenced 
more by external factors (Cooke and Wallace 1990). Addressing the external 
environmental or international influence, Wallace (1987, P. 641) stated that: 
"The influences of international agencies on developing countries is so 
strong that it is almost unbelievable that the literature works on the 
assumption that these countries are ftee to choose and determine their 
accounting systems ". 
International harmonisation/ standarisation efforts are amongst the suggested 
important external environmental factors. One of the primary generators of such 
efforts is the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which has 
issued a number of accounting standards (IAS). ' Despite some arguments that 
have questioned the suitability of the IAS for developing countries (Samuels and 
Oliga 1982; Saudagaran and Meek 1996), it has been claimed that the work of the 
IASC has had an impact on IASC member developing countries 2 (Iddamalgoda 
I Effective I April 2001, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) assumed accounting standard setting 
responsibilities from its predecessor body, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This was the 
culmination of a restructuring based on the recommendations of the report Recommendations on Shaping IASC for the 
Future. According to the new structure, the IASC is an independent organisation having two main bodies, the Trustees and 
the IASB, as well as a Standards Advisory Council and the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee. 
The IASC Foundation Trustees appoint the IASB members, exercise oversight and raise the funds needed, whereas IASB 
has sole responsibility for setting accounting standards called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
(www. iasc. org). 
2 Jordan is one of the IASC member bodies through Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA). In 
addition, Jordan was one of the TASC board members over the period 1988-1995 (Cairns, 2002, PP. 18-20). 
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1986; Nobes and Parker 1995). There are some indicators supporting such claim 
(IASC 1997; Purvis et al. 1991). The suggested reasons for such influences 
include the high cost of setting up national standards and developing countries' 
inability to set their own standards, to facilitate the growth of international trade 
and attract foreign investment and join the international harmonisation/ 
standarisation drive. The majority of the developing countries have 
adoPted/adapted or have been using IAS are (or have been) members of the 
British Commonwealth (IASC 1997; Purvis et al. 199 1). 
On the basis of the above arguments, it may be possible to hypothesize that the 
standardisation effort by IASC is amongst the important external environment 
factors that are likely to have an influence on the extent of disclosure in a country 
like Jordan. Jordan does not have an equivalent of the Accounting Standards 
Board and, prior the imposition of IAS, the country did not have agreed national 
accounting standards. The country has a close economic and trade relationship 
with European Union (EU) member countries and the USA. In addition, Jordan is 
not a member of the British Commonwealth, but an IASC member developing 
country with aspiration to attract major foreign investments. 
As developing countries are not a homogenous group, the claim that the work of 
the IASC has had an influence on developing countries cannot be generalised until 
we understand the impact of the IAS in many of these countries. For example, 
little is known about the impact of the IAS on the extent of disclosure, their 
impact on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, 
and on share price volatility, or the effect on international trade. In particular, 
there is no empirical evidence, that investigates the impact of the all related and 
relevant IAS on the extent of disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital, and share prices volatility for companies listed in 
the stock market in a country like Jordan. 
From a micro (company) perspective, it has been suggested that there are 
company-specific factors that may affect the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS. Although the association has long been recognised, the results of the 
previous studies carried out in different countries have been mixed, to a certain 
2 
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extent inconsistent and sometimes contradictory. Such inconsistency or 
contradiction, however, could be for different reasons: 1) the number of firms 
included in the sample, 2) the type and number of company characteristics 
examined, 3) the number of information items that formed the basis of the set of 
disclosure indexes as a dependent variable, and 4) the different statistical 
methodologies used to analyse the data. 
Hence, a further investigation into the impact of company-specific factors of the 
extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS in a country, which was not subject to 
such a previous study, may contribute to efforts that have been made to identify 
the factors affecting the extent of disclosure of companies. Jordanian companies 
have not been covered in the previous disclosure studies in compliance with all 
related IAS, (as far as this researcher is aware), and therefore the impact of 
company-specific factors on the extent of disclosure in compliance with all related 
and relevant IAS is not known. 
For the accounting years ending December 1998, IAS was made mandatory 
through the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 for 
all Jordanian public companies. Unfortunately there was no institutional change to 
check on compliance. However, it does create an opportunity to test if there were 
any factors, which systematically affected or were associated with the degree of 
compliance. 
On the basis of the review of relevant literature and theoretical arguments 
summarised above, the research problem has been identified as the following 
questions: 
1. Has the extent of disclosure of Jordanian companies been influenced by the 
IAS? 
2. Has the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS of Jordanian companies 
been influenced by company-specift factors, namely: company size, audit 
firm, industry type, profitability and structure? 
3 
Chapter One 
One of the claimed benefits of adopting an improved system of disclosure is that it 
leads to a reduction in the cost of capital to companies (Amihud and Mendelson 
1986; Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Barth et al. 1999; Botosan 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee 2000; Brealey and Myers 2000; Choi 1973; Copeland and Galai 1983; 
Demsetz 1968; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Gary and Gray 1989; Gary et al. 
1995; Glosten and Milgrom. 1985; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Huddart et al. 
1999; Levitt 1998; Richardson and Welker 2001; Sengupta 1998; Verrecchia 
1996). The argument is that improved information reduces uncertainty about a 
company and therefore, potentially the risk premium required by investors. There 
are many models for explaining how the risk premium arises. The capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), arbitrage pricing theory (APT), and the Fama & French 
(1995) model are all possible explanations of the risk premium facing companies 
- and the equity risk premium in particular. For the purpose of this work, the 
CAPM will be used as the maintained model of asset pricing. 
Within this framework to test whether the cost of equity capital has been reduced 
requires a preliminary question of whether the uncertainty is systematic or 
unsystematic. Fundamentally, a further preliminary question has to be discussed 
and that is whether stock market volatility has been reduced. This leads to asking 
the following questions: 
3. Have the systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, and cost of equity 
capital of Jordanian companies been influenced by the IAS adoption? 
4. Has the share price volatility of Jordanian companies been influenced by the 
IAS adoption? 
It is conceivable, however, that the cost of equity capital has been influenced by 
other changes taking place over the period other than the change in the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS. In particular, the firms may have been 
changing their business risk or their financial risk and this need to be controlled 
for in assessing the impact of the change in disclosure on the cost of equity 
capital. It is also conceivable that the firms have responded to the change in extent 
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of disclosure in compliance with IAS by changing their business and financial 
risk. Theses effects lead to ask the following question: 
5. Has the cost of equity capital of Jordanian companies influenced by the 
business risk and financial risk? 
1.2 Scope of the Jordanian Study 
This study is essentially a single-country study which reviews the development of 
the Jordanian economy and the disclosure regulations requirements in order to 
assess the impact of IAS through empirical investigation on the extent of 
disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, 
and on share price volatility. 
Jordan is chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. Firstly, it is an open 
economy in the Middle East especially to EU members and USA. Secondly, the 
Amman Stock Exchange is growing rapidly and this creates a possibility of testing 
cost of capital propositions. Thirdly, so far, however, little is known about the 
impact of the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS on systematic risk, 
unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and on share price 
volatility not only in developing countries but also in developed countries as well. 
Fourthly, the sudden imposition of IAS by the Jordanian Companies Act and the 
Securities Law creates an opportunity for stronger tests of the propositions about 
disclosure and the cost of capital. 
To test the propositions, a sample of only Jordanian industrial companies was 
selected. These companies had existed for the six years period 1995-2000 under 
consideration. They had to have a full set of company accounts and they had to 
have been continuously trading over the whole period. 
Having chosen the sample of companies, it was vital to assess which of the IAS 
were relevant to the company and companies. For example, IAS related to 
consolidated financial statements would be rarely relevant because groups of 
5 
Chapter One 
companies are unusual in Jordan. However, there is always some ambiguity as to 
whether a standard or item is relevant or not, so some choices had to be taken. 
This clearly affects the interpretation that is given to make about the degree of 
compliance. It also means that this variable, of the degree of compliance, is 
inevitably measured with errors. 
The study investigation was limited to the disclosure of information in Jordanian 
industrial companies' annual reports. Whilst there are other sources through 
which companies may disclose information, the choice of companies' annual 
reports as the source of information was taken because actual disclosure may be 
assessed most accurately through annual reports as pointed by Tai et al. (1990). 
The years covered in this study are 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999 and 2000. The 
reason for covering more than one year is it provides robust evidence as regards 
the impact of the factors covered in this study, to investigate the period pre and 
post the announcement of the adoption of IAS in Jordan in the first of September 
1998 through the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997. Giner (1997, P. 63) argued that 
the analysis of several years, instead of focusing one year per company as most 
studies do, could provide stronger and more relevant results. 
1.3 The Disclosure Index and Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital 
Seeking an answer to the question concerning the extent that Jordanian industrial 
companies comply with the mandatory requirement to disclose IAS, an updated 
disclosure index has to be developed, which contained all operative, related and 
relevant IAS. Each of the IAS related to the period under investigation is analysed 
in order to develop the list of disclosures required by IAS. It has to be noted that 
many of these standards have been revised, reformatted and combined into other 
standards over the years, which has been taken into account. The number of IAS 
considered in this study for developing the updated disclosure index, therefore, 
was 18 over the period 1995-1998 and'21 over the period 1999-2000. The 
disclosure index covering the period 1995-1997 contained 137 applicable items to 
the selected JIC-s', while the disclosure indices covering the years 1998,1999 and 
2000 contained 186,221 and 219 items, respectively. The selected items are those 
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which have been influenced by: 1) The items had to be potentially relevant to a set 
of JIC-s' that could be characterised in general as domestic manufacturing firms. 
2) Each item had to be applicable to the generality of firms. 3) The items have 
been chosen so that it is easy to verify whether the company discloses it or not. 
The procedure followed to measure this disclosure is as follows: 1) Construction 
of a disclosure-scoring sheet, 2) Selection of the period to be covered, 3) 
Identification of Jordanian Industrial Companies listed in the Amman Financial 
Market over the period considered, 4) Scoring the disclosure items, and 5) 
Constructing the disclosure index. 
The index used in this study is a modified unweighted index called "Partial 
Compliance (PC) ". The degree of compliance for each company, according to this 
approach, is measured by adding the degree of compliance for each standard. This 
implicitly gives equal weighing to each applicable standard and avoids the 
problem of unintentionally giving more weight to a standard with a larger number 
of items in the index. It gives equal weighing for each standard instead of equal 
weighing for each item as it is in the unweighted approach used by earlier studies. 
The choice of area of accounting practice to be covered in this study was based 
upon the fact that Jordanian companies are small national companies comparing 
with those multinational ones. Furthermore, IAS requirements concerning 
advanced accounting practices such as deferred tax, accounting for leases, 
inflation accounting, etc are not applicable. 
Despite the above processes for developing as accurate indices as possible, it has 
to be noted that developing those indices are limited to items where compliance is 
visible and therefore the research inevitably end up testing disclosure more than 
measurement and accounting policy statements more than accounting practice. 
The index is therefore a proxy for compliance and in some ways a slightly biased 
proxy. In particular, in measuring the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS, 
the study is reliant on the fact that companies making clear statements of 
accounting policy and making them honestly. 
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One of the key hypotheses to be tested in this work is whether the introduction of 
IAS had any influence on the cost of equity capital of Jordanian companies. To 
test this hypothesis requires a model of asset pricing. There are many models of 
asset pricing including the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory or multi-factor models and the Fama & French Model (1995). The 
CAPM is used in this study because it is the dominate model in the academic and 
professional literature. Moreover it has been adopted by industry regulators 
throughout the world. 
In the CAPM model the risk of the security that matters is the systematic (or non- 
diversifiable risk). Other forms of risk that can be diversified away do not require 
compensation by investors. In the equilibrium of this model this systematic or 
beta risk is priced by the market risk premium where this is the difference 
between the expected return on the market portfolio and the risk free rate. The 
product of the market risk premium and the beta constitutes the risk premium in 
the model. The total expected return on a security, or its cost of capital, is the sum 
of this risk premium and the risk free rate. 
The CAPM shows that it is only a security's systematic risk, which is of iýterest 
to a well-diversified shareholder. The value of B is, therefore, of key importance 
to the investor. The higher the systematic risk of a security, the higher the return 
required by the investor. The major conclusion of the CAPM is that the price of 
securityj will adjust so that its expected return E(ri) is given by: 
E(rj) = rf + Rrm - rf) Pj 
Where rf is the risk-free rate of interest. The expected return depends linearly on 
the systematic risk (pi). The relationship between E(rj) and Pi is known as the 
Security Market Line (SML). The P of a security is the standarised covariance of a 
security's return with the market return on the market portfolio. Therefore: 
Beta of security i= Cov(ri, rm) / Var(rm) 
8 
Chapter One 
To assess the impact of IAS on the cost of capital we have to look to its impact on 
the three components of the CAPM - the risk free rate, the market risk premium 
and beta. It is unlikely that IAS will influence the risk free rate since this is likely 
to be determined by macroeconomic factors in Jordan and the world economy. 
For this reason the impact of IAS on the cost of capital only focuses upon the risk 
premium and its two components. 
It proves to be difficult to estimate the impact of the IAS on the market risk 
premium for Jordan. To estimate it would require an estimate of the expected rate 
of return on the market portfolio in Jordan and the risk free rate. Unfortunately 
Jordan has issued very few treasury bills over this period making a reliable 
estimate difficult to obtain. However the market risk premium is shown to be 
remarkably stable throughout the international community and it is this that is 
used as a proxy. 
This leaves beta as the only factor to be estimated. For this purpose the Market 
Model is used. However because the CAPM always forces the beta of the market 
portfolio to be one, a security's beta is estimated on an international portfolio and 
not a Jordanian market portfolio. This methodology then enables a test of the 
hypothesis to be made in the context of the international community. Did the 
introduction of IAS lead to a reduction in the cost of equity capital of Jordanian 
companies compared to other international companies? 
The Market Model is a statistical model, which relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfolio. The model's linear specification 
follows from the assumed joint normality of asset returns. For any security i we 
have: 
Rij = aij + Pi rmt + cii 
We assumed the cij were uncorrelated random error terms with mean zero and 
constant variance CF2 (homoskedasticity and not hetroskedasticity)3 . That is, 
3 For more details see (Hill et al. 2001, PP. 235-237). 
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= Cr2, COV(p E(F, ij) = 0, Var(F-ij) i, Fj) =0 
Where rij and rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
respectively, and cij is the zero mean disturbance term, constant variance and not 
correlated with itself or with the market return. aij and Bj, and cij are the 
parameters of the market model. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
An understanding of the issue of International Accounting Standards and its 
impact upon the extent of disclosure in a country like Jordan suffered for long 
time from having specified and determined disclosure requirements by the law is 
important. It could be added that such importance increased when the country's 
economy depends heavily on neighboring countries and foreign investment; an 
issue is not part of the study investigation. So far, there is no published 
information about the impact of IAS on extent of disclosure and what company- 
specific factors influencing such extent, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital and share price volatility. This is the first study 
addressing these issues, which will contribute to a better understanding in Jordan 
and so will represent an addition to knowledge. Given the fact that Jordan is a 
developing country, this study may also add to the existing knowledge about the 
factors influencing extent of disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility in developing countries. 
Adhikari and Tondkar (1992, P. 77) argued that studies examining environmental 
influences on accounting are important because they can help in providing 
empirical evidence on the asserted relationships between environmental variables 
and accounting disclosure. This study which has attempted to assess the impact of 
IAS as an external environmental factor on accounting disclosure and its financial 
consequences in Jordan would provide evidence on the proportion that this factor 
have had an impact on developing countries. 
The significance of such assessments in terms of contribution to knowledge is as 
follows: it is sometimes argued that developing countries are influenced by 
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standards issued by the IASC although these are primarily members of the British 
Commonwealth (Purvis et al. 1991), as the content of IAS was closely consistent 
with the practices in a number of developed British Commonwealth countries 
including the UK (Nobes and Parker 1995). Moreover, the accounting systems of 
developing countries that are member of the British Commonwealth were similar 
to the accounting system of the UK. Adoption or adaptation of the IAS by these 
countries, however, does not itself provide sufficient evidence to make a 
meaningful generalisation that the IAS have had an impact on developing 
countries. Therefore, this research, which assesses the factors affecting extent of 
disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, cost of equity capital and share 
price volatility in Jordan, a developing country that was under close British 
supervision during the period 1918-1946, may extend our knowledge on the 
impact of the IAS on developing countries. 
Studies examining the impact of the IAS on extent of disclosure and as a result the 
financial consequences of that impact in various countries, developed and 
developing, are quite important issue. That is because they can help to identify 
whether or not such standards, which attempt to reduce differences in financial 
reporting and disclosure practice among countries, are succeeding. Success could 
be measured by increasing extent of disclosure, lower systematic risk, lower, 
unsystematic risk, lower risk premium, lower cost of equity capital, and less share 
price volatility. 
The majority of past studies that examine the association between company- 
specific factors and the extent of disclosure have focused on one year and 
therefore provided a point-in-time picture using mostly univariate or multivariate 
analysis. Only a few studies have examined such a relationship by covering more 
than one year per company (Al-Modahki 1996; Amernic and Maiocco 1981; Soh 
1996). In addition, interestingly, previous studies have reported inconsistent 
results (e. g. different factors found to be significant in different years or factors 
found to be significant in certain years, but found to be insignificant in other 
years). This study, which looks at the association between company-specific 
factors and extent of disclosure over six different years using both univariate and 
multivariate analysis, will provide further evidence of association between 
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company-specific factors and extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS over 
time. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the relationship between the level of disclosure and 
characteristics of reporting firms will not only extend our knowledge of 
significant factors influencing the extent of disclosure, but may also be of use to 
regulatory authorities. This could be done by selecting an appropriate course of 
action for setting up new or modifying existing regulations. 
To summarise, this is the first study on extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS and factors influencing this extent. It is the first study investigates the 
financial consequences of adoption the IAS in Jordan, a developing country. This 
study, therefore, will contribute to a better understanding of accounting disclosure 
and the factors influencing accounting disclosure in a developing country. It will 
also contribute to efforts that have been made to identify the company-specific 
factors affecting extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS adopted by 
companies. 
1.5 Thesis Organisation 
This thesis is structured into 8 chapters divided into two main parts. Figure 1.1 
shows the overall structure of the thesis. 
Part I provides an introduction to the empirical research, examines Jordanian 
economy development, disclosure requirements regulations changes since the 
establishment of the country and reviews the literature relevant to the study 
objectives. This part consists of four chapters: 
Chapter One 
It is the summary of the thesis. It introduces the research problems and purpose of 
the study, explains the scope of the research and also stresses the significant of the 
study in terms of contribution to knowledge. Finally, the general organisation of 
the study is laid down. 
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Figure 1.1 
Thesis Structure 
Part I- Introduction, Theoretical Investigation and Literature Review 
Chapter One 
The Introduction 
Chapter Two 
Jordanian Economy Development 
Chapter Three 
Financial Reporting Regulations Development and IAS 
Chapter Four 
Literature RevieW4 
A- Review of Empirical Literature Concerning Disclosure in Compliance With IAS 
13- Review of Empirical Literature Concerning Influence of Company-Specific Factors on Extent 
of Disclosure 
C- Theoretical and Empirical Research Concerning Financial Consequences of Increased 
Disclosure 
Part 11 - The Research Methodology, Results and Conclusions 
Chapter Five 
Research Methodology and Hypotheses 
Chapter Six 
Extent of Disclosure in Compliance with IAS and the Impact of Company-Specific Factors 
Chapter Seven 
Financial Consequences of IAS Adoption 
Chapter Eight 
Conclusions, Boundaries, and Future Research 
This section included a review of literature on macroeconomic factors influencing extent of 
disclosure. 
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Chapter two 
After introducing the summary of the thesis by Chapter One, Chapter Two looks 
at the historical background; major events in Jordan history, economic overview; 
economic strategy, policies and globalisation; and Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
development. 
Chapter Three 
The chapter focuses upon the financial reporting regulations specified by the 
Jordanian laws and its developments over the years since the establishment of the 
country. As factors affecting financial reporting in Jordan, Companies Acts is the 
first piece of Jordanian legislation to look at followed by Income Tax Law, 
Amman Stock Exchange Law (ASE) and finally Accounting Profession 
involvement. By doing so, the question of the necessity of adopting IAS in Jordan 
has been explored, as a result, by discussing issues such as IAS: theoretical 
arguments and prior expectations, standardisation: objectives and means, and 
finally IAS relevant for Jordan. 
Chapter Fou 
This chapter reviews previous empirical evidence in the literature concerning the 
study objectives. It is reviewing; the literature on disclosure, company-specific 
factors influencing extent of disclosure, cost of equity capital and share price 
volatility. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter explains the research methodology used and the hypotheses 
developed in this study for achieving its objectives. This chapter is divided into 
three main sections. The first section explains the research methodology adopted 
to investigate the impact of IAS on extent of disclosure of Jordanian Industrial 
Companies listed in ASE over the period 1995-2000. The second section explains 
the research methodology adopted to analyse the impact of company-specific 
factors on extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS by Jordanian Industrial 
Companies listed in ASE over the period 1995-2000. The third section explains 
the research methodology adopted to investigate the financial consequences of 
adopting the IAS. The investigation starts by exploring the impact of IAS on 
14 
Chapter One 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and on 
Jordanian Industrial Companies share price volatility over the period 1996-2000. 
The research hypotheses to be tested are also developed in this chapter. 
Chapter Six 
Reports and discusses the results of the research that is conducted to explore the 
impact of IAS on JIC extent of disclosure. In addition, the chapter reports and 
discusses the results of the univariate and multivariate tests conducted to assess 
the impact of company-specific factors on extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS of Jordanian Industrial Companies listed in ASE and their share traded over 
the period 1995-2000. 
Chapter Seven 
Reports and discusses the results of the research that is conducted to explore the 
impact of the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS on systematic risk, 
unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility 
of Jordanian Industrial Companies listed in ASE and their share traded over the 
period 1996-2000. 
Chapter EiRht 
Summaries, discusses and evaluates the research findings; identifies the 
boundaries of the study; and offers suggestions for future research. 
is 
Chapter Two 
CHAPTER TWO 
JORDANIAN ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
It could be argued that in a world, where the globalisation and free trading 
and investments agreements is a big issue nowadays and playing a vital role 
in any country accounting system and, hence, its corporate reporting and 
disclosure practices. Thus, it might be necessary to explore the 
environmental characteristics of Jordan in order to determine whether its 
accounting system has been developed in an appropriate way that fits its 
environment. 
This chapter accordingly, attempts to examine the issue mentioned above in 
the following sections by looking at the Historical background; Major events 
in Jordan history; Economic overview; Economic strategy, policies and 
globalisation; and Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The final section provide 
a summary of the chapter. By exploring the above aspects, moreover, the 
chapter could provide some evidence whether the impact of adopting the 
IAS in Jordan in 1998, the major issue of this study, has significantly 
influenced the macroeconomic indicators in the Jordanian economy. 
2.2 Historical Background 
2.2.1 Location and Area 
Jordan is a developing Arab state boarded by Syria on the north, Iraq on the 
north-east, Saudi Arabia on the south-east and West Bank on the west. It is a 
small county of 89,544 sq. km. (34,573 sq. mi. ) situated near the 
southeastern coast of the Mediterranean which has given it strategic and 
economic importance and a vital trading and communication link between 
countries, people, and continents. The kingdom has a diverse range of 
landscapes. The Badia lie to the east with hills and mountains. The fertile 
rift valley cleaves the length of the country forming a natural boundary to 
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the lowest into which the Jordan River flows and converges at the Dead Sea, 
the lowest point on earth. At the southern tip of Jordan is the Gulf of Aqaba, 
which gives the country access to the Red Sea. 
2.2.2 History 
Jordan has been home to some of the world's earliest human settlements. 
The land of Jordan has changed hands many times up to the 20th century 
parts of the modem Jordan were included in the dominions of ancient 
Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian, and Mesopotamian Empires. 
From the west, Pharanoiac Egypt extended its power, while nomadic 
Nabateans built their empire in Jordan (including the city of Petra) after 
migrating from the south. Finally, Jordan was incorporated into the classical 
civilisations of Greece, Rome, and Persia. 
Since the mid-seventh century AD, the land of Jordan has remained almost 
continuously in the hands of various Arab and Islamic dynasties. These 
include the Umayads (661 - 750), the Abbasids (750 - 969), the Fatamids 
(969 - 1171), the Ayyubids (1174 - 1263), and the Mamluks (1250 - 1516). 
From 1516 to the end of the First World War (1918), the territory occupied 
by Jordan formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The modem history of Jordan 
began with dethronement of the Ottoman rule after the First World War in 
1918. The Emirate of TransJordan, which was under close British 
supervision, was created in April, 1921 as part of the post-war settlement 
and as an appendage to the British mandate in Palestine. In May 1946, the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was declared as an independent estate. As a 
result of the creation of Israel in May 1948 and the subsequent Arab-Israeli 
war, Jordan controlled the West Bank, which remained in Arab hands, and 
unity between the two Banks (East and West) was realised in April, 1950, 
following a general election for a new council of representatives in which 
Palestinians were to have the same number of seats as Transjordan. 
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The West Bank was occupied by Israel in 1967 and consequently, in 
practice, the unity between the two regions broke down. The legal 
relationship survived until July 1988 when King Hussein of Jordan (1953- 
1999) declared the disengagement of the legal and administrative 
relationship between the two parts. In July 1994, King Hussein signed an 
agreement with Israel ending 46 years of war and tension relations between 
the two countries. Jordan, nowadays, is led by King Abdullah, eldest son of 
the late King Hussein. 
2.2.3 Population 
Jordan's population was estimated 5.04 million in 2000 with an annual 
growth rate of 2.8 percent (DOS 2000, P. 1) and average annual per capita 
1089.2 JD in 19981. The population's gender breakdown is almost equal 
with 52% males and 48% females. The majority (over 38%) is concentrated 
in the greater Amman region, with a further 18% in Irbid in the west, 15% in 
Zarqa, and 2% in Aqaba. There is still a very small number of Bedouin who 
live a semi-nomadic existence (Amman Chamber of Industry, 2000). It has 
to be mentioned, however, that there was a slow fall in the population 
growth rate during the last decade. Table 2.1 shows the fact that people who 
are living in Jordan has increased rapidly over the years. 
1 It has to be noted that the exchange rate for JD in 24/10/2002 is fl. 0179 for buying and fI- 1547 for selling. 
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Table 2.1: Population and its Growth Rate 1967 - 2000 
Year Population (In Million) Growth Rate % 
1967 1.19 
1968 1.23 3.4 
1969 1.35 8.0 
1970 1.51 11.8 
1971 1.53 1.3 
1972 1.55 1.3 
1973 1.57 8.3 
1974 1.70 6.5 
1975 1.81 4.4 
1976 1.89 2.6 
1977 1.94 3.1 
1978 2.00 6.5 
1979 2.13 4.2 
1980 2.22 4.0 
1981 2.31 3.5 
1982 2.39 4.2 
1983 2.49 4.0 
1984 2.60 4.2 
1985 2.72 4.4 
1986 2.81 3.2 
1987 2.90 3.1 
1988 3.03 4.3 
1989 3.14 3.5 
1990 3.47 10.2 
1991 3.70 6.7 
1992 3.84 3.8 
1993 3.99 3.9 
1994 4.14 3.7 
1995 4.29 3.6 
1996 4.44 3.4 
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Table 2.1: Population and its Growth Rate 1967 - 2000 
Year Population (In Million) Growth Rate % 
1997 4.60 3.6 
1998 4.76 3.5 
1999 4.90 2.9 
2000 5.04 2.8 
Source: Department of Statistics, Different Issues, Amman, 
Jordan. 
As it can be seen, Table 2.1 shows that the population growth was 
consistence around 3.3 percent during the period 1995-2000. In addition, it 
shows that the average growth rate was higher than 6 percent for some years 
like 1969,1970,1973,1990, and 1991. This dramatic increase could be 
explained as a result of people emigrated from their countries to Jordan as a 
consequence of conflicts happening in their countries like Palestine, 
Lebanon and Iraq. Such a situation, therefore, makes it hard to any Jordanian 
government over the years to grow the General Domestic Products (GDP) to 
match the population growth in order to improve the standards of living. 
Finally, it can be said that Jordan has a relatively young population where 
more than 67 percent of the population less than 25 years old (Jordan and 
World Bank 1998, P. 12). The mortality rate decreased to 5 percent 1000 
population, while expectancy is 68 years for male and 73 years for female in 
2000 (DOS 2000, P. 1). 
2.2.4 Language and religion 
The official language is Arabic, but English is widely understood and is 
often used as a second language in commerce. Islam is the predominant 
religion, with over 92% of the population being Sunni. Some 6% is 
Christian, mainly Greek Orthodox and Catholic. The remainder, Sunni 
Cireassians, who settled in Jordan around 1878, few Baha1s, Druze, and a 
small number of Shia Muslims. Muslim New year and other Islamic 
holydays are Public holidays. 
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2.2.5 Political and legal system 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy with legislative power vested in the king 
and the National Assembly. The country has parliamentary representation. 
The National Assembly is divided into two houses: the senate with 40 
representatives appointed by the king; and the House of Representatives 
with 80 deputies through popular suffrage. 
Legislation is drafted by the Government and presented to Parliament for 
debate and approval. Joint House sessions may be held to resolve any 
impasses in the lower house. Upon approval, the King must ratify laws. 
Judges are independent of both the legislature and executive branches, and 
are appointed by Royal Decree. There are three categories of court: civil, 
religions and special. 
2.3 Major events in Jordan History 
It might be necessary before exploring the Jordanian economy development 
over the years since the declaration of being independent state in May 1946, 
to introduce in brief the main events, which had a significant effect on the 
economy. The Jordanian economy had a remarkable shock when the 
population trebled in 1948 as a result of the first Arab-Israel War (Abdullah 
1994, P. 57). Consequently, Jordanian government began during that period 
to be dependent on foreign aid for expanding the country infrastructure and 
services (Day 1986, P. 97). The economy, therefore, shifted from being 
agricultural orientated to service economy (Piro 1998, P. 30). 
The years started from 1967 until 1973 were the most difficult period for the 
Jordanian economy because of two wars in almost four years. The 1967 Six 
Days war with Israel imposed a heavy burden on the Jordan economy, which 
not only changed the population structure by being increased about quarter 
in one year as a result of the Palestinian being pushed outside the West Bank 
'see Table 2.1' but also the loss of the land considered as the most 
productive for the country at that time (Mazur 1979, P. 81). Moreover, the 
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civil war during 1970-1971 disturbed the development efforts and added 
more burden on Jordan! s economy mainly because of the cut off aid by Arab 
states like Kuwait and Libya to the Jordanian government as a result of 
Jordan! s actions against the Fedayeen Group (Piro 1998, P. 62). 
Although Jordan is not producing oil, its economy depends heavily on the 
oil prices. The oil price revolution during the period 1970s reflected 
positively on Jordan's economy by enjoying sustained boom (Jordan and 
World Bank 1998, PA). Moreover, the prosperity in Jordan's economy was a 
result of influxes of aid and soft loans from the Gulf States, the most prolific 
oil producers in the world, which were significant monetary transfers to the 
country. In addition, the large number of Jordanian citizens who were 
working in the Gulf States provides their families as well as their country an 
important source of income. 
Both, the external aid and workers remittance constituted 58 percent of 
Jordan's GDP (Michael et al. 2001, P. 31) which will be explored in the 
following section. The effect on Jord&s economy during the period 1970s 
as a result of that sudden wealth, however, brought full employment where 
almost 300 thousands Jordanians worked in the Gulf counters, especially in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Day 1986, P. 98). 
The collapse of the international oil market in the 1980s caused a significant 
effect upon Jordan's economy, particularly on the level of foreign aid from 
the oil Arab states which fell from $ 1.1 Billion in 1981 to less than $ 600 
million in 1989 (Michael et al. 2001, P. 32). Moreover, the supply of jobs 
for foreign workers has shrunk in the oil exporting Arab countries and 
accordingly there was not only drop on the level of remittances sent home by 
Jordanian workers abroad, but also on the level of products exported from 
Jordan to these countries. In addition, the war between Iraq and Iran for 8 
years (1980-1988) affected badly the Jordanian economy since many 
Jordanian companies relied heavily on the Iraqi market, the biggest trade 
partner for Jordan. 
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Finally, Jordanian export revenues declined at that time because of declining 
in exporting the phosphates and potash as a result of depreciation in its 
prices (Nismba 1990, P. 2). As a result of all these difficulties mentioned 
above Jordanian government had to borrow heavily to meet its budgetary 
requirements as well as to compensate the excessive reliance on foreign 
assistance and workers remittances. Therefore, it can be seen, from the 
outstanding foreign debt to the Jordanian government, as will be presented 
shortly, that Jordan started to rely on foreign debt from commercial and 
international banks heavily since that time (1980s) which has become 
intolerable and poses an extreme difficult for the Jordanian economy. 
By 1988 Jordan was on the verge of an economic crisis and its symptoms 
were as following (Michael et al. 2001; Piro 1998): 
1. Stunting GDP growth, this declined that year by 1.6 percent and 
lower per capita income. 
2. Debt burden increased from $2.3 billion to $6.5 billion by the end of 
1988 (Al-Nabilsi 1994, P. 175). 
3. Almost $20 to $30 billion of Jordanians' capital was held abroad 
which might be because of high level of risk in the Jordanian 
economy regarding the economic instability. 
4. By mid 1988 Central Bank of Jordan official reserves was only $19 
million. 
Due to the above developments, the crises led to devaluation for the 
Jordanian currency (the Dinar) by 50 percent (Piro 1998, P. 73). 
Jordan's deep economic crises forced the Jordanian government to begin 
rescheduling the debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who 
agreed to implement a five year recovery plan from 1989 to 1993. The 
1990/1991 Gulf War between Iraq and the United Nations led by the USA as 
a result of occupying Kuwait by the Iraqis aggravated, however, Jordan's 
already serious economic problems. Consequently, Jordanian population 
increased more than 10 per cent (300 thousand Jordanians from Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait) rising the unemployment rate to record high of 25 
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percent (Feiler 1993) and, thus, an important source of income was lost. The 
United Nation considered Jordan to be the most damaged country from that 
crisis (ESCWA 1991, P. 5). 
What will be presented in the following sections from economic factors, 
however, should be views in the context of that major events happened over 
the years since the independence in 1946. 
2.4 Economic overview 
Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources. Just over 10% of its 
land is arable, and even that is subject to the vagaries of a limited water 
supply. Rainfall is low and highly variable, and much of Jordan's available 
ground water is not renewable. 
Jordan's economic resource base centers on phosphates, Potash, and their 
fertilizer derivatives; tourism; overseas remittances; and foreign aid. These 
are its principal sources of hard currency earnings. Lacking forests, coal 
reserves, hydroelectric power or commercially viable oil deposits, Jordan 
relies on natural gas for 10% of its domestic energy needs. Jordan depends 
on Iraq for most of its oil. 
Jordan! s distance from other markets makes its exports less competitive 
outside the region, and political disputes among its traditional trading 
partners- Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf States - frequently restrict 
regional trade and development. Therefore, King Abdullah has encouraged 
his government to liberalise the economy, improve economic ties in the 
region, and seek opportunities in the global information economy. 
Since 1987, Jordan has struggled with a substantial debt burden, lower per 
capita income, and rising unemployment. In 1989, efforts to increase 
revenues by raising prices of certain commodities and utilities triggered a 
riot in the south. The mood of political discontent swept the country in the 
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wake of the riots helped set the stage for Jordan's moves toward 
democratisation. 
Jordan's main economic problem is the lack of capital. Therefore, the 
government's 1986 decision to loosen restrictions on capital movement was 
a step in the right direction, for many restrictions on the movement of capital 
along with the overvalued Dinar hampered foreign investment. The removal 
of capital restrictions in 1986 and the Dinar devaluation in 1988/1989 have 
helped to open the door to foreign investors who can take advantage of the 
skilled Jordanian labor force and the existing infrastructure. In return, 
foreign investors can improve the Jordanian economic base by creating new 
industries and by reducing unemployment, which unfortunately was hurt by 
the Gulf crisis in 1990/1991. 
Jordan suffered adverse economic consequences from the 1990/1991 Gulf 
crisis. While tourist trade plummeted, the Gulf States' decision to limit 
economic ties with Jordan deprived it of worker remittances, traditional 
export markets, a secure supply of oil, and substantial foreign aid revenues. 
UN sanctions against Iraq-Jordan's largest pre-war trading partner - caused 
further hardships, including higher shipping costs due to inspections of 
cargo shipments entering the Gulf of Aqaba. Finally, absorbing up to 
300,000 returnees from the Gulf countries accelerated unemployment and 
strained the government's ability to provide essential services. 
Since 1995, economic growth has been low. Real GDP has grown at only 
1.5% annually; while the official unemployment has hovered at 14% 
(unofficial estimates are double this number). The budget deficit and public 
debt have remained high, yet during this period inflation has remained low, 
and exports of manufactured goods have risen at an annual rate of 9%. 
Monetary stability has been reinforced, even when tensions were renewed in 
the region during 1998 and during the illness and ultimate death of King 
Hussein in 1999 (U. S. Department of Estate 2002). 
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Expectations of increased trade and tourism because of Jordan's peace treaty 
with Israel have been disappointing. Security-related restrictions to trade 
with the West Bank and Gaza have led to a substantial decline in Jordan's 
exports there. Following his ascension, King Abdullah improved relations 
with Arab Gulf states and Syria, but this brought few economic benefits. 
Most recently, the Jordanians have focused on World Trading Organisation 
(WTO) membership and Free Trading Agreement with the U. S. as means to 
encourage export-led growth. 
In the following sub sections, however, macroeconomic indicators and other 
development measures will be explored in more detail taking into account 
the movements for each over the years after classifying the period under 
consideration. 
Most of the Jordanian economists divided the economic development of 
Jordan into five phases: 1948-1961; 1962-1966; 1967-1972; 1973-19852 and 
finally 1986 until the present time (2000). For our purposes, a more suitable 
classification is to examine the 1950-1967 period to serve as background for 
our much more detailed examination of the period 1968-1985 and the period 
1986 until recent year (2000). Within the period 1986-2000, the possible 
impact of IAS adopted in 1998 will be investigated by looking at the 
changes in macroeconomic indicators and Investment factors after the 
adoption date of IAS. 
2.4.1 The 1950 - 1967 Period 
Political and historical events joined hands with the paucity of resources to 
make Jordan dependent on more and more foreign resources ever since this 
state came into existence, which have formed the bulk of foreign resource 
inflow. 
2 This period often further is split into three sub periods; the 1973 - 1975 (the three years development plan), 1976-1980 (the five years development plan) and the 1981-1985 (the 
second five years plan for economic and social development). 
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Due to the involved political hazards, the alarm over the dependence of the 
government on foreign transfers has been being expressed since the early 
days of the state. Dispensing with these transfers has been consistently 
pronounced and ranked highly among the objectives of economic policy. 
In their book, Chenery and Syrquin (1975) studied the experience of a 
hundred and one countries over the 1950-1970 period. According to the 
Chenery-Syrquin Classification, Jordan was among the small-industry 
oriented countries. 
Exploring the available data for Jordan economy, one can notice the facts 
that during the period 1950-1967 Jordan experienced low gross saving and 
investment and also low government revenue 'see Table 2.2'. 
It is argued that during that period the private and government consumption 
as a percent of GDP were high reinforces the idea that there was no severe 
monetary policy to restrict consumption, and taxes were imposed for 
government revenue and not as a policy to restrict consumption or increase 
saving (Chenery and Syrquin 1975, P. 45). 
It has been reported that during the period 1954-1967 GDP at current prices 
grew by 6.9 annually. At the same time, inflation averaged around 2 percent 
annually and Real Per capita income increased by 4.4 percent during the 
same period. Agricultural income grew by 3.6% annually and industrial 
income grew by 14.2%. At the same time, income from services grew by 
9.1 % annually (Mustafa 1977; NPC 1975). 
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Table 2.2: Major Indicators of Growth and Economic Development in 
Jordan 1954 - 1967 
1954 - 1961 1962 - 1967 1954 - 1967 
period period period* 
Production and income 
annual growth rate (%): 
- GDP (current factor 11 8 6.9 
cost) 
- Real Per capita GDP 7 3 4.4 
- Agricultural income 2 6 3.6 
- Industrial income 13 15 14.2 
- Services income 12 5 9.1 
Relative share of main 
sectors in GDP (%): 
- Agriculture 22 21 21.5 
- Industry 13 16 14.5 
- Services 65 63 64 
Balance of payments 
variables as a% of GDP: 
- Import 45 41 43 
- Export 6 6 6 
- Trade deficit 39 35 37 
Foreign trade: 
- Import growth rate 11 10 10.5 
- Export growth rate 8 14 11 
- Distribution of imports 
by economic function 
N 
I. Consumer 71 63 67 
goods 
2. Intermediate 18 29 23.5 
goods and raw 
materials 
3. Capital goods 11 8 9.5 
Public finance: 
- Domestic revenues / 43 53 48 
Total revenues (%) 
- External revenues / 57 47 52 
Total revenues (%) 
- Direct taxes total 5 6 5.5 
revenues (%) 
* Calculating the average tkorn the other two columns has developed this 
column. 
Researcher calculations 
Source: Adopted from National Planning Council (NPC), Five Year Plan 
for economic and social development (1976 - 1980), PP. 13-25. 
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The above table shows the following facts regarding Jordan economy: 
1. Jordan's economy was at its first stages of development, i. e., Jordan's 
industries were in the stages of establishment, even though, the 
manufactured production increased at an average rate of 16% per 
year over the period 1962-1967 (NPC 1975, P. 10). Moreover, major 
conclusion that emerges from our discussion of Jordan's economic 
development so far is the dominance of the services sector. 
2. Total exports, as a percent of GDP was lower than the imports 
showing a deficit in trading balance over the period 1954-1967 
highlighting the facts that since the establishment of the country 
there was always a need for help from the outside world (regional or 
international) to support the country economy budget beside the 
support from Jordanian workers' remittances abroad especially in the 
Gulf estates. 
3. Jordan suffered from scarce of materials, heavy reliance on raw 
materials, and falling down of capital goods over the period 1954- 
1967 beside the fact that Jordan is a consuming and not a producing 
country emphasise the disparate need for foreign investment. 
National Planning Council (NPC) reported that fixed capital formation 
growth increased by 11.1% and constituted 14.7% of GDP at current prices. 
Government investment constituted the bulk of investment and the 
government invested in several infrastructure projects. Indeed, the 
construction sector was the main engine of growth during the 1954-1967 
period. Those projects financed by foreign borrowing and aid. Consumption 
during the same period grew by 14.7% annually from JD 53.1 million to JD 
188.8 million and constituted 111.5% of the GDP (NPC 1975). 
In conclusion, it can be said that over the period 1954-1967 there were an 
impressive valid economic growth attained prior to June 1967 Arab Israeli 
war when that growth dropped substantially as will be explored in the 
following section. 
2.4.2 The 1968-1985 Period 
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Growth rates during the period 1968-1972 dropped substantially as a result 
of the Arab - Israel War in 1967 and the civil war in 1970. Although GDP at 
market prices and GDP per capita steadily increased over this period except 
for the year 1970 as it is shown in Table 2.3, however, the increase in real 
terms was almost nil. Consequently, real per capita income declined by the 
rate of natural increase in population 5.2% 'see Table 2.3'. These 
consequences were results of loosing Jordan the contributions of the West 
Bank in GDP, estimated to have been 35 to 40 percent, as a result of the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967 beside the instability inside the country because of 
the civil war. As it is presented in Table 2.3, after the year 1972, available 
data shows that GDP at market price, for the East Bank rose from JI) 281 
million in 1672 to JD 435.9 million in 1975 making the growth rate 
averaged 13% per annum. GDP were steadily increasing over the period 
1976-1985 when it reached JD 2020.2 million at the end of the period. 
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Chapter Two 
That steady increment was mainly ascribed to a host of factors, especially the high 
levels of remittances from Jordanian workers, which increased from JD 7.4 
million in 1972 to JD 402.9 million in 1985 and also the export level which 
increased from JD 17 million in 1972 to JD 310.9 million in 1985 after the 
fluctuation during the period 1968-1971 as a consequence of the civil wa?. The 
inflation rate, moreover, increased from 6.9% in 1969 to 19.4% in 1974 reaching 
its peak, while it decreased continuously after 1974, except for the years 1977, 
1979 and 1980, to reach its lowest level 3% in 1985 'see Table 2.3'. Number of 
exogenous and endogenous factors like the stability in import prices, the drop in 
the rate of expansion of domestic liquidity in 1982,1983,1984 and 1985, and the 
lower growth of demand in 1984 and 1985 were regarded as the main factors 
behind the decline in the inflation rate (Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 
Different Issues). The main factors behind the high level of inflation experienced 
during the period 1973-1977,1979 and 1980, on the other hand, were traced to the 
low elasticity of domestic supply, the increase in purchasing power (the exchange 
rate % JD/$ were high during this period - 'see Table 2Y), thanks to the 
significant increase in Jordanian worker's remittances which started from 3.3 as a 
% of GNP in 1972,23.1 in 1977,25.8 in 1984 to 21.71 in 1985 (the end of the 
period concerned), and the high levels of import prices (CBJ, Annual Report, 
Different Issues). 
Abdulhak (1979, PP. 192-193) reported that gross domestic savings were negative 
during the period 1968-1985 growing negatively from JD-27.5 million in 1968 to 
JD-205.2 in 1985. The main reasons that contributed to increasing government 
and private consumption and decreasing gross domestic savings (or making it 
negative) were the political unsuitability in the region generally, and in the 
Kingdom specifically and the liberal imports policy, which encouraged 
consumption and discouraged savings. 
3 During the civil war 1970-1971 the development efforts disturbed and added more burden on 
JordaWs economy mainly because of not only the cut off aid by Arab states like Kuwait and Libya 
to the Jordanian government but also the cut off the trading with Jordan which reflected on 
decreasing levels of export 'see Table 2.4' as a result of Jordaifs actions against the Fedayecn. 
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By investigating the structure of production presented in Table 2.4, it can be seen 
that agricultural output as a percent of GDP (at market prices) fluctuated between 
10.6% and 7.9% during the period 1968-1980. such an output, however, where 
continuosly decreasing over the period 1981-1985 and reache its lowest in 1985 
by being only 5.5%. The industrial output (Construction, Manufacturing and 
Mining and Quarrying), however, as percent of GDP increased in continues 
manner from 22.8% in 1968 to 28.1% in 1984. 
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Chapter Two 
The industrial sector increased as a percent of GDP was mainly attributable to the 
expansion of phosphate production from 1.6 million tons in 1968 to 5.9 million 
tons in 1985. Another contributing factor to that increase was the growth in other 
activities like potash cement as a direct result of Jordan's industry-oriented 
policies (CBJ, Annual Report, and Different Issues). Table 2.5 shows the increase 
in the principal industries for Jordan. 
Table 2.5: Industrial Production of Principal Industries (In Thousand 
Tons)1968 -2000 
Year Phosphate Cement Potash Fertilizer Chemical 
Acids 
1968 1590.9 357.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1969 1078.3 480.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1970 938.9 377.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1971 640.0 418.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1972 709.0 661.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1973 1080.9 616.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1974 1674.8 614.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1975 1352.5 598.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1976 1701.8 582.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1977 1771.1 587.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1978 2302.7 553.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1979 2845.5 623.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1980 3906.8 912.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1981 4243.7 964.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1982 4390.7 788.4 15.1 116.4 0.0 
1983 4748.5 1269.0 282.8 301.6 632.5 
1984 6262.0 2026.3 486.9 541.0 1194.6 
1985 5918.8 2022.9 908.6 510.5 1007.6 
1986 6249.2 551.1 1103.7 551.1 1024.8 
1987 6801.0 604.0 1203.4 604.0 1103.2 
1988 5668.2 615.8 
1 
1309.6 
1 
615.8 1157.0 
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Table 2.5: Industrial Production of Principal Industries (In Thousand 
Tons)1968 -2000 
Year Phosphate Cement Potash Fertilizer Chemical 
Acids 
1989 6928.7 602.7 1320.4 602.7 1169.5 
1990 6082.2 595.8 1402.7 595.8 1135.5 
1991 4934.4 602.1 1364.1 602.1 1299.7 
1992 5270.8 553.6 1346.0 553.6 1110.3 
1993 4282.6 469.9 1370.1 469.9 848.8 
1994 4216.5 749.7 1550.3 749.7 1381.5 
1995 4983.9 729.3 1780.0 729.3 1337.5 
1996 5355.1 3512.2 1765.5 670.7 1262.3 
1997 5895.6 3250.5 1415.6 711.2 1369.1 
1998 5924.6 2650.3 1526.9 849.6 1712.2 
1999 6013.6 2687.0 1800.2 813.5 1688.6 
2000 5506.1 2639.9 1936.3 619.5 1684.0 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan. Yearly Statistical Series (1968 - 2-UUU), 
Department of Research and Studies, Amman, Jordan. 
The increase in the share of industry sector in GDP, however, was accompanied 
by a slight fall in the share of service sector (Trade, Restaurants and Hotels; 
Transport, Storage and Communications; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services; Producers of Government Services; and Other Services), which 
decreased from 66.6% in 1968 to 66.5% in 1985 keeping the structure of the 
economy is dominated by service-related activities 'see Table 2.4'. It has to be 
remembered, however, that these limited principal industries are finite resources 
which emphasise the fact that attracting foreign investments to invest in different 
sectors is an important issue for developing the economy as improving these 
industries to increase its participation as a percent of GDP, which basically 
highlight the need for adopting the IAS in a country like Jordan. 
To confirm the fact that Jordanian economy is not fully independent and it is 
relying heavily on foreign national and international aid as a consequence of the 
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huge trade deficit, Table 2.6 shows structure of trade over the period 1968-1985. 
As it is presented in the table, the total imports as a percent of GDP increased 
significantly from 28.7 in 1968 to 53.2% in 1985 which can be explained by a host 
of factors like the demonstration effect on consumption goods imports and the 
lack of a restrictive trade policy (Kandah 1987, P. 25). The total export as a percent 
of GDP increased slightly from 7.09 in 1968 to 15.39 in 1985 where the total 
import as a percent of GDP increased dramatically from 28.7 in 1968 to 53.2 in 
1985, however, made the balance between both sides of the trade structure 
unacceptable. 
Table 2.6: Structure of Trade 1968 - 1985 
Year GDP at Market 
Prices 
(In Million JD) 
Export as a% 
of GDP 
Import as a% 
of GDP 
1968 200.4 7.09 28.7 
1969 249.6 5.93 27.1 
1970 228.4 5.35 28.9 
1971 242.2 4.71 31.6 
1972 281.6 6.04 33.8 
1973 310.1 6.13 34.9 
1974 385.7 12.91 40.9 
1975 435.9 11.22 53.7 
1976 547.4 12.68 62.1 
1977 676.4 12.14 67.2 
1978 779.3 11.66 58.9 
1979 981.0 12.32 59.7 
1980 1180.3 14.54 60.7 
1981 1469.3 16.51 71.3 
1982 1701.1 15.55 67.2 
1983 1828.7 11.52 60.3 
1984 1981.4 18.67 54.1 
1985 2020.2 15.39 53.2 
6ource: uentrai isanK ot Jordan. Yearly and Monthly Statistical Series 
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Table 2.6: Structure of Trade 1968 - 1985 
Year GDP at Market Export as a% Import as a% 
Prices of GDP of GDP 
(In Million JD) 
(1968 - 1985), Department of Research and Studies, Amman, Jordan. 
Department of Statistics (DOS), Different Issues, Amman, Jordan. 
As it is shown in Table 2.6, it could be argued that Jordan can be considered as a 
poor and small developing country which means heavy reliance on imports and as 
a consequence a high degree of reliance on foreign aid in the forms of grant and 
loans. Table 2.7 shows the foreign aid over the years 1968-1983. 
Table 2.7: Foreign Loans and Grants 1925 - 1983 
Year Foreign Loans and Grants (Million JD) 
1925 - 
1934 0.6204 
1944 15.4536 
1956 85.8126 
1959 155.6358 
1963 140.0694 
1966 189.504 
1968 385.212 
1971 358.422 
1974 713.434 
1977 1675.365 
1980 3152.292 
1983 2078.28 
Source: Konikoff, A., Transjordan: an economic survey, Jerusalem, 
1946, P. 95. 
Ministry of Planning, Amman, Jordan. 
As it can be seen from Table 2.7 foreign support has been a basic characteristic of 
the Jordanian economy since the early days of the establishment of the country. It 
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is worth to mention, moreover, that Jordan has been receiving such a foreign aid 
mainly because of political and social developments in the Middle East. Such aids 
could be considered as a significant resource for funding the trade imbalance 
presented earlier in Table 2.3. The establishment of Israel in 1948 and the June 
1967 war, however, both resulted in two influxes of Palestinian refugees, which 
amounted to 350,000 and 224,000 respectively. Through the willingness of some 
donors to help Jordan provide the basic needs of refugees on one hand and on the 
other had to defend itself in an area that witnessed four major wars in less than 
three decades, Jordan has been receiving relatively large amounts of foreign aid. 
2.4.3 The 1986-2000 Period 
In the second half of 1980s, as the region entered into a recession due to the fall in 
oil prices, decline in worker's remittances and foreign aid, Jordan faced a severe 
drop in GDP growth rate below the rate of population growth as it is presented in 
Table 2.8 below. This led to a drop in the standard of living and worsened the 
unemployment problem. The economic problems critically deepen to the first half 
of the 1990s as a result of the Gulf war in 1990/1991 because of the occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq which caused remarkable economic difficulties for the country 
since Jordanian economy as discussed earlier relying heavily on Iraq and those 
Gulf Estates. Hundreds of thousands of Jordanian and Palestinian workers who 
left Kuwait and other Gulf Estates as a result of the occupation for political 
reasons which put significant pressure on the public services in the country and 
rising up the trade imbalance, unemployment rate and population growth to reach 
its peaks 'see Table 2.8'. 
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Although the foreign exchange earnings declined substantially, government kept 
on the level of public expenditures. This was financed by foreign borrowing on 
both commercial and professional basis, which led to accumulation of external 
debt burden higher than the ability of the economy to service that debt over the 
period 1988-1993 which was behind the 1988 crisis when Jordan suspended its 
debt service. Consequently the authorities initiated corrective macroeconomic 
policies including a large devaluation of Jordanian Dinar, as a result of that, 
inflation started to accelerate reaching its peak (25.6%) in 1989,16.2 in 1990 and 
8.2% in 1991 which could be considered as the highest inflation rates in Jordan 
economic history. To tackle the internal and external imbalance, the government 
adopted in 1989 an economic adjustment program supported by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank which resulted, in some initial 
progress, in major economic indicators 'see Table 2.8'. 
During that period, therefore, per capita income decreased and unemployment 
augmented. There developments negatively affected the Jordanian economy 
performance, which let the government to adopt economic adjustment program 
(1992-1995) for achieving a significant reduction in macroeconomics imbalance, 
satisfactory growth performance in terms of GDP with an increased role for the 
private sector in the economy. It has to be noted, however, that the remarkable 
increase in GDP growth rate in 1992 was a reflection of the investment for the 
more than 300,000 of Jordanians working abroad in the Gulf countries who invest 
mostly in the construction sector causing that deceivable significant jump in the 
GDP growth rate. Looking at the remarkable decrease in the GDP growth rate for 
the years afterward, this fact can be recognized 'see Table 2.8'. 
The performance of Jord&s economy under that program during the period 1992- 
1995 showed a significant improvement. With regard to GDP, it showed an 
average yearly growth rate 8.35 percent at market prices, inflation has declined to 
an average of 3.3 percent during the same period, deficit declined substantially, 
and the exchange rate of Jordan's Dinar maintained at its level 'see Table 2.8'. 
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For the period 1996 until 2000, which is an important period for this study to 
explore since the adoption of IAS was in September 1998, however, Table 2.9 
shows the movement for the macroeconomic indicators over the years 1996-2000. 
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Chapter Two 
The ongoing adjustment program had to be replaced by a new one covering the 
period 1992-1997. Generally speaking, the results were again positive 'see Table 
2.9'. GDP growth decreased significantly from 6.4% in 1995 to only 1.8% in 
1996., however, was mainly as a result of the recessionary policy followed by the 
Jordanian government by bringing down the government expenditure on the 
recommendation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
GDP growth, however, was ranging between 1.8% and 3.9% over the period 
1996-2000 at constant prices. Above these growth rates had been targeted in 
agreement with the IMF, but expectations had not been met since 1996 due to the 
setbacks in the peace process with Israel. There was feeling that time assumption 
the peace agreement will establish cooperative countries in the Middle East region 
for investments toward positively developing their economies and increasing the 
standards of living for their people, which indeed has not been achieved. 
According to the above table, inflation has been volatile, ranging between 0.7% 
and 6.5% a year during the period 1996-2000. The current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP, however, has been steadily improving. In 1996 imports were 
mainly high intermediary and capital goods. The high growth in imports in 2000 
is a reflection of the continuing high rate at which the industrial sector in 
particular is expanding. 
Regarding the sector participation developments, investigating the structure of 
production presented in Table 2.10, it can be seen that agricultural output as a 
percent of GDP (at market prices) decreased from 6.3% in 1986 to only 3.2% in 
1998 (the lowest in Jordan history). 
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Chapter Two 
The industrial output (Construction, Manufacturing and Mining and Quarrying), 
however, as percent of GDP fluctuated ranging between 19.1% to 29.5% as a 
consequence of the fluctuation in the main resources produced by the country 
presented in Table 2.5 over the same period leaving the service sector leading in 
terms of percent of GDP as it is shown in the above table. 
In summary, it can be argued that adopting IAS in Jordan starting from September 
1998 has not shown any significant changes in terms of macroeconomic 
indicators. It was expected to see considerable decrease in trade imbalance, 
unemployment rate and outstanding foreign debt to GDP as a percent. On the 
other hand, it was expected to see jump up in other macroeconomic indicators 
such as GDP and GDP per capita. These result, however, is not surprising to some 
extent for two reasons: first, the adoption of IAS started only two years ago 
(September 1998) which could be considered as not that long time to influence 
significantly macroeconomic indicators in Jordan as a consequence of creating 
more stable and less risky environment attracting foreign investment. Secondly, 
the Middle East region is one of the instable environments in the world suffering 
from continuous conflict between Palestinian and Israelis, almost half of the 
population in Jordan are originally from Palestine and also the block aid on Iraq 
since the Gulf war in 1990/1991 has created extremely difficult economic 
situation to overcome for a country like Jordan has not that much natural resources 
and relying economically heavily on its neighbors such as Iraq who is one of the 
biggest trade partner for the count . But, not 
being able to see that 
macroeconomic indicators have been change significantly as a result of adopting 
the IAS might not be the case when it comes to test other factors determined as the 
objectives of this study such as extent of disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic 
4 It has been argued by the well-known economic writer Fahid Al-Fanik in Al-Ra'l Daily Jordanian 
Newspaper on 29.10.2002 that any another possible war against Iraq, as it has been encouraged 
badly nowadays by the USA, will create a 25% estimated loss of Jordanian GDP. This estimation 
showing how much the Jordanian economy is still heavily linked and influenced by the economical 
and political situation in Iraq. 
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risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital and share price volatility which will be 
explored in Chapter six and Seven. 
2.5 Economic Strategy, Policies and Globalisation 
At the turn of the decade, following the near collapse of its economy, Jordan was 
forced to re-examine its policies and to redirect its development strategies. The 
country was struggling with economic and financial crisis and traditional remedies 
were proving to be ineffective. Jordan, therefore, stood at a critical crossroad. In 
response, the country chose to accelerate the liberalisation of its economy, and 
actively worked at enhancing its competitiveness within the regional and global 
context. In pursuit of this goal, Jordan removed, largely, the structural imbalances 
of the economy. Remarkable progress was achieved toward opening the economy 
through regional and global free trade, harmonising legislation to facilitate the free 
flow of capital, stabilising the monetary indicators to reassure investors, and 
creating attractive conditions for investment and business opportunities. 
In the belief that an efficient regulatory framework stimulates the role of the 
private sector, Jordan has recognised the need to establish business-friendly 
structures with strong emphasis on supporting entrepreneurial initiative for 
creating sustainable economic growth. With the establishment of the Investment 
Promotion Law No. 16 of 1995, and with other subsequent actions designed to 
enhance the investment environment, Jordan has opened its economy to the wealth 
and prosperity business and investment should bring. The Investment Promotion 
Law grants generous and attractive incentives to domestic as well as international 
investors in terms of. freedom from customs duties, tax holidays, income tax 
exemptions and unrestricted transfer of capital and profits. The implementation of 
this law is vested in the Jordan Investment Board (JIB), which is the only national 
entity responsible for promoting and facilitating investment in Jordan. The law 
irrevocably affirms that both Jordanian and non-Jordanian investors are treated 
equally. The JIB is responsible for marketing Jordan internationally, creating 
linkages between national and foreign companies through joint ventures, assisting 
investors at all stages of the investment cycle, and acting as a contact or liaison 
between investors and other government bodies whose services are needed by the 
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investor. The most salient features of the Investment Promotion Law No. 16 of 
1995 and its amendments for the year 2000, however, are: 
1. The law affords incentives to the sectors Industry, Agriculture, Hotels, 
Hospitals, and Maritime Transport and Railways. 
2. The Kingdom, by virtue of Regulations for Investment Sectors and Zones 
No. 2 of 1996, is divided into three zones: A, B and C, depending on the 
degree of economic development. Locating a project in each such zone 
grants specia incentives. 
3. Projects enjoy a ten-year exemption from income and social services taxes 
at the following rates depending on the area in which the project is located: 
a. Projects in zone A 25% 
b. Projects in zone B 50% 
c. Projects in zone C 75% 
4. Where a project is expanded, improved or modernised so as to increase the 
production capacity it shall receive an additional year for every increase of 
production which is not less than 25% for a maximum of four years. 
5. All projects encompassed by the law enjoy the following exemptions from 
taxes and fees: 
a. Fixed assets required for the project are exempted from taxes and 
fees. 
b. Fixed assets needed for expanding, modernising, or developing 
projects are exempted from taxes and fees if this results in an 
increase of a minimum of 25% of the production capacity. 
c. Spare parts imported for the project are exempted from taxes and 
fees provided that their value does not exceed 15% of the total 
value of the fixed assets utilising these spares. 
6. The Investment Law irrevocably affirms that non-Jordanian investors shall 
be afforded equal treatment as Jordanian Investors. Non-Jordanian 
investors may acquire all or any part of any "economic activity" in the 
Kingdom. However, they may not own more than 50% of any project in 
the following sectors: Construction and contracting, Land and air transport, 
Trading and trade services, Banking and insurance, Telecommunications, 
Metallurgy and Agricultural products. 
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7. Minimum amount of non-Jordanian investment in any project is set at JD 
100,000, which has to be transferred into the Kingdom in a convertible 
currency prior to the completion of the ownership registration (Conversion 
rate JD I= US$ 0.7). 
8. Investment in the Amman Financial Market was regulated in the 
Investment Law separately. Non-Jordanian investors may purchase 
securities listed on the Amman Financial Market in Jordanian currency 
provided that it has been converted from a convertible foreign currency. 
The non-Jordanian ownership in a public shareholding company may not 
exceed 50%, unless the percentage of the non-Jordanian ownership ratio 
was more than 50% at the time of closing of subscription to the shares of 
the public shareholding company, in which case the maximum limit for 
non-Jordanian ownership shall be fixed at that percentage. The minimum 
amount that may be invested by a non-Jordanian in the Amman Financial 
Market is set at JD 1,000 (Conversion rate JD I= US$ 0.7). 
The Investment Promotion Law no. 16 of 1995 as it is amended in 2000 
established a council named "The Higher Council for Investment Promotion". The 
council chaired by the Prime Minister, and with the membership of. Minister 
of Industry & Trade (Deputy Chairman), Minister of Finance, Minister of 
Planning, Minister of Tourism, Minister of Transport, Governor of the Central 
Bank, Director General (Reporter), Chairman of the Union of Jordanian Chambers 
of Commerce, Chairman of Amman Chamber of Industry, Three competent and 
experienced persons from the private sector appointed by the Chairman for two 
renewable years. The main objectives of the Council as it is stated by the Law are 
that to create a suitable environment for investment in order to achieve the 
comprehensive development goals, and for that the Council has the authority to 
assume the following responsibilities: 
1. Approving National Strategy for Investment including the development of 
production sectors, developing and following-up its implementation. 
2. Approving the investment policies. 
3. Approving the Investment Promotion Policy, and following-up its 
implementation. 
4. Reviewing the investment regulations. 
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Finally, According to the provisions of this law, a corporation named "The Jordan 
Investment Board (JIB)" has been established which enjoys a legal personality 
with financial and administrative independence. The aim of JIB is promoting 
investment in the Kingdom, by carrying out the following: 
1. Enhancing confidence in the investment environment, identifying 
investment opportunities, promoting these opportunities and motivating 
investment therein. 
2. Simplifying the registration and licensing procedures of investment 
projects, following up existing Projects, and giving them priority in 
finalisation of applications at official authorities. 
3. Establishing an investment window at the JIB, which shall undertake 
licensing investment projects and obtaining approvals on such projects 
from other authorities pursuant to the legislation in force. 
4. Giving advice, providing available information and data for investors and 
issuing related guides. 
5. Setting and implementing investment promotion programs to attract 
investors to the Kingdom. 
As a result of this effort, it can be concluded that much progress has been made 
since 1995, and Jordan finds itself today among the more attractive investment 
sites in the Middle East. A recent study by the Stanford Research International 
(SRI) which was previously named as Stanford Research Institute, for example, 
stated that, 
"Jordan's overall score in the commercial policy matrix is 77yo, the 
highest in the Region, which represents an attractive and 'Business 
Friendly'policy environment. " 
Jordan continues to surpass its neighbors in rankings by other international 
authorities as well. A recent study carried out by the Heritage Foundation, 
published in the Wall Street Journal, places Jordan ahead of its keen competitors, 
Egypt and Israel, in its 'Index of Economic Freedom. ' The World Economic 
Forum Global Competitiveness Report 1999 ranks Jordan first in the region ahead 
of Israel and Egypt in economic growth projections 2000-2008 and second in the 
region in terms of competitiveness. It was reported; moreover, by Suha Ma! ayeh 
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on 7h January 2001 in Jordan Times Newspaper that Investment Promotion Law 
attracted investments was amounting. Total investments in projects that enjoyed a 
special package of exemptions and incentives last year from the Investment 
Promotion Law amounted to JD800 million, up from JD584 million in 1999, 
according to a speech for Jordan Investment Board (JIB) director general Reem 
Badran. Speaking at a luncheon organised by the Jordanian-Scandinavia Business 
Club, Badran said that the JIB strategy for this year would give priority to 
investment projects in the field of pharmaceuticals, information technology and 
tourism for European countries. The director said that enforcing intellectual 
property rights legislation as Jordan joined the World Trade Organisation and 
signing the Free Trade Agreement with the US last year are an attraction for 
potential investors. Moreover, promoting investments in textiles will target the US 
and the Far East. She added, through the country's five designated Qualified 
industrial Zones (QlZs), goods enjoy duty and quota free access to the US market, 
after meeting certain criteria. 
As a consequence of structural and legislative adjustments, the economy grew in 
real terms by an average of 4.7 percent since 1990. Inflation was checked to 
around 3 percent and the exchange rate of the Jordanian Dinar remained stable. 
However, the Jordanian economy took a sharp downward turn toward the end of 
the 1990s. Recession conditions beside population growth high rate especially in 
1990 and 1991 'see Table 2.1' caused low level of per capita income. 
Unemployment grew to unprecedented levels, poverty became deeper and more 
widespread, and the inequality of wealth broadened substantially 'see Tables 2.7 
and 2.8'. 
It can be seen nowadays that regional tensions continued to slow down the rate of 
economic growth. The tension comes from various reasons; the sanctions on Iraq, 
the setback in the peace process, and the fluctuating of oil prices. This situation 
has significantly influenced Jordan toward devising new appropriate economic 
strategy and policies that are able to overcome regional circumstances, or work 
within them, and look for inner circumstances that will lead to sustainable 
economic growth. It is worth mentioning; therefore, that the economic policies 
implemented during the past few years have attempted to break the regional 
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restrains on the economic growth rates. Jordan economic policies have 
concentrated on developing the Information Technology and Communications 
Sectors, encourage foreign investment in any way, and penetrating the global 
markets. Additionally, Jordan has undertaken serious measures in this regard and 
declared Aqaba a special economic zone as of 15/2/2001. Moreover, Jordan has 
signed several agreements that serve to integrate itself in the global economy, and 
guarantee the opening of markets for Jordanian goods in exchange for the opening 
of local markets for foreign goods. Table 2.11 shows the agreements signed during 
the last four years (1997/ 2000) for achieving Jordanian new strategy toward the 
integration with the outside world. 
Tnhh- 7-11! Thp Acrrppmpntc cioned nver the vears 1997-2000 
Agreements Date Implementation Comments 
Signed 
The Arab free trade 19/2/1997 1/1/1998 Free trade with the 
agreement Arab Countries 
throughout the 10- 
year duration of the 
agreement 
The Jordan-USA 1/7/1997 1/7/1997 Encouragement and 
bilateral investment reciprocal protection 
treaty of investments and 
economic co- 
operation. 
The Euro- 1/11/1997 I/l/2000 Free trade zone by 
Mediterranean 2010 and strengthen 
agreement joint co-operation 
between EU 
members and the 
Mediterranean 
countries. 
The agreement of 16/11/1997 16/11/1997 Free trade with the 
establishing the USA within the QIZ 
Qualified Industrial (one- way trade). 
Zones (QlZs) in 
Jordan 
The Jordanian 24/11/1997 1/1/1999 Free trade with the 
European joint European Union 
partnership throughout the 12- 
year duration of the 
agreement. 
The World Trade 17/12/1999 11/4/2000 This agreement 
Organisation (WTO) permits retaining a 
maximum of 20%- 
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Table 2.11: The Agreements signed over the venr.. -z 1907-7fifif) 
Agreements Date 
Signed 
Implementation Comments 
30% Customs Fees 
throughout the 10- 
year duration of the 
agreement. 
The Free Trade 30/9/2001 Free trade with the 
Agreement (FTA) USA throughout the 
with the USA I 0-year duration of 
the agreement. 
Source: Jordan investment board, Different issues, 2000. 
Exploring the role for the Jordanian public and private sectors, it can be said that 
the later one still has a very secondary role. Despite the importance of the 
measures taken in the scope of encouraging foreign investments by signing several 
agreements that serve to integrate the Jordanian economy in the Global economy, 
or the establishment of a special economic zone in Aqaba, the challenges facing 
the Jordanian economy compel it to motivate the private sector and allow it to 
contribute to the efforts aimed at achieving economic growth. This falls within 
the Goverment focus on redistributing roles that serve to give the private sector a 
leading role in the economic activity, leaving the Government to tend to all its 
main duties like planning policies, supervision and organisation, development of 
social services, and protecting the environment, among others. Table 2.12 shows 
the new Jordanian strategy toward the private sector in developing the country 
economy through the privatisation effort. 
Table 2.12: Privatisation: Enternrises Privatised 
Enterprise Privatisation Privatisation Buyer/ Tenant/ 
Date Procedure Operator 
Jordan 2000 40% of its Consortium 
Telecommunications Co. shares were (France 
(JTC) sold Telecom/ Arab 
Bank) 
Aqaba Railway 2000 Leased Consortium 
Corporation (ARC) (Raytheon/ 
Wisconsin 
Central) 
Jordan Cement Factories 1998 33% of its Lafarge (French 
(JCF) shares were Company) 
sold 
Jordan Tourism and Spa . 
1998 Leased Consortiu 
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Table 2.12: Privatisation: Enternrises Privatised 
Enterprise Privatisation Privatisation Buyer/ Tenant/ 
Date Procedure Operator 
Co. (Accor/ 
II I I 
Ghandoor) 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Jordan: economic overview, Amman, Jordan, 
2000. 
As it can be recognised from Table 2.12 in order to liberate the national economy 
and increase the flow of foreign capital, the goverment of Jordan has initiated a 
privatisation program designed to activate the role and efficiency of private sectors 
in the long term development plans of the kingdom. In 1996, the 
Telecommunication corporation and the Jordanian electricity authority were both 
transformed into public shareholding companies fully owned by the government 
as a first step towards full privatisation. By the end of 1997, the govermnent has 
sold off all its other holdings in companies where the original stake was 5% or 
less. The government also divested itself of its more strategic industries, 
beginning with a 40% stake in the Jordan Telecommunication Company, and a 
33% share in the Jordan Cement Company. 40% of state-owned Aqaba Railways 
has been soled to a consortium of American, Japanese and Jordanian companies. 
Plans are now underway to sell off significant stakes in Royal Jordanian Airlines, 
Public Transport Corporation, The National Electric Power Company (NEPCO), 
Post Sector, Free Zones Corporation, Ports Corporation Aqaba, and Water 
Authority of Jordan. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that due to the fact that most Jordanian companies 
are small or mid-size and are currently incapable of competing in the foreign 
market and benefiting from the agreements mentioned in Table 2.11 because of 
shipping fees or because of the quality of their products and services which are 
below the global acceptable level, Jordanian companies should seriously consider 
merging, especially similar industries in order to be able to become more 
progressive and more technologically advanced and therefore for being more 
competitive. In addition, developing these companies can be achieved by 
attracting foreign investors to invest heavily bringing with them the entire feature 
required for being successful on the global economic scale. In order to achieve 
this strategy, not only the Jordanian Government but also the economic 
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institutions such as Amman Stock Exchange have started developing their 
regulations for making the new economic strategy and policies applicable in a 
region missing badly the political and social stability, which will be explored in 
more details in the following chapter. 
To sum up, it has to be said that adopting the IAS in Jordan starting from 1998 
could be considered as part of a package of reforms to stimulate the economy 
through privatisation and investment which has not shown, to some extent, any 
significant changes according to the macroeconomic indicators investigated. This 
is not a surprising result, which will be investigated on the microeconornic level in 
Chapter Six and Seven, since political and social stability is missed badly in the 
entire Middle East region as it is explored previously. 
2.6 Amman Stock Exchange 
The stock markets make only one part of the capital market in any economy. 
Increasingly the role of stock markets has become greater in mobilising savings 
into the capital information and growth of economics. Thus, attention is being 
increasingly given by analysts to these financial intermediaries in an attempt to 
understand the conditions that best render these markets as effective and efficient 
as possible. 
Capital markets embrace all financial institutions that deal with capital, both in the 
short and long term (Patric and Wai 1973); while stock markets, are those markets 
where companies sell stocks in order to generate long term capital that can be 
channeled into their profitable operations. When stocks are issued (sold), no 
redemption date is specified: buyers either hold on to their stocks for future 
dividend pay-outs, or exercise their right of selling their holdings at a very small 
transaction cost holing for capital gains due to price appreciation. Thus, stock 
markets are, in essence, long term capital markets. However, the importance of 
security markets stems not only from them being markets of long-term capital but 
also from their allocated efficiency of funds (Dryden 1970; Fama 1970). 
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Drake (1977) addresses the issue of the importance of stock markets by indicating 
that a stock market is worthwhile if it increases real saving, "increases net capital 
inflow from abroad", increases the return on investment and decreases the cost of 
equity in that economy. Patric and Wai (1973) argued, however, that what is more 
important than the rate of savings is the allocating efficiently of capital markets. 
They added that stock markets might induce people to invest in these markets 
while channeling such investments to genuinely unprofitable projects. In short, 
they argued that it is quite possible for a stock market to increase the savings rate 
in a country while at the same time giving inaccurate signals for resource 
allocations. It could be argued, however, that both aspects; rate of savings and 
efficient allocation of capital are quite important and goes together since investors 
won't invest in a stock market they do not have confidence in by being efficient 
and therefore transparency is vital in such situation. Moreover, increase savings 
rate in a country while at the same time giving inaccurate signals for resources 
allocation won't be permanent on the long run. 
Nevertheless, in their basic form, stock markets are financial intermediaries that 
definitely assist lenders and borrowers of funds to meet conveniently and cheaply. 
This function on its own identifies stock markets as an extremely important 
financial venue in any economy. Following from this, it's also argued that stock 
markets are markets for liquidity (Firth 1980). 
Whatever the reason might be behind the establishment of a particular stock 
market, stock markets have many advantages and vital contributions to any 
nation's capital market. Opening up family businesses, broadening the range of 
financial instruments that is available to investors and reducing the cost of 
financing are just some of these advantages (Drake 1977). 
Nonetheless, for stock markets to be more effective in fulfilling their roles of 
efficient allocation of funds and the expansion of the national growth rate, various 
conditions of operational efficiency are expected to be satisfied. One of these 
conditions is the suitability of the political and the legal environment within which 
capital markets operate (Mullin 1996). 
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The legal environment, on the other hand, is of crucial importance of the well 
being of a stock market, since in the absence of legal regulations the market will 
most certainly be a power struggle and small investors, who have low power in the 
absence of legal regulations, will be the victims of the resulting conflict. Such a 
situation will force those who have less power to leave the stock market. 
Consequently, the stock market won't be efficient and effective in achieving its 
objectives. Information disclosure requirements imposed on companies listed on a 
specific stock market is one example of such legal requirements, without which 
the very existence of stock markets will be jeopardized (Mahon 1965; Scott 1968; 
Staking and Schulz 1999). 
An immediate outcome of conflicting influences on stock market is the prevalence 
of higher levels of risk associated with trading in such a market. This higher level 
of risk leads investors to demand higher rates of returns from their investments, 
since the conventional financial axiom is that the higher the risk the higher is the 
expected return (the cost of equity capital). 
In Jordan, however, Public shareholding companies were set up and their shares 
were traded in, long before the setting up of the Jordanian Securities Market. In 
the early thirties, the Jordanian public already subscribed to and traded in shares; 
the Arab Bank was the first public shareholding company to be established in 
Jordan in 1930, followed by Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes in 1931, Jordan 
Electric Power in 193 8, and Jordan Cement Factories in 195 1. The first corporate 
bonds were issued in the early sixties. As a result, an unorganised securities 
market has emerged in the form of non specialised offices. This prompted the 
government to contemplate the idea of setting up a market to regulate issuance of 
and dealing in securities, in a manner that would ensure safe, speedy and easy 
trading, and protect small savers, through a mechanism that would define a fair 
price based on supply and demand. Successive economic plans called for the 
establishment of such a market, and various parties started to prepare, with the 
government's support, for setting up an organised securities market. In 1975 and 
1976, the Central Bank conducted intensive studies, in cooperation with the World 
Bank's International Finance Corporation QFC), and it became clear therefore that 
the size of the national economy and the share of the private sector in it through 
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public shareholding companies and its broad investor base justified such a step. 
Such a market was perceived as a creator of and caterer for much needed 
opportunities for economic growth, which would stimulate and spurt economic 
activity. These joint efforts bore their fruit, and Temporary Law No. 31 of the year 
1976 was promulgating, and what was known as Amman Financial Market was 
consequently established. A Cabinet resolution of March 16,1977 set up an AFM 
Administration Committee, which immediately went into action; and operation on 
AFM started on the I st of January, 1978. 
The Law laid out the objectives of AFM as follows: to mobilise savings by 
encouraging investment in securities; thereby channeling savings to serve the 
interests of the national economy; to regulate issuance of and dealing in securities 
in a manner that would ensure the soundness, ease and speed of transactions; to 
safeguard national financial interests and to protect small savers; and to provide 
the necessary data and statistics to achieve AFM objectives. As of its inception, 
AFM therefore, was entrusted with a dual task, namely the role of a Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the role of a traditional Stock Exchange. 
The market operates a price limit policy, which necessarily means that stock prices 
should not go above or below a pre-specified limit within one day. This limit is 
expressed as a percentage of the opening price of the stock, which is currently (in 
2000) 5%. The reason behind having such a price limit is, as viewed by the 
Director General of the market, to prevent large price fluctuations in addition to 
eliminating unnecessary speculation and protecting the interests of the small 
savers (Toulcan 1996). 
Amman Financial Market classified the listed companies into four sectors, 
Banking, Insurance, Services and Industrial. As pointed out in the market law, the 
market is open to international investors and there are no barriers to entry or exit 
from the market, however, foreign investors are not allowed to own more than 
49% of any company's stock. However, capital gains and dividends belonging to 
foreigners can be remitted outside the country without any restrictions provided 
that this capital has originated from abroad. 
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It is argued that economic development means a continuing rise in the tempo of 
economic activity, which inevitably brings in its wake an increased demand for, 
and supply of capital, waiting to be channeled through a stock exchange. In 
Jordan, the stock exchange organisation and all the development processes in 
action have an unfavorable public image and they have failed to win the complete 
confidence. It is well to recognise that in Jordan stock exchange had evolved in 
the past more like private clubs catering to the needs of its members only, and not 
as a public institutions functioning in the wider public interests. As a result, the 
stock exchange still remains an institution in which only a microscopic section of 
the country is interested. Inadequate disclosure practices by Jordanian companies 
listed in the stock market and, consequently, more speculative activities in the 
securities market might explain the lack of public interest to some extent. 
As a consequence, Jordanian government adopted a comprehensive capital market 
reforming policy, which aimed at building on the previous experience, boosting 
the private sector, expanding and diversifying the national economy, and 
improving regulation of the securities market to reach international standards. 
Among the most important features of the new orientation were institutional 
changes in the capital market, use of international electronic trading, settlement 
and clearance systems, elimination of obstacles to investment, and strengthening 
capital market supervision to reach optimum transparency and safe trading in 
securities, in line with globalisation and openness to the external world. In 1997, 
therefore, a new securities law was enacted to reflect the development of systems 
and the sophistication of new products and participants. The enactment of the 
Temporary Securities Law, No. 23 of the year 1997, was a landmark; indeed, it 
was a qualitative leap and a turning point for the Jordanian capital market. Its aim 
was to restructure and regulate the Jordanian capital market, and to complete its 
infrastructure in consistency with international standards, in order to secure 
transparency and safe trading in securities (The financial market observes 
international standards of fair practice in the orderly transaction conduct of the 
market). The Law provided for setting up three new institutions to replace AIM, 
namely: 
1. Jordan Securities Commission (JSQ: It has financial and administrative 
autonomy, and is directly attached to the Prime Minister, which would 
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enhance it future role, and would enable it to effectively assume its 
supervisory role over the capital market. It has a Board of Commissioners, 
composed of five full-time members, which is entrusted with the following 
functions: drawing up draft laws and regulations on securities; approving 
the by-laws and regulations of the SDC and ASE; granting licenses issued 
under the Law; setting limits for commissions of financial services 
companies and members of the SDC; and adopting accounting and 
auditing standards for the organs falling under its supervision as well as 
standards for their qualified auditors. 
2. Amman Stock Exchange (ASE): It is a non profit legal entity, with financial 
and administrative autonomy, and it is the only party authorised to act as 
an organised market for trading in securities in the Kingdom. Its 
membership is made up of financial brokers, and it is managed by the 
private sector. 
3. Securities Depositary Commission (SDQ: was established on May 10, 
1999 with the aim of ensuring safe custody of ownership of securities; 
registering and transferring ownership of securities traded on ASE; and 
settling the prices of securities among brokers. It is a non profit legal 
entity, with financial and administrative autonomy, and is managed by the 
private sector. 
The Amman Stock Exchange has three separate tiers of stocks that are traded. 
The three-tier system was established, so that an investor can readily know the 
status of the company he wants to invest in and the requirements it has 
fulfilled. It also promotes the transparency of the ASE and the companies 
traded on the stock exchange. There are certain strict requirements that must 
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5 be met before a company can be listed in the first tier of the ASE. There is an 
intermediary tier, which lists companies on the ASE, however they have yet to 
fill the requirements needed to move up to the first tier. The third tier allows 
investors to invest in unlisted companies on the ASE. These are companies 
that are waiting to fulfill the requirements to become a listed company. Table 
2.13 provides a summary of the development of the ASE since its 
establishment. 
3 Companies that apply for a listing of their shares on the Second Market must fulfil the following 
conditions: A) The Net Shareholders' Equity must not be less than 50% of the paid-in capital, B) A 
full year must have elapsed since the Company was granted the right to start its business (Article 
3). Companies the shares of which are transferred from the Second Market to the First Market must 
fulfill the following conditions: A) The Net Shareholders' Equity must not be less than 100% of the 
paid-in capital, B) The paid-in capital or the market capitalization must not be less than 2 (two) 
million Jordan Diners, Q The Company must have made net pre-tax profits for at least two fiscal 
years out of the last three years preceding the transfer of listing, D) The Company must have 
distributed profits or bonus shares at least once over the last three years, E) The Company's shares 
must have been listed on the Second Market for a full year at least, F) At least 10% of the total 
subscribed shares of the Company must have been traded in over the last twelve months preceding 
the listing transfer, and the minimum days of trading in said shares must not be less than 15% of 
overall trading days of same period (Article 5). The shares of a Company listed on the First Market 
shall be transferred to the Second Market in any of the following cases: A) A reduction of the 
Company's capital which leads to a fall in capital and market value to less than 2 (two) million 
Jordan Diners, B) A decline of the Net Shareholders' Equity to less than 75% of the paid-in capital, 
Q If the final accounts of the Company in the last fiscal year show a loss of more than 30% of the 
Net Shareholders' Equity as it stands at the beginning of that fiscal year, D) If the accounts of the 
Company show losses in the last three years, which exceed in total 50% of the paid-in capital 
(ASE, Securities Law No. 23 of 1997, Article 3,5, and 16). 
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Chapter Two 
From the above table, it is clear that although ASE has grown rapidly by 23% 
since 1995 in terms of number of companies, the growth was very little in terms of 
market capitalisation suggesting that per capita value has fallen. Indeed, it is 
obvious that the market is very small not only in terms of market capitalisation but 
also in terms of number of companies listed and volume of trade when it is 
compared to other well-known stock markets such as London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Table 2.14 provides a summary of number of companies listed in LSE, 
market capitalization, number of foreign listed companies, and capitalization of 
foreign companies over the period 1995-2000. 
Table 2.14: Development of London Stocks Exchange (Million JD) 1995 - 
2000 
Year Number of 
Listed 
Companies 
Market Capitalisation Number of 
Foreign 
Listed 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalisation 
of Foreign 
Companies 
1995 2078 916445 525 2399193 
1996 2171 1029787 533 2431101 
1997 2157 1273825 526 2472550 
1998 2087 1447942 522 2854786 
1999 1945 1852656 499 3641521 
2000 1904 1828795 501 3588811 
Source: London Stock Exchange Web Site. 
Making a comparison between ASE and LSE development over the period 1995- 
2000, it can be seen there is a gab in terms of indicators such as number of 
companies listed and market capitalisation beside the fact that LSE ranked as the 
top financial market having foreign investment as it is shown in Table 2.14. 
Although the number of listed companies increased in ASE during the period 
1978-1985, then declined slightly during the years 1988-1990, this decline was 
mainly attributed to merger activity in the market, particularly in the insurance 
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sector (Abu-Nassar and Rutherford 1995). In 2000, the ratio of market 
capitalisation to GDP was 58.4% compared with 72.3% and 73.6% and 74.4 for 
1999 1998 and 1997, respectively. The decline of trading volumes and market 
capitalisation in 1994 and 2000 compared to other years starting from 1993 was 
attributed to various factors including an increase in the new stocks issued during 
those years (ASE Annual Report, 1994,1998,1999,2000). Additional factors 
include a stalled Middle East peace process and the prolonged UN trade embargo 
on Iraq-Jordan's main trading partner prior to the Gulf War. A final and significant 
factor was the state of uncertainty, which dominated investors in the market in a 
region considered as one of the political hot-spots in the world. That is because of 
the continuous conflict between Israelis and Palestinian, remembering that nearly 
half of the Jordanian residents nowadays originally are Palestinian. But, in 
conclusion, it can be said that overall market capitalisation at the ASE has 
witnessed accelerated growth in recent years, rising 120.87% from 1991 to 2000. 
The banking sector leads the market with around 63% of total market 
capitalisation. The industrial sector ranks second with 24% of capitalisation, and 
the service and insurance sectors represent 11 % and 12% respectively. Exploring 
the market capitalisation development pre and post the adoption of IAS, however, 
it can be seen from Table 2.13 that market capitalisation growth was significantly 
decreasing over the period 1998-2000 (the period post the adoption of IAS) when 
it reached its lowest growth rate in the most recent year (2000) to be - 15.2%. This 
fact can be recognised by looking at the market capitalisation to GDP at current 
prices as a percent which was also decreasing until it reached its lowest in the 
most recent year (2000) to be only 58.4% comparing with 75.6% for the year 1995 
(pre the adoption date) which has been justified referring these surprising results 
to macroeconomic factors influences as mentioned earlier. 
Today, the ASE is considered one of the most sophisticated financial markets in 
the Arab World. With market capitalisation of around JD 4.14 billion in 1999 the 
ASE is one of the largest stock markets in the region open to foreign investors. 
The role of the capital market in Jordan's national economy is highlighted by the 
ASE's 72.3% ratio of market capitalisation to GDP in 1999. This is one of the 
highest ratios among emerging markets, indicating a very well established stock 
market and a relatively high level of securities trading. Furthermore, the 
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government followed a proposal prepared by the Jordanian Higher Council for 
Investment (HCI) to attract foreign investment. The proposal recommending 
removing the 50% limit of foreign ownership on all listed companies except 
mining, construction, and retail, which are subject to 50% ceiling of the paid-up 
capital and annual dividends are subjected to 10% tax. In addition, capital gains 
and interest earned are exempt from tax for both Jordanians and foreigners 
investing in Jordan through the Securities Law as a part of the package of reforms 
making the market one of the most liberal and open in the region. Table 2.15 
shows the Non-Jordanian investment development in ASE. 
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Chapter Two 
In 2000, non-Jordanian own about 42% of market value, while the government, 
through Investment Corporation, owned approximately 11%. Jordanian 
institutional and individual investors own the remaining 47%. Historically, 
however, Jordanian and Arab investments in the ASE have been the most stable, 
whereas non-Arab foreign investment has been variable and unpredictable. 
Therefore, greater levels of corporate transparency will be needed if the market is 
to stabilise foreign portfolio investments in the future (ASE 2000). This 
transparency definitely will be increased as a result of increasing the extent of 
disclosure through adopting the IAS as enforced by the new Securities Law No. 23 
of 1997. In addition, it can be seen from Table 2.13 that not only the decline was 
in volumes of trade and market capitalisation but also was in net foreign 
investment which become negative for the first time over the period 1996-2000 
for the most recent year (2000) confirming the argument regarding the uncertainty 
and increasing risk in a region considered as one of the political hot-spots in the 
world. 
The slowdown in the ASE performance over the last few years and be partially 
attributed to the tight monetary policy of the Central Bank of Jordan, resulting in 
substantially higher interest rates. Additional factors include a stalled Middle East 
peace process and the prolonged UN trade embargo on Iraq-Jord&s main trading 
partner prior to the Gulf War. However, the recently reformed investment laws, 
and the acceleration of the privatisation program are expected to have a positive 
impact on the stock market. The stock markets' price index rose by 3.4 points and 
turnover almost doubled in the week following the JD72 million deals of selling 
33% of the government's equity in Jordan Cement Factories Company (JCFC) to 
Lafarge of France. Such deals are expected to continue the process of restoring 
foreign investors' confidence in the ASE, and positively reflect on the prices of 
shares on the floor. 
2.7 Summary 
The chapter explored the Jordanian economy development since the independence 
and its history. That has been achieved by looking at the following issues: 
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Historical background; Major events in Jordan history, Economic overview; 
Economic strategy, policies and globalisation; and finally Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). 
In summary, it can be said that Jordan is a small and open economy with a free 
capital market and a parliamentary system of government. The early 1990s 
witnessed political and economic developments affecting Jordan. The most 
prominent reasons behind these developments were the outcomes of the Gulf 
crisis, the subsequent war and the economic sanctions on Iraq. In order to avoid 
the negative implications, the government has pushed an economic adjustment 
program and a package of reforms in order to strengthen the economy, improve 
efficiency and broaden the role of the private sector. Adopting the IAS was part of 
this package of reforms; legal regulations, privatisation and businesses 
opportunities through free trade agreements for being able to attract efficiently and 
effectively foreign investments in developing the country economy. 
The situation of peace in the region in 1995 when the peace process started among 
countries in the Middle East region made it possible at that time to attract capital 
for investment from public and private international bodies. Therefore, starting 
from that year, the Jordanian government articulated its vision of the path to an 
open, competitive business environment. The government goal was to deepen and 
extend macroeconomic stabilisation, trade liberalisation, financial sector reform, 
legislative reform, and change the role of the state in order to promote a better 
climate for private sector development and competitive investments. In order to 
attract foreign investments and joint ventures in Jordan, the government 
introduced a new Law for Investment Promotion in 1995 mentioned previously 
and also Companies' Law in 1997 and Securities Law in 1997, which will be 
explored in the following chapter. 
In conclusion, such significant reforming effort, however, has been disturbed by 
various political and social problems over the period 1995-2000 which has slow 
down the acceleration of getting any benefit from such strategic economic 
changes. This fact has been explored clearly by investigating the macroeconomic 
indicators concerned. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FINANCIAL REPORTING REGULATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
AND IAS 
3.1 Introduction 
The amount of information disclosed by companies in an economy depends on the 
level of development, the legislation in force, the development of the accounting 
profession and the *existence of a sophisticated financial market. Following the 
discussion of different issues regarding the Jordanian economy and its level of 
development, the purpose of this chapter therefore is to explore the role of 
legislation, the profession and the Jordanian financial market in shaping and 
influencing the current financial reporting practices of public shareholding 
companies in Jordan in order to examine the need of adopting IAS. 
The chapter focuses upon the financial reporting regulations specified by the 
Jordanian laws and its developments over the years since the establishment of the 
country. As factors affecting financial reporting in Jordan, Companies Acts will be 
the first piece of Jordanian legislation to look at followed by Income Tax Law, 
Amman Stock Exchange Law (ASE) which used to be called the Amman Financial 
Market (AFM) until 1997, and finally Accounting Profession involvement. By doing 
so, the question of the necessity of adopting IAS in Jordan will be explored, as a 
result, by discussing issues such as IAS: theoretical arguments and prior 
expectations; standardisation: objectives and means; and the relevance of IAS for 
Jordan. 
3.2 The Companies Act 
In the early thirties, the Jordanian public already subscribed to and traded in shares; 
the Arab Bank was the first public shareholding company to be established in Jordan 
in 193 0, followed by Jordan Tobacco and Cigarettes in 193 1, Jordan Electric Power 
in 1938, and Jordan Cement Factories in 1951. The first corporate bonds were 
issued in the early sixties. 
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However, the first piece of Jordanian legislation regarding companies was the 
enactment of the Companies Act No. 12 of 1964. Before that, the legal matters 
concerning the establishment and registration of companies were addressed by the 
Ottoman civil law and commercial law which was replaced and amended by the 
registration of Jordanian Companies Act of 1927 amended in 1929 and in 1930.1 
After Jordan's independence in 1946, however, the Palestinian Companies Act was 
introduced and applied which was influenced by the British Companies Act until 
1962 when the Temporary Company Act No. 33 of 1962 was issued cancelling all 
previous legislation concerning companies. The Temporary Companies Act No. 33 
of 1962 amended in 1964 and therefore, the Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 had been 
published. 
3.2.1 Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 
The Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 contains general disclosure requirements. Books 
of accounts are to be kept and audited, and a true and fair balance sheet is to be 
prepared, sent to shareholders and filed with the Controller of Companies. A true 
and fair profit and loss account for the accounting year is also required. 
According to the Act, there were two types of companies identified: partnership and 
limited shareholding companies. Furthermore, the Act distinguished private from 
public limited shareholding companies; shares of a private company are not offered 
for public subscription. The introduction of the Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 was 
the first legislative attempt to place emphasis on the provision of infori-nation by 
public and private shareholding companies. The following disclosure requirements 
for public shareholding companies were introduced by the Act: 
1. The Board of Directors of every limited shareholding company was 
required to prepare, within the first three months of every year, a balance 
1 From 1516 to the end of the First World War (1918), the territory occupied by Jordan formed part of 
the Ottoman Empire. The modem history of Jordan began with dethronement of the Ottoman rule 
after the First World War in 1918. The Emirate of TransJordan, which was under close British 
supervision, was created in April, 1921 as part of the post-war settlement and as an appendage to the British mandate in Palestine. 
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sheet and profit and loss account audited by a certified public auditor, 
with "a sufficient exposition7' of the major items for revenues and 
expenses for the previous financial year. 
2. The Board of Directors of every public shareholding company was also 
required to publish the balance sheet, the profit and loss account and a 
summary of the directors' report in a daily newspaper within two months 
of the general meeting, which must be held within the first four months of 
the end of the financial year. 
3. The Board of Directors must file copies of the above documents with the 
Controller of Companies pointed by the government in the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, the Amman Financial Market and the Auditor of the 
company. 
4. In the event that the auditor's report was not presented or read in the 
general meeting, the approval of the accounts and distribution of profit by 
the general meeting are invalid. 
5. The auditor of the company must ensure that the balance sheet and the 
profit and loss account are prepared in a way, which shows correctly the 
true financial situation of the company, and that the company's records 
and accounts are organised and prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). 
Therefore, although there was no mention of any specific disclosure requirements 
with regard to the contents of financial statements, the Companies Act No. 12 of 
1964 represents the first legal attempt to address corporate disclosure by requiring 
companies to prepare financial statements in accordance with GAAP, which was not 
clearly specified. However, the Act was subject to further amendments in 1966, 
1967,1972,1973,1976 and 1978. 
The tremendous economic growth 'see Chapter Two- section 2.4.3', in particular 
the increase in the number of corporations, the establishment of the new stock 
exchange in 1978 and the emergence of the first accounting professional body in the 
country, meant that the Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 needed revising. The 
Temporary Companies Act No. I of 1989 was then placed on the statute book. 
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3.2.2 Companies Act No. 1 of 1989 
Companies Act No. 1 of 1989 could be described as more clear and provided 
detailed and specified procedures that must be followed by an auditor. It included 
clauses requiring auditors to undertaken certain procedures: to examine company 
administrative and financial regulations relating to the company, namely, to examine 
the internal financial monitoring system, to check company assets and properties, to 
check company commitments and to ensure compliance with the law. 
Compared with the 1964 Act, the 1989 Act provided for a wider range of types of 
companies that could be established. Those types are partnership, limited 
partnership, private limited company, partnership limited by shares and public 
shareholding company. Consequently, a shareholding company registered under the 
provisions of the Act must offer its shares to the public. Compared to the other 
types of companies, public shareholding companies are of greater economic 
significance and as a consequence subject to more stringent disclosure 
requirements. The following disclosure requirements for public shareholding 
companies were introduced by the Act 1989: 
1. The Board of Directors of every public shareholding company must prepare, 
within the first three months of the end of the financial year the following 
documents which together constitute the company's annual report (Article 
168): 
e The balance sheet and the profit and loss account for the current year, 
with comparative figures for the previous year. 
9 The directors' report (brief summary about the company position). 
* The auditor's report. 
2. The above documents must be presented to the shareholders' annual general 
meeting and at least 14 days before the meeting, a copy of the annual report 
must be sent to each shareholder accompanied by invitation to the annual 
general meeting. In addition, the board is required to file copies of the above 
documents with the Controller of Companies and AFM at least 21 days of the 
annual general meeting to publish the balance sheet, the profit and loss account 
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and the auditor's report. Copies are also to be sent to the Income Tax 
department and to the Auditors (Article 169). 
3. The Board of Directors of the company have to file with the Controller of 
Companies and AFM a half yearly report showing the financial position of the 
company and the results of operations for the interim period signed by the 
board's chain-nan (Article 170). 
4. The auditor's report must be presented and discussed at the shareholder's 
annual general meeting (Article 199). 
5. Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor (Article 
220). 
6. The main responsibility of the auditor is to report to shareholders on the 
company's accounts (Article 221). 
7. The auditor must address the following in his report (Article 223): 
* Whether he or she has obtained all the infonnation and the explanation 
necessary to perform the audit in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards. 
Whether the company's account and financial records are adequate and 
necessary for performing his or her duty in satisfactory manner. 
Whether the balance sheet, profit and loss account and the statement of 
resources and application of funds presents fairly the company's financial 
position and complies with generally accepted accounting principles. 
e Whether the financial matter cited by the directors in their report are in 
agreement with the company's record. 
e Whether there have been any violations by the company and its directors of 
the provisions of the Act, or the company's articles of association, and the 
extent of which the violation had an impact on the company's financial 
position and its results of operations. 
* Any other information or marks which the auditor considers important for 
the company's shareholders to know which are covered by the above. 
8. The auditor must be independent from the company and its directors. 
Therefore, an auditor who is partner or an employee of any director should not 
be appointed (Article 225). 
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9. To emphasise the prohibition of insider trading, the Board of Directors may not 
deal with any securities of the company on the basis of important information 
which may have been acquired in his or her official capacity in the company, 
and he or she may not have an interest in any company, association, society or 
other group which indulges in activities designed to affect the stock market 
prices relating to any kind of securities issued by the company, nor to carry 
such activities personally or through others (Article 194). 
Although insider trading was outlawed in Article (194), the important step of 
publishing the stockholding position of dependents (or trusts in which a director has 
a beneficial interest) was not required. Moreover, there were no provisions 
regarding consolidated financial statements and such statements were not legally 
required. In practice, companies, which maintain branches, prepare and present a 
combined balance sheet and a combined profit and loss account. All inter-branch 
transactions are eliminated in the accounts. According to the Companies Act No I 
of 1989, books of accounts are to be kept and audited and "true and fair" balance 
sheet is to be prepared. The Act also requires a true and fair profit and loss account 
for the accounting year. 
The balance sheet should clearly be prepared in order to give a correct picture of the 
company's financial position at that date. There are no legal requirements, however, 
as to the form or content of financial statements for both public and private 
shareholding companies. Financial statements must be in Arabic script. 
Presentations familiar to those in the U. K. and the USA are followed. Both forms 
of shareholding companies are widely used by Jordanian enterprises. Foreigners 
doing business in Jordan do not commonly form Jordanian shareholding 
companies, but usually operate as foreign shareholding companies, or occasionally 
as branches. Joint ventures between foreign and Jordanian firms are not mentioned 
in the Act. 
To sum up, the Act provides that the financial statements must be prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which were not 
defined to any extent by law. There were no specific legal requirements existing as 
to the form and contents of such statements beyond the requirement that they must 
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prepare according to GAAP (e. g. Companies Act No. 1 of 1989 does not provide any 
regulations for depreciation and inventory valuation). In other words, the Act was 
very limited in scope and was expressed in loose and general terms. Moreover, there 
was no legal requirement that a statement of changes in financial position and cash 
flow statement must be published as a part of the annual report (Article 168). As a 
consequence, the Companies Act No. 1 of 1989 has been described as general and of 
limited content and coverage (Suwaidan 1997). It has not kept abreast of the rapid 
development in the Jordanian economy 'see Chapter Two- section 2.4.3'. Jordan 
has now issued Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 to fit the new economic strategy for 
the country, especially its aim to attract foreign investors. 
3.2.3 Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 
Following the dramatic change in Jordan, mainly because of the Gulf War in 1991, 
the blockade of Iraq which is the biggest trade partner to Jordan, the end of financial 
aid from the Arabian Gulf countries, the return of thousands of Jordanian people 
who used to work in the Gulf countries as a result of the Gulf War and the peace 
agreement with Israel on e of October 1994, the country has started to concentrate 
its effort toward building an independent economy 'see Chapter Two- sections 2.5 
and 2.6'. This is has been done by attracting foreigners to invest in Jordan through 
the application of a free market economic strategy and providing new regulations to 
help in achieving the new Jordanian economic strategy such as the Investment 
Promotion Law (1995), Securities Law (No. 23 of 1997) and the Companies Act 
(No. 22 of 1997). In addition, the Central Bank has removed all obstacles relating to 
importing or transferring foreign currency abroad. 
Following from the general and limited content and coverage of the Companies Act 
No. 1 of 1989, Jordan has now issued Company Act No. 22 of 1997 to fit the new 
economic strategy for the country. The following disclosure requirements for public 
shareholding companies were introduced by the Act 1997: 
1. The Board of Directors of the Public Shareholding Company shall, within a 
maximum of three months from the end of the Company's fiscal year, 
prepare the following accounts and statements to be presented to the annual 
general meeting (Article 140): 
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" The annual balance sheet of the Company and its profit and loss 
account, cash flows statements and notes compared with those of the 
last year's accounts, all duly certified by the Company's auditors. 
" The annual report of the Board of Directors on the Company's 
activities and forecasts of activities for the following year. 
2. The above documents must be presented to the shareholders' annual general 
meeting and at least 14 days before the meeting, a copy of the annual report 
must be sent to each shareholder accompanied by invitation to the meeting. 
In addition, the board is required to file copies of the above documents to the 
Controller of Companies in the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Income 
Tax Department with the annual tax return and ASE. Also, the Board is 
required, within 30 days of the annual general meeting to publish in a daily 
newspaper the balance sheet, the profit and loss account along with the 
auditor's report (Articles 141 and 14 1). 
3. The Board of Directors of the Public Shareholding Company have to file 
with the Controller of Companies and ASE a half yearly report showing the 
financial position of the company and the results of operations for the 
interim period signed by the board's chairman within one month of its 
handing over to him (Article 142). 
4. The Board of Directors of the Public Shareholding Company shall annually 
place in the Company's head office at the disposal of the shareholders, at least 
three days prior to the meeting of the Company's General Annual Meeting a 
detailed report containing the following statements copies of which shall be 
sent to the controller (Article 143): 
The amounts received from the Company during the fiscal year by the 
chairman and each of the members of the Board of Directors, in the 
form of wages, fees, salaries, allowances, remuneration and others. 
" Benefits that the chairman and the members of the Board of Directors 
enjoy such as free housing, cars and others. 
" Amounts that have been paid to the chairman and members of the 
Board of Directors during the fiscal year such as travel and transport 
allowances in and outside the Kingdom. 
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Donations paid by the Company during the fiscal year in details and 
the parties who received the said donations. 
5. The Board of Directors of the Public Shareholding Company shall announce the 
Company's General Annual Meeting date in at least two local daily newspapers 
within a maximum of fourteen days prior to that date provided that the meeting 
shall be held within the four months following the end of the Company's fiscal 
year (Articles 145 and 169). 
6. Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor who has to 
report to shareholders on the company's accounts. Moreover, the auditor's 
report must be presented and discussed at the shareholders' annual general 
meeting along with the company's accounts (Article 17 1). 
7. A public Shareholding Company shall organise its accounts and keep its 
registers and books in accordance with "generally accepted accounting 
principles" (Article 184). 
8. The fiscal year of a public Shareholding Company shall start on the first of 
January of each year and shall end on the thirty first of December of the same 
year, unless otherwise provided for in the company's Memorandum of 
Association (Article 1985). 
9. The auditor must address the following in his or her report (Article 195): 
" That the auditor has obtained the information, statements and 
clarifications he deemed necessary to perform his work. 
" That the Company keeps proper books of account, registers and 
documents maintained in accordance with "generally accepted 
accounting principles and adopted in the Kingdom by competent 
professional bodies"2 which can clearly show the financial position of 
the Company and the results of its operations and that the balance 
sheet and profit and loss account are in conformity with the records 
and books. 
That the audit procedures carried out by him for the Company's 
account are, in his opinion, considered sufficient reasonable basis to 
express his opinion regarding the Company's financial position, 
2 It is known that Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) recommended using 
the 1AS since 1990 as it will be explored later in the chapter. - 
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results of its operations and cash flows in accordance with 
internationally recognised audit registers. 
That the flnancial statements included in the Board of Director's 
report addressed to the General Annual Meeting are in compliance 
with the Company's records and registers. 
Any violations of the provisions of this Law or of the Company's 
Memorandum of Association that have taken place during the year in 
question and which have had a material effect on the results of the 
Company's operations and its financial status and whether any of these 
violations still exist within the limits of the information available to him. 
10. The Auditor must be independent from the company and its directors. 
Therefore, an auditor who is a partner to any member of a company Board of 
Directors, a member of its Board of Directors, or work permanently in any 
technical, administrative or consultancy work should not be appointed for 
auditing the company's accounts (Article 197). 
11. The Company's auditor and his employees shall not be permitted to speculate in 
the shares of the Company which he audits its accounts whether such a 
speculation is being done directly or indirectly. Otherwise, the auditor shall be 
penalised by dismissal from his job as an auditor of the Company and shall be 
requested to compensate for any damage that he has caused as a result of his 
violation of the provisions of this (Article 203). 
An important note is that the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 included many articles 
directed towards foreign companies and mutual funds in Jordan. The Act required 
the foreign companies to send the Controller a copy of their balance sheet, and profit 
and loss account relating to the companies' activities in Jordan audited by a 
Jordanian auditor within three months of the end of the financial year. In addition, 
the foreign company must make its financial reports available to the public 
, 
through 
publication in a newspaper. The Act also has many articles to deal with holding 
companies. Article (208) requires that a holding company must prepare a 
consolidated income statement and a consolidated balance sheet annually, in 
addition to the disclosure otherwise required. These consolidated financial reports 
are required to be prepared in accordance with the requirements of IAS. The law 
also includes many articles to deal with joint investment projects, provisions for 
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associated companies, joint venture investment companies; their establishment and 
their capital structure, all of which had not been considered in Act 1989.3 
On the other hand, it can be recognised that Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 
mentioned the financial statements must be prepared in accordance to the GAAP 
which were not defined to any extent (Article 184) along with asking auditors to 
prepare their auditing report in accordance with "GAAP and adopted in the Kingdom 
by competent professional bodies " which is considered as an indirect way of 
mentioning the IAS since these standards had been recommended in 1990 to be 
adopted by Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (Article 195). 
Before the Act 1997, it can be argued that JACPA had no enforcement power to 
adopt its recommendation concerning IAS adoption. 
3.3 The Income Tax Law 
According to Alexander and Nobes (1994); Ball et al. (1998); and Walton et al. 
(1998), taxation is a very important factor in situations where accounting systems 
are strongly influenced by state objectives. 
The first Income Tax Law in Jordan was issued in 1933. This law made all public 
and private sector salaries and wages subject to taxation and a special section in the 
Ministry of Finance was established to execute the provisions of this law called the 
Income Tax Section. In 1945, taxation was expanded through Income Tax Law No. 
26 to include all individual income obtained from the profits of any profession, craft 
and trade. This law also mentioned all the technical and legal bases to be applied in 
the calculation of income taxation. In 1951 the Temporary Income Tax Law No. 50 
was issued by which an Income Tax Department was established, replacing the 
previous Income Tax Section in the Ministry of Finance, and this was made 
responsible for implementing the legislation on taxation. The Temporary Income 
Tax Law No. 50 of 1951 was amended in 1964 and 1975. This involved no changes 
in accounting practices. 
3 It has to be noted that the issues of consolidated financial statements, joint venture, and associated 
companies were not applicable to the selected JIC's. 
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In 1982, with the advancement in Jordan's economy 'see Chapter Two- section 
2.4.39, it became necessary to develop further legislation to meet modem 
developments and trends in economic and societal activities. As a result, Temporary 
Income Tax No. 34 of 1982 was issued. This adopted the principle of "self 
assessment" as a basis for income estimation, and, at the same time, expanded the 
taxation criteria and includes more prospective payers. The law represented a 
civilised advance, since an understanding of tax became more important and a 
necessary requirement for achieving the economic and social goals, which 
represented the aims of national development. The Income Tax Law No. 34 of 1982 
had an effect on accounting in Jordan through the calculation method applied for 
inventories. 
For example, no provisions regarding the valuation of inventories are contained in 
the Companies Act. In practice, inventories are carried out at cost or market prices 
whichever is lower. For taxation purposes, the tax authorities have accepted 
valuation at cost only, as determined by one of the recognised accounting methods 
and this requirement appears to have influenced reporting practice (AI-Issa 1988). 
Another example is that, as the Companies Act does not provide any regulations for 
depreciation, the regulations contained in the Income Law are used. The 
depreciation rates for tax purposes are the only claimable if they are the rates used in 
the accounts as the tax allowable figures. 4 
In 1985, the permanent Income Tax Law No. 57, as amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 
and Law No. 14 of 1995, was issued through which it became more convenient and 
reasonable than that under previous laws since tax provided payers with exemptions 
and incentives to comply. According to the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, as 
amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 and Law No. 14 of 1995, the most important 
expenses considered in determining income tax are: 
1. Depreciation: The taxpayer must prepare and submit to the Income Tax 
Department the determined depreciation on a special form provided for this 
purpose for what he is using from machinery, equipment, and furniture. 
Deduction allowable under the provisions of the Law must be computed on 
4 Since 1985, law has specified depreciation rates for tax purposes and only the straight-line method 
can be used. 
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the basis of the straight-line method of depreciation. However, in certain 
cases, if the taxpayer can prove that there was extraordinary depreciation as a 
result of additional work, the assessing tax officer may apply the depreciation 
deduction on the basis of percentage rates not exceeding double those 
percentages determined by the Law. The rates determined by the Law for 
industrial building range from 2% for the depreciation of store building to 
25% for other industrial building companies. The Law also provides that, 
when making the deductions for depreciation, the following should be 
considered: 
1. No depreciation is allowed on land. 
2. Total depreciation charges must not exceed the original cost. 
Therefore, revaluation of assets is not allowed, as the IAS required. 
3. In the case that the gross income is less than the depreciation 
amount in any year, the amount of depreciation not covered by 
income may be carried forward to the next year or to the following 
years. 
However, there is no mentioned in the Tax Law as to whether companies are 
allowed to use different depreciation methods for reporting purposes. Given that, the 
company must use the rates stated by the Tax Law in filing its income return. 
2. Bad Debts: The Law provides that bad debts are deductible when they are 
actually incurred. Therefore, for taxation purposes the direct write-off method 
is the only accepted method, provided that subsequent recoveries of 
previously written-off debts must be included as a profit in the taxable 
income in the year they are collected. In practice, taxpayers that want to 
deduct bad debts should provide the tax officer with proof that the debt has 
been un-collectable. Thus, establishing a provision for un-collectable 
accounts is an unacceptable practice for the purpose of calculating tax 
liability. However, in certain cases where the nature of the business requires 
the company to establish provision (e. g. current danger provision formed by 
insurance companies), the Income Tax Department allows such provisions to 
be regarded as expenses for the period. Moreover, the law provides that 
correct and genuine files and records should be maintained in relation to bad 
debts. 
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3. There is no explicit requirement regarding inventory-pricing methods, except 
those inventories should be valued at the lower of cost or market price. 
Inventories with the tax authority revealed that companies must use actual 
cost as an accepted inventory pricing method. 
4. Intangible Assets: Goodwill was not subject to depreciation due to its 
increasing value over time. Copyright, patents, establishment costs and 
vacating-costs should be depreciated over a five-year period. Any impainnent 
in value, moreover, was not deductible for tax purposes. 
5. Other Expenses: This is includes rental expenses, wages and salaries, 
pension costs, training, marketing and research and development costs. 
Company's losses, thefts, and maintenance expenses not defined as being 
capital expenses are also taken into consideration in determining income tax. 
In the case of a branch of a company, central company costs allocated to that 
branch should not exceed five percent of income achieved by the branch 
before tax. 
The Income Tax Law also requires public shareholding companies, and other 
categories prescribed by the Law, to maintain the following documents: 
1. Aj oumal. 
2. A book of letter copies which includes all the documents, vouchers and 
correspondence. 
3. The inventory book and the balance sheet. 
4. Any necessary books which are required by the nature of the work. 
While the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 does not provide any regulations for 
depreciation and inventory valuation, it seems that companies use the regulations 
provided by the Income Tax Law concerning these matters (Halbouni 2000). It is 
reasonable, therefore, to say that the income tax requirements, especially those 
imposed on public shareholding companies, complement other requirements of the 
Companies Act. It has to be noted, however, following the Income Tax law 
requirements by companies is not a matter of choice for reporting purposes. 
The Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 and Law 
No. 14 of 1995, required certain types of companies who practise their activities in 
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Jordan to prepare their records on the basis of the GAAP that are approved by the 
specialised authority, which were not defined to any extent. Such companies were 
the Public Shareholding Companies, Limited Liability Companies, Jordanian 
Partnerships in Shares, Jordanian Limited Partnerships, Foreign Companies or their 
branch of any type, whether resident or non-resident, in addition to other entities 
specified by the law. It is noticeable that the Income Tax Law had very limited 
requirements concerning income measurement and asset valuation methods. 
Regarding the tax on taxable income, Article (17) of the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 
1985, as amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 and Law No. 14 of 1995 stated that 
companies that work in the following sectors: metallurgy, industry, hotel, hospitals 
and transportation - should be charged at 15% of their taxable income. In addition, 
in the case of transportation and construction companies, only those that have paid 
up capital of at least one million J. D. should be charged at this rate. Moreover, 
banks, financial, insurance, inter-mediation and exchange companies should be 
charged at 35% of their taxable income, while other companies should be charged 
at 25%. 
An interview conducted by Halbouni (2000) with some employees at the Income 
Tax Department in Jordan shows that there is a difference between the income tax 
estimated by companies and that estimated by the department. Tbis, could be 
attributed mainly to the method of treatment of capital and current disbursements 
and of the following items in a way that was not consistent with the income tax 
requirements: 
1. The amortisation of establishment costs and vacating money. 
2. Expenses, which are related to, exempted profits. 
3. Entertainment expenses. 
4. Travel expenses. 
5. The branches' share of the costs of the head office. 
6. Carried losses. 
7. Donations and the treatment of provisions and reserves. 
8. The recoverable debt. 
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In spite of the significant contribution to the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, as 
amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 and Law No. 14 of 1995, in regard of financial 
reporting regulation developments, revaluation of assets is not allowed as the IAS 
requires it since total depreciation charges must not exceed the original cost, the law 
has not mentioned how many years should the amount of depreciation when it is not 
covered by the gross income be carried forward. In addition, the Income Tax Law is 
not requiring from companies, more specifically the public shareholding companies, 
any documents of proof about the assets registered for the company beside the other 
documents mentioned above. Finally, The Tax Law required certain types of 
companies who practise their activities in Jordan to prepare their records on the 
basis of the GAAP that are approved by the specialised authority, which were not 
defined to any extent. On the other hand, it seems that the regulations provided by 
the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985, as amended by Law No. 4 of 1992 and Law 
No. 14 of 1995, comes as complementary regulations, especially those regulations 
imposed on public shareholding companies, of the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 
concerning depreciation and inventory valuation. 
3.4 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
It has been argued that capital markets contribute to the national economy's well- 
being through increasing the amount of funds available to finance industry and 
encouraging savings towards investment (Pike and Neal 1993). 
Jordan is a small open economy with a free capital market with a parliamentary 
system of government. Industry is dominated by the service sector, with mining and 
manufacturing contributing only some 17% GDP in 2000. The country's stock 
market commenced operation in 1978 with quotations according to the profession of 
the Amman Financial Market Law No. 31 of 1976 through the efforts of the Central 
Bank of Jordan and the International Finance Corporation. It is a government- 
mandated vehicle for both the regulation and institutionalisation of the securities 
market in Jordan. It has been given the appropriate power to promote the 
development of the securities market, to regulate the activities of member firms 
dealing in securities as underwriters, brokers and investment advisors, and to 
regulate the trading market (Arab Potash Co., 1997). It started its activities on the 
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first of January 1978 covering 67 listed companies; this number rose to 116 in 198 8. 
The number had fallen slightly at 112 in 1991 as a result of merger activity. 
However, till Sep. 2000, the number becomes. 163 companies 'see Chapter two- 
section 2.6'. 
According to the Law No. 31 of 1976, Amman Financial Market adopted certain 
policies conceming disclosure: 
1. A listed company is required to make immediate public disclosure of all 
material information conceming its affairs. 
2. A listed company is required to release material information to the public in 
a manner designed to obtain full possible public dissemination. 
3. Any rumour or report, true or false, that contains information that is likely to 
have, or has an effect on the trading in the company's shares or would be 
likely to have a bearing on investment decisions, must be publicly clarified 
as soon as possible. 
4. A listed company should refrain from promotional disclosure activities 
which exceed that necessary to enable the public to make informed 
investment decisions. Such promotional activities may include press 
releases, public announcements not justified by actual developments in the 
company's affairs, exaggerated predictions and other forms of overstated 
disclosure which may mislead investors and cause unwarranted price 
movements and activity in the company's shares. 
5. Insiders should not trade on the basis of material information which is not 
known to the investing public. Moreover, insiders should refrain from 
trading, even after material information has been released to the press, for a 
period sufficient to permit through public dissemination and evaluation of 
the information. 
The AFM Law No. 31 of 1976 disclosure requirements were greater than those of the 
Companies Act No. 12 of 1964 amended in 1966,1967,1972,1973,1976 and 1978. 
The AFM's articles of association required the following of listed Jordanian public 
companies: 
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1. The market has the right to ask listed companies, to disclose any information 
about their performance, to ensure safe transaction and to protect investors 
(Article 28). 
2. Companies wishing to issue securities (shares or bonds) have to prepare a 
prospectus on a special form containing all information and explanations 
deemed necessary to investors (Article 33). 
3. Article 34 requires companies to inform the market of any information, 
which is likely to influence security prices, and the market has the right to 
disclose such information via any means (e. g. the press). 
4. Article 36 states that General Director and/or any member of the Board of 
Directors is required to provide the market with a statement showing the 
shares of bonds he (they) own in the company within one month of his 
(their) appointment. Further, he is (they are) required to provide the market 
with a statement of any changes in his (their) ownership within ten days of 
the change. 
5. Article 39 states that public shareholding companies are required to keep 
records of shareholders. Such records contain the names of the shareholders, 
their shares number, their transfers of shares and any details deemed to be 
necessary by the market. 
It has been argued that Amman Financial Market Law No. 31 of 1976 was only 
concerned with shareholders and investors. In addition, they can be seen as lax, 
vague and loose (Al-Issa 1988). It did not require the specific infori-nation normally 
deemed relevant for an efficient market (At-Issa 1988; Solas and Bakay 1989). This 
might be due to the relatively small amount of activities in the market, since it would 
appear that the policy of the market is to attract a large number of listed companies 
(Abu-Baker 1995). Moreover, Dahmash (1992) contended that all Arab countries 
encounter obstacles that reduce the effectiveness of their financial markets. The 
most effective obstacles facing the development of stock exchange are the 
following: 
1. The loss of investors' confidence in shares of listed companies. 
2. The lack of information. 
3. The spread of misleading information, fraud leading to investment risk. 
4. The lack of a computerised system. 
93 
Chapter Three 
The Amman Financial Market (AFM) is operated through two markets: the primary 
or the first market in which new issues of stocks and bonds are sold for the first time 
and the secondary market where securities which have been issued and subscribed 
are traded 'see Chapter Two- section 6.2'. The secondary market is divided into 
three parts: the regulator or the, where trading in the stocks of listed companies takes 
place, the parallel or the second market, where trading in bonds takes place, and the 
trading floor or the third market, where dealing in unlisted companies and legal 
transfers takes place (AFM 1996). 
Concerning the disclosure requirements, AFW Law No. 31 of 1976 discussed the 
disclosure of information in general terms. In addition, the few requirements were 
concerned more about the prevention of insider trading than the provision of 
information in companies' reports. In this sense, the AFM could be described as an 
unregulated market in which listed companies were not subject to any stringent 
disclosure requirements (Solas and Bakay 1989). Moreover, according to Omet 
(1990) AFM is unlikely to have a considerable impact upon the economy of Jordan 
for some years to come. The perfon-nance of AFM has been seriously affected as a 
result of the Gulf war and Jordan's proximity to both Iraq and Kuwait. 
The 1976 Law was amended by the enactment of the AFM Law No. 1 1990 managed 
by the committee appointed by the Council of Ministers on recommendation by the 
Minister of Finance. The committee was made up of the market general manager 
and five other members; one each from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, two 
licensed banks, a share holding company and a representative of Amman Chamber 
of Industry. However, according to Khouri (1997), the following are the weaknesses 
in the operation and regulation of this body: 
1. The law did not differentiate between the process of the exchange of 
securities and the process of controlling and regulating the market. 
2. There was an overlap between the AFM Law and the Companies Act, 
which affects the right for small investors; 
3. There is no specification of the type and the time of the required 
financial inforniation. 
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4. Neither the Companies Act nor the AFM Law contains any provisions 
relating to investment funds. 
5. Stock prices sometimes did not reflect a fair value, sometimes as a result 
of the small volume of trading. 
6. The government has ownership of a large number of listed companies. 
The articles for the Law 1990 concerning disclosure required the following from 
listed shareholding companies: 
1. The market has the right to ask listed companies to disclose any 
information about their performance, to ensure safe transactions and to 
protect investors (Article 28). 
2. Companies wishing to issue securities (shares or bonds) have to prepare a 
prospectus on a special form containing all infonnation and explanation 
deemed necessary to investors (Article 33). 
3. Companies have to inform the market of any information, which is likely 
to influence security prices, and the market has the right to disclose such 
information by any means such as the press (Article 34). 
4. General Director and/or any member of the board of directors of listed 
companies is required to provide the market with a statement showing the 
shares or bonds he owned in the company within one month of his 
appointment. In addition, he is required to provide the market with a 
statement of any changes in his ownership within ten days of the changes 
(Article 36). 
5. The listed Jordanian shareholders companies are required to keep records 
of shareholders. These records contains the names of shareholders, the 
number of their shares, transformation of the shares and any details 
deemed to be necessary by the market (Article 39). 
An interesting point has to be said is that according to the AFM Law No. 1 of 1990 
the committee of the financial market5 has the right to establish a price ceiling in 
either direction of the stock opening price. The ceiling is applied as a percentage of 
5 The management Committee is composed of eight members who are appointed by the Cabinet on 
the recommendation of the Minister of Finance (AFM Law 1990, Article 26). 
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the stock opening price, and can be applied to the market as a whole or to a certain 
stock. Before December 1989, the price ceiling was 10% but, in 1990, this margin 
was reduced to 5%. The purpose of establishing price ý ceiling is to keep speculative 
movement in market prices under control (El-Khouri and Civelek 1993). 
The name for the financial market has been changed from Amman Financial Market 
(AFM) to Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and new securities law was issued in May 
1997 in order to develop and regulate the stock market. Securities Law No. 23 of 
1997 established four independent entities 'see Chapter Two- section 2.6': 
1. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), whose purpose to 
regulate, develop and monitor the securities market. 
2. The Stock Exchange where the securities in the Kingdom will be traded. 
3. The Central Securities Depository (CSD), which is responsible for the 
deposit and transfer of ownership of securities, traded in the stock 
exchange. 
4. The Professional Committee, which represents certified financial 
professionals and aims to safeguard the interests of its member and act 
in a supervisory capacity with regard to what constitutes acceptable 
professional conduct by its members. 
The ASE Law provided the legal framework for disclosure, financial services 
companies, investment companies and mutual funds by all companies falling under 
its supervision. The Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 adopted accounting, auditing and 
performance evaluation standards for all entities failing under the Commission's 
supervision. Additionally, it determined standards, requirements and tasks for 
qualified auditors in auditing the books and records of the SEC, the CSD, financial 
companies, investment funds and public joint stock companies. 
In 1996, AFM signed an agreement with the Paris Bourse to modernise the stock 
market in accordance with international standards of trading, clearing and settlement 
(AFM 1996). In early 1998, this project was completed. It is clear that the Securities 
Law No. 23 of 1997 played a significant role in determining the 1AS as the basis on 
which Securities Exchange Commission members should prepare their annual 
reports (ASE 1998). In 1998, the Securities Commission Board issued Directive No. 
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I on the disclosure (Securities Exchange Commission Law No. 1 of 1998), 
accounting standards, auditing standards and conditions applying to the audit of 
entities subject to the control of the securities commission. 
With regard to disclosure, Article (8) required the issuer to submit to the board 
annual and semi-annual reports and statements containing the balance sheet, the 
profit and loss account, the cash flow statement and the notes to the financial 
statements. Therefore, the annual report must contain the following: 
1. An adequate description of the issuing company. 
2. The nature of its business and its activities. 
3. The names of the member of the board of directors, executive officers, 
senior staff and major investors. 
4. Audited financial statements clearly showing the issuing company's 
financial profit and an evaluation by issuer's management of current and 
future developments that may have an effect on the company's results or 
financial position. 
The new law prospectus specified that the following information should be 
included: 
1. An adequate description of the issuer. 
2. Its business and activities. 
3. The individuals in charge of managing its affairs, such as members of 
board of directors, executive officers, senior staff and major 
shareholders. 
4. An adequate description of the securities, their number, price and issue 
provisions. 
5. The financial position of the issuer containing all relevant financial data 
including an audited balance sheet and profit and loss account for the last 
financial year. 
6. Any other information required by the commission in order to assist the 
investor in making a decision about investing in the securities. However, 
the new law does not make any specific requirements in relation to 
foreign investors. 
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Directives on Disclosure Related to Amman Stock Exchange Issued by virtue of the 
provisions of Article 26 (c & d) of the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 enforce the 
Stock Exchange to disclose the following infonnation: 
1. The Stock Exchange must disclose the following infonnation: 
a. Names of issuers of securities listed on the Stock Exchange. 
b. Names of issuers of securities suspended from trading. 
c. Names and addresses of the Stock Exchange members. 
d. Names of the Stock Exchange members barred from practising. 
e. Names of the certified financial professionals licensed to trade on the 
Stock Exchange. 
f. Daily, weekly, monthly and annual data, which cover each company's 
trading, as well as the sector movements, in terms of number of traded 
shares, volume of trading, number of contracts, prices, indices and key 
financial indicators. 
Information and data coming to the Stock Exchange, which have an 
influence on the prices of securities, and the trading flow. 
2. The public may have access to and may make copies of, against consideration, 
the information and data mentioned in sub-paragraph A of this Article. 
3. Disclosure shall be through Stock Exchange bulletins, and information shall 
be circulated to the Stock Exchange members and shall be announced via 
those methods deemed appropriate by the Stock Exchange 
It has to be noted that Directive No. I issued by the Securities Commission Board 
(Securities Exchange Commission Law No. 1 of 1998) asked companies under their 
supervision to adopt the 1AS, international auditing standards and the requirements 
needed to be an auditor. Moreover, they prohibit the members of the Board of 
Directors, the Chief Executive Officer, the Stock Exchange staff, the external legal 
consultant of the Stock Exchange, and the auditor of the Stock Exchange to divulge 
any information or data. 
In summary, it could be argued that Amman Financial Market Law No. 31 of 1976 
can be seen as lax, vague and loose concerned only with shareholders and investors 
and discussed the disclosure of information in general terms. In addition, the few 
requirements were concerned more about the prevention of insider trading than the 
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provision of information in companies' reports. In this sense, the AFM at that time 
could be described as an unregulated market in which listed companies were not 
subject to any stringent disclosure requirements. The Amman Financial Market Law 
No. 1 of 1990, however, did not impose any accounting requirements for listing 
companies. Moreover, the law did not differentiate between the process of the 
exchange of securities and the process of controlling and regulating the market. 
Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 (and Securities Exchange Commission Law No. 1 of 
1998), therefore, could be seen as the law, which specified requirements relating to 
the content of a company's annual report. In addition, the law adopted the IAS and 
the international auditing standards for all entities falling under the supervision of 
the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) completing the work started by the 
Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 who asked Jordanian companies under his 
supervision to adopt those standards recommended by JACPA 'see section 3.2.3'. 
3.5 Accounting Profession 
The 1919 legislation in Iraq and Palestine relating to the accounting profession was 
based on British Company Law and was employed in Jordan in the absence of 
national legislation (Saadah 1996). Accordingly, that legislation covered auditors' 
rights, duties and responsibilities, specifying the body authorised to license 
professional practices and the party authorised to appoint the auditor. 
The first auditing firm in Jordan was Saba & Co., which established its first office in 
Jerusalem in 1924 and its first office in Amman in 1944. Gorge Khader & Co. was 
among the first auditing firms to render auditing services from the west bank of 
Jordan and established a permanent audit office in Amman in 1944 (Abdullah 
1982). 
In the early fifties, with the progress and development of the economy 'see Chapter 
Two- section 2.4. F, some foreign firms of auditors, such as Whinney Murray & Co. 
opened branches in Jordan. In 1997, there were a number of foreign auditing firms 
working in Jordan, including Deloitte & Touche, Arthur Andersen, Ernst and 
Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCooPers. 
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According to Khouri (1997) the auditing profession has been deeply influenced by 
British rules and principles since the twenties and thirties. British auditors were 
exclusive in Jordan and the Arab world, and Russell & Co. performed most 
auditing. Pioneering Arab auditors e. g. Saba & Co. in Jerusalem, Yani Nawwar in 
Egypt and Zaki Hassan in Lebanon, played their role in amending legislation and 
founding Arabic auditing offices in the early twenties or thirties. In the last few years 
the American auditing bases and principles have affected the auditing profession 
(Halbouni 2000). 
In 1961, the first law concerning the auditing profession, the Accounting Auditing 
Profession Law No. 10 of 1961 was issued. This law specified all the conditions that 
should be satisfied in order to have the right to practise the auditing profession. 
However, it can be said that entry into the accounting profession was loosely 
regulated by the Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 10 of 1961 in which entry 
was not subject to professional examinations or stringent academic qualifications, 
especially for those people working for the government. In this Law, there were no 
official pronouncements on general accounting principles, auditing standards or 
professional ethics that govern the audit profession in Jordan, and it was mainly 
concerned with the audit profession in the private sector. Furthermore, all licensing 
procedures and authorities were not specified. 
In Law No. 12 of 1964, auditing became compulsory for all public companies. A 
breakthrough for the profession occurred in 1985 after the enactment of the 
Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 which provided the 
establishment of the first accounting profession in the country, namely the Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) came into effect in 1987. 
3.5.1 Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 
Before 1985, entry into the accounting profession was loosely regulated. The only 
organisation responsible for the entry into the auditing profession in Jordan at that 
time was the Audit Bureau (AB) which was a governmental body and originally 
established to supervise the financial matters of the government. The Accounting 
Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 regulated the audit profession and made 
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membership of the association compulsory, effectively superseding law No. 10 of 
1961. In 1986, the Accountants Auditors Classification Regulation was issued, 
followed in 1987 by the Auditors Association Regulation. 
The Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 provided, beside the 
establishment of JACPA that will be discussed later in a separate section, for the 
establishment of the Council of the Auditing Profession (CAP). The CAP exercises 
the authority of licensing and classifying auditors. The CAP is composed of twelve 
members as follows: 
1. President of the Audit Bureau appointed by the government. 
2. Vice-president of the Audit Bureau. 
3. Deputy Minister of Finance. 
4. Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade. 
5. Director of the Income Tax Department. 
6. Deputy of the Central Bank of Jordan. 
7. Director of the AFM. 
8. Two accounting academics selected from Jordanian universities 
9. Three auditors appointed by the Cabinet based on a recommendation by the 
Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA). 
In addition, the Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 called for the 
establishment of the Jordanian Auditors Society (JAS) with the purposes of looking 
after the interests of members of the profession, working towards the promotion of 
co-operation between them and seeking to raise the scientific and technical level of 
the profession. 
According to the Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985, to be eligible 
to practice auditing, the person must have one of the following qualifications: 
1. A Bachelor's degree or its equivalent in accounting with at least three years 
of experience in accounting and auditing of which one year must be in 
auditing. 
2. A Master degree or its equivalent in accounting with at least two years of 
experience in accounting and auditing of which one year must be in auditing. 
3. A PhD in accounting with at least one year of experience in accounting and 
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auditing or two years' teaching experience in one of the Jordanian 
universities. 
4. A Bachelor degree or its equivalent from the Faculty of Commerce, Law or 
Economics with at least five years' experience in accounting and auditing of 
at least one year must be in auditing. 
5. A Community College degree in accounting with at least six years of 
experience in accounting and auditing of which at least two years must be in 
auditing. 
6. Have worked for the Audit Bureau (AB) or any other government 
department as a principal auditor and possess a Bachelor's degree or its 
equivalent. 
7. A certificate from an internationally recognised professional body such as 
the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) in the Unites States or the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales or the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Scotland. 
In addition to the above academic qualifications and experience, person categories 1, 
2,4,5 and 6 above should pass an examination set as a prerequisite for entry into the 
profession covers a wide range of topics in accounting, auditing, legislation related 
to accounting, taxation and the financial system in Jordan (Ramadan 1989). 
The Law also classifies companies into three groups as follows: 
1. Group (1), which includes Banks and Financial Institutions, Insurance 
Companies, Industrial Public Shareholding Companies, Branches of Foreign 
Companies and Government Agencies. 
2. Group (2), which includes other, Public Shareholding Companies not 
mentioned in group I above. 
I Group (3), which includes sole traders and other types of companies, not 
mentioned in-groups I and 2 above. 
The CAP, however, classifies auditors into the following three categories (Article 
4): 
1. Category (A) which includes the following: 
9 Licensed auditors possessing the qualifications stated in 1,2,3 or 7 
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-l-ove. au 
9 Auditors licensed before the enactment of the Audit Law 1985 and who 
possess the qualifications stated in 1,2,3 or 7 above. 
2. Category (B) which includes the following: 
9 Licensed auditors possessing the qualifications in 4 or 6. However, in the 
latter cases, the auditor must have the Bachelor's degree in commerce, 
Law or economics. 
e Auditors licensed before the enactment of the Law and possessing the 
qualification required in 4 above. 
3. Category (C) which includes the following: 
* Licensed auditors possessing the qualifications stated in 5 or 6 above. 
However, in the latter case, the auditor must have a first university 
degee. 
* Auditors licensed before the enactment of the Law and possessing the 
qualifications in 4 above. 
Article 5(a) of the Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 provides that auditors 
must practice public auditing according to their classifications adopted by the CAP 
as follows: 
1. Auditors classified as category (A) are allowed auditing the accounts of 
groups 1,2 and 3 above. 
2. Auditors classified as category (B) are allowed to audit the accounts of 
goups 2 *and 3 above. 
3. Auditors classified as category (C) are allowed to audit the accounts of group 
3 above. 
Based upon the Law, the auditor shall not practice any work in conflict with the 
nature of the audit of accounts of the company, such as being a member of the board 
of directors or in the management of any advisory office. Furthermore, he has the 
right to examine all the books of the company and to present his report which should 
include the following: 
1. All infonnation and explanations, to the best of his knowledge, are necessary 
for rendering an opinion. 
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2. Financial Statements (the balance sheet and the loss and profit account) that 
present a true and fair view of the financial position and results of operations 
of the company under his examination. Moreover, these statements must be 
prepared in accordance with the Companies Act and other related laws. 
3. A statement that confirms that the statements were prepared in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 
4. An assertion as to whether or not there has been any violation of the 
Companies Act or other laws which has had an effect on the company's 
financial statements. 
To sum up, it could be argued that the Accounting and Auditing Profession Law 
No. 32 Of 1985 is clarifying auditors who are eligible to practice auditing in Jordan 
by having specific qualifications. Moreover, the law has called for the establishment 
of the Jordanian Auditors Society (JAS) who are looking after the interest of 
members of the profession, working towards the promotion of cooperation between 
them and seeking to raise the scientific and technical level of the profession. In 
addition, the law called for the establishment of the Council of Auditing Profession 
(CAP) who exercises the authority of licensing and classifying the auditors. Finally, 
the law called for the establishment of the Jordanian Association of Certified public 
Accounting (JACPA) who are in charged of developing the competence and 
independence of its members, publishing accounting principles for the training and 
awareness of its members and developing accounting and auditing standards that 
could best meet the needs of the country, an issue will be discussed in the following 
section. Accounting and Auditing Profession Law No. 32 Of 1985, therefore, can be 
seen as complementary regulations of the Companies Act No. 12 of 1997 concerning 
auditing practice. 
3.5.1.1 Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) 
The Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 provided for the 
establishment of Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) as 
it is mentioned earlier. The main objectives of the JACPA are to develop the 
competence and independence of its members, to publish accounting principles for 
the training and awareness of its members and to develop accounting and auditing 
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standards that could best meet the needs of the country (JACPA 1987). The JACPA, 
however, has not developed or formulated any national standards, or even defined 
GAAP. Nevertheless, in 1989 the JACPA adopted the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) in the hope that such standards would be replaced as national 
standards were developed. In March, 1989, the Board of Directors of JACPA 
decided in its Ordinance No. 54 that such standards have to be followed by the 
Jordanian public accountants during their course of examination of financial 
statements of the Jordanian Shareholding Companies starting by December, 1990. It 
seems, therefore, that the objective of developing national standards is no longer 
being pursued by the JACPA. As stated by Naeem Saba, the Chairman of the Board 
of the JACPA from 1993 to 1997: 
"Setting national standards will isolate us ftom the rest of the world and 
complicate matters. Consequently, we must use MS with a little adaptation to 
suit the needs of economic projects in Jordan. It would be a waste of time and 
effort to set national standards that would discourage foreigners ftom 
considering investing in the country". 
It has to be said that the JACPA did not have the power to impose IAS on 
companies or on its members until 1997 when Companies Act No. 22 of 1997, 
Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 have given consideration, authority and more power 
to JACPA. The Securities Law No. 23 of 1997, for example, has given more power 
to the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accounting (JACPA) through the 
following: 
1. Auditors for a company controlled by the Jordanian Securities 
Commission are required to be a member in the JACPA (Article 27). 
2. Auditors should implement the instructions published by the JACPA. In 
addition, auditors should improve their skills and follow the changes 
which might happen by having frequent training courses supervised by the 
JACPA or other licensed by the JACPA (Article 28). 
3. JACPA, through a co-operation with the Jordanian Securities Commission, 
creates the necessary regulations for making sure of implementing what 
has been said in Article 28 (Article 29). 
4. JACPA has to provide annually a list for the auditors' names that satisfied 
the conditions every first month of each year and the modifications which 
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might happen on this list. This is has to be handed to the Jordanian 
Securities Commission (Article 30). 
According to Matter (1995), the fact that the decision of the JACPA to adopt IAS 
had not been translated into legislation makes compliance with such standards by 
companies and auditors questionable. He indicated that many companies and 
auditors did not follow IAS, because there were no legal or professional 
implications. Realising that, the JACPA exercised a great deal of effort to 
incorporate IAS in the provision of the Companies Act 1989 and in the 1990 
Amman Financial Market (AFM) Law, but without success. Recently the 
Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 ask companies 
under their authorities to fully adopt the IAS's 'see Chapter Two- sections 2.2 and 
2.49. 
An important issue that might be necessary to discuss is the independence of the 
auditors in Jordan. It is widely acknowledged that the value of auditing services 
depends, to a large extent, on the fact that auditors are independent from their clients 
(Corless and Parker 1987; Koh and Mahathevan 1993; Simon and Francis 1988). 
For example, investigating the impact of price cutting on auditor's independence, 
Simon and Francis (1988) found that price cutting had an adverse effect on auditor's 
independence. This situation could be the case in Jordan, as a developing country, 
where the quality of auditing is valued less than the cost. Interviews with managers 
of six auditing firms in Jordan conducted by Suwaidan (1997) revealed that the 
market for audit services suffers from severe price competition. Although, the 
JACPA attempted to solve this problem by determining a minimum fee (JD300), it 
seems that even this very minimum fee were not complied with by some auditors. 
As stated by one of the managers 
"The reason why sometimes we accept an auditing job at a very low price is 
that ifwe do not take it, someone else will". 
Another variable which was hypothesised to have an adverse impact on auditor 
independence is the provision of management advisory services (MAS) (Barkess 
and Simnett 1994; Hartley and Ross 1972; Shockley 198 1). The main argument here 
is that the involvement of an auditor in providing services other than the usual audit 
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will lead to a close relationship with the client which makes it difficult for the 
auditor to remain independent. However, the results for investigating this variable 
were mixed. For example, Hartley and Ross (1972) in their study investigated the 
perceptions of three groups; chartered financial analysts, CPA's and financial 
executives, they found that the majority of the respondents did not consider that 
performing MAS impaired auditors' independence. In contrast, the results of 
Shockley (1981) study indicated that both financial statements users and CPA's 
perceived MAS to be associated with a higher risk of loss of independence. 
In Jordan, a study conducted by Matter (1995) examined the above variables based 
on a questionnaire sent to 129 respondents comprising three groups: CPAs, users of 
financial statements and official respondents for controlling and supervising the 
audit profession. The respondents were asked to assess the importance of 
competition and management advisory services (MAS) on the impairment of auditor 
independence. The results of the study indicated that the respondents considered 
competition as an important factor with an adverse impact on auditor independence. 
As for MAS, the results of the study indicated that this variable was considered 
unimportant in influencing auditor independence. Matter (1995, P. 321) concluded 
that: 
"Maintaining and supporting auditor independence in Jordan requires having 
a code ofprofessional ethics governing the auditing profession, applying strict 
penalties to auditors who do not comply with the code ofprofessional ethics, 
and having a minimum rate of auditfees which should be respected by auditors 
so as to minimise unfavourable competition in the professional market". 
To sum up, the auditing profession has been deeply influenced by British rules and 
principles since the twenties and thirties. In the last few years the American auditing 
bases and principles have affected the auditing profession. It can be seen, moreover, 
disclosure requirements are generally lacking details, very limited and not specific 
according to the Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985. For example, 
the Accounting Auditing Profession Law No. 32 of 1985 asked auditors for a 
statement in their reports confin-ning that the statements were prepared in 
accordance with General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which never was 
defined by law. Moreover, the law determined that a person could be qualified as an 
auditor if he has a bachelor degree or its equivalent from the faculty of Commerce, 
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Law or Economics. The fact that there was no emphasis upon training in accounting 
has been considered as a weakness. 
Greater effort and effectiveness, therefore, had been achieved by the JACPA when it 
made pioneering steps towards the use of global approaches to accounting and 
auditing in Jordan. The dramatic economy development in the nineties has made 
JACPA to follow and apply international accounting and auditing principles, 
regardless of any local obstacles, by adopting policies of qualitative improvement 
and training in auditing. No doubt, the application of the IAS will make for the 
preparation of dependable and trusty financial statements, which are reliable and 
comparable to international standards and will make a difference to international 
investors. In addition, the accounting profession has started to play an important role 
in influencing the reporting practices of companies supported by the Companies Act 
and the Securities Law. However, this power for the accounting profession might 
need to be expanded in order to make the association more involved in developing 
the financial reporting in the country. Abayo et al. (1993) argued that given a 
widespread shortage of qualified accountants and auditors and the generally weaker 
influence of professional bodies, it seems reasonable to assume that both internal 
accounting systems and audit quality are often poorer in less developed countries 
than in developed nations, and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are 
less likely to be followed. This leads to an assumption of poorer quality financial 
disclosure and, in particular, the possibility of both inaccurate and incomplete 
disclosure. 
3.6 IAS: theoretical arguments and prior expectations 
There are different external environmental factors that have had an impact on 
accounting and disclosure in various countries. One of these is international and 
regional harmonisation / standardisation efforts. For instance, the EU member 
countries, in issuing a number of accounting directives has been one of the primary 
generators of such efforts influencing the accounting and disclosure of the EU 
member countries. The other primary generator of international / standardisation 
efforts has been by International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC), which 
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has issued a number of the IAS. However, despite some arguments that have 
questioned the suitability of the IAS for developing countries, it has been claimed 
that the work of the IASC has had an impact on accounting, including disclosure, 
particularly in developing countries 'see Chapter Four- Literature Review'. 
3.6.1 Standardisation: objectives and means 
It can be argued that motives for adopting the IAS varies: The economic forces of 
international trade made evident a need to overcome the obstacles created by a 
widely divergent system of financial reporting and their nationalistic antecedents. It 
can not be said that the international trade did not exist before the standardisation 
effort of financial reporting, but it can be argued that the barriers will be reduced as a 
result of this effort in a world were the multinational business is playing a significant 
role in developing not just the domestic economic growth but also the world 
economic growth. Chamisa (2000) argued that the increasing growth in international 
trade and investment has brought to the forefront problems engendered by 
differences in accounting reports used in many different countries. Studies have 
demonstrated, in a variety of ways, that a) differences in financial accounting 
measurement and reporting practices do exist; and b) these differences do actually 
create problems of misunderstandings, inefficiencies, and uncertainties to 
participants in the global economy (Arpan and Radebaugh 1985; Choi and Levich 
1991; Evans and Taylor 1982; Peavey and Webster 1990; Purvis et al. 1991). 
Nowadays firms wish to list their securities on multiple stock exchanges. This is to 
obtain exposure to new markets, obtain foreign debt and equity capital for growth 
and expansion, improving customer recognition, increasing publicity about the firm, 
having materials and technology and looking to reduce possible political costs (Gray 
1995). Prior research argues and concludes that firms competing for foreign 
resources tend to expand their financial and accounting disclosure (Zarzeski 1996). 
This expanded disclosure is assumed to reduce resource providers' uncertainty about 
transactions with the firm and, in turn enable the firm to obtain resources at lower 
cost. Choi and Levinch (1991b) argued that diversity in accounting reporting 
(measurement, presentation, and disclosure) affects capital market participants. In an 
ext ensive survey of capital market regulators and rating agencies, almost one-half of 
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the respondents stated that their capital market decisions were affected by 
accounting diversity. In the absence of common accounting principles and disclosure 
practices, analysing foreign financial statements is difficult for investors. 
Chamisa (2000) pointed out that the international accounting harmonisation 
objective is important for developing countries because of their significant reliance 
on inflows of foreign capital to finance economic and industrial developments. This 
argument is clearly relevant to the Jordanian economy which shows significant 
dependence on the international institutions for funding 'see Chapter Two- 
Jordanian Economy Development'. 
An alternative means of listing on multiple stock exchanges is by producing 
multiple financial statements to comply with the securities laws and host country 
GAAP. This however could be a very costly process to the firm and confusing to the 
financial markets, and may lead to sub-optimal resource allocation for both the firm 
and local markets (El-Gazzar 1999). 
Harmonisation of accounting standards at the international level is rapidly gaining 
momentum due to the growth in capital markets spurred by technological advances 
in communications and gradual deregulation of national capital markets. The major 
players promoting harmonised standards are two international bodies: the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) (Hora 1997). Sharpe (1998); and 
Street et al. (1999) argued that the benefits of international accounting standards 
include the reduction of investment risks and cost of capital worldwide, the lowering 
of cost arising from multiple reporting, the elimination of confusion arising from 
different measures of financial position and performance across countries, the 
encouragement of international investment, and the more efficient allocation of 
saving worldwide. IOSCO is playing a major role in adopting IAS globally by 
encouraging its member stock exchanges to recognise IAS and by advising the IASC 
on the probable acceptability of standards (Thorell and Whittington 1994). 
As a consequence, it could be argued that complying with IAS will likely to increase 
substantially the amount of cross-border financing which means economies become 
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more and more inter-dependent. In this regard, Street et al. (1999) reported in his 
empirical study that with the revision of IAS 8, IASC guidelines on extraordinary 
items are in some instances stricter than national requirements. Illustrative of this 
scenario, in its 1996 and 1995 financial statements prepared according to the GAAP 
in Finland, one company from his sample reported discontinued operations as 
extraordinary items on the 1996 and 1995 profit/loss statements. In its 1995 
profit/loss statement, the company also reports the cumulative effect of a change in 
accounting principle as an extraordinary item. However, the profit/loss account 
prepared according to IAS includes no extraordinary item. Such deviation between 
national guidelines and IAS can be confusing for users of financial statements, 
decrease substantially the amount of cross-border financing and illustrate the need 
for harmonisation of standards. 
In addition to the previous discussion, it has been argued that in an efficient global 
market, if the inherent reliability and timeliness of accounting information is 
questionable, investors and creditors will impose higher costs of financing on 
companies providing misinformation. According to Al-Issa (1988); Abu-Nassar 
(1993); and Abu-Baker (1995) the reliability and timeliness of accounting 
information in Jordan is questionable. 
3.6.2 Relevance of IAS for Developing Countries: the case of Jordan 
It has been argued that IAS are not appropriate for all developing countries because 
of their differences socially, culturally and politically (Briston 1978; Perera 1985; 
Samuels and Oliga 1982). However, it has to be mentioned that all of these studies 
investigate countries that had radical change from communistic to capitalistic 
economies. 
Briston (1978) argued, in short, there is a fact that developing countries are an 
amorphous and heterogeneous group. Therefore generalising a conclusion by saying 
IAS irrelevant for developing countries is a great danger. Samuels (1990); Samuels 
(1993); and Samuels and Oliga (1982), who oppose the wholesale adoption of the 
IAS, argue that accounting professions in developing countries should try to assist in 
designing reporting systems that are the most useful for economic decision making 
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within the country, rather than trying to persuade the country to adopt systems that 
are needed for international trade and business. It is possible the two can be 
developed simultaneously but the latter should not be seen as a substitute for the 
former. 
According to Samuels (1993), the adaptation of IAS is an example of an attempt to 
develop a system that satisfies both the development of locally relevant standards 
while adopting foreign systems. Perera (1985), who more vehemently argues against 
the adoption of these standards, stresses that the available evidence suggests that the 
IASC standards have not been able to make any significant impact upon accounting 
practices of developing countries. The IASC standards cannot be expected to be 
successful in developing countries particularly for two main reasons, (a) they are 
based on experiences which are totally different from those found in developed 
countries, and (b) lack of relevant standards is only one of several problems in the 
field of accounting in developing countries, for example, weak financial 
management accounting systems in business enterprises, inadequate accounting 
knowledge for primary users of accounting information, weak professional control, 
deficiencies in education and research are some of them. 
Cairns (1997) argued, on the other hand, that it is increasingly apparent that the 
different economic, social and legal considerations which have influenced national 
accounting do not necessarily result in different accounting and that countries are 
reaching the same answers irrespective of their different cultural backgrounds (or 
reaching different answers in spite of their similar cultural backgrounds). The 
adoption of the IAS is supported by many researchers 'see for example Aitken and 
Islam (1983); Turner (1983); Merei (1985); Belkaoui (1988) and Cairns (1990)'. 
They argued that the rationale behind such an adoption strategy may be to (a) reduce 
the set-up and production costs of accounting standards, (b) join the international 
harmonisation drive, (c) facilitate the growth of foreign investment which may be 
needed, (d) enable its profession to emulate well-established professional standards 
of behaviour and conduct, and (e) legitimise its status as a full-fledged member of 
the international community. 
As it can be clearly seen, Jordan suffered from the lack of experience in developing 
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national GAAP, an acute shortage of financial and manpower resources and lack of 
legal procedures for financial disclosure 'see sections 3.2,3.3,3.4 and 3.5'. This 
situation could be generalised for most of the developing countries who 
implementing the IAS as an appropriate alternative to bridge the gap and avoid 
paying an expensive price for developing a national GAAP. In this regard, 
Ashbaugh (1997) provided evidence on why firms adopt IAS. She found in her 
empirical study that IAS is more restrictive with respect to accounting measurement 
choices in 16 of the 17 countries she examined and required more disclosures than 
Foreign-GAAP in every country, suggesting that firms adopting IAS were meeting 
higher recognition and disclosure standards than required under their domestic 
GAAP- More importantly, Ashbaugh also compared foreign firms that adopt IAS to 
those that choose Foreign-GAAP using a logit analysis. She found that the 
probability of adopting IAS was higher for firms in countries with lower disclosure 
requirements, as it is the case in Jordan, and where IAS more severely restricts their 
measurement choice, after controlling for fin-n size, the number of markets in which 
the firm is listed, and future equity offerings, suggesting that these firms adopt IAS 
to improve their disclosure. 
Several academic accountants argue that 1AS is irrelevant for developing countries 
because of the size and dominance of the public sector (Briston 1978; Perera 1985; 
Samuels and Oliga 1982). However, in Jordan this situation has been changed 
significantly during the recent years toward privatisation. The private sector has 
already taken over the businesses 'see Chapter Two- section 2.5'. Thus, this argue 
does not hold for Jordan. Furthermore, the argument may not be valid especially in 
the absence of empirical evidence. It can be seen that in a country like UK the public 
sector represented by the National Health Service (NHS) is playing a significant 
role. In Switzerland there are significant public sector owned enterprises. In these 
countries the public sector operates as a private business making a return on capital 
which means that the IASC standards maybe relevant. 
In capitalist economies, an active capital market is essential for allocating resources 
and promoting economic growth. A prerequisite for any capital market is confidence 
that prices are fair. Fair prices can only come about if both buyers and sellers are 
equally well informed. It could be argued that IAS provides this information and at 
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low cost to the Jordanian economy, an issue which will be investigated empirically 
in this study. 
Therefore, there is general agreement that useful accounting reports and appropriate 
accounting and auditing standards are essential for the development of the capital 
market and as a result for the economy itself (Mahon 1965; Scott 1968; Staking and 
Schulz 1999). Jordan, on the other hand, never had a system for producing its own 
national GAAP. Moreover, neither the Companies Acts nor the Amman Financial 
Market Laws specified the accounting standards to be applied by Jordanian 
companies. The Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JAPCA), 
however, recommended the adaptation of IAS in 1990. But, the JAPCA did not have 
the legal power to force Jordanian companies to follow its recommendations. The 
Companies Law No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 required from 
companies under their supervision to adopt the IAS as the basis for Jordanian 
accounting practices. Furthermore, the Securities Law adopted international auditing 
and performance evaluation standards for all entities falling under the supervision of 
the Security Commission 'see Sections 3.2 and 3.4'. 
In addition, since 1988 Jordan is one of the IASCs member developing countries 
which have experienced significant change in its economic strategy and policies. 
This has been achieved by signing different open trading agreements such as the free 
trading agreement with EU and the USA 'see Chapter Two- section 2.5'. For these 
changes in capital markets and trade to happen, reliable accounting is required. 
Given that the accounting profession in Jordan is still in the early stage of 
development and therefore is incapable of developing its own standards within a 
reasonable time period, it suggests that IAS should be adopted. This would enable 
the accounting profession in Jordan to concentrate on more fundamental matters 
such as disclosure of financial information, valuation methods, poor internal control, 
lack of management accounting concepts, incomplete and inaccurate late records, 
un-auditable systems and lack of comparability of financial statements. The 
disclosure requirements were weak (e. g. annual financial statements were delayed, 
the role of financial intermediaries was weak, and there were no financial analysis 
and research). . 
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3.7 Summary 
As it is mentioned in the beginning, the amount of information disclosed by 
companies in an economy depends on the level of development, the legislation in 
force, the development of the accounting profession and the existence of a 
sophisticated financial market. In other words, required disclosure is laid down by 
statute, professional regulations and the listing requirements of stock exchange. 
Therefore, the extent to which companies comply with legal and regulatory 
requirements depends on the strictness or laxity of the government, professional and 
other regulatory bodies. The Chapter, therefore, explores the role of legislation, the 
profession and the Jordanian financial market in shaping and influencing the current 
financial reporting practices of public shareholding companies in Jordan in order to 
examine the needy of adopting IAS. 
It can be argued that before 1997, the legal and regulatory framework and financial 
reporting in Jordan was very limited. The Companies Act 1964 and 1989 did not 
mention of any specific disclosure requirements with regard to the contents of 
financial statements. There were no specific legal requirements existing as to the 
form and contents of such statements beyond the requirement that they must prepare 
according to GAAP (e. g. Companies Act did not provide any regulations for 
depreciation and inventory valuation), which were not themselves defined by law. 
Companies Act, therefore, were very limited in scope and it expressed in loose, in 
general terms, limited content and coverage. The Companies Act 1989 required 
companies to prepare an annual report, including a profit and loss account and 
balance sheet, with comparative figures and explanatory notes. Jordanian companies 
also published a statement of changes in financial position annually before 1995 and 
the cash flow statement after that year, although neither statement was required 
either by the Companies Act or by the Amman Financial Market Law. As a 
consequence of the Jordanian economy development, a new Companies Act has 
been published (Companies Act No. 23 of 1997) requiring the financial statements to 
be prepared based upon the accounting standards adopted internationally. 
Currently, Income Tax Law has very limited requirements concerning income 
measurement and asset valuation methods. The law requires certain types of 
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companies who practise their activities in Jordan to prepare their records on the 
basis of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles that are proved by the 
specialised authority 
Furthermore, before 1997, Amman Financial Market Law could be seen as lax, 
vague and loose concerned only with shareholders and investors and discussed the 
disclosure of information in general terms. In addition, the few requirements were 
concerned more about the prevention of insider trading than the provision of 
information in companies' reports. In this sense, the AFM could be described as an 
unregulated market in which listed companies were not subject to any stringent 
disclosure requirements. The law did not differentiate between the process of the 
exchange of securities and the process of controlling and regulating the market. 
Securities Law No. 23 of 1997, therefore, adopted IAS, international auditing and 
performance evaluation standards for all entities falling under the supervision of the 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC). Moreover, the new law specified 
requirements relating to the content of a company's annual report. 
Finally regarding the accounting profession in Jordan, the auditing profession had 
been deeply influenced by British rules and principles since the twenties and thirties. 
In the last few years the American auditing bases and principles have affected the 
auditing. It can be seen, moreover, disclosure requirements are generally lacking 
details, very limited and not specific. Greater effort and effectiveness, therefore, had 
been achieved by the JACPA adopting pioneering steps towards the more adopt 
global approaches of accounting and auditing standards in Jordan effective from 
1990. Therefore, it could be said that in spite of the fact that JACPA had not the 
legal power before 1997 to enforce its requirements, its adoption of the IAS in 1990 
was the only guide to the accounting practices to be adopted by Jordanian companies 
before 1998, when the new Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law 
No. 23 of 1997 have become effective. The accounting profession, on the other hand, 
nowadays has started to play an important role in influencing the reporting practices 
of companies supported by the Companies Act and the Securities Law. However, 
this power for the accounting profession might need to be expanded in order to 
make the association more involved in developing the financial reporting in the 
country. 
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In conclusion, it can be clearly seen that the accounting problems in Jordan relate to 
disclosure of financial information, valuation methods, poor internal control, lack of 
management accounting concepts, incomplete and inaccurate late records, un- 
auditable systems and lack of comparability of financial statements highlighted the 
necessity of adopting the IAS. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Introduction 
As the first objective of this study is to investigate the impact of IAS on extent of 
disclosure, this chapter therefore will review the literature concerning disclosure 
practice in compliance with IAS in both; developing and developed countries. 
Moreover, since the extent of disclosure is varied among individual companies, 
another objective of this study is to examine the impact of economic entity factors 
known as company-specific factors on extent of disclosure. The aim in this 
chapter, therefore, is to provide a review of the relevant literature. More 
specifically, this chapter will review studies that examined the impact of 
company-specific factors on disclosure practices adopted by companies. In 
addition, as the financial consequences (systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility) are one of the major 
issues in this study to be investigated, this chapter will review studies that 
explored fully or partly these aspects in both developed and developing countries. 
Such a review helps to identify gaps in the literature, which this study aims to 
address. It may also help to establish a structure for the current study and identify 
findings of previous studies relevant to the study being undertaken. In addition, 
analysis of previous studies assists in determining an appropriate research 
methodology. 
4.2 Review of empirical studies concerning disclosure in compliance with 
1AS 
A number of studies have been carried out in last three decades to evaluate 
directly or indirectly the impact of IAS on developed and developing countries. 
Some of the notable ones are reviewed below in chronological order. 
Nair and Frank (1981) 
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In this relatively early study, Nair and Frank surveyed the effect of IAS 1-10 on 
the accounting practices of 37 countries, a majority of which were from the 
developing countries by using the Price Waterhouse (PW) surveys published in 
1973,1975 and 1979. They analysed the data (i. e. changes in distribution of 
countries among categories) by employing the non-parametric Friedman's 
Analysis of variance test. Based on their findings, their overall conclusion was 
that: 
"The period of the IASCs existence has coincided with a growing 
harmonisation of accounting standards. This association between the two 
is strengthened by the fact that many of the topics on which the IASC has 
issued pronouncements are those on which the authors observe 
harmonisation " (P. 77). 
Evans and Taylor (1982) 
With the aim of determining the impact of the IASC standards on financial 
reporting in member nations, Evans and Taylor studied compliance by large 
corporations in France, Spain, UK, USA and West Germany with the main 
requirements of five IAS (2,3,4,6 and 7) over six years. They gathered the data 
from the analysis of annual reports of 9-10 companies from each country for the 
period 1975-1988 (i. e. the period when the five IAS were introduced) and 
analysed them using percentages in respect of extent of compliance per country 
for each year. They reported that: 
"The IASC has had very little impact on the accounting practices of the 
countries surveyed Except for a few instances, a country following a 
particular methodprior to promulgation ofan IASC standard continued to 
follow the same practice after the standard's issuance ". 
Tay and Parker (1990) questioned three aspects of this study: Firstly, the use of 
English-language version of annual reports, choice of countries and companies 
sampled. This criticism was based on the possibility that they could have been 
abridged or the financial statements restated on bases other than those used in the 
original statements. Secondly, they questioned the choice of countries on the 
ground that no justification was made for elimination of other countries that were 
also founding members of the IASC. Thirdly, they questioned the choice of 
companies sampled on the basis that they were not matched. Further criticism of 
this study came from Nobes (1996), who pointed out misinterpretation of certain 
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findings in the study, claiming that this paper illustrates some typical problems 
with some research in international accounting. 
McKinnon and Janell (1984) 
This study analysed direct and indirect influence of the IAS on accounting 
practices of countries by looking at the three topics contained in the IAS: 
depreciation, equity method and currency translation. Using the Price Waterhouse 
(PW) 1979-survey results, the authors first examined existing financial reporting 
practices with respect to the said issues within 64 countries covered in the PW 
survey to determine if practice confirmed with IAS. They then made a country-by- 
country analysis to answer the question "Has practice changed to reflect the new 
standard, or does practice confirm for other reasons? " (P. 22). They concluded, 
"The IASC has not succeeded in changing existing standards or setting new 
standards. " This study, like other similar studies that used the same data source 
(i. e. the PW survey) was criticised on the ground that original PW survey data 
contain errors (Nobes 1981; Nobes 1996). 
Doupnik and Taylor (1985) 
This study attempted to assess compliance of countries, particularly western 
European countries, with the first eight IASC standards over the years 1979 and 
1983 and across groups of countries (e. g. EU members, non-EU members, etc. ). 
For data on accounting practices in 1979, they analysed the PW 1979 survey and 
for the year 1983 they conducted their own questionnaire to PW offices world- 
wide, receiving responses from 50 countries 16 of which are located in Western 
Europe. The questionnaire contained 53 propositions representing measurement 
procedure and disclosure requirements recommended in the first eight IAS and 
there were five response categories with respect to each issue, ranging from 
required to not permitting. Doupnik and Taylor, having weighted each response 
category, calculated average scores for countries as well as the groups of 
countries. They used non-parametric statistics to differentiate groups of countries. 
No statistical test was employed to test the significance of changes in level of 
compliance over years. Their overall findings seem to support the hypothesis that 
many differences still exist in western European accounting practices, though 
some increased compliance with the IAS was found. The other two noteworthy 
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specific findings reported in this study are that EU member countries' level of 
compliance with the IAS is higher than that of non-EU members. Moreover, EU 
countries were more inclined to conform to propositions related to disclosure 
requirements than those related to measurement practices. Findings of this 
research, however, were disputed by Nobes (1987) who argued that the data was 
too weak to support the detailed numerical analysis, descriptions and conclusions 
of DouPnik and Taylor. 
Taylor, Evans and Joy (1986) 
This study sought to answer the question of whether or not the comparability and 
consistency of international accounting reporting practices for five IAS (1,2,3,4 
and 7) have improved significantly since the standards were issued. They evaluate 
comparability and consistency before and after the IAS were issued based on the 
results of a questionnaire that was directed to accountants in 40 countries. The 
paired-samples Mest was used to test the significance of differences in 
comparability and consistency before and after the IAS were issued. The 
researchers concluded that the IASC, through its international accounting 
standards, appears to be succeeding in improving the comparability and 
consistency of international accounting reporting practices. 
1ASC Surveys (1988 and 1997) 
The IASC published two surveys to evaluate the use and application of the IAS. 
IASC survey in 1988 was based on the responses to a questionnaire sent to IASC 
member bodies in 70 countries. In the questionnaire, the IASC member bodies 
were asked to indicate 1) the extent to which national requirements to practices 
conform with each of the first 25 IAS and 2) whether financial statements issued 
to external users generally conform, in all material aspects, with IAS and, if so, 
whether they disclose this fact. On the bases of a descriptive analysis of 
questionnaire results, the IASC reported that in the majority of countries' national 
requirements or practices conform with 23 of the existing 25 IAS and that the 
financial statements of the majority of private-sector and public-sector trading 
enterprises conform in all material respects with the IAS, but disclosure of such 
conformity was found to be rare. 
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The IASC carried out its second survey in 1996 and published only the results of a 
preliminary analysis of the responses in 1997. The main findings in the survey are 
that 56 of the 67 countries either look directly to IAS as their national standards or 
develop national standards based primarily on IAS. In only II out of 67 countries 
are national standards developed primarily without reference to IAS. An important 
point to note is that the ma ority of countries found to be using IAS as national 
standards in this study are developing countries, which will be discussed in more 
details in the following section. The survey also found that IAS are accepted by 
many stock exchanges, including London, Frankfurt, Zurich, Luxembourg, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, Amsterdam and Rome. 
An important limitation has to be mentioned in both surveys. In each survey the 
questions asked related to entire standards rather than to specific issues inside 
each standard. Accounting requirements in a country may conform to most of a 
standard while specific parts are not conformed with at all -(Robert et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, the questionnaire surveys, which were completed by the member 
bodies of IASC, may be subject to some "wishful thinking bias" (Robert et al. 
1996; Saudagaran and Meek 1996). To gain a full picture of the extent of which 
companies or countries comply with IAS far less aggregated data must be 
employed. It is necessary to know the level of compliance with specific rules or 
issues rather than compliance with overall standards. 
Nobes (1990) 
In this study Nobes examined the direct effects of the IASC standards on listed 
USA corporations by looking at those corporations' compliance with IAS in three 
areas of disclosure where there were IASC requirements but no USA GAAP. The 
areas chosen in this study were IAS 3's requirement to show minority interest in 
the consolidated balance sheet, IAS 4's requirement to show lives of depreciable 
assets and rates of depreciation, and the disclosure requirements of IAS 22 
addressing the "pooling" (e. g. amount of assets transferred in pooling, effective 
date of pooling, etc. ). Having gathered data with respect to each case from the 
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annual reports of listed USA corporations, ' Nobes first examined whether or not a 
significant of sampled USA corporations were complying with the specified 
requirements of the IAS. In each case, compliance by a sample of companies was 
found to be significantly less than 50%. For minority interest disclosure and 
pooling disclosure, he carried out further analysis to determine if there had been 
moves towards compliance since the introduction of relevant IAS. In both cases, 
his analysis revealed that there were no such movements. Nobes concluded that 
"The results of the study provide sufficient evidence to accept the 
hypotheses that differential requirements of IAS are not obeyed by most 
listed companies and IAS have no direct impact " (P. 49). 
Purvis, Gernon and Diamond (1991) 
In their empirical analysis of compliance with IASC standards pre-E32 (pre the 
IASC Comparability Projece) for EU members, the researchers grouped countries 
into three types: un-standardised; independent of the IASC; and dependent upon 
the IASC. Greece was found to fall into the un-standardised group while all other 
EU members (with the exception of Luxembourg and Portugal which were not 
included in this study) fell into the independent group. This, however, does not 
mean that the overall level of congruence with IAS is necessarily low. The lowest 
degree of congruence was that of Denmark with a 'conformity index' of 60% 
followed by France at 76%, while the other EU members all followed at least 80% 
of the IASC standards. While this clearly suggests that there is a relatively high 
level of congruence between the IASC and EU, these results must be treated with 
a degree of caution. That is because the results relate to the position before the 
Comparability Project. Therefore, depending upon the specific options followed 
by companies, the degree to which companies follow those practices permitted by 
1 Data with respect to the first two areas were gathered from the 1985 annual reports 20of 200 
randomly chosen listed USA corporations (1976 annual reports of 15 of companies that complied 
with IAS 3 in 1985 were further analysed). With respect to the last area, data were collected from 
the 1983,1984 and 1985 annual reports of 61 listed USA corporations. 
2 While IAS issued during the 1970s and 1980s were recognised to have made some progress 
towards international harmonisation, by the late 1980s the performance of the IASC was 
increasingly criticised because of the flexibility of the IAS and a continuing lack of comparability 
across country boarders. An important agreement in 1988 between IASC and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) has been developed to find a way to allow 
company to list its securities in any foreign stock market on the basis of one set of financial 
statements conforming to IASC (Cairns 1995). The IASC responded with its Comparability 
Project defined in its Exposure Draft E32, Comparability of Financial Statements IASC (1989) 
aiming to improve disclosure requirements and reduce the number of alternative accounting 
treatments then permitted so as to enhance the credibility and acceptability of JAS by the IOSCO. 
During this project the IASC revised ten IAS, effective 1995. Additional standards developed and 
introduced in accordance with the agreement with IOSCO to complete a core set of IAS by 1999. 
123 
Chapter Four 
the Comparability Project may be very much lower than these results indicate. 
Secondly, the data used were those generated by the IASC (1988), which has been 
criticised as mentioned earlier. 
Graham and Wang (1995) 
With the specific aim of providing evidence of the influence of IAS on the 
development of Taiwanese accounting standards, Graham and Wang looked at 
whether the recently issued Taiwanese accounting standards were conforming 
with the IAS. In this descriptive, non-statistical study, having analysed 17 recently 
issued Taiwanese accounting standards for comparability with existing IAS, they 
updated the information relating to Taiwan found in the 1988 IASC survey to 
determine if the extent of conformity of the Taiwanese GAAP to IAS had 
increased since 1988. They found an indication that the Taiwanese GAAP are 
increasingly in conformity with IAS. The conclusion was that 
"Taiwan considers LIS in the development of its accounting standards and 
that IAS are applicable to the formation of accounting standards in 
economically developing countries " (P. 149). 
The later remark in this conclusion, however, can be questioned on the ground 
that an increase in the level of conformity of a developing country's GAAP with 
the IAS itself does not necessarily indicate applicability of IAS on developing 
countries because the envirom-nent within which accounting develops is not the 
same in each developing country. 
Al-Basteki (1995) 
In this study Al-Basteki looked at 1) the extent of voluntary adoption of IAS by 
publicly traded corporations in Bahrain over 10 years and 2) the factors associated 
with voluntary adoption of IAS by the said corporations. Data regarding the 
voluntary adoption of the IAS were gathered from the audit reports of 26 publicly 
traded Bahraini companies during the 1982-1991 periods. The data with respect of 
five specific factors (i. e. audit firm, industry type, company size, foreign operation 
and leverage) were gathered from the 1991 annual reports of the same 26 
corporations. A descriptive analysis of the extent of voluntary adoption revealed 
that the majority of examined Bahraini companies (58%) had adopted IAS in 1991 
and the number of companies that had adopted IAS increased during the years 
1982-1991 from 5 to 15. Furthermore, the association between voluntary adoption 
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of IAS and audit firm and industry type were tested through "sample partition" 
and the other factors were tested using a variety of univariate tests. The results 
indicated that only external auditors have influenced the IAS adoption/non- 
adoption decision made by Bahraini publicly traded firms. 
An important point to note is that Bahrain did not have national GAAP at the time 
this research was carried out and almost all companies selected in this study were 
audited by one of the big international audit firms. Al-Basteki having 
acknowledged that the findings in his study might not be generalisable to other 
developing countries as each country has its unique socio-economic environment 
influence its accounting practices, pointed out a need for further similar studies to 
be carried out in other developing countries. 
Emenyonu and Gray (1996) 
Following the similar methodological approach adopted in their earlier study, in 
their study in 1992 attempting to evaluate whether or not accounting measurement 
practices in three EU Member States (France, Germany, and UK), Japan and USA 
were harmonise as at the end of 1989 in the context of EU harmonisation effort, 
the researchers attempted in this study to assess the extent to which accounting 
measurement and associated disclosure practices of large listed companies from 
the five countries said had become more harmonised internationally since 1973 
when the IASC was established. This assessment was made by an examination of 
29 key accounting measurements and 17 related disclosure issues as at 1991/1992 
and a comparison made with the position as at 1971/1972. Data with respect to 
each specified issue were gathered from annual reports of 293 sampled companies 
across the five countries. Like their previous study, they used a chi-square test to 
assess the significance of changes in accounting measurements and associated 
disclosure practice over the years 1971-199 1. Their overall conclusion was that 
"The impact of efforts to reduce international accounting diversity over 
the years 1971-1991 has been, in general terms, quite modest" (P. 278). 
Roberts et al. (1996) 
Using data from practicing auditors, this study examines how closely the IASC 
revised standards through the Comparability Project match existing EU financial 
reporting practices. The study used a questionnaire containing 27 issues for 
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collecting the data required by directly asking the company or experts who are 
likely to have detailed knowledge of corporate accounting practices, what actual 
practices are followed by companies. For each of the 27 issues, respondents were 
asked to indicate what percentage the organisations in their country followed each 
of several listed treatments. Listed treatments included, where appropriated: 1) 
IASC benchmark treatment, 2) IASC alternative treatment(s), 3) other described 
practices, and 4) an unspecified 'other' category. The study found that while EU 
financial reporting practices mirror many of the IASC recommendations, there 
were still considerable differences, both within the EU and between the EU 
countries as a whole and the IASC. 
Street et al. (1999) 
This empirical study addresses the extent of compliance with IAS revised during 
the Comparability Project to which companies claiming to comply with IAS and 
the nature and significance of measurement and disclosure noncompliance. The 
annual report of a list of 49 companies around the world most of them from 
developed countries (France, Sweden, Canada, Finland, Germany and 
Switzerland) claiming to comply with IAS in 1996 obtained from IASC who has 
publicised the fact that these companies have stated their voluntary commitment 
to comply with IAS in late 1996. The selected companies have been chosen after 
meeting the following additional criteria; a) 1995 sales of at least $1 billion, and 
b) they are non-regulated and non-financial industry. The findings reveal 
significant noncompliance with IAS including: use of Lower of Cost or Market 
(LCM) method for inventories measurement where IAS 2 allowed to use First In 
First Out (FIFO), Weighted Average or Last In First Out (LIFO) methods; 
violation of the all-inclusive requirement for reporting profit/loss and of the strict 
definition of extraordinary items; failure to capitalise certain development costs; 
failure to provide all required disclosure for property, plant and equipment, 
particularly those associated with revaluations; failure to comply with pension 
disclosure requirements; for companies operating in hyperinflationary economies, 
failure to restate foreign entities in accordance with IAS 29; and charging 
goodwill to reserves or amortising goodwill over a period in excess of the 20 year 
limit. In addition, where compliance with all or most of IAS is indicated in the 
accounting policy footnote and/or audit opinion, there are notable examples of 
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noncompliance with the measurement and disclosure requirements of individual 
IAS in practice. The researcher concluded that the degree of compliance by 
companies claiming to comply with IAS is very mixed and somewhat selective. 
Noncompliance, as evidenced by the current research, is very problematic for the 
IASC as it strives to achieve an International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) endorsement and as IAS Revised becomes effective for 
1999 financial statements, therefore. 
Chamisa (2000) 
In this study the researcher investigated the contradiction between the 
considerable increase in the number of accounting professional bodies in 
developing countries who are adopting the IASC standards against the backdrop 
of academic arguments suggesting that the IASC standards are irrelevant and/or 
even harmful to these countries. This contradiction and the question of the 
relevance of IASC standards to developing countries were evaluated and explored 
using Zimbabwe as a case study. The study examined and evaluated further the 
relevance of the IASC standards to developing countries, measuring the extent to 
which corporations in Zimbabwe conform to the IASC standards, and measuring 
the impact of the IASC standards on the accounting and reporting practices of 
enterprises in Zimbabwe. To determine the level of compliance and the impact of 
the IASC standards on the accounting and reporting practices of listed Zimbabwe 
companies, four published annual reports (one each for 1975,1980,1985 and 
1990) were collected for 40 listed companies covered all sectors and a disclosure 
index was prepared based on the requirements of IAS I to 22. The results of both 
compliance level and the impact of the IASC standards on the reporting practices 
of listed Zimbabwe companies appeared to be significant and seemed to buttress 
the conclusion that the IASC standards are relevant to Zimbabwe and similar 
capitalistic developing countries where the private sector dominate the economy 
and the capital market exists. Chamisa concluded by arguing that these results 
suggest important implications for the IAC's standardisation program. 
In short, it can be argued that number of studies were undertaken to evaluate the 
impact of the IAS on various countries. The results of these studies, however, do 
not provide conclusive evidence regarding the influences of the IAS. For example, 
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while Ahmed (1996); Chamisa (2000); Nair and Frank (1981) found an indication 
of the success of the IASC, the results of studies by Doupnik and Taylor (1985); 
Evans and Taylor (1982); Purvis et al. (1991); Robert et al. (1996) provide little 
indication of the impact of the IAS in various countries. Nobes (1990); Street et 
al. (1999), similarly, found no evidence of such impact. An interesting point to 
note is that direct or indirect evidence founded as regards the influence of the IAS 
are generally those studies that were concerned with developing countries (Al- 
Basteki 1995; Graham and Wang 1995) or covered mainly developing countries 
(Nair and Frank 19 8 1). 
4.2.1 The impact of IAS on developing countries 
Despite the substantial arguments that have questioned the suitability of the IAS 
on developing countries 'see Chapter Three - section 3.6.2', it has been claimed 
that the work of the IASC has had an impact on accounting in developing 
countries (Iddamalgoda 1986; Nobes and Parker 1995) due to a number of reasons 
as discussed earlier in the previous chapter. 
One of the indications regarding the influences of the IAS on developing countries 
is the adoption of the IAS by a number of developing countries. For instance, 
Purvis et al. (1991) in an empirical analysis of compliance with IASC standards, 
grouped countries into three types: un-standardised, independent of the IASC and 
dependent upon the IASC. A total of 11 countries were found to fall into the 
dependent upon IASC group, all of which are developing countries. Some further 
indication regarding the use of IAS by developing countries can also be seen in 
the results of a survey carried out by the IASC in 1997 after grouping countries 
into three types: IAS used as national standards, IAS used as national standards 
but national standards developed for topics not covered by IAS and IAS are used 
directly as national standards but, in some cases, may be modified for local 
conditions. All of the 9 countries where IAS were used as national standards and 
all of the 14 countries where IAS were used directly as national standards but, in 
some cases, modified for local conditions were "developing countries". 
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Chamisa (2000) reviewed the historical development of the IASC influence by 
arguing that the membership of the IASC has increased rapidly over the years. 
The IASC was set up in 1973 at the initiative of Henry Benson, the British 
chartered accountant, by the professional accountancy bodies of nine countries 
containing 16 members: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. By January 
1983, it had 88 members from 64 countries, by January 1992, there were 105 
members from 78 countries, and by September 1999 there were 143 members 
from 104 countries (Nobes 1999). The proportion of IASC members from 
developing countries shot from 6% in 1973 to about 84% by September 1999. The 
majority of the IASC members from developing countries have adopted the IAS. 
In addition, the number of professional accounting bodies from developing 
countries joining the IASC and adopting its standards has increased despite 
overwhelming academic arguments suggesting that the IAS are irrelevant or even 
harmful to these countries (Briston 1978; Perera 1985; Perera 1989; Samuels and 
Oliga 1982). 
Furthermore, there is a rule that the IASC Board who has the power in voting, 
issuing and approving a new standard should include representatives of not less 
than three developing countries. 3 One of the IASC objectives as mentioned by 
Cairns (1997), moreover, is to ensure that IAS meet the financial reporting needs 
of developing countries and newly industrialised countries, such an objective 
might contribute to attract more developing countries in adopting the IAS. 
An interesting argument has to be mentioned, however, is that the founding date 
of the IASC is very significant, for on I January 1973, the UK joined the 
European Union. Many people believe that the IASC was set up primarily at the 
instigation of the British accountancy profession as a counterweight to the 
harmonisation ambitions of the European Commission; in 1971 this body had 
already issued its proposed draft of an accounting directive, which largely 
reflected German law and practice. The British accountancy profession was 
horrified at the thought of being obliged to accept alien accounting principles 
3 Under the IASC rules, a three quarters majority of the board (13 votes out of 16) is necessary for 
the issue of a standard. 
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consequent on Britain's entry into the European Union. It is claimed that the 
hidden agenda of the IASC was to issue standards that reflected Anglo-American 
practice, which the UK (and similarly minded countries) could use as ammunition 
in its endeavors to stop the European Union from imposing accounting rules that 
conflicted with British practice (Hopwood 1994). To extend the Hopwood 
argument, Flower (1997) argued that the year 1995 witnessed two events which 
over the next few years are likely to have a major impact on financial reporting at 
the international level: 1) the agreement between the International Organisation of 
Securities Commission (IOSCO) and the IASC which envisaged that the IASC 
standards would be acceptable by the major stock exchanges for the accounts of 
foreign companies, and 2) the announcement by the European Commission that it 
proposed to allow European mutli-national companies to use the IASC standards. 
Flower added that although it is, as yet, too early to forecast, present indications 
are that IOSCO/IASC agreement will not lead to a major change in the 
relationship between America and the rest of the world; the American will 
continue to apply US GAAP in splendid isolation. But the partnership between the 
European Commission and the IASC may well become the most significant force 
in international accounting. Flower ended his argument by saying that the major 
problem is identified as being that the IASC is dominated by the Anglo-American 
approach to financial reporting. In his second article which came as a result of 
strong objection by Cairns (1997) against the idea of IASC being dominated by 
Anglo-American approach, Flower (1998) claimed that his previous work made 
two major propositions: 1) that, in the past, the IASC had been dominated by the 
Anglo-Americans' and has followed their approach in financial reporting, and 2) 
that, in the future, there may be a realignment of the forces that govern financial 
reporting at the international level. 
In spite of the above argument by Hopwood and Flower, an interesting point 
raised by Belkaoui (1992) is that 
"some of the developing countries give more credence to the IASC ... than do some of the developed countries that have a dominant influence in the 
preparation ofsuch standards" (P. 49 1). 
Indeed, the results of the above reviewed study by Nobes, who found that IAS 
have no direct impact on listed USA companies, Al-Basteki (1995), who found 
that companies in Bahrain have increasingly adopted voluntarily the IAS over the 
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years, and Street et al. (1999), who found that significant noncompliance with IAS 
for companies claiming compliance with IAS tend to support such a view. 
Furthermore, among the above reviewed studies, unlike the study by Doupnik and 
Taylor (1985); Evans and Taylor (1982); Purvis et al. (199 1); Robert et al. (1996), 
which were concerned exclusively with developed countries and found little 
indication of the impact of the standards issued by the IASC, the study by Nair 
and Frank, covered 37 developed and developing countries a majority of which 
were developing countries, and also the studies by Ahmed (1996); Al-Basteki 
(1995); Chamisa (2000); Graham and Wang (1995) found an indication of the 
success of the IASC. According to Iddamalgoda (1986), the evidence of success 
found by Nair and Frank study may be primarily attributed to the adoption of IAS 
by developing countries. 
4.2.2 Abstract and evaluation 
It could be argued that there have been substantial efforts to increase global 
standardisation. The primary generator of such efforts has been the IAS. The 
IASC, which is an independent private-sector body, has issued several IAS since 
1973 addressing most of the important issues of corporate financial reporting, 
including accounting disclosure 'see Appendix 2'. Despite the lack of 
enforcement power, there are arguments that the IASC has had some success in 
getting incorporated into the national standards of certain member countries, 
particularly developing countries. The results of empirical studies that attempted 
to evaluate directly or indirectly the impact of IAS on various countries, some of 
which were reviewed in this chapter, however, provided mixed evidence. Among 
the reviewed studies that looked at compliance with or observance of IAS at a 
point in time or over the years in various countries, the results of studies by the 
Al-Basteki (1995); Chamisa (2000); Graham and Wang (1995); IASC (1997a); 
IASC (1988); IASC (1997b); Nair and Frank (1981) provide a strong indication 
regarding the impact of the IAS. The results of relatively early longitudinal studies 
by Doupnik and Taylor (1985); Evans and Taylor (1982); McKinnon and Janell 
(1984) provide little evidence and finally the studies by Nobes (1990); Street et al. 
(19 99) provides no evidence regarding the impact of the IAS. 
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On the other hand, use and/or adopting of the IAS by a number of developing 
countries as evidenced in the studies by the IASC (I 997a); IASC (I 997b); Purvis 
et al. (1991) as well as the results of studies that considered influence of the IAS 
on a developing country (Ahmed 1996; Al-Basteki 1995; Chamisa 2000; Graham 
and Wang 1995; Nair and Frank 198 1), tend to support the claim that the work of 
the IASC has had some impact on accounting in developing countries. Wallace 
(1987, P. 223) pointed out that developing countries are not a homogenous group, 
which makes a generalisation about the impact of the IAS on accounting and 
disclosure in developing countries meaningless until we understand the impact of 
such factors on accounting in many of these countries. Developing countries show 
diversity in many respects; 1) the group includes countries in different 
geographical locations, 2) the group includes countries with different historical 
developments and economic philosophies, and 3) developing countries include 
countries at different stages of economic development. This highlighted the 
diversity among developing countries making a generalised conclusion regarding 
the impact of the IAS on accounting and disclosure misleading. Jordan has been 
considered as a developing country and so far no empirical study was undertaken 
to evaluate the impact of all relevant IAS on the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with these standards in this country. 
The literature review section regarding the impact of IAS on extent of disclosure 
in compliance with IAS revealed that researchers attempted to investigate the 
impact of international harmonisation/standardisation efforts by applying a variety 
of methods. One of the research methodologies commonly employed by previous 
researchers involved assessing the impact of international 
harmonisation/standardisation efforts on accounting and disclosure practices in 
various countries, and also adopted in this study, is examination of companies' 
compliance pattern with legislation or standards issued by international 
organisations (Charnisa 2000; Doupnik and Taylor 1985; Evans and Taylor 1982; 
Nobes 1990; Street et al. 1999). In this study, therefore, the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS (the dependent variable) will be measured by an unweighted 
index based on an extensive list of disclosure items representing the IAS 
disclosure requirements and taking into account the changes over the period under 
consideration for such requirements. The IAS, however, have been modified and 
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improved over the years, which required from the researcher to develop four 
disclosure indices containing different number of items considering such 
improvements and changes, which calculated using a dichotomous procedure. The 
first disclosure index covering the period 1995-1997 has 137 items, the second 
disclosure index covering the year 1998 has 186 items, the third disclosure index 
covering the year 1999 has 221 items, and the fourth disclosure index covering the 
year 2000 has 219 items. 
4.3 Review of empirical studies concerning the impact of company-specific 
factors on the extent of disclosure 
Although a number of studies have been carried out since early 1960s to evaluate 
the impact of company-specific factors on disclosure on developed and 
developing countries, quite a few empirical studies investigated that impact in 
compliance with IAS. There is a considerable indeterminacy, however, on the 
question of which variables are capable of explaining the differing disclosure 
levels revealed by the annual reports of various enterprises in different countries. 
Some of the previous studies are reviewed below in chronological order. 
Cerf (1961) 
It seems that Cerf has been the first to deal empirically with some of the factors 
which might influence the adequacy of disclosure. He studied the investment 
decision process, reviewed the literature on how such decision should be made, 
interviewed security analysts and examined their reports. On the basis of this 
research he constructed an index of aggregate disclosure of 31 items, focusing on 
the information needs of investment analysts, investment decision process, most 
likely to be found in U. S. annual reports of non-financial firms, review of the 
literature on how the investment decision should be made, interviews with 
security analysts. Items included in the index were attached a weight ranging from 
one to four after reviewing the literature and surveying the user group. Total 
weights have been given to all items equal to 68. The items included in the index 
were classified into four categories and were given different weights ranging from 
I to 4. The resulting index, therefore, used to evaluate the sample of 527 U. S. 
corporate annual reports. A modification was made when items were not 
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applicable to a specific company. The index score for each company was 
calculated as a percentage by dividing the actual score a company earned by its 
maximum expected score. Company-specific factors selected were: asset size, 
number of stockholders, and listing status. Listing status reflected whether a 
company's stock was traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or other 
exchanges, as opposed to being in the Over The Counter (OTC) market. 
Cerf used class means and least square regression and found that there was a 
positive association existing between the disclosure index scores and the three 
company characteristics. In this study, assets size was found to be the most 
significant explanatory variable. This early study, however, was considered to be 
a major advance in applying the scientific approach to disclosure in corporate 
annual reports (Cooke 1989a, P. 18). His method was modified, developed and 
applied to other time periods and/or countries. Despite that, Cerf s study has a 
number of limitations. First, it was confined to listed companies. In addition, it 
considered only one user group and the number of the items of disclosure included 
in the index was small. Furthermore, even though the interdependence between 
some of the explanatory variables was noted, no formal test for multicollinearity 
was undertaken. 
Singhvi(1968) 
This study attempts to identify some of the characteristics of corporations 
associated, namely: size, profitability, audit firm, type of management, and 
number of shareholders with the level of aggregate disclosure in annual reports for 
Indian corporations. Such reports were selected for a sample of 45 listed industrial 
corporations over the period 1963-1965. To evaluate the quality of information 
disclosed in annual reports, an index of disclosure was used identical to that 
developed originally by Cerf (1961). It consisted of 31 items. Weights ranging 
from one to four were assigned to the items as indicated by the various sub- 
committees of the Committee on Corporate Information, and also indicated by the 
security analysts interviewed in India. To test the significance of the relationship 
between the extent of disclosure and the various characteristics, chi-square test of 
independence of principles of classification was used. 
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The study concluded that the companies, which disclose inadequate information in 
annual reports, are likely to be small in size, less profitable (as measured by rate 
of return and earnings margin), audited by a C. A. firm of any size, and managed 
by Indian management. The statistical analysis shows that the relationship 
between the extent of disclosure and size, profitability, and type of management 
was significantly positive. Singhvi argued, however, that adequate and accurate 
corporate disclosure of information is important to allocate economic resources 
efficiently in a market economy and to enable investors to make investment 
decisions, which will safeguard their interest against fraudulent securities 
practices. The extent of corporate disclosure influences the quality of investment 
decisions made by the investing public. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
In this study, Singhvi and Desai attempted to improve upon and extend the work 
done by Cerf. They modified Cerf s index by dropping three items which they felt 
were relevant only to wasting asset type companies and adding six others based on 
their own research into the appropriateness of Cerf s index. They verified their 
aggregate index by reference to the Financial World survey of annual reports. 
Moreover, they made more extensive use of statistical techniques, and added three 
new company characteristics to the study of non-financial enterprises. In addition, 
the researcher investigated the impact of extent of disclosure on share price 
fluctuation of 100 U. S. A listed firms. 
Individual tests of the six characteristics indicated that the extent of disclosure in 
annual reports was positively associated with a company's (1) size (as measured 
by total assets), (2) listing status, (3) number of shareholders, (4) profitability (as 
measured by rate of return on net worth and earnings margin), and (5) size of 
audit firm. 
Singhvi and Desai used both univariate (Chi square) and multivariate (multiple 
regression) tests. The Chi-square test results revealed that there was a significant 
association between the extent of disclosure and all the variables investigated. The 
multivariate regression equation gave a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.434 
for the six variables, which means that 43.4% of the variation in disclosure index 
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is explained by these six variables. However, in this analysis, listing status was the 
single most important variable, explaining 38.1% of the variation in the extent of 
disclosure. An interesting point to note is that, unlike the Chi-square test which 
indicated significant association between extent of disclosure and all six variables, 
the regression results revealed that only listing status was a statistically significant 
variable. Moreover, their study also showed that the superior extent of disclosure 
is related on average with lower security price fluctuations. Singhvi and Desai's 
findings are in conflict with Cerf s since in the latter; asset size was found to be 
most significant. 
This study was criticised by Moore and Buzby (1972) who questioned the use of 
an absolute rather than a relative scoring system, usage of Chi-square tests, and 
lack of formal tests for multicollinearity between the independent variables. They 
added that these problems in the Singhavi and Desai study research design and 
statistical analysis preclude a meaningful interpretation of Singhvi and Desai's 
results. That is, you cannot determine whether the extent of disclosure is 
associated with size or listing status, or for that matter, any of the other 
characteristics, based on their results. 
Buzby (1975) 
Recognising contradictory results in Cerf s and Singhvi and Desai's results with 
regard to explanatory variables, Buzby undertook a further study to identify 
whether asset size or listing status was the most important variable associated with 
the extent of disclosure. He constructed a disclosure-scoring instrument of 39 
items based on the. needs of financial analysts. Each item in the scoring instrument 
was then assigned a weight based on the assessments of 131 financial analysts. 
The researcher selected 44 matched pairs of listed and unlisted US non-financial 
companies and completed a scoring instrument for each company. The companies 
were matched based on assets size, industrial classification and time of the annual 
reports covering the years ending between June 30,1970, and June 30,1971. 
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test was used to test for the listing status 
effect and the Kendall's rank correlation was calculated for both listed and 
unlisted samples to examine for the assets size effect. Buzby found that the extent 
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of disclosure in annual reports is positively associated with the size of a 
company's assets and not affected by listing status. These results were consistent 
with Cerfs results, but not with those of Singhvi and Desai. Belkaoui (1978) 
argued that since the methodology used by Buzby was more powerful on the 
listing status variable than the methodology applied by Singhvi and Desai, it may 
be concluded that the asset size variable is the most important one. Cooke 
(1989a), however, criticised Buzby's matching procedure. Additionally, Cooke 
questioned the representative-ness of unlisted companies by those listed on the 
Over-The-Counter market (the unlisted group). 
Stanga (1976) 
This study reported on the evaluation of a sample of 80 annual reports of US firms 
with an aggregate disclosure model consisting of 79 identified items from a 
review of the literature and annual reports of large industrial companies, which 
were weighted to reflect their importance to the group of financial analysts 
surveyed. Stanga compared the mean scores of different industry groups and also 
used multiple regressions for testing the study hypotheses. He used net sales as the 
size variable rather than total assets and investigated 29 industries to discover if 
this variable, previously not investigated, had some explanatory value. 
No significant association was found between size and the extent of disclosure 
which was inconsistent with previous studies (Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961). On the 
other hand, he found that industry type -a variable that had not previously been 
selected by other researchers - to be a significant explanatory variable, as firms 
seemed to play "follow the leader" in disclosure. Since he measured size 
differently, it is not surprising that his results do not agree with the previous 
studies. However, he did provide us with another probable explanatory 
characteristic, the industry type. 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) 
Apart from the Singhvi (1968) study, all the studies discussed have focused on the 
US firms whereas Belkaoui and Kahl examined the association between adequacy 
of financial disclosure and five firms' specific variables (e. g. size - as measured 
by sales and total assets -, industry type, firm's profitability, firm's liquidity, and 
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capitalisation ratios) of a random selection of 200 Canadian companies. The 
aggregate disclosure index was developed based on 30 items of information 
considered useful for decision-making. The scoring instrument was sent to 200 
accountants and 200 financial analysts in order to provide information on the 
weighting of disclosure items. The mean weight assigned by them was used to 
evaluate the adequacy of financial disclosure in the corporate annual reports of the 
sampled companies. 
The degree of association between selected company characteristics and the 
relative disclosure index was made using Kendall's rank correlation coefficient 
(tua) and ANOVA test were employed to examine association between industry 
type and disclosure. Findings revealed that a detailed analysis of the categories of 
moderate and low consensus value items point to the need of a better disclosure 
policy (extent of disclosure ranging between 0.651 and 0.449). Moreover, by 
liquidity being the major explanatory indicator of relative disclosure, the 
company-specific factor size (assets and sales) and industry type were found to be 
associated with disclosure, while profitability and capitalisation ratios were not 
and its association was negative. As the capitalisation ration was a surrogate for 
the number of stockholders, the observed negative association was contrary to 
expectation. According to Cooke (1989a), one possible explanation for this 
contrary result is because capitalisation is not a good surrogate for number of 
stockholders. The ANOVA test was found to reveal a result consistent with 
Stanga (1976), i. e. the extent of disclosure varied between industries. 
Firth (1979) 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of voluntary disclosure 
in corporate annual report and three firm-specific characteristics that may have 
some influence over the level of disclosure in the UK. These three characteristics 
are the size of the company, whether it is listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
and the firm accounts engaged in the audit. The research design involved the 
construction of a list of not statutory items (voluntary disclosure) that could be 
included in an annual report by reviewing the relevant literature, reviewing those 
most frequently mentioned in the accounting press as being useful for investors 
and bankers, reviewing of several company annual reports, and discussing such 
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issues with various users of accounts in order to refine the list which ended by 48 
items. A total of 120 financial analysts working for stockbrokers and investment 
institutions, which 46 of them replied, were then asked to weight these items in 
terms of importance. The weighted list was then applied to a sample of annual 
reports and a disclosure index was calculated for each one. The sample consisted 
of three groups; 40 manufacturing companies were randomly selected from the 
largest 120 companies listed on the stock market, 40 companies who were paired 
with the listed companies on the basis of size and industry type, and 100 
manufacturing companies listed on the stock market. The size of the 
manufacturing firm used ranged from over E3,500 million in terms of capital 
employed to just under El million. The results showed that companies tend to give 
very little information above what they have to disclose under the Companies 
Acts. In the case of listing status and audit firm, standard Mest and Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test were used which showed significant difference in 
the level of disclosure in the three groups' means but was not the same case for 
audit firm factor. In the case of firm size, however, Kendall's rank correlation 
coefficient (tua) for each of the three sample groups were used showing that there 
is positive association between size and disclosure level for all groups. 
Courtis (1979) 
The purpose of this study was to report on the findings of an application of the 
Buzby (1975) 38-items aggregate disclosure index in unweighted form to the 
1974 annual reports of the 126 publicly listed companies in New Zealand to 
measure the extent of disclosure. Several variables, including those examined by 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), but using New Zealand data instead of U. S. A data as 
Singhvi and Desai applied were chosen. More specifically, this study examined 
the extent of disclosure in annual reports of New Zealand selected companies and 
the association of this disclosure with a company's: annual reports preparation 
costs, annual report preparation time, annual report pagination, asset size, level of 
stockholders' funds, sales, number of stockholders, number of employees, number 
of subsidiaries, number of directors, rate of return on net worth, earnings margin, 
absolute net income, level of ordinary dividends, public issues of long term debt, 
percent external equities, access to capital markets, size of audit firm, speed of 
reporting, industry type, absolute market prices, fluctuation in security prices, 
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price ranges, dividend pay-out ratios, average monthly share price fluctuation, and 
speed of reporting. 
Using the non-parametric Chi-square test, Courtis found that disclosure was 
positively related to the seven measures of corporate size, profitability level, as 
well as to the amount of expenditure and time devoted to annual report 
preparation. As a concluding remark, Courtis (1986) stated, 
"The influence of corporate size seems to permeate most variables 
examined and is likely to be dominantly associated with annual report 
disclosure levels" (P. 4 1). 
In addition, significantly, disclosure levels were found to vary inversely with 
stock price fluctuation (disclosure levels were negatively associated with 
fluctuation in security prices and price range, but ambiguous or unlikely 
association with average monthly fluctuation), thereby contrasting the findings of 
Singhvi and Desai (1971). 
This study was one of the first studies undertaken outside North America and it 
considered more independent variables than any other studies covered in the 
review chapter. However, the scoring instrument used in this study was 
constructed based on US annual report analysis and therefore its usage for New 
Zealand is questionable. In addition, no mention was made regarding items that 
are not applicable and as such it is possible that some firms' disclosure scores 
were penalised for not disclosing an item that were not applicable to the company. 
Furthermore, as the association between the extent of disclosure and each variable 
was tested separately, the multicollinearity between variables was not taken into 
account in the statistical analysis. 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
Applying agency theory, Chow and Wong-Boren examined the voluntary 
reporting practices of a sample of 52 listed Mexican manufacturing companies. 
They computed weighted and unweighted disclosure scores for 24 items and then 
regressed scores on the three firm characteristics: size (as measured by the market 
value of equity plus the book value of debt), leverage (as measured by the book 
value of debt divided by size), and proportion of assets in place (as measured by 
dividing the net book value of fixed assets by total assets). They found that 
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voluntary disclosure varied widely within the 52 Mexican manufacturing 
companies listed on Mexican Stock Exchange and the extent of disclosure was 
significant, only for firm size at the 0.01 level. The regression model explained 
15% of the variation in the dependent variable. 
Wallace (1987) 
Wallace selected a sample of 47 listed Nigerian companies and using a wide- 
ranging approach, the researcher examined the extent of information disclosed by 
these companies using a comprehensive list of items that were not directed at any 
particular user group. To overcome subjectivity in applying the relative scoring 
procedure, Wallace first examined all available records about the companies and 
read thoroughly the annual reports in order to determine the relevance of an item 
to the company. 
Using multiple regression, eight variables, namely: size (as measured by total 
assets, sales, number of shareholders), risk (profitability - profit after taxation as a 
percentage of capital employed -, and liquidity - current asset divided by current 
liability), were evaluated to determine their impact on two generated disclosure 
index: aggregate and statutory disclosure index. One of the significance of the 
study was that, it was the first study that measured the extent of statutory 
disclosure separately and assessed the association between such disclosure and 
selected variables. Wallace found that average disclosure index decreased from 
39.75 percent in 1982 to 37.55 percent in 1986, and then peaked at 43.11 percent 
in 1984. As far as aggregate disclosure level is concerned, the researcher found a 
positive significant association between asset size and the level of disclosure at 
0.05 levels. This result was in conformity with the results of previous studies 
carried out in the US (Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961) and Canada (Belkaoui and Kahl 
1978). In addition, type of management was found to be the only variable 
associated with the extent of statutory disclosure. All other variables were 
rejected. However, exclusion of unlisted companies was the main limitation of 
this research. 
Cooke (1989a) 
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Focusing on Swedish companies, Cooke assessed whether there is a significant 
association between a number of independent variables, namely: listing status 
(unlisted, listed, and multiple listed), size (as measured by total asset, sales, and 
number of shareholders), industry type, parent company relationship, and the 
extent of aggregate disclosure (voluntary and mandatory). The study covered a 
random sample of 90 non-financial companies' annual reports of which 38 were 
unlisted and 52 listed, for the financial year ended 31 December 1985. 
Cooke argued that it was considered appropriate to eliminate banks, insurance 
companies, cooperative and associations because of the specialised nature of their 
operations. Moreover, Cooke excluded Over-The-Counter companies arguing that 
they were considered to be a group on their own and their inclusion might distort 
the analysis in addition to its small size as this would lead to considerable 
statistical problems. The 224 items included in the disclosure index were based 
mainly on disclosure indexes used in previous studies, recommended for 
disclosure by the IASC, Swedish regulations, and desirable disclosure determined 
by two of the three Swedish practicing accountants who were consulted at the 
pilot study stage. A dichotomous procedure was used to score items included in 
the scoring instruments in which an item is scored one if it was disclosed and zero 
if it was not. Any item was not mentioned in the annual report was considered not 
applicable and excluded from the calculation of the index. Applicability of an item 
was determined by reading the whole annual report. Then, the index score for 
each company was calculated by dividing the actual scores a company obtained 
by the maximum scores, which that company was expected to get. 
Using nonparametric tests (Chi Square, Cramer's V., Contingency Coefficient); 
Cooke found significant association between listing status and the extent of 
aggregate disclosure. Furthermore, a one-way ANOVA test revealed that unlisted, 
Stockholm Stock Exchange listed and multiple listed firms were significantly 
different from each other. A multiple regressions (stepwise regression routines) 
also run by including all the variables into the model. The study has shown that 
disclosure is very variable and that there is a significant association between the 
extent of disclosure and listing status which was the most important explanatory 
variable explaining the dependent variable variation followed by size (each size 
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variable revealed similar result). Furthermore, a low level of significance was 
found between the extent of disclosure and industry type. On the other hand, 
extent of disclosure by unlisted companies was lower than listed companies only 
on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, which found to disclose lower than multiple 
quotation companies. Moreover, three regression models were used incorporating 
one size variable in each multiple regression routine, total assets, annual sales, and 
number of shareholders. The coefficients of determination (R2) were very similar 
regardless of which size variable was incorporated. As a result, whilst it is 
concluded that listing status and size are two significant factors, it is shown that 
no matter which one of the three size variables is selected. 
Tai et al. (1990) 
This study examined the extent mandatory disclosure in the annual reports issued 
by 76 selected Hong Kong listed companies. The significant areas of on- 
compliance, therefore, with the statutory requirements: Companies Ordinance, 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SAAP) issued by the Hong Kong 
Society of Accountants, the Securities Ordinance were investigated through a 
checklist provided by the local office of the Big-Eight audit firm. The list 
contained all the material disclosure requirements of the Companies Ordinance 
and the SAAP. Concerning the Securities Ordinance requirements, the 
Undertaking prescribed under the Securities (Stock Exchange Listing) Rules 1986 
was used as appoint of reference. Interviewing five company executives and seven 
audit managers identified the cause of non-compliance. In addition, possible 
relationships between each pair of factors (company size, industry type, and audit 
form) were tested using the chi-square test of independence and the Friedman 
two-way analysis of variance by ranks. 
The analysis of the annual reports revealed a ma or departure from disclosure 
requirements (non-compliance in average were 22%). Furthermore, the study 
indicated a significant relationship only between size of the Hong Kong 
companies and the departure from disclosure requirements. Large companies 
(shareholders' funds over HK$500 million) and small companies (shareholders' 
funds less than HK$5 million) had fewer departures than medium-sized firms 
(shareholders' funds between $5 million and $500 million). The cause of non- 
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compliance with the various disclosure requirements was examined by means of 
an interview survey. The findings of the interviews suggested that the important 
causes of non-compliance were manly: difficulties in interpreting the disclosure 
requirements and auditing guidelines, insufficient awareness of general 
accounting concepts, lack of proficiency of staff, and lack of resources to keep 
abreast of the changes in the disclosure requirements. 
Cooke (1992) 
This empirical study represents a contribution to rigorous testing of Japanese 
reporting, which is considered as a country having a unique business environment 
and unique culture, and specifically reports on the impact of size, stock market 
listing and industry type on disclosure, both voluntary and mandatory (aggregate 
disclosure), in the annual report of 35 listed corporations. The focus of this 
research is disclosure of information to a wide range of users, 165 of items, 
including voluntary and mandatory disclosures, was included in the scoring sheet. 
The items were selected based on previous studies, recommended disclosure by 
IASC, requirements by Japan authorities and recommendation by JICPA. 
One major differences of this study from the previous studies is that company size 
was measured in eight variables, namely: capital stock, turnover, number of 
shareholders, total assets, current assets, fixed assets, shareholders' funds and 
bank borrowings. The unusual variable considered was "bank borrowing" and it 
was included because of the special relationship of Japanese companies with the 
banking sector. Another important point is that, in contrast to Cooke's (1989a), 
the problem of multicollinearity was resolved by factor analysis where the 
principal factors were used as regressors by the inclusion of a composite size 
variable in the regression equation. 
Adopting multiple linear regressions, the study found that size and listing status 
were important explanatory variables with total assets, shareholders' funds and 
fixed assets being the most highly correlated with the composite size variable. In 
addition, manufacturing corporations were found to disclose significantly more 
information than other types of Japanese corporations. Coverage of the number of 
companies, however, was one of the limitations of this study. 
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Malone et al. (1993) 
The principal research question addressed by this study was whether there are 
identifiable and measurable factors that are associated with the extent to which 
125 American firms in the oil and gas industry discloses financial information 
(aggregate disclosure). Firms included in the sample were firms its shares traded 
not only on the New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ markets, but on many 
other formal and informal exchanges as well. 
The extent of financial disclosure measured by using a weighted index of 
disclosure 129 items weighted by oil and gas financial analysts according to the 
importance of each disclosure in an investment decision. The selected factors to 
be investigated for impact on the extent of disclosure were leverage, number of 
shareholders, size, industry type, profitability, foreign directors serving on the 
board of directors, foreign operations, audit firm, and listing status. Therefore, a 
stepwise regression model was used to determine which variables were "best" in 
explaining the extent of financial disclosure. Of the selected independent variables 
entered, only four retained in the final model at the 0.20 level of significance: 
exchange listing status, audit firm, leverage, and number of shareholders which 
three of them (exchange listing status, leverage, and number of shareholders) its 
parameters estimates shows significance in explaining the extent of financial 
disclosure. 
Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) 
The study assessed empirically the extent of statutory information disclosure in 
the corporate annual reports of 65 listed non-financial companies for the fiscal 
year 1987-1988 and the impact of selected key company attributes on the degree 
of disclosure compliance with accounting regulatory status in a developing 
country, Bangladesh. In particular, the compliance level was assessed against the 
combined statutory requirements of the Companies Act 1913 and the Securities 
and Exchange Rules 1987. The researchers used linear regression for testing the 
impact of selected company specific factors; size, leverage, multinational 
company influence, professional qualifications of the principal accounting officer 
of the company, and audit firm on mandatory disclosure compliance. 
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The results showed that the degree of compliance in Bangladesh was low, since 
none of the sampled companies complied with statutes by disclosing all 
mandatory information. Using multiple regression techniques the results showed 
that subsidiaries of multinational companies and large audit firms had significant 
positive impact on the level of disclosure compliance. The study concluded that to 
increase the degree of compliance, the accounting profession should strengthen its 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and increase awareness about the 
existing mandatory provisions by conducting training programs for its members 
on a regular basis. 
Hossain et al. (1994) 
This study examined the influence of six firm-specific characteristics on voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of 67 non-financial companies listed on the Kula 
Lumpur Stock Exchange on December 31,1991. The unweighted disclosure 
index was comprised of 78 accounting items 50% of them were similar to those 
selected by Gary et al. (1995). The six variables tested were size, ownership 
structure, leverage, assets-in-place, audit firm, and listing status. The univariate 
(Student's t-test and Mann-Whiney U test) and multivariate (multiple regression 
model) analysis were adopted for testing the empirical research hypotheses. 
Findings revealed that both univariate and multivariate analyses showed that 
corporate size, listing status, and ownership structure found to be significantly 
associated with voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. Firm size was the most strongly 
significant variable associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, 
leverage, assets-in-place, and audit firm did not appear to be important factors in 
explaining voluntary disclosure by firms. 
Wallace et al. (1994) 
Beside reporting on the results of an investigation into whether the differences in 
the level of mandatory disclosure mirror the differences in firm characteristics, the 
second objectives for the researchers was to examine whether the firm 
characteristics found to be relevant in previous country disclosure studies are also 
implicated in Spain. The procedure for measuring disclosure level, in this study, is 
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different from the one commonly found which used disclosure indexes in 
measuring the extent of disclosure. That is instead of awarding one mark for the 
presence and zero for the absence of an item of information in a corporate annual 
report and accounts, as in most previous studies, the researcher in this study 
emphasise the comprehensiveness nature of the disclosure on each of the 
information items selected for investigation by rewarding the depth of information 
provided in the annual reports and accounts to give credit to the density (fullness) 
of the information on each item. The study focuses on 50 non-financial Spanish 
firms of which 30 were listed and were unlisted on Madrid and Valencia Stock 
Markets. A total of eight firms' characteristics were specified and classified into 
three non-mutually exclusive categories: structure related variables (e. g. size - 
total asset and total sales -, solvency - debt to equity ratio), performance related 
variables (e. g. rate of return, profitability, liquidity), and market related variables 
(e. g. industry type, listing status, and auditor type). The list of items to measure 
the mandatory disclosure was restricted to 16 mandatory ones. 
Having made a rank transformation of the dependent and continuous independent 
variables, the researcher used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to examine 
the association between the extent of disclosure and selected company-specific 
factors. The study provided evidence that the amount of detail in Spanish 
corporate annual reports and accounts is increasing in firm size and stock 
exchange listing. In addition, it is noteworthy to point out that in contrast to 
research by Belkaoui and Kahl (1978); liquidity was found to be a significant 
negative explanatory variable in the reduced regression models. Finally, no 
significant association was found between the other five variables and the extent 
of disclosure. 
Meek et al. (1995) 
This study extended Gray et al. (1993) work, which examined the effect of 
international listing status on voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of U. S, 
UK and Continental European (specifically, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands) multinational corporations with at least 10% of its sales from non- 
domestic source and sales in excess of $500 million. The total sample examined in 
this study was 226 companies consisting of 116 U. S., 64 UK, 16 France, 12 
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Germany, and 18 Netherlands for the year 1989. The final unweighted checklist 
consisted of 85 items of information disclosed voluntarily. The factors examined 
its influence on voluntary disclosures of three types of information; strategic, non 
financial, and financial. These factors were size, country/region of origin, industry 
type, leverage, multinational operations, profitability, and listing status. Multiple 
regression routines used to test the impact of explanatory variables on voluntary 
disclosure. The study found that while company size, country/region, listing 
status, and, to a lesser extent, industry type are the most important factors 
explaining voluntary disclosure overall, the importance of the factors varied by 
information type. 
Raffournier (1995) 
The aim of this study was to look for possible determinants of the voluntary 
disclosure policy of 161 Swiss non-financial (industrial and commercial) listed 
companies by relating the content of their 1991 annual reports to possible 
determinants representing agency and political costs. Raffournier argued that 
financial and insurance enterprises were excluded because they are subject to 
specific disclosure requirements, so that the content of their annual reports cannot 
be considered as voluntary determined. Furthermore, their inclusion would 
probably have biased the results because of their financial characteristics. 
The selected characteristics were size, internationality level, percentage of fixed 
assets, audit firm, industry type, leverage, profitability, and ownership structure. 
The extent of disclosure was measured by an unweighted index driven from the 
Fourth (provides several formats of balance sheet and profit, loss account and 
required additional information in the notes to the financial statements) and 
Seventh (relates to group accounts) European Union Directives since Switzerland 
economy depends on EU economy, although it is not a member of the EU. 
Relations were assessed using univariate (one-way variance analyses and linear 
regression) and multivariate analyses (multiple linear regressions). 
The findings were that the extent of disclosure found to be significantly related to 
size, internationality level, percentage of fixed assets, audit firm and, to a smaller 
extent, to industry type and profitability explaining 42% of the dependent variable 
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variations. Inversely, no significant relationship was found for leverage and 
ownership diffusion. When examined simultaneously, however, the only 
significant variables were size and internationality level. 
Owusu-Ansah (1997) criticised Raffoumier's study by claiming that the 
disclosure index used did not adequately measure the voluntary disclosure of the 
firms. He added that the assumption underlying the selection of Raffournier 
disclosure items makes it difficult to accept the reliability and the validity of the 
index on which his findings are based. Without empirical evidence, one can 
hardly use information items under the EU disclosure rules as a sole proxy for the 
voluntary disclosure items of Swiss firms on the assumption that Swiss firms 
operate commercially in EU countries. 
Wallace and Naser (1995) 
One of the main purposes of this study was to examine the relationship between 
comprehensiveness of aggregate disclosure in the corporate annual reports of 80 
companies listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange over the period 1988-1992 
and II firm characteristics, namely: three size variables (total asset, sales, and 
market capitalisation), leverage, ownership distribution, profitability, rate of 
return, liquidity, industry type, audit firm, and official domicile. 
Comprehensiveness of disclosure was measured by an index based on 142 items. 
However, as in Wallace et al. (1994), the degree of detail was rewarded by giving 
credit to the fullness of information disclosed. 
Both unranked and ranked OLS regression estimates were used to determine the 
explanatory power of the independent variables. The results of both types of 
analysis were similar and indicated that disclosure varied positively with asset size 
and industry type. On the other hand, surprisingly, disclosure scores were found to 
be negatively associated with profitability. Wallace and Naser explained that this 
might be due to the unique characteristics of the capital market in Hong Kong and 
the distinguished nature of Chinese managers' mindset (face). Furthermore, in 
contrast to Wallace et al. (1994), the size of audit firm was found to be negatively 
associated with the extent of disclosure. 
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Ahmed (1996) 
This empirical study investigated the extent of aggregate disclosure in the 1987/88 
and 1992/93 annual reports of 118 non-financial publicly quoted companies on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh excluding banks, insurance companies, 
and mutual funds from the list, and association between company size, leverage, 
whether the company is a subsidiary of multinational enterprise, qualifications of 
the principal accounting officer, and audit firm size with disclosure level. To 
assess the overall disclosure levels of companies in both 1987/88 and 1992/93, 
150-information items comprising 94 statutory items and 56 voluntary items were 
identified in order to develop the unweighted index applied. The multiple linear 
regression analysis was undertaken for testing the impact of the selected 
company-specific factors on extent of disclosure. Separate regression analysis for 
each year was also undertaken to investigate the changes in the explanatory power 
of the independent variables. 
The results showed that the disclosure level varied between 29.8 percent and 73.4 
percent, with an average of 53.3 percent. While the majority of the companies 
disclosed much information of a statutory nature, primarily because of the 
enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Rules following the adoption of 18 
selected International Accounting Standards related to the disclosure in the 
balance sheet, profit and loss account statements and notes for the accounting 
policies, the level of voluntary disclosure was very low. Using the multiple linear 
regression model, the study found that subsidiaries of multinational enterprises 
and companies audited by large audit firms disclosed significantly more 
information in their annual reports. 
AI-Modahki (1996) 
Al-Modahki investigated longitudinally the extent of disclosure in the annual 
reports using a sample of 33 Saudi listed companies over the period 1986 to 1990. 
Beside the changes in the extent of aggregate, mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
over the years, the impact of five corporate characteristics (industry type, 
company size - as measured by sales, total assets, number of shareholders, and 
paid-in capital -, auditor type, foreign investment, and length of incorporation), on 
the extent of disclosure were tested. The extent of disclosure was measured by an 
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index based on 121 items that were selected based on a review of the literature, 
recommendation by academics and auditors, and the results of a pilot study. Like 
Cooke (1993); Cooke (1989a); Cooke (1992); Wallace (1987); Al-Modahki 
(1996) also used dichotomous, unweighted and relative scoring procedures. 
Using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, the author found that all three measures of 
disclosure (aggregate, mandatory and voluntary) showed a significant increase 
over the selected years, except between 1989 and 1990. In addition, using the non- 
parametric Mann-Whitney test, a significant association was found between extent 
of aggregate disclosure and only one size variable - paid-in capital - during the 
last three years. Furthermore, industry type was found to be significant between 
two industries only (i. e. industry 1: banking, and industry 2: manufacturing and 
cement) for the years 1986,1987 and 1988. The other three variables were found 
to have no significant impact on the extent of disclosure in any of the years 
examined. 
Soh (1996) 
In this study, focusing primarily on both compliance and voluntary disclosure, the 
researcher examined the extent of disclosure by 65 Malaysian listed companies for 
the years 1991,1992, and 1993 to determine their relationship with five company- 
specific variables, namely: company size, foreign ownership, industry type, 
profitability and leverage, as well as changes over the years. 
Both voluntary and compliance disclosure levels of sampled companies for each 
year were measured by unweighted disclosure indices using a dichotomous 
scoring procedures. As mandatory disclosure requirements laid down in the 
regulations (Le. the Companies Act and Stock Exchange disclosure requirements) 
as well as the national accounting standards, the researcher developed three 
compliance disclosure indices: 1) regulation compliance index (RCDI) based on 
118 items of information selected from the Companies Act and the Stock 
Exchange disclosure requirements, 2) national accounting standards compliance 
index (NASCDI) based on 106 items of information selected from national 
accounting standards, and 3) aggregate compliance disclosure index (ACDI) 
based on 148 items of information. The voluntary disclosure index (VDI), on the 
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other hand, was developed based on 116 items of information derived mainly 
from previous studies. 
OLS multiple regression was conducted separately for each year to test the 
association between each of the indices and company-specific characteristics. The 
test results indicate a significant relationship between: 
1. ACDI and two variables, i. e. profitability (negative) and foreign ownership 
(positive) in both 1991 and 1992 (adjusted R2were: 0.12 in 1991,0.06 in 
1992, and 0.028 in 1993). 
2. RCDI and (a) foreign ownership (positive) in 1991, (b) industry - consumer 
group - (positive) in 1992, (c) industry - building (negative) in 1993 (adjusted 
R2were: 0.12 in 1991,0.08 in 1992, and 0.021 in 1993). 
3. NASCDI and (a) foreign ownership (positive) and profitability (negative) in 
1991, (b) profitability (negative) in 1992 (adjusted R2were: 0.11 in 1991,0.12 
in 1992, and 0.021 in 1993). 
4. VDI and (a) industry - services - (positive in 1991, (b) company size 
(positive) in 1992and 1993 (adjusted R2were: 0.29 in 1991,0.18 in 1992, and 
0.23 in 1993). 
It is interesting to note out that, like the results of longitudinal studies by (Al- 
Modahki 1996), this study also indicated that the explanatory power of the 
company-specific variables varied over time. 
AI-Mulhem (1997) 
In this study, Al-Mulhern investigated whether aggregate disclosure levels vary in 
Saudi corporate annual reports and if variations in the information provided, 
mirror the variations in certain firms' characteristics. A random sample of 40 
annual reports of non-financial listed and unlisted companies for the financial year 
1994 was selected. Adopting a wide-ranging approach, similar to Cooke (1993); 
Cooke (1989a); Cooke (1992); Wallace (1987), a list of 165 items were selected 
and a disclosure index for each company in the sample was developed on the basis 
of the selected items. 
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The firm specific characteristics examined were firm size (as measured by total 
assets and net sales), profitability (as measured by rate of return and earnings 
margins), industry type, listing status, and type of audit firm. To test significance 
of association between the index score and selected variables, both univariate 
(regression for continuous independent variables -e. g. size and earnings margin- 
and one-way ANOVA for industry type, listing status and type of audit firm) and 
multiple regressions were run. The univariate tests were carried out first taking 
into account all the 40 companies and then removing five electricity companies. 
The multiple regressions were run only on the basis of the analysis of 35 
companies (excluding the five electricity companies). 
The univariate analysis before excluding the five companies revealed that there 
was a significant relationship between the extent of disclosure and three variables: 
earnings margin, type of audit, and listing status. After the five companies were 
removed, the results revealed that size and listing status were statistically 
significant explanatory variables. The multiple regressions, on the other hand, 
revealed that the following three variables were statistically significant: listing 
status, size (as measured by sales) and rate of return. The interesting point to note 
in this study is that exclusion of certain companies revealed considerably different 
results. 
Inchausti (1997) 
As the researcher has argued it that accounting information is subject to two 
different influences: market pressures and regulatory bodies' pressure. Therefore, 
the study provides an empirical analysis of the influence of both these factors on 
information aggregate disclosure by Spanish flrms over the years 1989-1991 using 
a sample of 138 companies - excluding financial institutions, insurance 
companies and investment funds. In addition, considering the influence of positive 
accounting theory such as agency, political and signaling theory; several 
characteristics relating to company-specific factors, namely: size, audit firm, 
listing status, profitability, leverage, dividends, and industry type, were selected 
and tested empirically. The information disclosed by sample companies was 
measured by unweighted disclosure index based on 50 items (voluntary and 
mandatory items) of information. Stepwise regression technique was used for 
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testing the impact of selected company-specific factors on disclosure. In addition, 
the influence of regulation was analysed through a panel data analysis including 
time effects. This technique, allows a large number of data points, increasing 
degree of freedom, reducing collinearity among explanatory variables, improving 
the efficiency of econometric estimates, and more importantly controlling the 
unobservable heterogeneity existing among the sample companies, since they can 
be monitored through time (Hasiao 1986). 
According to the results obtained through the regression analysis and the panel 
data analysis, the hypotheses concerning size, audit firm, and listing status - 
related to positive accounting theory - provide a satisfactory basis for explaining 
the attitude of firms regarding the provision of financial information. Other 
hypotheses, relating to variables such as profitability, leverage, dividends and 
industry type were rejected by the analysis. The analysis of panel data indicates 
the influence of legislation over Spanish companies showing a strong increase in 
disclosure. The study concluded that it could be argued that although positive 
theory can be used to provide an explanation of the attitudes of Spanish firms 
towards information disclosure, it is necessary to 'recognise the effect of 
legislation. Therefore, it may not be possible to leave disclosure to the financial 
market alone, and it may be necessary to regulate accounting in order to ensure 
that firms satisfy the information needs of different users. 
Marston and Robson (1997) 
This study investigated aggregate disclosure in India as an example of a 
developing country. Disclosure in the annual reports of 51 large Indian 
companies, in terms on turnover exceeding 500 million rupees, was studied in 
1982/1983 and 1989/1990. The research instrument used was a weighted 
disclosure index, which included both voluntary and mandatory items developed 
by Barret (1976). The non-parametric test Wilcoxon matched pairs were carried 
out for investigating differences in disclosure over time and testing whether Indian 
company size influence disclosure. 
The study concluded that increasing disclosure over time were found to have 
occurred which partly a result of an increase in accounting standards disclosure 
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requirements over the period explored and also there was an increase in 
compliance with existing standards. In addition, it was found that large companies 
disclosed more than smaller companies in both periods. 
Patton and Zelenka (1997) 
This study empirically tested the mandatory disclosure for 50 Czech joint 
companies that were included in the 1993 Prague Stock Exchange Index and its 
relationship with the independent variables firrn size, type of auditor, number of 
employees, stock exchange listing status, profitability (return on equity) 
performance, financial risk (leverage) as monitoring variables. The dependent 
variables (three unweighted indexes measuring the extent of disclosure in annual 
reports) were based on Czech regulations concerning disclosure in the financial 
statements of publicly traded firms. The first disclosure index included only those 
items, which were expected to apply to most companies; the research referred to 
this as the 'narrow index'. This index were supplemented by other two indexes 
that include the initial index as well as items that may be more subject to the 'not 
applicable' problem; (i. e. a 'somewhat broader' index and a 'broader' index). 
The 'narrow' disclosure index mean was 0.56 while the 'somewhat broader' index 
mean was 0.50 and the 'broader' index mean was 0.43 confirming the existence of 
differences among the three disclosure indexes. Univariate analyses generally 
supported the existence of the hypothesised relationships between extent of 
disclosure in annual reports and firm size, profitability performance, financial risk 
(leverage), and monitoring variables. Multivariate regressions explained about 
25% of the variance in the extent of disclosure in annual reports. The most 
important independent variables in the multivariate regressions were the type of 
auditor the firm had (Big 6 versus, other) and the number of employees. 
Statistically, significant variables in multiple regressions include type of auditor, 
number of employees, stock exchange listing status, and return on equity 
performance. 
Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) 
In this study the researchers argued that since the foundation in 1973, the IASC 
has become established as the most authoritative agency for accounting 
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harmonisation by spreading its influence widely to all parts of the world, in 
particular in developing countries, newly industrialised or newly capitalistic ones. 
Some countries have gone further such as France and Switzerland can use IAS for 
the preparation of consolidated financial statements. Therefore, the empirical 
study aimed to identify the motivation of Swiss listed companies which 
voluntarily comply with IAS choosing Switzerland in particular since its level of 
accounting regulation and its accounting comprehensiveness is low. In this 
context, compliance with IAS is particularly costly since it implies additional 
disclosure and renunciation of considerable discretion in accounting practice. 
Knowledge of the characteristics of companies, which voluntarily adopt a 
particular set of accounting standards, may be of particular interest for standards 
setting. On the basis of prior literature on voluntary disclosure and auditing, the 
researchers formulated a set of hypothesis, which were tested on a sample of 133 
Swiss listed companies covering 80% of the target population. The sample 
divided into two groups; the IAS group included 51 companies (i. e. 38%), which 
declared their financial statements in conformity with IAS, and the second group 
included 82 companies constitute the non-IAS group. The independent variables 
considered were internationality (as measured by two variables: percentage of 
sales realised abroad and percentage of sales outside Europe), size, ownership 
diffusion, leverage, capital intensity (e. g. it is proxied by the assets-in-place ratio 
obtained by dividing the book value of fixed assets - net of depreciation - by total 
assets, profitability, return on equity ratio, market measure of profitability was 
also used which is the average stock rate of return from 1992 to 1994), auditor 
type, and listing status. 
The study used the univariate analysis (non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test and 
Chi-square, and parametric student t-test) and multivariate analysis (multiple 
regression) for testing its hypothesis. In conclusion, the Univariate analyses 
showed a positive influence of size, internationality, listing status, auditor type 
and ownership diffusion on voluntary compliance with IAS. Inversely, no 
significant relationship was found for leverage, profitability and capital intensity. 
Multivariate analyses designed to control for collinearity among independent 
variables, which confirmed these results. They revealed that firms, which comply 
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with IAS, are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and 
have a more diffuse ownership. Overall, Dumontier and Raffournier argued that 
these findings suggest that political and pressure from the outside markets play a 
major role in the decision to apply IAS. 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) 
It is reported by the researcher that accounting researchers have investigated 
association between corporate characteristics and disclosure in corporate annual 
reports since 1961. Findings have consistently shown corporate size and listing 
status to be significantly associated with disclosure levels, while mixed results 
have been reported for leverage, profitability, and audit firm size. The purpose of 
Ahmed and Courtis empirical research is to investigate the underlying causes of 
variations in the results of past disclosure studies by employing meta-analysis 
techniques of the results of 23 separate studies of the association between annual 
report disclosure level and firm characteristics. 
Glass et al. (198 1) defines meta-analysis as the analysis of analysis - the statistical 
analysis of a large collection of results from individual studies, for the purpose of 
cumulating and integrating the findings. Meta-analysis accumulates the statistical 
findings of related research in order to evaluate the findings across studies, and to 
determine whether differences in results are primarily due to differences in 
economic variables, research setting, measurement scales or sampling error. The 
technique enables clearer and consistent conclusion to be drawn from past 
research by systematically bringing about commonalities, which are not possible, 
by descriptive analysis (Greenberg 1992; Hunter et al. 1982; Rosenthal 1991). 
A meta-analysis of 23 studies between 1968 and 1997 confirms significant and 
positive relationships between disclosure levels and corporate size, listing status, 
size of audit firm and leverage. No significant association is found between 
profitability, with aggregate disclosure levels. They concluded that in addition to 
sampling error, the results are moderated by differences in disclosure index 
construction, differences in definition of the explanatory variables, and differences 
in research settings. 
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To sum up, the following section will provide an abstract and evaluation for the 
previous empirical studies searched regarding the issue of the impact of selected 
company-specific factors on extent of disclosure. 
4.3.1. Abstract and evaluation 
Several researches were carried out to examine the association between company- 
specific factors and the extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports in various 
countries. In examining such relationship, generally speaking, while most 
empirical studies have chosen the level of voluntary disclosure (Al-Modahki 
1996; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 1989b; Dumontier and 
Raffournier 1998; Firth 1979; Hossain et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1994; Lau 1992; 
McNally et al. 1982; Meek et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995; Soh 1996; Tong et al. 
1990) and aggregate disclosure (Ahmed 1996; Al-Modahki 1996; Al-Mulhern 
1997; Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961; Cooke 1993; Cooke 
1989a; Cooke 1992; Courtis 1979; Giner 1997; Inchausti 1997; Malone et al. 
1993; Marston and Robson 1997; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Stanga 
1976; Wallace 1987; Wallace and Naser 1995) to be investigated, few studies 
indeed focused only on the mandatory disclosure (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Al- 
Modahki 1996; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Tai et al. 1990; Wallace 1987; Wallace 
et al. 1994). Since the present study seeks to examine the impact of company- 
specific factors on the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS of JIC listed in 
Amman Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2000, this part of the chapter 
focused not only on the review of the studies that looked at the association 
between company-specific factors and the mandatory disclosure, but also on the 
review of the studies investigating the voluntary and aggregate disclosure in both 
developed and developing countries, at a particular point in time and over a period 
of time. An abstract and findings of studies reviewed in this section provided is in 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below: 
Table 4.1: Abstract of Findings Concerning the Impact of Company- 
-5pecinc r actors on rxtent oi iL. Pisciosure 
Explanatory Region and Countries where Associations Between 
Factor Disclosure Scores and Explanatory Factors are 
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Size 
Proritability 
Liquidity 
Proven 
Developed Countries 
Cerf, 961; Singhvi, 1967; 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976; 
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Courtis, 1979; Firth, 1979; 
Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, and 
1992; Malone et al., 1993 
Wallace et al., 1994; Gary et 
al., 1995; Raffournier (1995); 
Marston and Robson (1997); 
Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier 
and Raffournier, 1998; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Developing Countries 
Singhvi, 1968; Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 
1987; Tai et al., 1990; Ahmed 
and Nicholls, 1994; Hossain 
et al., 1994; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Ahmed, 1996; 
Al-Modahki, 1996; Soh, 
1996; Al-Mulhem, 1997; 
Marston and Robson, 1997; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Developed Countries 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978 
(negative association); Spero, 
1979; Courtis, 1979; Wallace 
et al., 1994; Raffournier, 1995 
Developing Countries 
Singhvi, 1968; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995 (negative 
association); Soh, 1996 
(negative association); Al- 
Mulhern, 1997; Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997 
Developed Countries 
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Wallace et al., 1994 (negative 
association) 
Not Proven 
Developed Countries 
Stanga, 1976; Spero, 1979; 
Malone et al., 1993 
Developing Countries 
Singhvi, 1968 
Developed Countries 
Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978; 
Spero, 1979; Malone et al., 
1993; Gary et al., 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier 
and Raffournier, 1998; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Developing Countries 
Wallace, 1987; Lau, 1992; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Develoned Countries 
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Table 4.1: Abstract of Findings Concerning the Impact of Company- 
Factors on Extent of Disclosure 
Explanatory 
Factor 
Industry Type 
Audit Firm 
Leverage 
Region and Countries where Associations Between 
Disclosure Scores and Explanatory Factors are 
Proven 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997 
Not Proven 
Wallace, 1987; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995 
Developed Countries 
Stanga, 1976; Belkaoui and 
Kahl, 1978; Courtis, 1979; 
Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 
1992; Raffoumier, 1995; Gary 
et al., 1995 
Developing Countries 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Al- 
Modahki, 1996; Soh, 1996 
(negative association with 
building industry type and 
positive with the other 
sectors) 
Developed Countries 
Singhvi and Desai, 1971; 
Raffoumier, 1995; Inchausti, 
1997; Dumontier and 
Raffoumier, 1998 
Developing Countries 
Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; 
Hossain et al., 1994; Ahmed, 
1996; Al-Mulhern, 1997; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; 
Durnontier and Raffournier, 
1998 
Developed Countries 
Courtis, 1979; Malone et al., 
1993; Gary et al., 1995; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Developing Countries 
Hossain et al., 1994 
Developed Countries 
Malone et al., 1993; 
Wallace et al., 1994; 
Inchausti, 1997 
Developing Countries 
Wallace, 1987, Tai et al., 
1990; Al-Mulhem, 1997 
Developed Countries 
Courtis, 1979; Firth, 1979; 
Malone et al., 1993; 
Wallace et al., 1994; 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999 
Developiniz Countries 
Singhvi, 1968; Tai et al., 
1990; Tong et al., 1990; 
Hossain et al., 1994; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995 
(negative association); Al- 
Modahki, 1996 
Developed Countries 
Wallace et al., 1994; 
Hossain et al., 1995; 
Raffoumier, 1995; 
Inchausti, 1997; Dumontier 
and Raffoumier, 1998 
Developinp, Countries 
Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; Ahmed and Nicholls, 
1994; Hossain et al., 1994; 
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Table 4.1: Abstract of Findings Concerning the Impact of Company- 
Specific Factors on Extent of Disclosure 
Explanatory Region and Countries where Associations Between 
Factor Disclosure Scores and Explanatory Factors are 
Proven Not Proven 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Ahmed, 1996; Soh, 1996; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997 
Listing Status Developed Countries Developed Countries 
Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Buzby, 1975 
Desai, 1971; Firth, 1979; 
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Chapter Four 
As it can be observed from the review summarised above subsequent to the 
pioneering study by (Cerf 1961) the majority of early studies focused on the 
U. S. A. This field research was extended first to other developed countries in the 
late 1970s and then to the developing countries in the late 1980s. Another 
interesting trend is that, despite the fact that the majority of studies focused on 
only one year per firm, a number of studies, mostly, in the 1990s covered more 
than one year (a maximum of five years was considered by (Al-Modahki 1996)). 
The number of firms in each study has varied from 33 to 527. 
The company-specific characteristics (the independent variables) were examined 
as possible predictors of the extent of disclosure ranged from two (Buzby 1975) to 
24 (Courtis 1979). Size (generally surrogated by total assets, net or gross sales, 
and market capitalisation) was the most popular variable considered in the 30 
studies reviewed. Listing status and industry type were the second most popular 
firm factors featuring in more than half of the studies. Other popular company- 
specific characteristics featuring in at least a third of the studies reviewed were 
profitability, leverage/liquidity rations and auditor type. 
In all the studies reviewed, the extent or quality of disclosure (the dependent 
variable) was measured by a disclosure index. The information items forming the 
basis of the index varied considerably, ranging from II (Tai et al. 1990) to 224 
(Cooke 1989a). Unlike most of the early studies, which used weighted indices, the 
observed trend in recent studies was to use unweighted indices. Weighting the 
indices was accomplished by employing weights determined subjectively by the 
researcher(s) (e. g. Cerf 1961), replicating weights used in previous studies (e. g. 
Singhvi and Desai 1971) or using weights attached in a questionnaire survey of 
users9 perceptions of items of information (e. g. Buzby 1975; Stanga 1976; 
Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). The unweighted index was calculated using a 
dichotomous procedure -a non-disclosure results in a score of zero and disclosure 
results in a score of one. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) provided some evidence 
that there may be no significant difference between weighted and unweighted 
disclosure indices. In this respect, Marston and Shrives (1991) suggested that 
where there are numbers of items in the index, the unweighted and weighted 
scores would give similar results. 
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Different statistical procedures have been used to assess the relationship between 
the extent of disclosure and company-specific factors. The main analytical tools 
used in the early studies were univariate statistics (e. g. non-parametric Chi-square 
and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test or parametric ANOVA). Moreover, 
despite some recent studies using univariate analysis (e. g. Cooke, 1993; Al- 
Modahki, 1996), the fact is that most of the studies carried out after late 1980s 
have employed multiple regression procedure. The sophistication and 
innovativeness of analysis of regression methodology are improving continuously. 
For instance, Cooke (1989a) used different rigorous dummy variable manipulation 
procedures within a stepwise multiple (OLS) regression, while Wallace and Naser 
(1995); Wallace et al. (1994) used ranked and unranked OLS regression to scope 
with the data sets with non-linear and monotonic relationships between dependent 
and independent variableS. 4 The explanatory power of estimated models was high 
(over 60%) in studies by Inchausti (1997); Wallace et al. (1994), while other 
estimated models had little explanatory power (e. g. Chow 1987; Wallace 1987). It 
is interesting to point out that in the studies the R2or adjusted R2found to be high 
are mainly carried out in developed countries whereas studies with R2or adjusted 
R2found to be low are mostly those that were undertaken in developing countries. 
Generally speaking, it can be argued that the majority of studies reviewed in this 
section indicated that size and listing status are positively associated with the 
extent of disclosure 'see Table 4.1'. However, some inconsistency was also 
observed (Buzby 1975; Malone et al. 1993; Singhvi 1968; Spero 1979; Stanga 
1976; Wallace and Naser 1995). On the other hand, among the studies that 
considered both size and listing status, it is found that listing status to be the most 
important explanatory variables (Al-Mulhem 1997; Cerf 1961; Cooke 1989a; 
Singhvi and Desai 1971), while other found to be size (Buzby 1975; Giner 1997; 
Hossain et al. 1994; Patton and Zelenka 1997). Interestingly, studies by Singhvi 
4A critical review of different transformation of variables and the use of rank regression in 
disclosure studies when dealing with non-linear and linear relationships when relationship is 
monotonic found in the recent study by Cooke (1998). In this study, regression based on 
untransformed data, log odds ratio, ranks and normal scores were applied to data on the disclosure 
of information in the annual reports of companies in Japan and Saudi Arabia and found that 
regression using Normal Scores has advantages over ranks that, in part, depends on the structure of 
the data. 
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and Desai (1971) reported different results when they used both univariate and 
multivariate analysis. 
As far as the industry type is concerned, it can be argued that despite the fact that 
this variable was also found to be significantly associated with the extent of 
disclosure in a considerable number of studies, other empirical studies disagreed 
with such result 'see Table 4.1'. With respect to the variables liquidity and 
leverage ratios, significant association has been proved in developed countries 
with regard to both variables (i. e. the relationship proved to be significantly 
positive and negative), although most results were against supporting such 
relationship in developing countries. In addition, regarding the variables auditor 
type and profitability ratios, although the later variable proved to be positively and 
negatively significant, generally speaking, results for both variables in both 
developed and developing countries are not clear or indeed contradictory. Finally, 
an interesting point to note is that, surprisingly, the negative association between 
the extent of disclosure and the profitability variable ratios for some previous 
empirical studies is against the theoretical arguments which will explored in 
detailed in the Methodology Chapter since this variable has been chosen as one of 
the variables to be investigated. 
Hence, the results of the studies reviewed in this section have been mixed and a 
certain extent inconsistent and sometimes contradictory. As also pointed by 
Wallace et al. (1994), such results are perhaps due to the fact that the research 
studies dealt with differing experimental units - in terms of the type and number 
of firm characteristics examined, sample size, different statistical methods, 
countries and years brought into their various research designs. The components 
of their disclosure indexes differed in respect of the list of items - their 
comprehensiveness and weighting. Moreover, in addition to sampling error, 
differences in definition of the explanatory variables have either individually or 
severally contributed to the mixed results. A further investigation featured by: 1) 
focusing on the mandatory disclosure while few studies explored this aspect, 2) 
investigating the extent of disclosure in compliance with all relevant IAS to JIC, 
and 3) using both univariate (parametric and non-parametric tests) and 
multivariate (multiple linear regression and stepwise regression) analyses, of the 
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association between the extent of disclosure and corporate characteristics of 
companies in a country which was not subject to such a previous study (Jordan), 
therefore, may contribute to efforts that have been made to identify the factors 
affecting disclosure practices of companies. 
As this review showed that neither Jordan nor any Jordanian companies have been 
subject to any disclosure studies in compliance with all relevant IAS, therefore 
little is known about the impact of company-specific factors on the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS in Jordanian corporate annual reports. In 
addition, this review indicates that company size, industry type are two of the 
company-specific factors (independent variables) that were considered and found 
to be significantly associated with the extent of disclosure in a number of studies 
that were carried out in various countries (developed and developing countries). 
This research also attempts to examine the impact of not only these factors on the 
extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS in the annual reports of JIC but also 
the impact of other popular factors considered previously showed a contradictory 
results such as leverage ratios, profitability ratios, and type of auditor. 
In this study, the researcher also examines the association between the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS and selected corporate characteristics over six 
years to determine not only whether there exist significant relationship between 
dependent and independent variables but also is such a relationship consistent 
over the years. This is achieved by analysing the annual reports of 50 Jordanian 
Industrial Companies listed on Amman Stock Exchange over the six years, 1995, 
1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000. Thus,, the sample is larger than many of the 
previous studies, and the period covered in this study is the maximum period has 
ever been covered in similar previous studies (a maximum of five years was 
considered by Al-Modahki (1996). 
4.4 Theoretical and empirical literature concerning the financial 
consequences of increased disclosure 
It has been argued that one of the major financial consequences of increased 
disclosure is its impact on the cost of equity capital 'see Chapter Five - Research 
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Methodology and Hypotheses'. The theoretical and empirical literature 
concerning this effect is the subject of the next section. Theoretical arguments and 
empirical studies concerning share price volatility, as another consequence 
influenced by increasing extent of disclosure, however, will be explored in a 
separate followed section. 
4.4.1 Theoretical and empirical literature concerning the impact of 
disclosure on cost of equity capital 
A major link between economic and financial theory and contemporary 
accounting thought is the notion that a firm's commitment to greater disclosure 
should lower costs of capital that arise from information asymmetries. Information 
asymmetries create costs by introducing adverse selection into transactions 
between buyers and sellers of firm shares. A commitment to increased levels of 
disclosure reduces the possibility of information asymmetries arising either 
between the firm and its shareholders or among potential buyers and sellers of 
firm shares. This, in turn, should reduce the discount atwhich firm shares are 
sold, and hence lower the costs of issuing capital (Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Levitt 1998). 
It could be argued that the extent to which firms benefit from increased disclosure 
remains a controversial issue in the absence of significant empirical evidence. 
Several models of asset pricing suggest increased disclosure reduces the cost of 
equity capital but little empirical evidence exists to support these claims. This 
absence of evidence fuels an ongoing debate among practitioners regarding the 
benefits of enhanced disclosure. For example, the Special Committee on Financial 
Reporting of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA 
1994) (i. e. Jenkins Committee) states that an important benefit of greater 
disclosure is a lower cost of equity capital. In this regard, Huddart et al. (1999) 
argued that the choice of the comer solution of full disclosure is robust even in the 
absence of cost-of capital considerations. Verrecchia (1999) explaining Huddart et 
al. arguments broadly saying, 
"... full disclosure may result even in the presence of an 
entrepreneurlmanagers of the firms who exploit shareholders through 
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unrestricted insider trading, because it is likely to achieve the greatest 
market depth (P. 282). " 
In rebuttal, the Financial Executive Institute (Berton 1994) argued that the 
enhanced disclosure called for in the Committee's report are targeted to stock 
traders which add to share price volatility thereby increasing risk and leading to a 
higher cost of equity capital. Such an argument supported also by Ball (1995); 
Barth et al. (1999). Ball (1995) observed that international harmonisation of 
accounting standards is not necessarily a desirable goal. He pointed out that 
multiple users of accounting information have multiple objectives and that 
country-specific GAAP evolves in a political process balancing country-specific 
economic environments, users, and objectives. Barth et al. (1999), moreover, 
showed also some direct evidence that cost of capital is not always decreasing in 
harnionisation. Their results suggest that regulators and standards-setters should 
exercise caution in their harnionisation efforts. More specifically, the fundamental 
point in their arguments is that if one increases public disclosure, and increased 
public disclosure has the collateral effect of making private information 
acquisition less costly, then more disclosure can make markets more or less liquid. 
More (less) liquidity, in turn, implies a lower (higher) cost of capital. The reason 
of this result is clear. The direct effect of more disclosure is that generally it 
makes markets more liquid. However, when acquiring private information is 
costly, the proportion of informed investors is endogenous. If a collateral effect of 
public disclosure is to make private information acquisition cheaper, then it is 
conceivable that more disclosure results in more private information acquisition, 
which, in turn, may result in less liquid markets. 
Theoretical research supporting a negative association between disclosure level 
and cost of equity capital has followed two related thrusts. The first is that greater 
disclosure enhances stock market liquidity thereby reducing cost of equity capital 
either through reduced transactions costs or increased demand for a firm's 
securities (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Barth et al. 1999; Copeland and Galai 
1983; Demsetz 1968; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; 
Huddart et al. 1999; Verrecchia 1996). Amihud and Mendelson claimed that the 
cost of equity capital is greater for securities with wider bid-ask spreads because 
investors demand compensation for added transactions costs. By disclosing 
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private information, firms can reduce the adverse selection component of the bid- 
ask spread and reduce their costs of equity capital. Diamond and Verrecchia, 
suggested that greater disclosure reduces the amount of information revealed by a 
large trade thereby reducing the advance price impact associated with such trades. 
As a result, investors are willing to take larger positions in a particular firm's 
stock than they otherwise would. This increases the demand for the firm's 
securities and raises the current price of the firm's stock, thus reducing the cost of 
equity capital. 
The second stream of research suggests that greater disclosure reduces estimation 
risk arising from investor's estimates of the parameters of an asset's return or 
payoff distribution. That is, greater uncertainty exists regarding the "true" 
parameters when information is low. If the estimation risk is non-diversifiable, 
investors required compensation for this additional element of risk (Barry and 
Brown 1985; Clarkson et al. 1996; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Coles et al. 
1995; Handa and Linn 1993; Klein and Bawa 1976). Barry and Brown (1985); 
Coles et al. (1995); Handa and Linn (1993) used a Bayesian Approach which 
recognises that investors or predictive distributions that reflect their uncertainty 
about the true parameters. They concluded that estimation risk is non- 
diversifiable, is not reflected in the traditional CAPM formula for market beta 
(which is derived under the assumption that the parameters of the distribution are 
known) and that estimates of market beta are systematically too low for low 
information securities because market beta fails to incorporate estimation risk. 
Clarkson et al. (1996) stated that estimation risk has a significant non-diversifiable 
component if resolution of uncertainty about low information securities affects the 
return earned on the market portfolio. They also argue, however, that the breadth 
of modem securities markets allows the correlation of returns induced by the 
resolution of uncertainty to be diluted to the point that any non-diversifiable 
component of estimation risk is immaterial. Nevertheless, they concluded that the 
extent of the impact of estimation risk remains, fundamentally, an empirical 
question. 
In their theoretical argument, Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) have established a 
link among the liquidity needs of the capital markets, the optimal level of 
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disclosure, the cost of capital, agency costs, and insider trading, in a model in 
which the costs and benefits associated with disclosure are endogenous. It is 
assumed, however, that the nature of the capital market is characterised by the 
potential liquidity needs of investors from whom capital is raised. Concerning the 
link among the first three factors mentioned above, Baiman and Verrecchia 
argued that market illiquidity and cost of capital fall because more disclosure 
encourages investment by individuals who may have future liquidity needs. Thus, 
as investors potential liquidity needs increase, the optimal level of disclosure 
increase, the liquidity of the market increases, the cost of capital decreases, the 
expected profits of insider trading decrease, and the manager's residual moral 
hazard problem increases leading to decreased efficiency. Hence, their analysis 
predicted a direct relationship between the use of such contracts, the market's 
potential liquidity needs, and the observed level of disclosure. 
Although existing empirical research tends to support a negative association 
between disclosure level and cost of equity capital, the authors of the Jenkins 
Committee (1994, P. 38) report admit that the evidence to date does not present 
"an empirical case that informative disclosure lowers the cost of capital. " Such an 
argument is because prior research has examined the impact of disclosure on 
variables that are expected to be positively related to cost of equity capital and not 
on cost of equity capital itself (Frankel et al. 1995; Healy and Palepu 1995; Healy 
et al. 1995; Welker 1995). 
It could be argued that, empirically, little is known about the impact of increased 
disclosure on cost of equity capital in both: developing and developed countries. 
Such an issue, therefore, is providing the significant of this study in the field of 
accounting and finance. The empirical studies investigated the significant of such 
impact, however, are reviewed below in chronological order. 
Firth (1984) 
The purpose of Firth's empirical study was to examine whether the amount of 
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of 100 manufacturing companies 
in the UX selected from 1000 largest companies in 1977 was linked to the 
assessment of stock market risk. Specifically, the level of disclosure, derived from 
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a weighted disclosure index consisted of a list of 48 items, was examined to see if 
it was associated with systematic risk measured by beta (P), unsystematic risk 
measured by variance of residuals (C, 2ej) , and total return risk measured 
by 
variance of returns (02 Rj). Estimates of these risk measures were calculated from 
the Market Model assuming that total return risk is a function of the systematic 
and unsystematic risk. The coefficients of the Market Model were calculated 
using 60 observations of monthly security returns from January 1972 to December 
1976. 
The study involved regressing measures of leverage, earnings beta, size, dividend 
yield and disclosure on measures of security risk. Leverage was measured as the 
market value of interest bearing debt divided by the market value of equity. The 
market values were measured as at the end of 1976. Firm size was taken as the 
total market value of the equity shares at the end of 1976, and the dividend yield 
was also measured as at the end of 1976. Earnings beta is measure as the co- 
variability of firm's reported earnings available for shareholders with the reported 
earnings available for ordinary shareholders of the market as a whole, i. e. 
Eamings beta = COV (Ei, Em) 
/ C12 (Em) 
Where Ej = earnings of firms j and Em = earnings of all firms in the market. 
Estimating the earnings beta was measured by using twelve years of annual 
earnings data, where the market estimate of earnings was derived from using all 
listed manufacturing firms. 
The empirical tests found no evidence of the disclosure score having any impact 
on the level of systematic risk (0). Firth argued that although greater amounts of 
disclosure may be of use to the users of accounts, it is not because of assessing 
present and future levels of systematic risk. Moreover, the tests also showed that 
the amount of disclosure had no impact on unsystematic risk (a 2 e) and variance of 
return ((y2R). Such results are interesting, however, since its providing empirical 
evidence that there is no impact of disclosure on the cost of capital. 
Botosan (1997) 
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In this empirical study, Botosan (1997) examined the association between 
voluntary disclosure level provided in the 1990 annual reports of a sample of 122 
machinery industry US firms and the cost of equity capital by regressing firm- 
specific estimates of cost of equity capital on market beta, firm size and a self- 
constructed measure of disclosure level. The selection of items included in the 
weighted index for measuring the extent of disclosure were those items identified 
by investors and financial analysts as useful in investment decision making. The 
selection of these items was guided by recommendations provided in the AICPA 
(1994) study of business reporting (i. e., the Jenkins Committee report), the 
international survey of investors information needs (1987), and the Canadian 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (1991) study of the annual reports. In addition, 
firm size measures used were the market value of equity (MVAL) at the end of 
1990, the book value of total assets (ASSET), the net book value of property, the 
plant and equipment (PPE) and sales is the total sales, the number of employees 
reported, all for the year ended 1990. 
Beta was estimated, however, via a Market Model regressing of at least 24 of the 
60 monthly return observations in the five-year period ended May 31,1991 on the 
market index. The cost of equity capital estimated using an accounting based 
valuation formula developed by Edwards and Bell (1961); Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995); Ohlson (1995) which specifies a relation between equity values and 
current book values and future abnormal earnings. The derivation of the valuation 
formula is based on the well known dividend discount formula which states that 
the market price of a firm's stock (Pt) is equal to the sum of expected dividends 
{Et(dt+i)) discounted at the cost of equity capital (r). Since current share price 
specifies in terms of accounting numbers - current and future book values (bt and 
bt+i) and future earnings (xt+i), Ohlson (1995) argued that all gains and losses 
affect forecasted book value flow through forecasted earnings. The above 
equation, therefore, modified as a function of current book value plus the 
discounted sum of expected abnormal earnings. Setting the time (T) equal to four, 
solve the resulting fourth-degree polynomial equation for cost of equity capital, 
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rEmv; using Mathematical software, Botosan (1997) identified the formula for 
estimating rvBv. 5 
This empirical study provided direct evidence of an association between the cost 
of equity capital and disclosure level, and an indication of the magnitude of its 
effect. Holding cross-sectional variation in market beta and firm size constant, a 
negative association between cost of equity capital and voluntary disclosure level 
for firms that attract a low analysts following was reported. For firms with a high 
analyst following, however, no evidence of an association between measure of 
disclosure level and cost of equity capital observed. She referred such result to the 
reason that the disclosure measure was limited to the annual report and 
accordingly might not provide a powerful proxy for overall disclosure level since 
analysts play a significant role in the communication process. The study provided 
some preliminary evidence on the type of disclosure that seemed to play an 
important role in reducing the cost of equity capital. That is, for firms with low 
analyst following, disclosure of forecast information and key non-financial 
statistics is particularly important while for firms with high analyst following, 
disclosure of historical summary information is beneficial. In addition, the study 
showed that among firms without a large analyst following, those with higher 
quality-disclosures had higher prices, after controlling for other factors affecting 
price. 
The limitation of the study, however, is that it was based on observations for firms 
in one industry and for one year only, which make the results not generalised to 
other industries, different time periods, and different countries. In addition, the 
cost of capital is based on an accounting construct which itself will be affected by 
the level of disclosure and therefore enable a spurious result to arise. 
' Botosan (1997) argued that cost of equity capital could be estimated using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) which defines expected returns as the sum of the expected risk free rate 
(E(rf)), the product of a firm's estimated market beta (P) and the expected risk premium (E(rm-rf)). 
He added, as CAPM assumes cross-sectional variation in market beta alone derives variation in the 
cost of equity capital, and as a result the CAPM approach provides no role for disclosure level 
unless one assumes cross-sectional variation in disclosure level induces variation in beta, a notion 
that has no theoretical support, the accounting based valuation formula was adopted in his study 
for estimating the cost of equity capital. It has to be argued, however, this study is an attempt to 
examine empirically the notion that variation in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
could induces variation in beta as a measurement for the systematic risk and consequently 
variation in cost of equity capital. 
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Sengupta (1998) 
As theoretically argued that a policy of timely and detailed disclosures reduces 
lenders' and underwriters' perception of default risk for the disclosing firm and 
reducing its interest cost of issuing debt, this empirical study investigated the 
association between an industrial firm's overall disclosure quality ratings and its 
cost of debt financing, which could be seen as an extension to Botosan (1997) 
study in investigating the consequences of increased disclosure quality. The study 
eliminated the banking and insurance industries since it believed that their 
financing decisions are affected by somewhat different factors than those of the 
industrial firms. A measure of a firm's overall disclosure quality is obtained from 
the annual volumes of the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate 
Information Committee. 6 
For estimating the cost of debt, there were two alternative methods adopted by the 
research: 1) the yield to maturity on the first debt issue (YIELD), which represents 
the effective rate of interest that equates the present value of the principal and 
interest payments with the amount paid to the lender, and 2) the total interest cost 
of new debt issues (ICOST), which represents the effective rate of interest at 
which the present value of the principal and interest payment is equal to the 
amount received by the firm, net of underwriter discount. Firms that did not have 
three consecutive years' of information, therefore, were deleted leaving final 
sample for the analysis, involving YIELD consisted of 114 firms while 103 firms 
involving ICOST. 
By adopting multiple linear regression models, the study provided evidence that 
both measures of cost of debt employed were negatively associated with the 
disclosure ratings, after controlling for other potential determinants of a firm's 
cost of debt. Firms that were rated favorable by financial analysts for the degree of 
detail, timeliness and clarity of disclosures were perceived to have a lower default 
risk premium and were rewarded with a lower cost of borrowing. Sengupta (1998) 
6 In 1989 the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF) combined with the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts (ICFA) to form the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). From 1990 onwards, therefore, the corporate disclosure evaluation was published by AIMR under the title: Corporate Information Committee Report (CICR) and the evaluations still 
prepared by a committee of the FAF. 
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argued that the consequences of disclosure quality, therefore, are broader than a 
focus on equity issues alone could reveal. In addition, the findings also indicated 
that the relative importance of disclosures was greater in situations where there 
was greater market uncertainty about the firm as reflected by the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns. 
Richardson and Welker (2001) 
This study explored the relation between financial and social disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital for a sample of 225 Canadian firms' observations from 87 
different firms with yearend in 1990,1991, and 1992. Richardson and Welker 
(2001) empirical measures of financial and social disclosure were drawn from the 
joint Society of Management Accountants of Canada (SMAC) / University of 
Quebec at Montreal (UQAM) ranking. In addition, the study followed Botosan 
(1997); Botosan and Plumlee (2000); Gebhardt et al. (2000), for estimating the 
cost of equity capital using an accounting based valuation model developed in 
Edwards and Bell (196 1); Feltharn and Ohlson (1995); Ohlson (1995). 
For testing whether the financial and social disclosure scores were valid measures 
of those disclosures, Richardson and Welker (2001) run the regression between 
financial disclosure and firm size, financial performance, leverage, and financial 
analysts. Their result revealed that each of the variables except financial 
performance exhibited a significant and positive relation with financial disclosure, 
a result consistent with past literature. Moreover, a regression model was 
employed for testing the relationship of social disclosure scores with firm size, 
industry membership, financial performance, leverage, and analyst following 
(measured by the number of analysts making 1 -year earning per share forecast). 
The result was encouraging as the measure of social disclosure appeared to be 
related to variables that the past literature suggests it should be. 
As it was found that risk premium was negatively related to the number of 
analysts following the firm and positively related to leverage (Gebhardt et al. 
2000), this study included these variables as control variables in testing the 
relation between cost of equity capital and financial disclosure and social 
disclosure. 
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Consistent with prior empirical research, the study found significant negative 
relation between financial disclosure and cost of equity capital for firms with low 
analysts following confirming Botosan (1997) findings, while the relation with the 
social disclosure was significantly positive. 
In summary, in spite of the regulatory and theoretical support for increased 
disclosure by firms, direct evidence of a negative empirical relation between 
disclosure levels and the cost of capital is limited and mixed (Botosan 1997; 
Botosan and Plumlee 2000; Richardson and Welker 2001) on cost of equity 
capital, and on the cost of debt (Sengupta 1998). Aside from the difficulties of 
measuring the cost of capital directly and estimating this relation, one potential 
explanation for the mixed empirical results argued by Richardson and Welker 
(2001) who indicated that if there is little variation in the information disclosed 
due to effective regulatory interventions, or if analysts routinely generate 
information independently of the firms' own disclosures, then the power of 
empirical tests will be significantly reduced. For example, Botosan (1997); 
Richardson and Welker (2001) documented a statistically significant negative 
relation between the level of financial disclosure and cost of equity capital for 
their samples of USA and Canadian firms, respectively. This relation, however, 
holds only for the subset of their sample characterised by limited analyst 
following. 
A stronger test of the relationship between corporate information disclosures and 
the cost of equity capital is possible by choosing markets and information sets 
where corporate disclosure plays a larger role in market valuations. Such a 
relationship will be tested in Jordan, a developing country, with a history of loose 
and vague financial reporting requirements before adopting fully the IAS in 1998. 
This situation created an ideal environment for testing the possible impact of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS not only on the selected JIC cost of equity 
capital, but also on JIC systematic, unsystematic, risk premium, and share price 
volatility issues have not been empirically tested before neither in developed nor 
in developing countries. 
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4.4.2 Theoretical and empirical research concerning the impact of 
disclosure on share price volatility 
It is argued that one of the likely implications of inadequate corporate disclosure 
is the greater price dispersion in the securities market. Stigler (196 1, P. 214) wrote, 
"Price dispersion is a manifestation - and, indeed, it is a measure - of ignorance 
in the market. " Adequate disclosure of information minimises ignorance in the 
market and causes the market price to reflect the "true value" of the security; 
consequently, the price dispersion in narrowed down. 
Graham et al. (1962, P. 28) argued, therefore, true value or intrinsic value of a 
security, by definition, is "the value which is justified by the fact, e. g., assets, 
earnings, dividends, definite prospects, including the factor of management. " The 
current market price, on the other hand, is the price at which securities are quoted. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) argued 
"Dispersion between the market price and the intrinsic value of a security 
in part is the result of the quality of information - the more superior the 
quality of information disclosed, the lower will be the price dispersion. 
Investors tend to buy securities at a price which is higher than the intrinsic 
value, or they sell at the price which is lower than the intrinsic value for 
several reasons, and one of the reasons is the lack of information which is 
necessary to determine the intrinsic value o the security" (P. 136). )f 
With full disclosure of information, one would expect less drastic shifts in 
estimates of expected profitability of a given issue, a greater scope for scientific 
investment analysis, a diminished reliance on and use of rumors, a reduction in the 
scale of manipulation practices, and a narrower dispersion between the intrinsic 
value and market price of a security (Friend and Herman 1964, P. 391). 
In the absence of adequate corporate disclosure of information, dispersion in the 
market price of a security is likely to be wider than what it would be otherwise. 
Consequently, some corporations sell their securities at a price, which is higher 
than the intrinsic value of the security, while others sell for less than the intrinsic 
value. The cost of capital in the former case, therefore, is likely to be lower than in 
the latter case if the intrinsic value of the security is the same for both. This shows 
that investment decisions by the investing public affect the price of capital in 
security markets, which in turn affect decisions by corporate managements as to 
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investment of funds in new capital goods or inventories. If the cost of capital is 
relatively high in a given period, the cutoff rate for accepting investment projects 
will be relatively high, and several projects will be lower rate of return but useful 
to the economy probably will be rejected. These decisions, in this manner, affect 
allocation of resources and are likely to have major implications for the 
maintenance of a high level of business activity, employed and economic growth. 
Since the intrinsic value is based on the earnings potential of a corporation, in 
addition to other factors, the security prices are in fact divorced from the earnings 
potential when adequate information is not available. The stock market under 
these circumstances cannot be expected to serve as an effective disciplinary force 
capable of pressing management to maintain the efficiency of corporate 
operations. 
In conclusion, it could be argued that as corporate disclosure increases, the 
variations tend to narrow down, and this may further reduce excessive speculation 
and gambling in the security market. It is also likely that the corporations with 
poor earnings, when required to disclose full and fair information, might be 
weeded out of the securities market because it will be difficult for such 
corporations to raise capital at a reasonable cost. With adequate accurate 
information available, the investing public will have more confidence in the 
securities market and the number of investors is likely to increase providing more 
liquidity in the financial market and consequently providing funds for companies 
listed on the market at lower cost. 
In addition, it is argued that since prices of corporate securities are based on the 
estimated earnings and the earnings are estimated on the basis of the information 
available about corporate operations, the price fluctuations are likely to be less 
wide with the better disclosure of information (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; 
Bloomfield and Wilks 2000; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Knauss 1964; 
Sengupta 1998; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Stigler 1961). Reduction 
in share price volatility as a result of increasing extent of disclosure was 
empirically confirmed by Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Bloomfield and Wilks 
(2000); Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). 
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One of the earliest empirical studies by Singhvi and Desai (1971) investigated 
whether share price fluctuation significantly related to extent of disclosure. They 
grouped the selected 150 US companies into four groups according to their extent 
of disclosure, namely; 1) 50% or above, 2) 40% to 49%, 3) 30 to 39%, and 4) 
below 30%. Relying on their classification, they provided evidence in connection 
with the likely influence of corporate disclosure of information on security prices 
using the means analysis. Their results showed that inadequate corporate 
disclosure in annual reports of the selected US companies for fiscal year ending 
April 1,1965, and March 31,1966 is likely to widen fluctuations in the market 
price of a security since investment decisions, in the absence of adequate 
information, are based on less objective measures. Fluctuations in the security 
prices are measured by taking the differences between high and low prices of a 
security for a given year and dividing it with the low price for the same year. 
Statistically, Singhvi and Desai (1971) developed the following model to quantify 
the conceptualised relationship between the price dispersion and the level of 
disclosure: P= 78.53 - 0.66 (1), where (P) is the percentage price dispersion and 
(I) is the level of disclosure score. This relation suggests that as (1) increase, (P) 
significantly decrease and vice versa (e. g. R= -0.13 729). They concluded, 
"These fluctuations, which affect the cost of capital and the corporate 
management's decision to invest funds, lead to inefficient allocation of 
capital resources in the economy. The market system, under these 
circumstances, becomes a less efficient in allocating the nation's 
resources (P. 13 7). 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) methodology was replicated by Courtis (1979) on New 
Zealand low and high security prices for each company included in the sample. 
Corporate disclosure score then classified the resulting percentage fluctuations. 
High disclosure scores were associated with higher share price fluctuations, while 
low disclosure scores were associated with either low share price fluctuations or 
no trading whatsoever. Courtis (1979) evidence of an association between New 
Zealand stock price fluctuations and levels of disclosure did not seem to match 
that found by Singhvi and Desai (1971). Although there appears to be some 
association between fuller levels of disclosure and higher security prices, the 
association between disclosure and security price fluctuation seems to run 
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contrary to the U. S. A experience. One explanation for this perversity may lie in 
the relative efficiencies of the financial press of the two countries in reporting 
corporate information. 
Most recently, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) investigated German firms that have 
switched from the German GAAP to an international reporting regime (IAS or 
U. S GAAP), thereby committing themselves to increased levels of disclosure. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) employed proxies for the information asymmetry 
component: namely, the bid-ask spread, trading volume, and share price volatility. 
The researcher investigated the effect of international reporting strategies on the 
above proxies across firms. The sample was composed of 102 firms included in 
the DAX 100 index during 1998. The annual reports of the selected firms were 
analysed in order to determine when firms announced their switch from national 
German GAAP to international reporting standards (IAS or U. S. GAAP). Such a 
switch was considered over the period 7/l/97 and 6/31/98 and during that period 
there were 14 firms have chosen IAS, while 7 firms have chosen U. S GAAP. 
Therefore, to assess whether firms with an international reporting strategy provide 
more and higher quality of information, the study used annual report published 
ratings which were based on a disclosure index derived at the Institute of Auditing 
at Saraland University. The study obtained 90 of 102 sample firms and comparing 
the ratings for firms following an international reporting strategy to those firms 
that provided Gen-nan GAAP statements, the study found that the mean (median) 
rating of the former group were significantly higher using a t-test (Mann-Whitney- 
Wilcoxon test), respectively. Moreover, Leuz and Verrecchia used the average 
percentage bid-ask spread, median daily share turnover, and the standard 
deviation of daily returns as proxies for information asymmetry and liquidity. The 
findings were that firms following international reporting strategies had 
significantly lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume than the rest of the 
DAX 100 firms using a t-test (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test) in testing the means 
(medians). Unexpectedly, the average and median volatility of the international 
reporting group was slightly above the volatility of the German reporting group 
and the differences in the means (medians) were not statistically significant. 
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It is argued by the researchers, however, that the above univariate results should 
be interpreted cautiously since differences in firm characteristics were not 
controlled. Descriptive statistics to the two groups showed that German firms 
adopted the international reporting strategy, on average, were more widely held, 
more capital-intensive, less leveraged, more profitable, and more frequently listed 
in the UX and US confirming the self-selection bias in the cross-sectional 
regression. A subsequent analysis of the bid-ask spread and trading volume 
around the switch to international reporting, however, produced corroborating 
results where reduction in share price volatility was not documented. 
To sum up, mixed empirical results reported on share price volatility in relation 
with disclosure. Volatility might be influenced by many factors unrelated to 
information asymmetry and testing the effect of disclosure on volatility could be 
ambiguous - in particular for infrequently traded stocks (Leuz and Verrecchia 
2000) such as the case of Jordanian companies. Bushee and Noe (2000) 
demonstrated that the effect of disclosure on volatility is complex and may depend 
on the type of investors attracted to the firm. For these reasons, as-a measure of 
information asymmetry, volatility is likely to be the least reliable proxy among the 
others in exploring the financial consequences of adopting the IAS in Jordan. 
According to the efficient financial market theory, moreover, share price reflects 
all information available and hence implementing the IAS is just part of this 
information. In other words, many factors could affect share prices in the financial 
market such as not only microeconomic but also macroeconomic factors. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the literature related to the study objectives were searched 
covering the issues: 1) the impact of IAS on the extent of disclosure, 2) the impact 
of company-specific factors on the extent of disclosure, and 3) the financial 
consequences of increased disclosure. 
Several researches were carried out to examine the association between company- 
specific factors and the extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports in various 
countries. While most empirical studies have chosen the level of voluntary 
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disclosure and aggregate disclosure to be investigated in examining such a 
relationship, generally speaking, few studies indeed focused only on mandatory 
disclosure. Size was the most popular variable considered in the 30 studies 
reviewed, where listing status and industry type were the second most popular 
firm factors. In all the studies reviewed, however, the extent of disclosure was 
measured by a disclosure index. Unlike most of the early studies, which used 
weighted indices, the observed trend in recent studies was to use unweighted 
indices. In addition, the main analytical tools used in the early studies were 
univariate statistics, while most of the recent studies have employed multivariate 
analysis (e. g. the multiple regression procedure). 
Generally speaking, the majority of studies reviewed indicated that size and listing 
status are positively associated with the extent of disclosure. As far as the industry 
type is concern, empirical results were contradictory. With respect to the variables 
liquidity and leverage ratios, however, significant association has been proved in 
developed countries with regard to both variables (i. e. the relationship proved to 
be significantly positive and negative), although most results were against 
supporting such relationship in developing countries. In addition, regarding the 
variables auditor type and profitability ratios, although the later variable proved to 
be positively and negatively significant, generally speaking, results for both 
variables in both developed and developing countries are not clear or indeed 
contradictory. A further investigation featured by: 1) focusing on the mandatory 
disclosure while few studies explored this aspect, 2) investigating the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with all related and relevant IAS to JIC, and 3) using 
both univariate (parametric and non-parametric tests) and multivariate (multiple 
linear regression and stepwise regression) analyses, of the association between the 
extent of disclosure and corporate characteristics of companies in a country which 
was not subject to such a previous study (Jordan), therefore, may contribute to 
efforts that have been made to identify the factors affecting disclosure practices of 
companies. 
Concerning the financial consequences of increased disclosure, theoretical and 
empirical studies were reviewed. It could be summarised that in spite of the 
theoretical support for increased disclosure by firms, direct evidence of a negative 
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empirical relation between disclosure levels and the cost of capital is limited and 
mixed. Aside from the difficulties of measuring the cost of capital directly and 
estimating this relation, one potential explanation for the mixed empirical results 
argued by Richardson and Welker (2001) who indicated that if there is little 
variation in the information disclosed due to effective regulatory interventions, or 
if analysts routinely generate, information independently of the firms' own 
disclosures, then the power of empirical tests will be significantly reduced. A 
stronger test of the relationship between corporate information disclosures and the 
cost of equity capital is possible, therefore, by choosing markets and information 
sets where corporate disclosure plays a larger role in market valuations. Jordan, a 
developing country, experienced for a long time loose and vague financial 
reporting requirements before adopting fully the IAS in 1998 could be seen as an 
ideal environment for testing the possible financial consequences of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS, an issue has not been empirically tested before neither in a 
developed country nor in a developing country. 
Finally, as far as the share price volatility is concern, mixed empirical results 
reported in its relation with disclosure. Volatility, however, might be influenced 
by many factors unrelated to information asymmetry and testing the effect of 
disclosure on volatility can be ambiguous-, in particular for infrequently traded 
stocks as argued by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) such as the case of Jordanian 
companies. As a measure of information asymmetry, volatility is likely to be the 
least reliable proxy among the others in exploring the financial consequences of 
adopting the IAS in Jordan. According to the efficient financial market theory, 
moreover, share price reflects all information available and hence implementing 
the IAS is just part of this information. In other words, many factors could affect 
share prices in the financial market such as not only microeconomic but also 
macroeconomic factors. 
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CHAPTERFIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides details of the research methodology employed and the 
hypotheses developed in this study for achieving its objectives. The first objective 
need to be achieved is that to test whether Jordanian Industrial Companies (JIC) listed 
on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and their shares traded during the period under 
consideration implement fully the IAS. The second objective is that if those JIC do 
not comply fully the IAS the research will explain the compliance level differences, if 
it is found, among those companies by looking at company-specific factors that have 
been chosen. On the other hand, the third objective that might have not had that much 
attention is that the consequence of adopting the IAS, as far as the financial market is 
concerned, in developing countries. Therefore, for exploring this issue, the following 
aspects could be investigated: 1) to what extent adoption in Jordan IAS has reduced 
the systematic risk estimated by beta, unsystematic risk estimated by residuals 
variance, risk premium, and cost of equity capital estimated by expected return? It is 
conceivable, however, that the cost of equity capital has been influenced by other 
changes taking place over the period other than the change in the extent of disclosure 
in compliance with IAS. In particular, the firms may have been changing their 
business risk or their financial risk and this need to be controlled for in assessing the 
impact of the change in disclosure on the cost of equity capital, 2) overall, can IAS 
adoption be associated with a reduction for JIC share price volatility?, 3) does bid-ask 
spread narrowed as a result of complying with IAS?. Therefore, the following 
sections will explain in more detail the above issues. 
5.2 Methodology for Assessing the Impact of the IAS on Disclosure Practices 
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The first objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the IAS on disclosure in 
Jordan by seeking an answer to the following question: 
"To what extent do JIC listed on the ASE and having their shares traded 
during the period under consideration complies with the mandatory 
requirement to disclose IAS? " 
There existed 41 standards issued by the IASC (as of June 2001), which mainly or 
partly address disclosure. In the worksheets, however, the IAS that became operative 
after 2000, those that address consolidated financial statements, those that are 
designed for business areas other than the Industrial Sector, and the standards found 
to be irrelevant to the selected JIC case were not covered. Table 5.1 shows the 
number of IAS, which were operative between 1995 and 2000 and those, which were 
relevant to the JIC over the same period and were used for developing the 
worksheetst. 
Table 5.1: IAS operative during the period 1995-2000 and the IAS relevant to 
i1c 
Year No. Of IAS Operative No. Of IAS Relevant to JIC 
1995 31 18 
1996 31 18 
1997 31 18 
1998 33 18 
1999 38 21 
2000 38 21 
6ources: international Accounting Standards 1995: the full text of all International 
Accounting Standards extant at I January 1995 and current exposure drafts, 
International Accounting Standards 1998: the full text of all International 
Accounting Standards extant at I January 1998 and current exposure drafts, 
International Accounting Standards 2000: the full text of all International 
Accounting Standards and SIC interpretations extant at I January 2000. 
See Appendix 2 (History of International Accounting Standards Concerned) for more details. 
198 
Chapter Five 
The IAS that became operative after 2000: The disclosure items worksheet, which 
was developed on the basis of the IAS active in the period under investigation (1995- 
2000), is used as a tool to examine the JIC disclosure and whether it complies with 
IAS. As the study concerns about the period 1995 - 2000 (the most recent year), only 
the IAS that were in force before 2000 could be included in the worksheet. 
IAS addressing: consolidated financial statements, financial institutions, sectors other 
than the Industrial Sector, and the standards found to be irrelevant to JIC. As 
consolidated financial statements and financial institutions were left outside the scope 
of this study, IAS 22 and 30, which are primarily directed consolidated financial 
statements and financial institutions, and parts of IAS 7 and 21, which relate to 
consolidated financial statements were not covered in the worksheet. In addition, 
parts of IAS 12, and 32, which relate to deferred tax and hedging respectively, have 
been excluded because of irrelevancy. Moreover, other IAS; 14,15,17,24,26,27, 
28,29,31, and 34 which are related to reporting financial infori-nation by segment, 
accounting responses to changing prices, accounting for leases, related party 
disclosure, accounting and reporting for retirement benefit plans, consolidated 
financial statements and accounting for investment in subsidiaries, accounting for 
investments in associates, financial reporting in hyperinflationary economies, 
financial reporting in joint ventures, and interim financial reporting respectively have 
been ignored because they do not apply to the selected JIC. Therefore, Table 5.2 
surnmarises the IAS apply to JIC used to develop the disclosure indices over the 
period 1995-2000 and the number of items in each index. 
Table 5.2: IAS Relevant to JIC 1995-2000 
Year(s) Covered Number of IAS Apply to JIC Number of Items 
1995-1997 18 137 
1998 18 186 
1999 21 221 
2000 21 219 
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The IAS considered, in general, represent the major components of disclosure. Each 
of the IAS related to the period under investigation is analysed in order to develop the 
list of disclosures required by IAS. It has to be noted that many of these standards 
have been revised, reformatted and combined into other standards over the years, 
which has been taken into account. In the construction of the worksheet, any changes 
made and being active after 2000 in the standards were not taken into account. 
To sum up the above arguments, Table 5.3 listing all IAS issued by IASC, IAS 
relevant to JIC used in developing the disclosure indices, and comments on the reason 
for exclusion some of these standards. 
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Chapter Five 
The disclosure index was developed by creating questions for each standard 
separately in order to be checked by analysing the annual reports for each industrial 
company over the period 1995-2000. Hypothesis that set out to assess the impact of 
the IAS is 
"HOI: There are no changes in the extent of disclosure in compliance with MS in the 
annual reports of JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1995- 
2000 ". 
To be able to test the above hypothesis, for JIC as individuals and as sectors, the JIC 
extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS over the six years (1995-2000) were 
estimated by using an updated index. The JIC included are those their shares traded in 
ASE and published their annual reports during the period 1995-2000, which means 
the study is not a sample exercise in testing the above hypothesis since all JIC with 
the above-mentioned characteristics are included. The disclosure index was updated; 
however, by taking into account the additions and changes to IAS over the period. 
Moreover, the hypothesis has also been tested by exploring whether there is a 
significant change pre and posts the mandatory application of IAS. 
5.2.1 Measurement of the Extent of Disclosure 
Cooke and Wallace (1989, P. 5 1) pointed out that accounting disclosure is an abstract 
concept that cannot be estimated directly. It does not possess inherent specifications 
by which one can indicate its intensity or quality, like the capacity of a car. 
Nevertheless, they argued that a suitable proxy, such as an index of disclosure, could 
be used to determine the extent of information disclosed by a firm. 
It can be said that disclosure indices used widely by previous researchers to measure 
the extent of disclosure in a company's accounts (Ahmed 1996; Ahmed and Nicholls 
1994; Al-Modahki 1996; Al-Mulhem 1997; Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Buzby 1975; 
Cerf 1961; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 1993; Cooke 1989a; 
Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; Courtis 1979; Dumontier and Raffoumier 1998; Firth 
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1979; Giner 1997; Hossain et al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997; Lau 1992; 
Malone et al. 1993; Marston and Robson 1997; McNally et al. 1982; Meek et al. 
1995; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Raffournier 1995; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 
1971; Soh 1996; Stanga 1976; Tai et al. 1990; Tong et al. 1990; Wallace 1987; 
Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994). Marston and Shrives (1991) argued 
that disclosure indices can be used to show compliance with regulations if the items 
in the index are so chosen. This study also uses disclosure indices to measure 
Jordanian companies' compliance with the disclosure requirements of IAS. The 
procedure followed to measure this disclosure is summarised as follows: 
1. Construction of a disclosure-scoring sheet. 
2. Selection of the period to be covered. 
3. Identification of JIC listed on the ASE over the period under consideration (1995- 
2000). 
4. Scoring the disclosure items. 
5. Constructing the disclosure index. 
However, there are issues in constructing a disclosure index, which should be 
explained. This study is using an "unweighted index" of compliance based upon the 
IAS requirements which is applied in earlier studies (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Al- 
Modahki 1996; Al-Mulhem 1997; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 
1989a; Cooke 1992; Courtis 1979, Firth 1980; Giner 1997; Gray 1995; Haniffla 1998; 
Hossain et al. 1994; Meek et al. 1995; Raffoumier 1995; Robbins and Austin 1986; 
Soh 1996; Wallace 1987; Wallace 1988; Wallace et al. 1994). According to Wallace 
(1988), the unweighted index is a ratio of the number of items a company disclosed 
divided by the total that it could have disclosed. Gray (1995) argued that the 
unweighted scoring approach assumes that each item is equally important. On the 
other hand, weighted disclosure index also have been used previously for measuring 
the extent of companies disclosure in both developed and developing countries 
(Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; 
Firth 1979; Malone et al. 1993; Marston and Robson 1997; Singhvi 1968; Stanga 
1976; Wallace and Naser 1995). However, the discussion regarding weighted and 
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unweighted issue will be extended later in section 5.2.1.4 to justify the approach used 
in this study for measuring the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. 
5.2.1.1 The Disclosure Scoring Sheet 
The first step in the development of a disclosure index to measure the extent of 
disclosure is the selection of items to be included on a disclosure-scoring sheet. Since 
there has been no general theory regarding the number and selection of the items, 
previous studies have used between II (Tai et al. 1990) and 289 (Spero 1979) items. 
This is because the scope of the selection of information items usually depends on the 
focus of the study. 
As this study involves an examination of JIC' compliance with IAS disclosure 
requirements over six years (1995-2000), the primary task was to develop a list of 
information items that might be disclosed in the annual reports of JIC to enable the 
researcher to measure the extent of the disclosure according to the IAS over the 
selected six years. The steps followed to develop the disclosure-scoring sheet are 
discussed below: 
Step 1: Construction of an initial form of scoring sheet. The objective at this stage in 
constructing an initial form of scoring sheet is to be reliable and relevant. Therefore, 
on the basis of a review of IAS and of previous disclosure studies, an initial 
disclosure-scoring sheet was constructed. The initial step in the construction of the 
indices of compliance was the selection of items which have been influenced by: 1) 
Relevant international accounting standards should exist in each of the years under 
study (1995-2000). Because of changes in the requirements regarding some standards, 
however, the number of individual points on which compliance could be estimated 
changed over the period as it is shown previously in Table 5.2.2) The items had to be 
potentially relevant to a set of JIC that could be characterised in general as domestic 
manufacturing firms. 3) Each item had to be applicable to the generality of firms. 4) 
The items have been chosen so that it is easy to verify whether the company discloses 
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it or not. Although there are many other items that could be included, the difficulties 
in judging whether it has been disclosed was the reason for excluding it in order to be 
more objective in measuring the level of disclosure for each company. For example, 
initially, JAS 16 as issued in 1982 permitted either historical cost or re-valued 
amounts as the basis for reporting plant assets. As revised via the Comparability 
Project, the IAS 16 benchmark suggests that PPE be carried at cost less accumulated 
depreciation. The allowed alternative states that PPE may be carried after initial 
recognition at its revalued amount. As modified, IAS 16 requires that any revaluation 
be to fair value and that these be updated regularly (at least every three years). The 
IASC requires that revaluation be made with sufficient regularity and that 
revaluations are applied to the entire class of PPE. Revaluation associated with 
company law and tax regulations may make it difficult, if it is not impossible, to 
comply with these IASC requirements. 
Street et al. (1999, P. 36) has found that 12 companies from his sample electing to 
revalue certain items of PPE, six indicate that valuations are made with sufficient 
regularity, and II indicate the specific classes of PPE revalued. He argued that it is 
impossible to determine if the remaining companies are complying with the IASC 
guideline. Therefore, many items cannot be included for the reason that one cannot 
tell whether there is compliance or not. 
One way of solving this problem is by relying on what has been said in the annual 
report for the company. But again this is can be a risky method as it have been 
mentioned by many researchers that the degree of compliance by companies claiming 
to comply with IAS is very mixed and somewhat selective (Cairns 1999; Cairns 1997; 
Street and Bryant 2000; Street and Gray 2001; Street et al. 1999; Taylor and Jones 
1999) supporting criticism by the President of the International Federation of 
Accountants QFAQ who has criticised auditors for asserting that financial statements 
comply with IAS when the accounting policies and other notes show otherwise 
(Cairns 1997). Therefore, it should be said that the study is looking at many aspects of 
the IAS rather than all of the IAS. 
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Step 2: Modification of the scoring sheet. To meet the objectives of being reliable and 
robust, items included in the initial disclosure-scoring sheet were reviewed by three 
Jordanian accountants, one of the Newcastle University staff specialists in the IAS 
from the Accounting and Finance Department and the researcher supervisor. The 
three Jordanian accountants are: a member of an audit firm, a member of the 
accounting profession, and a member of the Jordanian capital market. Therefore, 
taking into account the IAS requirements, an item of information was added if 
recommended, and eliminated if objected to by at least three members of the group. 
According to these procedures fifteen items were removed and seventeen items were 
added to the disclosure indices 1995-2000. 
Step 3: Pilot study. Having developed the disclosure-scoring sheet by selecting the 
items as described in the previous steps, a pilot study was carried out. In this stage, 
six randomly selected listed JIC annual reports over the six years (1995-2000) were 
analysed, first to ensure that all important disclosure items likely to be disclosed by 
JIC were covered in the scoring sheet. The second purpose was to identify those items 
of information included in the scoring sheet, but whose applicability cannot be 
determined from published annual reports. In this final stage, those items whose 
applicability to companies could not be determined based on the annual reports were 
eliminated, which were thirty two items. 
5.2.1.2 Selecting of Period to be covered 
The main objectives of the study are: 
To test whether JIC listed on the ASE and with their shares traded during a 
selected period implemented fully IAS, 
Secondly, if those JIC do not comply fully with IAS, the study will explain the 
compliance level differences. In terms of company-specific factors that have 
been chosen, namely: company size, audit firm, profitability, structure, and 
industry type. 
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* On the other hand, the third objective, which might have not had that much 
attention, is the financial consequences (e. g. systematic risk, unsystematic 
risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility) of IAS 
adoption as far as the ASE is concerned. 
The period selected in this study, therefore, for analysing the disclosure practices of 
JIC to gather evidence to assess the immediate impact and beyond the immediate 
impact (short and long term impact) of IAS on disclosure practices, is three years 
before the mandatory enactment of IAS starting from I September 1998, through the 
Companies Act published in 1997 by the Jordanian Government and the Securities 
law published in 1997 by the Stock Exchange, and three years after that. It has to be 
mentioned, however, that Jordanian companies were asked voluntarily to implement 
IAS by the Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA), which 
does not have any enforcement authority, starting from December 1990 as a result of 
the absence of national accounting standards, which is discussed in chapter three. The 
period fulfilling the study objective, therefore, will be from 1995 until 2000. This pre- 
and post- implementation period is considered to be enough for analysing the impact 
of the IAS on JIC, taking into account that the annual reports and the inforination 
needed for analysis could not be available longer than the period considered (the 
annual reports can not be later than the year 2000 because of its availability 
considering that collecting these annual reports took place in the beginning of the year 
2001). 
Furthermore, as the enactment of the IAS is one of the most important recent 
developments in the area of financial reporting in Jordan, and this regulation, which 
has been claimed to increase substantially the minimum disclosure requirements, the 
period surrounding the year that the IAS was enacted was considered to be one of the 
best periods to look at and assess the impact of IAS. 
The reason for covering more than one year is that it would provide a better picture of 
the disclosure and compliance patterns of companies and their financial performance 
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before and after the IAS were introduced and also would provide useful information 
about what the impact of IAS is, if any, direct or indirect. Choosing the period 1995- 
2000, therefore, is clearly justified for achieving the study objectives, not only for 
measuring the impact for the IAS on JIC disclosure and its improvement, but also for 
assessing any impact on the ASE. 
5.2.1.3 JIC Listed on ASE 
To the decision to limit this study to the industrial sector (mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, and construction) was made in this study, because in Jordan this 
sector considered to be the main sector, which makes significant continuous increase 
to the contribution to GDP (Tables 2.4 and 2.10). Moreover, other sectors may 
include different items in the financial statements and in addition there are specific 
legal and regulatory requirements for specific sectors (e. g. financial and insurance 
sectors), which affect the comparability of accounts. In other words, financial firms 
cannot be included since they do not possess characteristics (such as having an item 
that can represent what 'annual sales' can for non-financial firms), which make them 
comparable with non-financial firms. Furthermore, other limited companies (non- 
listed) will not be examined because the company law did not force them to publish 
their financial reports, which are consequently not available. Finally, industrial 
companies included are those companies had existed for the six years period 1995- 
2000, they had to have a full set of company accounts and they had to have been 
continuously trading over the whole period. Any industrial company, therefore, its 
share price was fixed over any of the years under consideration has been excluded. 
However, many previous empirical studies, especially most recent, focused also only 
on the non-financial companies (Ahmed 1996; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Al- 
Mulhem 1997; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989a; Hossain et al. 1994; 
Inchausti 1997; Raffoumier 1995; Stanga 1976; Street et al. 1999). 
There was no readily available list showing the industrial companies listed on the 
ASE between 1995 and 2000 featured by the mentioned above limits. The only 
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published document lists all companies registered with the ASE between 1995 and 
2000, classifying them into four sectors: Insurance, Banks, Industry and Services. 
Therefore, the research has to work out those industrial companies. 
Therefore, Table 5.4 surnmarises total JIC listed on ASE in the Secondary Market 
(First and Second) and those considered in the study over the period under 
investigation. 
Table 5.4: JIC Listed on ASE and those Considered in the study 1995-2000 
Year JIC Listed on 
ASE 
JIC Considered Proportion of 
JIC Considered 
1995 126 50 39.7 
1996 132 50 37.9 
1997 139 50 35.9 
1998 150 50 33.3 
1999 152 50 32.9 
2000 163 50 30.7 
Source: ASE, Yearly Statistical Series, Different issues. 
As it can be seen from the above table, the proportion of the industrial companies 
considered in this study was decreasing over the period 1995-2000. Out of those 
industrial listed companies, the number featured by the previous limits was 50 
companies. These JIC were classified by the researcher into five types of industry as 
follow: Chemical 13, Food and other services 10, Textile 7, Mining and Building 
Equipment II and finally Machinery and Metal Industry 9 companies. All of the JIC 
featured by the previous limits were chosen for studying. 2 It has to be noted, however, 
2 As the annual reports of one listed company, belong to the Food and Other Services Sector, for 
certain years were not available from the company itself or from the ASE, and the share price for 
another company, belong to the Mining and Building Equipment Sector, for certain years were not 
provided, those companies were eliminated. It has to be mentioned, however, that banking sector 
representing the most of the ASE market capitalisation. For example, Arab Bank represents almost 
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with the exception of the study reported by Lang and Lundholm (1993) that covered 
2319 total firm years (varying from one to five years per firm), most of the previous 
empirical studies focused only on one year per firm, and the number of firms in each 
study has varied from 33 to 527. 
A full set of the annual reports for the six years were obtained from the companies 
through personal contact with the management of the company. All companies 
investigated in this study have their financial year ending on 31/12 for each year. 
Although there are other different sources of information, which could be used such 
as stockbrokers' advice, prospectuses, employees reports, announcements to the Stock 
Exchange, newspapers and magazines, interim and quarterly reports, personal visits, 
the annual reports are considered to be the most important source of information 
about companies used by previous researchers (Al-Basteki 1995; Botosan 1997; 
Cooke and Wallace 1989; Evans and Taylor 1982; Hossain et al. 1994; Nobes 1990; 
Patton and Zelenka 1997; Raffoumier 1995; S inghvi and Desai 197 1). 
Compared with other sources of information, annual report information is viewed as 
more reliable and timely source (Foster 1986). On the other hand, Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) has found in their research that annual report disclosure levels are 
positively correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media, a result 
supported also by Botosan (1997). Moreover, Knutson (1992) states, 
"At the top of every analyst's list (offinancial reports used by analysts) is the 
annual report to shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every 
other financial report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it" 
(P. 7). 
Ahmad (1988) argued that as other sources of information are generally very limited 
in developing countries, this would suggest that annual reports as a source of 
information occupy a more important role in developing countries than in developed 
countries. Thus, the methodology employed in this study used the annual reports to 
decide whether or not the company disclosed an item in line with IAS disclosure 
25% of the market capitalisation 'see www. ase. com. jo'. 
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requirements. Another source that could be used is the ASE publications, which are 
not only not less timely than corporate annual reports but also most of their 
information regarding individual companies is extracted from companies' annual 
reports. ASE publications include information about the share prices and the financial 
ratios for the companies listed on the market. 
5.2.1.4 Scoring the Disclosure Items 
There are different approaches to developing a scoring scheme to capture levels of 
disclosure. The most commonly used approach is a modified dichotomous procedure 
in which an item scores one if it is disclosed, zero if it is not disclosed and NA if it is 
not applicable (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Al-Modahki 1996; Chow and Wong- 
Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1992; Dumontier and Raffournier 
1998; Haniffa 1998; Firth 1980; Gray 1995; Inchausti 1997; Meek et al. 1995; Patton 
and Zelenka 1997; Robbins and Austin 1986; Soh 1996; Wallace 1988). This is called 
the unweighted approach. A similar approach was also adopted in this study, that is 
the contents of a company's annual report are checked against the items on the 
scoring sheet and coded as one for complied, zero for not complied and NA for not 
applicable, depending on whether the report contained the item of information which 
is relevant to the particular company. 
The determination of whether an information item is not complied (0) or not 
applicable (NA) is not an easy task. For example, if there is not any contingent 
liabilities disclosed, does this mean that there are none or that the company is 
declining to disclose them? In order to overcome this problem the method suggested 
by Cooke (1989a); Cooke (1989b) is to scrutinise the entire corporate report before 
deciding whether a particular item is applicable or not. This helped to reduce the risk 
of penalising a company for not disclosing an item, which is not applicable. Another 
example is that if there is not development cost capitalised, especially by those JIC's 
in the Chemical and Mining and Building Equipment industries. 
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It should be clarified that not all the items were applicable to each company; thus, a 
company was not penalised for not disclosing a non-applicable item. To 
operationalise this, each annual report was extensively examined to determine the 
items which were applicable and therefore expected to be presented in the annual 
report, an approach has been used by previous empirical studies (Buzby 1972; Cooke 
1989a; Wallace 1987). This yields two scores for each annual report. The first is the 
maximum number of items applicable to a certain company and the second is the 
number of items actually disclosed by the company. A relative disclosure index was 
calculated for each company by the ratio of the actual number of items disclosed by 
the company to the maximum number of items applicable to the company. Therefore, 
a company's extent of mandatory disclosure was expressed as a percentage ranging 
from 0% if the company did not disclose any item to 100% if the company disclosed 
all the items applicable to it. The following is the general formula used by Ahmed 
(1996); Cooke (1992); Firth (1979); Meek et al. (1995): 
Individual company degree of compliance = 
Total score for individual company / maximum total applicable items 
A compliance score was arrived at through a reading of the financial statements. Each 
annual report was studied to determine whether there had been compliance with the 
IAS. Information was taken from the financial statements; the balance sheet, profit 
and loss account, cash flow statement, auditor report, company explanations and 
notes to the statements. 
The researcher coded the annual reports for the six periods under consideration in a 
consistent manner. After the entire individual companies' worksheets had been 
completed, the compliance scores were transferred to a master summary sheet. The 
summary sheet consisted of 6 columns (the number of years estimated), with 50 rows 
(one for each company) presented in Appendix 3. 
As mentioned earlier briefly in this section there are two different approaches for 
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measuring the compliance; the weighted and the unweighted indexes. The main 
disadvantage for the weighted approach is that it gives weights may be predetermined 
subjectively (Cerf 1961; Singhvi and Desai 1971), or may be a replication of weights 
used in previous studies (Barret 1977; Barret 1976; Courtis 1979; Marston 1986), or 
may be based on average weighted derived from a questionnaire survey of users' 
perception of disclosure items (Buzby 1975; Firth 1979; Stanga 1974). 
Clearly one class of user the financial statements will attach different weights to an 
item of disclosure than another class of user. For example, financial analysts will be 
more interested in disclosures relating to financial perforinance and earnings potential 
whereas employee groups will be interested in disclosures relating to employment 
conditions, remuneration and job prospects. However, the focus of this research is not 
on one particular user group but rather on all users of corporate annual reports. 
Support for not attaching weights can be found in Robbins and Austin (1986); Spero 
(1979). In addition, Marston and Shrives (1991) argued that if there are a large 
number of items in the index, one might expect that the weighted and unweighted 
scores would give the same result. That is to say, a sample of companies would be 
ranked in the same way using the unweigthed index as they would be using the 
weighted index. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) noted this in their study and 
subsequently restricted their statistical analysis to the weighted results. Firth (1980) 
also noted that unweighted and weighted scores showed similar results. 
On the other hand, the unweighted approach gives equal weight for each item, which 
can be considered one of the main weaknesses for the approach since some of these 
standards will have more weight than others because the number of items needs to be 
estimated within each standard is varied among these standards. Therefore, it will 
appear like the standard, which have more items, are more important than others with 
fewer items. Despite the above argument, it has been provided some proof that there 
may be no significant difference between weighted and unweighted disclosure 
indexes (Choi 1973; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Firth 1980; Robbins and Austin 
1986; Spero 1979). 
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The study objective is to test whether the JIC imply the standards in general (overall 
compliance) and therefore regardless to how the standards are used by other users 
when they estimated the compliance according to the items within each standard 
(unweighted approach). Accordingly, to achieve the study objective and in order to 
avoid the unweighthed approach problem mentioned above, the researcher has 
developed a new method by calculating an index for each standard. This new 
approach is called the "Partial Compliance (PC) unweighted" approach. Therefore, 
the degree of compliance for each company is estimated by adding the degree of 
compliance for each standard. This implicitly gives equal weighting to each 
applicable standard and avoids the problem of unintentionally giying more weight to a 
standard with a larger number of items in the index. It gives equal weighting for each 
standard instead of equal weighting for each item as it is in the unweighted approach. 
For example, to explain, let us assume that the extent of disclosure regarding three 
IAS needs to be estimated for company X. The first standard has one item, the second 
standard has three items and the third standard has one item. Considering that 
Company X has disclosed the only item in standard number one and one item from 
the items in standard number two and the only item in standard number three, 
therefore, because the study using the "Partial Compliance (PC) unweighted" 
approach, the extent of disclosure will be (2'P)/3= 7/9. However, using the 
unweighted approach will give a result of 3/5. It has to be argued in the same time 
that even this approach of treating all standards as of equal weight has the drawback 
of assuming all standards are equally important. However, given the problems of 
determining weightings, it is on balance the best approach. 
In the disclosure model used in this study, the total disclosure score for a company is 
taken to be additive. The following is the general formula used: 
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PC= rj - Xj = percentage for a standard 
disclosed. 
-r= number of relevant standards 
forph firm. 
Therefore, the extent of disclosure in compliance with the IASC requirements for 
each company was calculated through the following general formula: 
Individual company percent extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
PC / rj 
5.2.1.5 Constructing the Disclosure Index 
Once a disclosure-scoring sheet for each company for each year was completed, IAS 
compliance disclosure indices were created to measure the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS. 
The choice of area of accounting practice to be covered in this study was based upon 
the fact that JIC are currently practising only the basics of accounting since its local, 
small in size and not complex. In addition, they are no major multinational, stock 
ownership is not widely spread, and a few key owners control a firm. Furthermore, 
IAS requirements concerning advanced accounting practices such as deferred tax, 
accounting for leases, inflation accounting, etc are not applicable. For example, as 
mentioned earlier in Table 5.3, JIC do not lease assets since finance leases are not 
used in Jordan (underdeveloped financial systems) therefore IAS 17 concerning the 
leasing standard is not an issue. Similarly for deferred tax - since the Jordanian tax 
system does not give rise to temporary difference (or timing differences) and 
permanent differences between the tax profit and accounting profit, and then the IAS 
12 concerning deferred tax part is not an issue to be considered in developing the 
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disclosure indices. Consequently, the areas of accounting practice chosen in this 
research are relatively fundamental. 
In conclusion, despite the above explored processes for developing as accurate indices 
as possible, it has to be noted that developing those indices are limited to items where 
compliance is visible and therefore the research inevitably end up testing disclosure 
more than measurement and accounting policy statements more than accounting 
practice. The index is therefore a proxy for compliance and in some ways a slightly 
biased proxy. In particular, in measuring the extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS, the study is reliant on the fact that companies making clear statements of 
accounting policies and making them honestly. 
5.2.2 Data Analysis and Testing the Hypothesis 
For testing the significance of the change in the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with the IAS over the period 1995-2000, a number of statistical tests can be used. By 
taking into account the statistical test employed in previous similar studies (Al- 
Basteki 1995; Al-Modahki 1996; Doupnik and Taylor 1985; Emenyonu and Gray 
1996; Soh 1996; Taylor et al. 1986) and the nature of the data used in this study, ' it 
was decided to conduct "two related samples tests" to test the hypothesis set out in 
section 5.2. 
There arc two types of two-related-sample tests: parametric (e. g. the Paired-samples t- 
test) and non-parametric (e. g. the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test and Sign 
test) .4 The parametric West, which requires that the data must fulfil the normality 
assumption, is considered to be more powerful than its non-parametric alternatives 
(Siegel 1956). To be able to determine if the West can be used to test the hypothesis 
3 Data used for testing the hypothesis set out in the previous section are two observations from the same 
sample (i. e. two scores obtained from the same sample) and the suggested statistical test for such data 
is the two-related-samples statistical test (Siegel 1956). 
4 The Wilcoxon test rather than the Sign test was conducted because the former considers the 
magnitude of the differences between the values in each matched pair, not just the direction of the 
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set out in section 5.2, normality tests of skewness and kurtosis and K-S, Lilliefors5 
were undertaken. The results of normality tests indicated that data (extent of 
disclosure scores) for each year covered in this study appear to be normally 
distributed. Therefore, the paired-samples West was carried out to test the above 
hypothesis. A Wilcoxon test (the non-parametric alternative to the paired-samples t- 
test) was also run in testing the same hypothesis to check the results of parametric 
tests. Such a methodology have also employed by previous empirical studies (Curuk 
1999; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). The advantage of using two approaches is that the 
probability of incorrectly rejecting the hypothesis is reduced (Cooke 1989a). 
Triangulation, adopting multiple methods of analysis, has been recommended by 
Denzin (1970), who stated that "no single method will ever permit an investigator to 
develop causal proportionsfree of rival interpretations" (P. 26). 
For testing the significance different in means between a pair of sectors, years and 
interact between sectors and years over the period 1995-2000, Univariate Analysis of 
Variance has been employed by using General Linear Model (GLM)6. If the test 
shows that the difference in means is significant in general among sectors, years or 
interact between sectors and years, Tukey HSD has been employed for finding out 
among which pair of years, sectors or interact the difference in means was significant. 
differences, and is considered to be more powerful and sensitive than the Sign test (Siegel 1956). 
5 K-S Lilliefors (a non-parametric test) is a test of goodness of fit which means that it determines 
whether the sample can reasonably be assumed to come from a normal population (Siegel 1956). 
Where data are not normal, the significance level of K-S Lilliefors is expected to be large enough 
(Norusis 1995). 
6 The GLM Univariate procedure provides analysis of variance for one dependent variable by one or 
more factors and/or variables. The factor variables divide the population into groups. In such a model, 
one could investigate interactions between factors as well as the effects of individual factors. 
Additionally, after an overall F test has shown significance, post hoc tests can be used to evaluate 
differences among specific means, which is the concern of this study. In other words, once it is 
determined those differences exist among the means, post hoc range tests and pair-wise multiple 
comparisons can determine which means differ significantly. The Bonferroni and Tukey's honestly 
significant differences tests are commonly used multiple comparison tests. When testing a large number 
of pairs of means, Tukey's honestly significant difference test is more powerful than the Bonferroni 
test. For a small number of pairs, however, Bonferroni is more powerful. GLM procedures were used 
instead of two-way ANOVA because the number of observations among sectors is different (SPSS 
Manual Guide, 2000). 
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For testing whether there is a link between the enforcement of implementing the IAS 
by ASM dated in September 1998 and the change in the extent of disclosure, possible 
pooling of time series cross section has been employed for the period pre and the 
period post the mandatory action across all JIC. This is done by running Paired- 
Samples West as a parametric test and Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test as 
non-parametric for finding out whether the difference between the two groups (pre 
and post) is significant. 
5.3 Methodology for Assessing the Impact of Company-Specific Factors on the 
Disclosure Practices of Jordanian Companies 
After assessing the extent of disclosure for the JIC, the second aim for this study is to 
assess the impact of company-specific factors to find whether these factors affect the 
disclosure practice in Jordan. In order to accomplish the second objective, this study, 
in line with the methodological approach adopted in previous studies reviewed in 
chapter three, examines the association between selected company-factors and the 
extent of disclosure in the annual reports of JIC. In this section a discussion for the 
identification of the company-specific factors (i. e. independent variables), developing 
the hypotheses to be tested and details of the data analysis procedure and testing the 
hypotheses will be explored. 
5.3.1 Company-Specific Factors and Development of Hypotheses 
When the extent of compliance is not fully achieved, an issue comes to mind that the 
reason for this result has to be explored. So, as it is reached by previous researchers in 
different countries (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Al-Modahki 1996; Chow and Wong- 
Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 1993; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; 
Haniffa 1998; McNally et al. 1982; Raffournier 1995; Soh 1996; Wallace 1987), it is 
expected in this study as well that JIC will not comply fully with the IAS. Positive 
accounting theory such as political, agency and signalling theories were used to justify 
the influence of company-specific factors on disclosure as a theoretical approach 
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explored experimentally since 1961 by Cerf, Political process theories suggest 
hypotheses about the use of accounting data to fix prices in regulated industries, to fix 
tax policy or to decide policy on subsidies for companies. Companies which are 
politically visible and subject to high political costs, may employ financial 
information to avoid these risks, and also may execute accounting changes to reduce 
such risks or even costs (Holthausen and Leftwich 1983). Therefore, the existence of 
contracting costs - agency and political costs - may be used to explain the attitude of 
companies towards the disclosure of information and choice among different 
accounting procedures (Watts and Zimmerman 1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). 
Another mechanism for explaining the financial information policy followed by 
companies is signalling (Spence 1973). The existence of information asymmetry 
between the firms and investors may produce the problem of adverse selection 
(Akerlof 1970). Firms to indicate underlying reality and to influence external users 
when making decisions regarding them may use financial information. It may be 
argued that only good firms will use this instrument, because the quality of firms can 
be later observed without difficulty, and firms would be punished by the market if 
they sent wrong signals (Morris 1987). Therefore, the second objective of the study is 
to justify this result by looking at some company-specific factors trying to explain, if 
it is possible, the reason of the differences in the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS. 
Halbouni (2000) investigated the difference in the extent of disclosure for JIC 
regarding selected IAS (2,4,7,13,16,18 and 21) by exploring some company- 
specific factors. Her finding was that there was no significant effect for these factors 
influencing the extent of disclosure. However, this study is not only investigating 
factors more popular as the review for the literature showed 'see Chapter Four- 
Literature Review' but also the difference in the period under consideration (1995- 
2000) and investigating all related IAS might significantly influence the results. 
There exists empirical evidence in the literature that some company-specific factors 
are associated with corporate disclosure level. On the basis of such indication in the 
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literature, the following main hypothesis is formulated in the null form 
V02: None of the company-specific factors are significant in explaining differences 
in complying L4Sjbr JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1995- 
2000 ". 
The number of company-specific factors covered in previous studies varied 
considerably and there is no generally accepted single set of such factors. However, as 
mentioned before, the theoretical arguments and evidence from previous empirical 
studies reviewed in Chapter four suggested that company size, types of industry are 
amongst the most important ones. Factors related to companies' performance such as 
profitability and liquidity ratios as well as the auditor type and foreign 
ownership/investment in capital are other popular factors considered. Therefore, on 
the basis of consideration of previous empirical studies, theoretical arguments and 
availability of data and applicability to Jordanian companies, the following variables 
are selected for analysis in this study and a number of sub-hypotheses are formulated. 
5.3.1.1 Company Size 
Although evidence from previous research provides overwhelming support for the 
hypothesis that there may be a positive relationship between firm size and level of 
disclosure, the theoretical basis for such a relationship is unclear. There are several 
reasons for expecting a positive/negative relationship between the company's size and 
its extent of diSCIOSUre. 7 The impact of large firm on an economy is quite 
considerable. For example, they account for a great proportion of the goods and 
services produced the number of persons employed, the quantity and value of raw 
materials consumed and the quantity and value of components imported into a 
country. Despite the conflicting views and a few inconsistent results, evidence from 
7 The firms in this study are some of the largest in Jordan. Compared to other advanced democratic 
such as the UK and the U. S. A, firms in Jordan are local, small in size and not complex. There are no 
major multinational, stock ownership is not widely spread, and a few key owners control a firm in Jordan. 
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previous studies which have been done in developed countries provide a strong 
indication that there is a positive and significant relationship between company size, 
as estimated by total book value of assets, total market value of the firm, total 
revenue, turnover, current assets, total assets, or total number of shareholders and 
disclosure level suggesting that larger companies follow better disclosure practices 
(Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Buzby 1975; Cerf 1961; Chow 
and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1991; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; 
Courtis 1979; Depoers 2000; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Firth 1979; Hossain et 
al. 1995; Hossain et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997; McNally et al. 1982; Meek et al. 1995; 
Raffoumier 1995; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Stanga 1976; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Wallace et al. 1994). In developing countries, however, although a consistent 
significant positive association between company size and disclosure level has been 
reported, it is noted that a wide variation in results exists (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; 
Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Hossain et al. 1994; Marston and Robson 1997; Tai et 
al. 1990; Wallace 1987). 
Several arguments may be advanced to justify such positive association between size 
and disclosure adequacy in annual reports (Buzby 1975; Choi 1973; Cooke 1989b; 
Firth 1979; Schipper 1981; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994). Among the 
most important reasons for this relationship are the following: 1) Larger firms can 
more easily afford the costs of collecting and disclosing more adequate information. 
2) Larger firms may need even more funds from the capital markets in order to 
continue to expand their activities at a rate which might not be possible with internal 
sources only and hence these firms would be more likely to disclose more information 
so as to be able to obtain the needed funds at reasonable cost. 3) The competitive 
advantage of larger firms may be less endangered by more adequate disclosure than 
would be the case for small firms. 4) Larger firms tend to employ highly skilled 
individuals and sophisticated management reporting systems that can provide a wider 
array of corporate information. 5) The number of subsidiaries and areas of activity 
tends to grow with the size of the company, thus increasing the amount of information 
to be processed by managers. 6) There may also be greater demands on large firms to 
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provide information for analysts and the public. According to Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986); Watts and Zimmerman (1978), large firms are more sensitive to political 
costs, which force them to disclose more in order to allay public criticism or 
government intervention in their affairs. In contrast, the management of small firms 
may believe more strongly that the disclosure of more detail could endanger their 
competitive position (Mautz and May 1978; Singhvi and Desai 1971). 7) In the 
agency theory literature, Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that agency costs 
increased with the amount of outside capital. Agency theory predicts that larger firms 
will disclose more information in their accounts to alleviate the potential for wealth 
transfers from suppliers of outside capital to managers. 
To summarise, however, there is a demand for better disclosure by large firms and 
they are better placed to supply it. Therefore, company size is selected as one of the 
variables for the analysis. One problem, however, is how to decide what variable to 
use to represent the size, since size can be estimated in a number of ways. 
Cooke (1992) has pointed out that there is no overwhelming theoretical reason to 
select one variable rather than another. Cooke (1989b) concluded that while size, as 
estimated by total assets, sales, and number of shareholders, is an important variable, 
it does not matter which of the three measures of size is selected. One of the size 
variables most commonly used by previous researchers is the book value of total 
assets (Cooke 1989b). According to Soh (1996) the book value of total assets may be 
considered to be a more robust measure of company size as it is less affected by 
external conditions. In this study, the book value of total assets was chosen as a 
measure of size. However, it has to be mentioned that companies might have 
intangible assets. This kind of asset is not fully included in the balance sheet. 
There. fore, using the book value of total assets is not considering the value of some 
intangible assets. But, because this study deals with companies where intangible 
assets are less likely to be important, using the book value of total assets is still an 
acceptable approach. Based on this variable, the following sub-hypothesis is 
formulated in the null form 
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"H02 (a): There is no association between book value of total assets and the extent 
of disclosure in the annual reports of JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded 
during the period 1995-2000 ". 
To test the above hypothesis, company size (total assets) for the years under 
consideration (1995-2000) for JIC included was calculated. Therefore, the study 
classified these companies into two groups as companies with total assets equal or 
more than the mean were called "large companies" and companies with total assets 
less than the mean were called "small companies". The total asset's means for JIC 
included in this study have been used to allow the internal environment and its effect 
in classifying the companies into large and small. This classification has been used for 
testing the above hypothesis using the univariate analysis (parametric and non- 
parametric tests). Following the robust approach, however, the actual values for the 
company size (total assets) have been employed for testing the above hypothesis using 
the multivariate analysis. 
5.3.1.2 Audit Firm 
Support for examining audit firm size as a determinant of disclosure level has come 
from several studies (DeAngelo 1981; Firth 1979; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Wallace 
et al. 1994). Empirical support for a positive relationship between audit firm size and 
disclosure level is inconclusive. Some studies have found that large audit firms show 
a significant association with higher disclosure levels (Ahmed 1996; Ahmed and 
Nicholls 1994; Al-Mulhem 1997; Cooke 1993; Cooke 1989a; Craswell and Taylor 
1992; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Hossain et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997; Malone 
et al. 1993; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Raffournier 1995; Singhvi and Desai 1971). 
Similar results were obtained by other studies, but with lower significance levels 
(McNally et al. 1982; Tai et al. 1990). No relationship between size of audit firm and 
disclosure levels was found in other studies (Courtis 1979; Firth 1979; Hossain et al. 
1995; Hossain et al. 1994; McNally et al. 1982; Singhvi 1968; Tong et al. 1990; 
Wallace et al. 1994). One study found that large audit firms show a significantly 
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negative association with mandatory disclosure compliance of Hong Kong listed 
companies (Wallace and Naser 1995). 
Although the primary responsibility for preparing the annual report rests with the 
company's management, the audit firm of a company can influence significantly the 
amount of information disclosed in annual reports (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; 
Benjamin et al. 1990). It is argued by Beaty (1989); DeAngelo (1981); Firth (1979) 
that the size of the auditing firm might affect auditing quality. The argument here is 
that to avoid any negative impact on their reputation, large audit firms are more likely 
to associate themselves with clients whose reporting policies are of higher quality. 
Therefore, larger firms have a greater incentive to discover and report a breach in the 
client's accounting system because client financial statements issued with errors and 
inadequate disclosures would diminish the reputation of larger audit firms more that 
that of smaller firms. This phenomenon called by DeAngelo "collateral aspect". 
Specifically, it is argued that larger, better-known audit firms exert more influence 
over the disclosure policies of companies than smaller and lesser-known audit firms. 
In contrast, in their attempt to avoid the economic impact of losing a client, small 
audit firms are likely to be more sensitive to client demands for non-disclosure 
(Malone et al. 1993). Another explanation comes from signalling theory. Being 
audited by one of the Big Fix firms is a signal of high cash flow expectations. Good 
firms are likely to disclose more information to 'advertise' their perfon-nance (Bar- 
Yosef and Livnat 1984). In addition to the possible influence of the size of auditing 
firm on disclosure, one would argue that auditing firms which have professional 
contracts with international auditing firms more likely to be up-to-date with any 
international development in accounting and it might be expected that they influence 
their clients to present more information. 
Size can be estimated by different criteria such as number of audit hours, total 
revenues, number of customers and number of personnel working for each firm which 
were unavailable in Jordan. Therefore, for this study audit firms in Jordan were 
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classified into two groups; the first group is for JIC whose annual reports are audited 
by one of the top five international audit firms and the second group is otherwise. 
8 
Table 5.5 shows the big five international audit firms working in Jordan and the 
number of JIC included in this study audited by each of them: 
Table 5.5: Big rive international audit firms working in Jordan and the 
number of JIC included in this study audited by each of them over the period 
1995-2000 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1) Saba & Co. 7 7 9 9 11 10 
3) Allied Accountant 9 10 7 6 6 5 
Total number of JIC audited 16 17 16 15 17 15 
by One of the Top Five 
international audit firms 
working in Jordan 
JIC audited by one of the Top 32 34 32 30 34 30 
Five international audit firms 
working in Jordan % 
8) Total number of JIC audited 34 33 34 35 33 35 
by one of the audit firrns other 
than the big five 
Total Number of JIC Included 50 50 50 50 50 50 
in the study 
As it can be seen from the above table the big five international audit firms working 
8 The big five international audit firms are Arthur Anderson, Dieloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Jordanian regulations asking companies to register their names in 
Arabic, therefore, there are two of the big five international audit firms working actively in Jordan 
under the names of Allied Accountants who is representing Arthur Anderson and Saba & Co. who is 
representing Dieloitte & Touche. 
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actively in Jordan were Saba & Co and Allied Accountant. Table 5.5 shows that those 
big five international audit firms working in Jordan audited 32% of the annual reports 
for the JIC included in the study for the year 1995 and 1997,34% for the years 1996 
and 1999,30% for the year 1998 and 2000. Therefore, it can be concluded that the big 
five international audit firms dealt almost with one third of the JIC annual reports 
included in this study over the period 1995-2000. 
To determine whether or not audit firm has an impact on the extent of disclosure, the 
following sub-hypothesis is formulated 
"HO2 (b): There is no association between auditfirm and the extent of disclosure in 
the annual reports of JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 
1995-2000 ". 
For testing the above hypothesis, the big five international audit firms were given one 
and zero otherwise in both test approaches (univariate and multivariate). 
5.3.1.3 Industry Type 
It has been argued in the literature that the extent of disclosure in financial reports is 
not likely to be identical throughout all industries. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978); Cooke 
(1992); Cooke (1989c) argued that differences in industry classification may be used 
to justify differences in disclosure adequacy for the following reasons: 1) the use of 
different or industry related accounting techniques, policies and/or procedures will 
lead to differential disclosure in annual as well as other reports. In other words, for 
more complex industries, might be more IAS are relevant comparing with other less 
complex industries which making the industry effect, 2) many industries, especially 
those which are oligopolistic, tend to be dominated by one firm which the others 
follow in many ways, hence a particular industry may have similar disclosure policies 
because of this "follow the leader" effect, 3) some industries may be more interested 
in public relations or more concerned about their social responsibilities, hence may 
disclose information while others do not, 4) it may be customary for a particular 
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industry to communicate more with the environment than is the case with others, and 
5) an industry or its leading firm may become the innovative leader in changing the 
existing status of reporting to investors. 
A number of previous empirical studies investigated the relationship between 
disclosure and industry type (Al-Mulhem 1997; Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Cooke 
1989a; Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; Cooke 1989c; McNally et al. 1982; Stanga 1976; 
Wallace 1987; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994). A significant 
relationship was in some studies (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Cooke 1991; Cooke 
1989a; Cooke 1989b; Cooke 1992; Stanga 1976; Wallace and Naser 1995), but not in 
others (Inchausti 1997; McNally et al. 1982; Wallace 1987; Wallace et al. 1994). An 
explanation for lack of consistency across these studies might be found in varying 
definitions of industry classifications. 
Hence, the type of industry is also considered as one of the variables likely to be 
associated with the extent of disclosure and accordingly the following sub-hypothesis 
is formulated in the null form 
"H02 (c): There is no association between industry type and the extent of disclosure 
in the annual reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 
1995-2000 ". 
It has to be mentioned that past researchers such as McNally et al. (1982) and Cooke 
(1992) have noted that a potential statistical problem may arise if the industry 
grouping contains a very small number of companies. The industry grouping used in 
this study done by the researcher as follows: 1) Machinery and metal industry (9); 2) 
Mining and building equipment (11); 3) Textiles (7); 4) Chemical (13); and 5) Food 
and other services (10). 
5.3.1.4 Proritability 
A finn's profitability has been hypothesised to be positively associated with its 
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disclosure level. When profitability is high, management may be motivated to 
disclose detailed information so that their continuation in their positions and their 
compensations are maintained andjustified (Singhvi 1968). Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
argument for testing the variables profit margin and earnings return is that higher 
earnings motivates management to provide greater information because managers feel 
that greater disclosure provides assurance to investors of Profitability and thus 
increase the compensation of management. In addition, firms with good news tend to 
disclosure more detailed and precise information than firms with bad news, especially 
in a setting where more information allows investors: 1) to smooth earnings across 
periods (Imhoff 1992; Newman and Sansing 1992), and 2) to change the composition 
of firms in their investment portfolios. 
It is argued, moreover, that a highly profitable firm is more likely to signal to the 
market its superior performance by disclosing more information in its annual report 
(Buzby 1975; Cooke 1989a; Cooke 1989b; Courtis 1979; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Wallace et al. 1994). Signalling theory means that management of firms with 
information that implies a higher value than that established by the market will have 
incentives to disclose this information so that their values are adjusted upwards. In 
contrast, management of firm with information that implies a lower value than that 
established by the market may be tempted to suppress this information in order to 
avoid its negative effect on the firm's market value. This is consistent with the market 
efficiency, which is not surprising, as it has been proved by many previous studies 
(Bamber and Cheon 1995; Beaver 1968; Bonnier and Brunner 1989; Bottom 1998; 
Hoegh-Krohn and Knivsfla 2000; May 1971; Opong 1996; Porter et al. 1995). 
However, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that disclosures are likely to be related to 
a firm's profitability, only if perceived information asymmetry between managers and 
investors is high. They added, "The results from the theoretical and empirical 
research suggest disclosure could be increasing, constant, or even decreasing in 
correspondence withfirm performance" (P. 250). 
The literature of the field of corporate finance has traditionally made a distinction 
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between the business risk of the firm, which is the result of the policy compromise the 
firm must make between the long term objective of profitability and the short run 
objective of liquidity, and the financial risk which is the result of another policy 
decision with respect to the optimal mix of debt and equity financing (Forsyth and 
Johnson 1974). These two accounting based risk measures can be considered as an 
indication of the firm's willingness to reduce the uncertainty in the capital market. 
Since it is generally assumed that the firm is managed in such a way as to increase the 
value of the stockholder's equity, or at least to prevent it from declining, it is 
reasonable to assume that the firm is interested in reducing the uncertainty of 
investors. It is, therefore, hypothesised that the greater the soundness estimated by the 
profitability and liquidity ratios is expected to be associated with greater disclosure. 
Further support for a positive relationship between profitability and disclosure comes 
from the earning management literature. A review of the earnings management 
literature and its implications for standard setting has been done by Healy and Wahlen 
(1999). The study concluded that the earnings management literature currently 
provides only modest insights for standard setters. Prior research has focused almost 
exclusively on understanding whether earnings management exists and why. The 
findings indicates that earnings management occurs for a variety of reasons, including 
to influence stock market perceptions, to increase management's compensation, to 
reduce the likelihood of violating lending agreements, and to avoid regulatory 
intervention (Beatty et al. 1995; Beaver and Engel 1996; Beaver and Engel 1989; 
Collins et al. 1995; DeAngelo 1988; Scholes et al. 1990; Wahlen 1994). This 
evidence of managerial incentives to create "good news" leads support to a view that 
disclosure will positively correlate with earnings. 
Empirical evidence provides conflicting results. A significant positive relationship 
was found in some studies (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and 
Desai 1971; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994), while other studies found 
no such relationship (Cerf 1961; Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; Inchausti 1997; 
Lau 1992; McNally et al. 1982; Meek et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995). A significant 
negative association between profitability and disclosure level has also been reported 
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(Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Wallace and Naser 1995). It has to be mentioned, however, 
that most of these researches have been done on developed countries such as USA, 
UK, New Zeland, and Spain. 
Previous studies employed the following measures of profitability; rate of return and 
earnings margin (e. g. Singhvi and Desai (1971); Wallace et al. (1994)) and the ratio 
of net profits to total assets (e. g. Belkaoui and Kahl (1978)). However, clearly there 
are other measurement of profitability such as carning per share (EPS), earning per 
share growth, return on investment (ROI), dividend per share and earning before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. (EBITDA). Most of these measures arc 
current short-term measures of performance. Only growth in EPS can be interpreted 
as a long-term measure. There is an issue about whether disclosure follows 
profitability in which case we would lag the variable (consider the previous year 
profitability value). However, it could be argued that measurement can make 
disclosure decisions contemporaneously with profitability. 
For this study current ROI has been employed for exploring the influence of 
profitability on the extent of disclosure. The following sub-hypothesis is formulated 
in the null form 
"H02 (d): There is no association between profitability and the extent of disclosure 
in the annual reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 
1995-2000 ". 
There are many issues in calculating return on investment (ROI). For this study it is 
estimated by using the following formula (Holmes and Sugden 1999; Pendlebury and 
Grove 200 1): 
ROI = Net Operating Profit after Tax / Capital Employed (Equity Book Value 
All Borrowing Book Value)9. 
9 For calculating the Net Operating Profit After Tax, the corporate tax rate used for industrial 
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To test the above hypothesis, returns on investment average for JIC included were 
calculated. Therefore, the study groups these companies into two kinds; companies 
with ROI equal or more than the average were called "high return on investment" and 
companies with ROI less than the average were called "low return on investment". 
The ROI average for JIC included in this study has been used to classify these 
companies. Therefore, by doing so, the internal environment and its effect in deciding 
the ROI has been taken into account. This classification has been used for testing the 
above hypothesis using the univariate analysis (parametric and non-parametric tests). 
Following the robust approach, however, the actual values for the profitability (ROI) 
have been employed for testing the above hypothesis using the multivariate analysis. 
5.3.1.5 Capital Structure 
Conflicting results have been reported by previous empirical studies. A positive 
association between leverage, as estimated by book value of debt to shareholders' 
equity, book value of total debt to total assets, long-term debt to equity, or long-term 
debt to total assets and disclosure level has been hypothesised (Courtis 1979; Hossain 
et al. 1995; Malone et al. 1993; Myers 1977; Schipper 1981; Wallace et al. 1994) 
while others did not find such significant influence (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; 
Barber and Sen 1984; Chow 1987; Hossain et al. 1994; Ingram 1984; Meek et al. 
1995; Raffoumier 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994). In contrast, 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) observed a significant negative relationship between the 
disclosure index and the leverage ratio. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that because more highly levered firrns incur 
more monitoring costs, they seek to reduce these costs by disclosing more 
infon-nation in annual reports. Since the firm's investment, dividend and financing 
decision are linked via its cash flows; creditors achieve indirect control by limiting 
companies was 15% over the period 1995-2000 according to the Income Tax Law No. 57 of 1985 and 
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the firm's financing policies and dividends (Smith and Warner 1979). Therefore, the 
higher the proportion of debt in the firm's capital structure, the higher the agency 
costs because a larger proportion of debt allows for greater potential wealth transfers 
from creditors to shareholders. By providing discretionary information, managers may 
contribute to reducing conflicts between shareholders and creditors and perceive a 
benefit through the reduction in agency costs. 
According to the operating procedures of all the financial institutions, borrowing 
companies are required to comply with a number of requirements. Companies with 
large borrowing are monitored closely by financial institutions and may be required to 
furnish information more frequently than companies having small amounts of debt. 
Consequently, there is an a prior expectation that institutional financed companies 
carrying large amount of debt on their balance sheets are likely to provide more 
detailed information in their annual report than companies with small amount of debt. 
It could be argued, however, that debt management is an important issue and most 
debt contract contains restrictive covenants where these are often expressed as 
accounting variables. These accounting variables are general in terms of debt interest 
covered or debt equity ratio (D/E). However, the specification of this could be quite 
important. Maybe the D/E ratio does not offer any explanatory power in the variation 
of disclosure index until the critical boundary is reached. This would suggest using a 
dummy variable approach for the variable. 
For the purpose of this study the' D/E ratio average for JIC considered will be 
calculated using the following formula, which will be justified, in section 5.4.1.2: 
D/E = Book Value of All Borrowing / (Market Capitalisation + Book Value of 
All Borrowing) 
So, the study groups these companies into two kinds; companies with D/E equal or 
its amendment No. 14 of 1995 (Article 17). 
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more than the average were called "high geared companies" and companies with D/E 
less than the average were called "low geared companies". The D/E average for JIC 
included in this study has been used to classify these companies. Therefore, doing so, 
the internal environment and its effect in deciding have taken the D/E into account in 
this classification (Healy and Wahlen 1999). The above classification has been used 
for testing the hypothesis using univariate analysis (parametric and non-parametric 
tests). Following the robust approach, however, the actual values for the capital 
structure (D/E) have been employed for testing the above hypothesis using the 
multivariate analysis. It has to be mentioned that the reason for inclusion of the 
absolute value of debt was to assess whether the financial institutions and banks have 
had a favourable influence on the financial reporting practices of Jordanian borrowing 
companies (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). 
The following sub-hypothesis is formulated in the null form 
"H02 (e): There is no association between capital structure and the extent of 
disclosure in the annual reports ofXC listed on ASE and their shares traded during 
the period 1995-2000 ". 
5.3.1.6 Data Analysis and testing the Hypotheses 
In choosing an appropriate statistical test for assessing the relationship between the 
extent of disclosure (dependent variable) and company-specific factors, the researcher 
is usually faced with the problem of selecting between a parametric or non-parametric 
test. Parametric tests have certain conditions underlying their use. When these 
conditions are satisfied, parametric tests are considered to be the most powerful tests 
for rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. On the other hand, non-parametric 
tests do not make assumptions about the parameters of the population from which a 
sample is drawn, and non-parametric tests apply to ordinal and nominal scales (Siegel 
1956). 
A review of the studies, which employed disclosure indexes, indicates that they used 
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both parametric and non-parametric tests (Cooke 1989b). The main analytical tools 
used in the early studies were univariate statistics (e. g. non-parametric Chi-square and 
Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank tests or parametric ANOVA), most recent 
studies have used multivariate analysis (parametric test) by using multiple regression 
procedures (Al-Mulhern 1997; Cooke and Wallace 1989; Hossain et al. 1994; Patton 
and Zelenka 1997; Raffournier 1995; Wallace 1987). Therefore, this research not only 
carried out univariate analyses as a method in early studies but also multivariate 
analyses as a method adopted in most recent ones. In addition, Patton and Zelenka 
(1997) reported that a series of univariate analyses may overstate the apparent overall 
explanatory power of a set of independent variables, which force toward applying 
both approaches. 
The univariate analysis involved both parametric and non-parametric tests. Since 
there are two categories of companies for the variables company size, audit firm, 
profitability and structure, it was decided to undertake a parametric two independent- 
samples West to examine the significance of association between these three variables 
and the dependent variable the extent of disclosure. Furthermore, a non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U test for the same variables was run to check the results of the 
parametric test. On the other hand, it was considered better to use a parametric one- 
way ANOVA rather than undertake a multiple West for the variable industry type, 
because there where more than two categories of company for this variable. Kinnear 
and Gray (1995), noted that unlike ANOVA, the Mest cannot be used to evaluate a 
hypothesis about three or more population means. Again a triangulation approach was 
adopted and a Kruskal Wallis test (a non-parametric alternative one-way ANOVA) 
for variable industry type was also run to check the results of the parametric test. 
Both the West and ANOVA are parametric tests and assume that the data are 
normally distributed and there is homogeneity of variance. In order to test whether the 
normality assumption is satisfied, tests in terms of skewness, kurtosis and K-S 
Lilliefors were undertaken. The equal variance assumption was also tested using the 
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Levene test for homogeneity of variance as suggested by Norusis (1995). 10 
The multivariate analysis carried out in this study is not only multiple regression 
routines but also stepwise regression technique in order to determine which 
explanatory variables are "best" in explaining extent of disclosure variation over the 
period under consideration. Multiple regression routines for each of the five six years 
covered in this study, however, were tested by using all variables using the actual 
values approach for the variables company size, profitability and structure and the 
dummy variable approach for the variables audit firm and industry type. The overall 
extent of disclosure was the dependent variable and the independent variables were 
natural logarithm of company size", audit firm, industry type, profitability and 
structure. 
One of the problems of undertaking any multiple analyses is that there may be 
multicollinearity between independent variables. The multiple regression model 
assumes that there is no linear relationships between the values of the independent 
variables. If the linear relationships exist then it becomes impossible to compute the 
estimators (8i) (Thomas 1997, P. 237). It is stated that the variances and hence 
standard errors of the estimators (coefficients of the explanatory variables) will tend 
to be large (inflate standard errors) whenever there is a high degree of 
multicollinearity. Since there is no reason why multicollinearity should affect our 
estimators of these standard errors, their size will be reflected in any estimated 
standard errors that we compute. This is the major possible adverse factor when 
multicollinearity is present - large standard errors and hence large estimated standard 
errors. One, consequence of this is that any confidence intervals for the true Bi 
parameters that we form may turn out to be very wide. That is, our estimates will lack 
precision and we will be very uncertain about true parameter values (Thomas 1997, 
10 In Leven test, if the observed significance level (P) is small (not significant) you can reject the null 
hypothesis that the two population variances are equal (Norusis 1995). " it has to be mentioned that the natural logarithm for company size has been employed because 
linearity assumption improved, which is one of the main assumptions for implementing the regression 
model, comparing with the actual values. 
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PP. 238-239). Therefore, multicollinearity checked not only by testing for Pearson 
Correlation Coefficients as it has been adopted by previous empirical studies (Farrar 
and Glauber 1967; Judge et al. 1985; Malone et al. 1993; Street and Bryant 2000; 
Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace et al. 1994) 12 , but also by running the stepwise 
regression technique (Malone et al. 1993; Neter and Kutner 1989). Malone et al. 
(1993) reported that an examination of the regression coefficients was made at each 
step of the stepwise procedures. This examination showed that as variables were 
removed from the model, the coefficients of these variables, their standard errors, and 
the mean-square error remained relatively stable. In the presence of multicollinearity, 
as variables were removed, one would expect these values to exhibit instability. A 
second problem is that since multiple regression analysis is to be used, each category 
of the independent variables audit firm and industry type requires dummy variables 
for every year covered in this study. Consequently, there are two dummy variables 
within the independent variable audit firm (JIC audited by one of the top five 
international audit firms, otherwise), five dummy variables within the independent 
variable industry type 13 are: 1) Machinery and Metal Industry; 2) Mining and 
Building Equipment; 3) Textile; 4) Food and other Services; and 5) Chemical. For the 
other independent variables, however, the actual values will be employed. 
12 When we test for the multicollinearity, we look at the correlation coefficients, which should not be 
considered harmful until they exceed 0.80 as it is argued by Farrar and Glauber (1967) and Judge et at. 
(1985) while Street and Bryant (2000) argued that it should not exceed 0.90. Wallace et al. (1994), 
however, considered coefficient of correlation exceeding 0.77 high enough to cause multicollinearity 
concern. 
13 It is important to notice here that we must drop one dummy variable if we are using an intercept term 
when it comes to run the regression, otherwise we would produce a linear dependence in the data 
matrix which is called perfect collinearity (Johnston 1972, P. 180: Gujarati 2003, P. 315). Nie et aL 
(1975, P. 374) discussed the problem by saying the inclusion of all dummies created from given 
nominal variable would render the normal equations unsolvable because the kth dummy variable is 
completely determined by the first k-I dummies entered into the regression equation. It is therefore 
necessary to exclude one of the dummies from the equation. The exclusion of one of the dummy 
variables, however, does not actually result in a loss of information since each category in the nominal 
variable concerned is presented by a unique combination of the five dummy variables in this study. In 
fact, the excluded category becomes a sort of reference point by which the effects of the other dummies 
are judged and interpreted and for this reason the excluded category is referred to as the reference 
category. Therefore, it has been decided in this study to exclude the Food and Other Services sector 
from the multiple regression equation because of the abroad definition for the Jordanian companies 
included in this sector and for avoiding the perfect collinearity effect. Concerning the audit firm, 
moreover, JIC audited by other than one of the top five international audit firm group were excluded 
from the regression equation. 
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The regression equation used is as follows: 
Y(I-6) -= ao + PiDi + 
P2D2 + P3D3 + P4D4 + PsD5 + P6D6 + P7D7 + PsD8 +P9 
Dq+ E 
Where: 
Y= Disclosure indices (Yi for 1995, Y2 for 1996, Y3 for 1997, Y4 for 1998, Y5 
for 1999, Y6 for 2000) 
Di LN Company Size (total assets) 
D2 = Audited Firm 
D3 Profitability (ROI) 
D4 Structure (D/E) 
D5 Machinery and Metal Industry 
D6 Mining and Building Equipment 
D7 = Textile 
D8 = Food and Other Services 
D9 = Chemicals 
6= Error terns (disturbance) 
ao = Intercept (constant) 
Pi = Coefficients of the explanatory variables 
The disturbance term represents two sets of factors. First, it represents the effect on 
the dependent variable (extent of disclosure) of all variables other than the ones 
included in the study. Second, even if the variable included were the only identifiable 
variable influencing the dependent variable, it should not expected that the same level 
of dependent variable will stay year after year. e, therefore, is included to allow for 
the basic random unpredictability of human behaviour (Thomas 1997, P. 78). 
An important point to note is that, in order to undertake ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
multiple linear regression, the data must fulfil certain conditions, i. e. normalitY9 
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homogeneity (equal variance), uncorrelated" and linearity. The most commonly 
suggested approach to check whether or not the data fulfil these conditions is an 
analysis of the residuals (Norusis 1995; Kinnear and Gray 1995). In this study a Q-Q 
plot of residuals was analysed and formal tests of normality of residuals (skewness, 
kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors) were undertaken to check the normality assumption 
(Norusis 1995, PP. 452-453). Furthermore, the linearity and homogeneity assumptions 
were checked by analysing the scatterplots of the regression standardised predicted 
values against the residuals (Kinnear and Gray 1995, P. 174). Finally, a commonly 
used statistic for testing the existence of autocorrelation among residuals is the 
Durban-Watson (DW) statistic, which will be, employed (Maddala 2001, P. 228; 
PP. 242-245). 
An important issue to discuss is that, in the case of the regression model, the 
dependent variable is the extent of disclosure. Since the dependent variable in the 
present model was expressed as a ratio (constrained to lie between zero and one), the 
application of the standard OLS regression was considered inappropriate because the 
OLS approach assumes an unconstrained (unbounded) dependent variable. For a 
constrained dependent viable the OLS technique cannot ensure that estimates of the 
dependent variables will lie between zero and one, that is, there is a problem that the 
model would give predictions of probabilities greater than one (Green 1991; 
Hanushek and Jackson 1977). In order to introduce the zero-one bounds into the 
model, transformations involving the dependent variable generally are required before 
the OLS regression could be applied (Hanushek and Jackson 1977). One such method 
is to transform the dependent variable logistically, that is taking the logarithm of the 
14 Correlation between the error terms arising in time-series data which called autocorrelation or serial 
correlation. If autocorrelation exists, that means the error term ut at time period t is correlated with 
error terms ut+I, ut+2.... and ut-i, ut-2,... and so on. Such correlation in the error terms often arises 
from the correlation of the omitted variables that the error term captures. The correlation between ut 
and ut-k is called an autcorrelation of order k. the correlation between m and Ut-2 is called the second- 
order autocorrelation and is denoted by p2, and so on. Hence, there are (n-1) such autocorrelations if 
we have n observations. The consequences of autocorrelation errors are: 1) the leas squares estimators 
using the multiple regression are unbiased but are not efficient, and 2) the sampling variances are 
biased and sometimes likely to be seriously understated. Thus, R2 as well as t and f statistics tend to be 
exaggerated (Maddala, 2001, PP. 228-241). 
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odds ratio. Maddala (2001) argued that the log-odds ratio is a linear function of the 
explanatory variables. If P gives the probability of a firm disclosing a certain level of 
information, the logarithm of the odds ratio is given by 
Y= log (P/I-P) 
Where Y= transformed extend of disclosure; and p= computed total extent of 
disclosure for each company. The reason for considering the odds ratio, however, is 
that for a particular value of Y, P is guaranteed to lie in the range 0 :5P :51, a 
requirement of all probability measures (Holmes and Nicholls 1989). The transformed 
extent of disclosure was then regressed on attributes discussed earlier by applying the 
OLS regression technique. Cooke (1998), however, argued that in most disclosure 
studies, prediction is not the purpose of the study, but rather an explanation of the 
variability of the disclosure scores is sought and so the problem is of limited 
importance. 
5.4 Methodology for Assessing the Financial Consequences of Adopting IAS 
As it is stated before the third objective of the study is to investigate the consequences 
of adopting IAS as far as the Jordanian financial market is concerned. For exploring 
this issue, the following aspects could be investigated: 1) to what extent IAS reduce 
the systematic risk estimated by beta, unsystematic risk estimated by residuals 
variance, risk premium estimated by the difference between market return and risk 
free rate, and cost of equity capital estimated by the expected return? It is 
conceivable, however, that the cost of equity capital has been influenced by other 
changes taking place over the period other than the change in the extent of disclosure 
in compliance with IAS. In particular, the firms may have been changing their 
business risk or their financial risk and this need to be controlled for in assessing the 
impact of the change in disclosure on the cost of equity capital. It is also conceivable 
that the firms have responded to the change in extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS by changing their business and financial risk., 2) overall, can IAS adoption be 
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associated with a reduction in JIC share price volatility?, 3) does bid-ask spread 
narrow as a result of complying with IAS? 
The objective is based on the idea that a firm's disclosure policy is vital factor in 
determining its estimated systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, and cost 
of equity capital. Since Jordan experienced for long time loose and vague disclosure 
requirements, complying fully the IAS in 1998 could be seen as a remarkable change 
might has influenced the Jordanian companies' extent of disclosure and consequently 
its systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, and cost of equity capital. In this 
regard, Corporation (1982) stated, 
"S&P considers accounting quality as afactor in establishing the rating of an 
industrial bond issue. This practice suggests thatfirms that consistently make 
timely and informative disclosures are perceived to have a lower likelihood of 
withholding value-relevant unfavourable information. As a result these firms 
are charged a lower risk-premium " (P. 25). 
Sengupta (1998) added that investors try to assess the default risk premium of a firm 
based on all available information and one of the factors likely to enter into the 
default risk calculations is the probability that the firm is withholding value-relevant 
unfavourable information defined as information would increase the default risk 
premium of the firm. The larger this probability, the larger the risk premium the 
company will be charged and consequently the higher the company cost of equity 
capital. Gibbins et al. (1990) argued that comprehensive and transparent disclosures 
of value-relevant information by firms reflected of the equity markets efficiency 
should benefits firms through lower cost of capital for two reasons. First, increased 
disclosure by firms reduces transaction costs for investors resulting in greater liquidity 
of the market and greater demand for the firm's securities (Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991). Second, increased disclosure reduces the estimation risk or uncertainty 
regarding the distribution of returns (Clarkson et al. 1996). Botosan (1997), moreover, 
argued that financial disclosure could result in decreased cost of capital because 
expanded disclosure reduces estimation risk, decreasing the total risk in owning the 
equity security, or reduces the risk by decreasing information asymmetries and, hence, 
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adverse selection risk. 
Foster (1986) summarised the influence of capital markets on financial reporting. 
Companies compete with each other in capital markets on the types of securities 
offered and on the terms and expected returns promised. There is also uncertainty 
about the quality of firrns (e. g., in terms of the nature of their assets and their cash 
flows) and their securities. Investors, customers, employees, and regulatory agencies 
demand information to assess the timing and uncertainty of current and future cash 
flows. Companies satisfy this demand in part by supplying accounting information, 
thereby enabling them to raise capital on the best available terms. Supplying 
information, however, is affected by existing regulations and by the costs associated 
with disclosure, such as information collection and processing costs, litigation costs, 
and proprietary (i. e., competitive disadvantage and political) costs. To illustrate, Choi 
and Levich (1990) interviewed executive of multinational corporations. These 
executives reported that they balance the benefit of a lower cost of capital with the 
cost of providing and preparing information and the potential effects of disclosure on 
their competitive status. 
Gary et al. (1995) argued that those companies competing for funds in international 
capital markets provide a wide variety of accounting information beyond that are 
required. Indeed, the availability of accounting information is necessary to gain access 
to international capital markets. Such information disclosed by European 
multinational companies listed on London Stock Exchange are documented by Gary 
and Gray (1989), who detect strong overriding investor orientation consistent with the 
desire to raise capital in competitive international capital markets. Moreover, Choi 
(1973) examined disclosures by firms entering the European capital market. His 
premise was that these firms increase the extent of financial disclosure in order to 
obtain capital at lower cost and also he found that the extent of disclosure by firms 
increased immediately prior to entering the European market. 
Ideally, the bid-ask spread is an important approach to investigate since it is 
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commonly thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly and considered to be 
one of the cost of equity capital components (Sengupta 1998; Welker 1995). It is 
argued, however, that the bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection problem that 
arises from transacting in firm shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed 
investors. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which, in turn, 
implies a smaller bid-ask spread (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). Market-makers provide 
transaction immediacy in financial markets by standing ready to buy from sellers at a 
quoted bid price and to sell to buyers at a quoted ask price. The spread between the 
bid and ask spread quotes is the price that the dealer charges for providing this 
service, and the spread must be large enough to allow the market-maker to cover the 
operating costs and earn a reasonable profit. 
The market-maker, however, incurs three types of costs: inventory holding costs 
(Amihud and Mendelson 1980; Ho and Stoll 1981; Stoll 1978a), order-processing 
costs (Demsetz 1968), and adverse selection costs (Copeland and Galai 1983; Easley 
and O'Hara 1987; Glosten and Milgrom 1985). The total magnitude of these three 
costs, together with the intensity of competitive pressure, determines the size of 
market-makers' quoted bid-ask spread. The inventory holding cost component 
compensates the dealer for assuming non-diversifiable risk from holding an inventory 
of securities. The order processing cost component compensates the dealer for the 
clerical costs of processing orders, and the adverse selection cost component 
compensates the dealer for the expected losses to infon-ned traders. 
Some traders may have better information about the true value of the firm than does 
the market-maker. These informed traders buy when they know that the true value of 
the firm is greater than the market-maker quoted ask price and sell when they know 
that the true value of the firm is less than the marker-maker's quoted bid price 
(Bagehot 1971). The market-maker, unable to identify informed traders and required 
to transact at quoted ask and bid prices, always loses to informed traders (O'Hara 
1995). This loss to informed traders in the category of cost described above as 
adverse selection costs. The market-maker sets his or her spread wide enough so that 
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he or she will recoup his or her adverse selection costs from profits that he or she 
earns from transacting with uninformed traders (Bagehot 1971; Copeland and Galai 
1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985). Conditions of high information asymmetry create 
incentives for traders to discover undisclosed information in an effort to realise 
trading gains, leading to more informed trading and hence larger losses by market- 
maker to informed traders. Market-maker will respond to this informed trading by 
widening the bid-ask spread (Bagehot 1971). Expanded financial disclosure can 
reduce informed trading reducing incentives for investors to discover undisclosed 
information (Diamond 1985; King et al. 1990), leading to decreased informed trading 
which should enable the market-maker to narrow the bid-ask spread (Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985) empirically proved (Boone 1998; Greenstein and Sami 1994; Healy et 
al. 1999; Lee et al. 1993; Raman and Tripathy 1993; Welker 1995). In turn, the 
decrease bid-ask spread increase the liquidity of the security (Bloomfield and Wilks 
2000), thereby increasing share price (Botosan 1997; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991), 
reducing the illiquidity premium demanded by shareholders (Amihud and Mendelson 
1986), reducing cost of equity capital, reducing stock market risk (systematic and 
unsystematic), increasing trade volume, and generally enhancing social welfare by 
creating increased opportunities for trade and bid-sharing. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) argued that disclosing private information firms 
could reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread and reduce their 
cost of capital. They suggested that greater disclosure reduced the amount of 
information revealed by a large trade thereby reducing the adverse price impact 
associated with such trades. As a result, investors are willing to take larger positions 
in a particular firm's stock than they otherwise would. This increases demand for the 
firm's securities and arises the current price of the firm's stock, thus reducing the cost 
of capital. However, unfortunately, information needed for testing the bid-ask spread 
is not available from ASE, therefore, the third question will be avoided. 
In spite of the regulatory and theoretical support for increased disclosure by firms, 
direct evidence of a negative empirical relation between disclosure levels and the cost 
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of capital is limited ((Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2000; Richardson and 
Welker 2001) on the cost of equity capital, and on the cost of debt (Sengupta 1998)). 
It is argued that, in part, the lack of strong empirical findings on the relationship 
between disclosure and cost of capital may be an artefact of the markets and 
information set that are used in empirical tests. If there is little variation in the 
information disclosed due to effective regulatory interventions, or if analysts routinely 
generate information independently of the firms' own disclosures, then the power of 
empirical tests will be significantly reduced (Richardson and Welker 2001). For 
example, Botosan (1997) and Richardson and Welker (2001) documented a 
statistically significant negative relation between the level of financial disclosure and 
cost of equity capital for their samples of USA and Canadian firms, respectively. This 
relation, however, holds only for the subset of their sample characterised by limited 
analyst following. A stronger test of the relationship between corporate information 
disclosures and the cost of equity capital is possible by choosing markets and 
information sets where corporate disclosure plays a larger role in market valuations. 
In this study, therefore, such relationship will be tested in Jordan, a developing 
country, experienced for long time loose and vague financial reporting requirements 
before adopting fully the IAS in 1998. This situation created an ideal environment for 
testing the impact of disclosure on systematic, unsystematic, risk premium, cost of 
equity capital. 
The first issue will be investigated, therefore, is that whether IAS adoption has 
reduced the systematic risk estimated by beta (Barry and Brown 1985; Botosan 1997; 
Brealey and Myers 2000; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Firth 1984; Handa and Linn 1993; Kane et al. 1984; Klein and Bawa 1976; 
Opong 1996; Opong 1993; Ruback 1982; Scholes and Williams 1977; Zivot 2000), 
unsystematic risk estimated by residuals variance (Firth 1984; Fisher 1959; Fung and 
Rudd 1986; Sengupta 1998), risk premium estimated by the difference between ASE 
market return and risk free rate , and cost of equity capital estimated by the expected 
return (Brealey and Myers 2000). In order to explain the methodology to be followed, 
this section will give a background for the models being used for estimating beta, 
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residuals variance, risk premium, and the expected return, the rationality for 
controlling other factors might influence the association between the cost of equity 
capital and the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS, the methodology for 
measuring these other factors, and finally discussing how the hypotheses will be 
tested. For the second issue of the financial consequences of adopting IAS, the share 
price volatility estimated by standard deviation of logarithm weekly share returns 
(Botosan 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Sengupta 
1998) methodology will be discussed in a separate section. 
5.4.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model and Market Model 
Basically there are two alternative models for measuring the cost of equity capital: the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). 15 It 
can be said that Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a financial theory that has 
dominated the academic literature and influenced greatly the practical world of 
finance and business for over three decades since it was first expounded by the Nobel 
prize-winner William Sharpe and other theoreticians which is an extension of 
Markowitz portfolio theory to encompass the risk-return. trade off of capital assets in 
equilibrium (Markowitz 1952). At its heart the CAPM has an old and common 
observation - the return on a financial asset increases with risk, but what is new is the 
measure of risk. 
Basically, the model divides the risk in an individual security into two parts. The first 
part - known as the systematic risk - is that part of the total risk, which arises from a 
correlation between returns from the individual security, and the returns from the 
securities market as a whole. It cannot be diversified away. The second part - known 
as the unsystematic risk - is unique to the particular security and can be diversified 
away. 
13 For more discussion of various approaches used in practice to estimate cost of equity capital see 
(Ehrhardt 1994; Gitman and Merurio 1982). 
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It is perhaps worth stressing that using the CAPM in risk evaluation does assume that 
the company's sole objective is to maximise investors' wealth. Also, the CAPM itself 
involves a number of critical assumptions. It assumes that the market in securities is 
perfect, with information being freely available to all market participants (the market 
is efficient). It assumes no transaction costs for trading in securities and that the 
borrowing rate for all market participants is equal to the lending rate. Furthermore, it 
assumes that, in the event of bankruptcy, all the assets of a company can be sold at 
their economic value with no selling or legal costs. If some of these assumptions are 
relaxed then the total risk of a company as well as its systematic risk becomes of 
importance to the investor. 
The CAPM model has been used and argued widely by many researchers for 
estimating the cost of equity capital (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Barry and Brown 
1985; Brennen 1970; Clarkson et al. 1996; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Coles et al. 
1995; Copeland and Galai 1983; Demsetz 1968; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; 
Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Handa and Linn 1993; Klein and Bawa 1976; Levy and 
Sarnat 1978; Markowitz 1991; Scholes and Williams 1977). However, the model has 
been criticised in the 1980s and 1990s when researchers looked at the relationship 
between the CAPM's systematic risk measure, beta, and the returns on shares over the 
period since the mid-1960s. They discovered either that there was absolutely no 
relationship at all or that beta had only a weak influence on the return shares produced 
(Arnold 1998, P. 307). They commented that there were other factors 
(macroeconomics movements such as economic growth, inflation, and exchange rate 
changes) determining the returns on shares. Therefore, academics began exploring 
models, which were based on a number of explanatory factors influencing the returns 
on shares, rather than the one solitary variable considered in the CAPM. The most 
prominent is the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), which permits many factors other 
than beta to explain share returns introduced by Ross (1976). 
The logic behind the APT is much the same as that behind the CAPM: investors are 
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rewarded for taking on non-diversified risk. In the CAPM, one factor (the sensitivity 
to the market portfolio) captures this non-diversiflable risk. In contrast, the measure 
of this non-diversified risk in the APT can come from multiple factors. The number 
and identity of the factors are determined by the data on historical returns. 
The APT is built on the simple premise that investors take advantage of the arbitrage 
opportunities. In other words, if two portfolios have the same exposure to risk but 
offer different expected returns, investors will buy the portfolio that has the higher 
expected returns and, in the process, adjust the expected returns to equilibrium 
(Damodaran 1997). 
Arnold (1998), however, argued that the systematic factors permissible under the 
APT are many and various, compared with the CAPM's single determined variable. 
On the same time, APT does not specify what will be a systematic risk factor, nor 
does it state the size or the sign (positive or negative) of the "Bs". Each share or 
portfolio will have a different set of risk factors and a different degree of sensitivity to 
each of them. 
Researchers have tried to identify the most frequently encountered systematic risk 
factors. This turn out to be changes in the macroeconomics environment such as 
inflation, interest rates, industrial production levels, personal consumption and money 
supply. However, some firms will be more sensitive to changes in the factors than 
others - this is estimated by the "Bs". Each of these risk factors has a risk premium 
because investors will only accept the risk if they are adequately rewarded with a 
higher return. It is the sum of these risk premiums when added to the risk-free rate 
that creates the return on a particular share or portfolio. 
The APT is used and argued by many researchers (Abeysekera and Mahjan 1987; 
Ariff and Johnson 1990; Beenstock and Chan 1988; Chamberlain and Rothschild 
1983; Chen 1983; Chen et al. 1986; Clare et al. 1997; Clare and Thomas 1994; 
Connor and Korajczyk 1993; Dhrymes 1985; Dhrymes et al. 1984; Faff 1988; Garrett 
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and Priestley 1997; Grvenewold and Fraser 1997; Hudgins and Thurner 1995; 
Lehmann and Modest 1988; Priestley 1996; Roll and Ross 1980). 
However, for those who decided to move on from the CAPM, the APT has emerged 
not strictly as a replacement, but more as an extension of the model (Sharp 1964). The 
difference between the two models shows that the APT can be viewed as a 
development of the CAPM, since it is less stringent in its assumptions. On the other 
hand, both models have been subjected to scrutiny and both models have been 
criticised as un-testable theories. Perhaps the main criticism of the CAPM was that of 
Roll (1977), where he argued that to test the model correctly the true (but unknown) 
market portfolio has to be used. Of course the return on the true market portfolio 
cannot be observed therefore, the CAPM is not-testable. On the other hand the main 
criticism of the APT is the empirical evidence that if the construction of portfolios is 
changed or the number of stocks in portfolios is changed, the number of priced factors 
changed accordingly. 
For the purpose of this study, however, CAPM model will be employed in order to 
see whether the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS has influenced the cost 
of equity capital estimated by expected return. To justify using CAPM in this study it 
has to be said that in the CAPM the estimate of beta comes from the association of 
the security"s return with the market return which might making the model ideally 
good enough to achieve the study objective. However, it remains unexplained how the 
market assesses the beta of the security - it is clearly conditioned by the information 
that is available in the market. Accounting information or the fundamental analysis of 
accounting information represented in this study by the IAS applied to JIC remains 
the major source of information for investors. If this information changes then we 
expect investors to revise their views about the future share prices and hence returns 
of the securities. If the information change is sufficient to induce a behavioural 
change on the part of investors then we can expect to see the effect in beta and as a 
consequence in the cost of equity capital. A confounding event that may occur as a 
result of the implementation, however, is possible changes in capital structure. If JIC 
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were to borrow more as a result of improved disclosure, this V411 impact upon the 
equity beta. What it will do is increase equity betas at a time we hypothesise that 
equity betas may fall as a direct result of improved disclosure. The consequence of 
this is that we should control for the capital structure (financial risk) change, an issue 
will be explored in separate section. 
The CAPM shows that it is only a security's systematic risk, which is of interest to a 
well-diversified shareholder. The value of Pj (beta) is, therefore, of key importance to 
the investor. Higher the systematic risk of a security, the higher the return required by 
the investor. The major conclusion of the CAPM is that the price of securityj will 
adjust so that its expected return E(d) is given by: 
E(ri) = rf + (E(rm) - rf) pj 
where ff is the risk-free rate of interest obtained from the Central Bank of Jordan 
which supplied the prices of the 'Three Month Treasury Bill' from which the yearly 
average returns on the treasury bill could be computed (this return is assumed to 
proxy for the risk free rate of return) where rm is the logarithm weekly return for the 
'FTSE All World Index' from which the yearly average return could be computed for 
the same period. The expected depends linearly on the systematic risk (Pj). When Pj = 
0, the expected return is the risk-free rate. When Pj = 1, the expected return is the 
same as that for the market. The relationship between E(ri) and Pi is known as the 
Security Market Line (SML). The beta of a security is the standarised covariance of a 
security's return with the market return on the market portfolio divided by the market 
return variance. Therefore: 
Beta of security i= Cov(ri, rm) / al(rm) 
For the purpose of this study, the systematic risk estimated by beta will be estimated 
using the Market Model based on the logarithm weekly stocks' and markets' returns, 
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a model has been adopted by previous empirical studies (Botosan 1997; Firth 1984; 
Kane et al. 1984; Opong 1996; Opong 1993; Scholes and Williams 1977). Estimating 
beta by using the Afarket Afodel been argued also by many researchers (Barry and 
Brown 1985; Brealey and Myers 2000; Coles and Loewenstein 1988; Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991; Handa and Linn 1993; Klein and Bawa 1976; Ruback 1982; Zivot 
2000). 
The weekly return has been used, however, since it is believed that the more 
observations given, the more powerful the tests will be and the more accurate the 
results will be. Therefore, the logarithm weekly return on a specific stock after taking 
into account the declared dividends can be defined as follows: 
Rt = Ln (Pt + dt) - Ln (Pt-1) = Ln [(Pt+dt) / Pt-i] 
Where Rt is the stock rate of return in week t, Pt is the last traded price in week t, dt is 
the dividend declared "Xd"" in week t 16 and Pt-i is the last traded price in week t-i. It has 
to be mentioned, ho%vevcr, when the ASE was closed for a bank holiday on last day of 
the week, the observation for the day after used as the closing price for that week. 
Table 5.6 shows Jordanian national holidays considered before calculating the share 
price and market returns for JIC included in this study. 
Table 5.6: Jordanian National Holidays 
Fixed Public Holidays 
I January New Year's Day 
I May Labour Day 
25 May Independence Day 
10 June Army Day 
II August Accession of HM King Hussein 
14 November Birthday of HM King Hussein 
16 It has to be mentioned that for most observations there were no dividends and Rt=ln(Pt/Pt-1). 
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Table 5.6: Jordanian National Holidays 
25 December Christmas (Christians only) 
31 December New Year's Eve 
Movable Public Holidays 
Islamic New Year I day 25 March 2000 
Prophet's Birthday I day 3 Jun 2000 
Lailat Al Miraj I day 14 October 2000 
Eid Al Fitr 3 days 13 December 2000 
Eid Al. Adha 3 days 3 March 2000 
Weekend 
Friday, Saturday I 
Source: ASE Yearly Publications. 
On the other hand, the logarithm weekly return on the market can be defined as 
follows: 
Rm = Ln (Pt) - Ln (Pt. i) = Ln (Pt / Pt-i) 
Where Rm is the logarithm weekly market rate of return in week t, Pt is the price in 
week t, and Pw is the price in week w. 
The Market Model is a statistical model, which relates the return of any given security 
to the return of the market portfolio. The model's linear specification follows from the 
assumed joint normality of asset returns. For any security i we have: 
J-).. = Rij aij + Pj rmt + cij 
We assumed the cij were uncorrelated random error terms with mean zero and 
constant variance CF2 (homoskedasticity and not hetroskedasticity)". That is, 
17 For more details see (Hill et al. 2001, PP. 235-237). 
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E(eij) = 0, Var(cij) = g2, 
COV(Ei, Ej) = 
Where rij and rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
respectively, and cij is the zero mean disturbance term, constant variance and not 
correlated with itself or with the market return. aij and Bj, and cij are the parameters of 
the market model. In application, FTSE All World Index is used for the market. 18 The 
FTSE All World Index was used since running the market model for each company 
for each year requires a market index or equivalently the index of the market portfolio 
that is assumed to be held by investors. If the market portfolio was the portfolio of 
Jordanian equities then the market beta is by definition equal to one regardless of any 
disclosure aspects. The portfolio would have to be much wider than this if we wish to 
attempt to identify any influence of IAS on the equity betas of Jordanian companies. 
The portfolio that has been chosen here is the US dollar denominated FTSE All 
World Index. So the hypothesis being tested is whether the change in disclosure to 
IAS impacted upon the betas of Jordanian companies as assessed within a world 
index. Of course in using a world index measured in US dollars there is the possibility 
of foreign exchange risk being captured within the beta estimate. However in this case 
the Jordanian Diner is tied directly to the US dollar so preventing this effect 
influencing the results. Moreover, if the ASE general index will be used, testing for 
the impact of adopting the IAS on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, 
and on cost of equity capital wont be recognised since this effect, if it existed, will 
influence both: individual companies listed on ASE and ASE General Index itself, a 
reason required to employ an external reference point represented by the FTSE All 
World Index presented in American Dollars T. The use of FTSE All World Index 
will be employed for estimating beta, residuals variance, and the expected returns. For 
estimating the risk premium, however, ASE general index will be employed since the 
18 The FTSE All World Index aims to capture up to 90% of the investable equity market capitalization 
available in 49 countries classified into three groups: developed, advanced emerging and emerging 
segments. The study used the FTSE All World Index presented in US Dollars from the DataStrearn 
database (www. fcatset. com). 
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study concern about whether such premium is falling over the years after the adoption 
of IAS in Jordan. 
It has to be noted, however, that there is a problem reported by previous empirical 
studies that are caused by asynchronous prices in the calculation of returns. The 
importance of this problem becomes amplified with a shorter differencing intervals 
and infrequently traded securities which causing biased beta estimates (Fisher 1966; 
Opong 1996; Scholes and Williams 1977). Such a situation severely existed in ASE 
where some of the JIC selected in this study were thinly traded over the total period 
1996-2000 'see Appendix 5'. The procedures for overcoming the problem of non- 
synchronous trading employed in this study to obtain unbiased Market Model 
estimators (a, B, and c) is that a selected JIC were eliminated for a year considered in 
this study from the sample when its share price stayed fixed or its logarithm weekly 
returns movements lower than +/- 0.05 over that year. Such procedures eliminated 24, 
29,22,25, and 22 JIC and leaving 26,21,28,25, and 28 JIC for the years 1996,1997, 
1998,1999, and 2000, respectively, to be investigated. Since not all selected JIC will 
be included because of the thin trading problem and the shorter differencing intervals, 
it is decided to classify all JIC concerned into three groups, namely: actively traded 
companies those which their shares traded actively over the total period 1996-2000, 
less actively traded companies those which their share traded actively over some of 
the period 1996-2000, and the lowest actively traded companies those which their 
shares not traded actively over the total period 1996-2000 'see Appendix 6'. To be 
able to generalise the research results, however, the difference in means between the 
JIC average extent of disclosure actively traded group and JIC average extent of 
disclosure lowest actively traded group will be employed using Paired-Samples West. 
That is to see whether their means difference is significantly different or not since 
testing for the financial consequences of extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
on JIC actively traded group and JIC less actively traded groups could be generalised 
for the all 50 JIC selected in this study including those not actively traded over the 
total period 1996-2000 if the difference in means between the two groups not 
significant. 
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It is expected that after the mandatory action, the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with the IAS will increase which means reducing the systematic risk, unsystematic 
risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital for a security. 
19 Therefore, the null 
hypotheses to be tested as follows 
"H03: There are no changes in the systematic risk regarding the adoption of the IAS 
for JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 ". 
"H04: There are no changes in the unsystematic risk regarding the adoption of the 
L4Sfbr XC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 ". 
"HO5: There are no changes in the risk premium regarding the adoption of the IAS 
for JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 ". 
"H06: There are no changes in the cost of equity capital regarding the adoption of 
the L4Sfor JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 ". 
To be able to test the above hypotheses, JIC' beta, residuals variance, risk premium, 
and expected return over the five years (1996-2000) were estimated by employing the 
Market Model and the CAPM. 
5.4.1.1 Data Analysis and Testing the Hypothesis 
For testing the hypothesis concerning the impact of extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS on systematic risk estimated by beta, beta for each individual JIC included 
will be calculated to test whether the change in JIC beta over the period 1996-2000 
was significant. It has to be noted, however, as long as we have a beta for each year, it 
'9 It should be noted that the IAS adoption might has reduced the systematic risk, unsystematic risk, 
risk premium, or cost of equity capital, or might the influence is mixed from two or more than one of 
these financial consequences components. Moreover, previous empirical and theoretical studies argued 
that there is other factors could also influence such financial consequences such as macroeconomic 
factors (Chen et al - 1986; Fama and French 1989; Poon and Taylor 199 1). 
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does not matter if beta for a given JIC not there for other years since the test for 
average JIC betas and not for individual JIC betas which means that JIC will be used 
for this test are both; those actively traded and less actively traded groups. 
For testing the significance of the change in beta over the period 1996-2000, number 
of statistical tests can be used. By taking into account the statistical test employed in 
exploring the changes for the extent of disclosure over the period under consideration 
and the nature of the data used in this study, it was decided to conduct "two related 
samples tests" to test the hypothesis set out in section 5.4.1. More specifically, the 
paired-samples t-test was carried out to test the above hypothesis. A Wilcoxon test 
(the non-parametric alternative to the paired-samples t-test) was also run in testing the 
same hypothesis to check the results of parametric tests 'see section 5.2.2'. For testing 
the significance different in beta means between pair of years over the period 1996- 
2000, moreover, Univariate Analysis of Variance has been employed by using 
General Linear Model (GLM). If the test shows that the difference in means is 
significant in general among years, Tukey HSD procedures will be employed for 
finding out among which pair of years, the difference in means was significant. " 
In addition, since the impact of adopting IAS could influence the unsystematic risk 
estimated by residuals variance 21 , the study extends its investigation by testing 
whether the ratio from dividing a company residuals variance for the period t-1 by the 
residuals variance for the period t is significantly different from one. The null 
hypothesis, therefore, is the hypothesis that the variance is constant (i. e. HO: a2et-I = 
a2 et-i). In such a test, it does matter if residuals variance for a given JIC is there for 
each year considered (1996-2000) which means JIC will be used for this test are only 
those actively traded group. Therefore, the following equation is developed 
a 2ew / (y2 et =1 ,I= 1996,1997,199 8,1999, and 2000 
" It has to be noted that running ANOVA test gives the same result since both tests concerning the 
analysis of variance among groups. 
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Where (y2 the variance, et-i JIC average residuals for the last year, and ct JIC average 
residuals for the following year. As it is known, however, a' cannot be observed, and 
its value, therefore, were estimated by S2 changing the equation into the following 
S2 
et-i 
/S2 
et= I 
The 'calculated value', therefore, will be compared with the 'critical value' using F 
test under Ni-I =I numerator degrees of freedom since there are two residual 
variance observations (t, t-_i) and N2-1 = 51 denominator degrees of freedom since 
there will be 52 logarithm weekly returns observations in each year for estimating the 
residuals variance. The critical or schedule value 4.00 (Gujarati 1995; Maddala 2001), 
therefore, will be compared with the actual value and if the actual value is higher than 
4.00, that means the residuals variances for the period t and the period t. 1 is 
significantly different from one. Such a result means that there is a significant impact 
for the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS on unsystematic risk. 
Since it is argued that better disclosure means investors are more confident about the 
financial market, the equity risk premium (or market premium) will be reduced. 
Therefore, the study extended its investigation to test whether the adoption of IAS has 
reduced the average yearly ASE risk premium. Risk premium, therefore, will be 
estimated by deducting the average yearly risk free rate on Treasury Bills provided by 
Jordanian Central Bank from the average yearly ASE market return for the same year 
covering the period 1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000 since the changes for the 
premium over the period 1996-2000 could be influenced by the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS. 
As far as the cost of equity capital is concern, estimated by the expected return, 
however, clearly interpreting whether the cost of equity capital has changed, we have 
21 The actual residuals were obtained from running the Market Model. 
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to control for those factors that may influence it, namely: business risk and financial 
risk (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978; Botosan 1997; Michael et al. 2001). Therefore, the 
following section will discuss those factors in details. 
5.4.1.2 Financial Risk and Business Risk 
It has been decided that business risk and financial risk are the major factors which 
should be controlled in exploring the issue whether there is an association between 
the cost of equity capital and the extent of disclosure (Botosan 1997; Michael et a]. 
2001). 
Business risk is the variability of the firm's operating income that is the income before 
interest. This is can be found by examining the dispersion of returns for the all equity 
capital structure. This dispersion is caused purely by business related factors, such as 
the characteristics of the industry and the competitive advantage possessed by the 
firm within the industry. This risk will be influenced by factors such as the variability 
of sales volumes or prices over the business cycle, the variability of input costs, the 
degree of market power and the level of growth. Business risk is determined by 
general business and economic conditions (Botosan 1997; Michael et al. 2001). On 
the other hand, financial risk is the additional variability in returns to shareholders 
that arises because the financial structure contains debt. The increasing proportion of 
debt raises the firm's fixed financial costs. At high gearing levels there is an increased 
probability of the firm not only failing to make a return to shareholders, but also 
failing to meet the interest cost obligation, and thus raising the likelihood of 
insolvency (Arnold 1998, P. 787). 
Brealey and Myers (2000) argued that the cost of capital is a hurdle rate for capital 
budgeting decisions. It depends on the business risk of the firm's investments. The 
risk of a common stock reflects the business risk of the real assets held by the firm. 
But shareholders also bear financial risk to the extent that the firm issues debt to 
finance its real investments. The more a firm relies on debt financing, the riskier its 
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common stock is. Borrowing is said to create financial leverage or gearing. Financial 
leverage does not affect the risk or the expected return on the firm's assets, but it does 
push up the risk of the common stock and lead the stockholders to demand a 
correspondingly higher return. 
Hamada (1972) originally showed that there is a linear relationship between a firm's 
beta and the leverage of the fin-n (the amount of debt in its capital structure). He 
discussed this relationship between the beta of the common stock and leverage of the 
firm in a world with and without taxes. His conclusion is that leverage increases the 
risk of equity in both cases. However, he added, it can be shown that leverage 
increases the equity beta less rapidly under corporate taxes. This occurs because, 
under taxes, the government shares in the risks of the firm through its claim on taxes. 
Therefore, the study's second concern regarding the financial market in measuring 
how the cost of equity capital has responded to the move to IAS is taking into account 
the other factors; financial risk and business risk which should be controlled. 
The following will discuss the factors considered to influence the risk premium and 
its association with the extent of disclosure. 
Leverage 
Clearly it has to be distinguished between operating leverage and financial leverage. 
Operating leverage refers to the extent to which the firm's total costs are fixed. The 
profits of firms with a high operating leverage, such as car or steel manufacturers, are 
very sensitive to change in the sale level. Financial leverage is the focus of this study, 
which will be called leverage, and concerns the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure. Net income to shareholders in firms with high financial leverage is more 
sensitive to change in operating profits (Damodaran 1997, P. 313); (Arnold 1998, 
P. 777). 
Financial risk can be estimated straightforwardly by using the leverage (D/E). In the 
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theoretical models, the debt to equity ratio is simply a parameter that will influence 
systematic risk estimated by beta (Hamad and Scholes 1985; Strong and Appleyard 
1992). Strong and Appleyard (1992, P. 11) argued that the estimated beta of tile firm 
will reflect not only the operating risk (business risk) of the firm's cash flow but also 
the financial risk of the particular capital structure. 
In practice, however, deciding the leverage is more difficult. For examp e, companies 
are financed out of a mixture of share capital, retained profits and borrowings. 
Borrowings may be long term such as debentures, or short term such as bank 
borrowing. In addition, the company may have set aside all sorts of provisions (e. g. 
for taxation) which it expects to meet sometimes in the future. These may also be 
regarded as borrowings. From an ordinary shareholder's point view, even preference 
share capital can be classed as borrowings, because the preference shareholders will 
have priority over ordinary shareholders, both in respect of dividends and upon 
liquidation (Arnold 1998). 
If a company finances itself from a high level of borrowings, there is obviously a 
higher risk, could be called financial risk, in investing in it. This arises for two main 
reasons: 1) the higher the borrowings, the more interest that the company will have to 
pay, and that may affect the company's ability to pay ordinary dividend; 2) if the 
company cannot find the cash to repay its borrowing, the ordinary shareholders may 
not get any money back if the company goes into liquidation. 
There are several ways of calculating leverage, the most common being as stated by 
Arnold (1998, PP. 778-779) as the following: 
1. Long-term debt / Shareholders' Funds. 
2. Long-term debt / Long-term Debt + Shareholders Funds. 
3. All Borrowing/ All borrowing+ Shareholders' Funds. 
4. Long-term Debt / Total Market Capitalisation. 
However, theory suggests that using the market value of the variable debt and equity 
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is preferable assuming that it could be observed (Raghuram and Zingales 1995). But, 
in reality the debt variable is not observable because it is not actively traded. 
Therefore, the book value for the debt, which will be close to market value if it is 
short-dated, will be employed using the following formula: 
D/E = Book Value of All Borrowing / (Total market Capitalisation. + Book 
Value of All Borrowing) 
All borrowing has been included because there is an issue of whether short-term debt 
is a revolving facility (constantly being renewed). Moreover, for calculating the total 
market capitalisation: a) the average market share price for each company for each 
year has been used (Holmes and Sugden 1999, P. 221) taking into account any 
changes for the number of ordinary shares in issue over the period 1995-2000, and b) 
preference shares excluded because it is not an issue for JIC. 
Previous studies have found that there is no specific level for leverage can be 
employed for all countries. Rutherford (1988) summarised previous studies and 
presented evidence from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) data suggesting that firms in France, Germany and Japan are 
more highly levered than firms in the United States and the United Kingdom. Borio 
(1990) has found that companies in Japan and Continental Europe are more highly 
levered than companies in the Anglo-American economies. A few years later, 
Raghurarn and Zingales (1995) have found that firm leverage is fairly similar across 
the G-7 countries. 
Many studies have been investigated the correlation between leverage and some 
factors. According to Milton and Raviv (1991), the consensus is that leverage 
increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, and firm 
size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of 
bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of the product. Tangibility of assets, the 
market-to-book ratio (usually thought of as a proxy for investment opportunities), 
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firm size, and profitability have shown up most consistently as being correlated with 
leverage in previous studies (Long and Malitz 1985; Myers 1977; Myers and Majluf 
1984). However, this study will investigate the association between leverage as a 
proxy for financial risk and the cost of equity capital, which might has not been 
considered in the context of disclosure by previous studies to the best knowledge of 
the researcher. The leverage ratio as a proxy for the financial risk of the firm has been 
adopted by previous empirical studies (Patton and Zelenka 1997). 
It could be argued at this point that a positive association between cost of equity 
capital and leverage might be expected. The lower the cost of equity capital, the lower 
the leverage will be. This is because where the company has a lower cost of equity 
capital that means different sources of finance are available and as a consequence the 
company is not suffering from financial distress. 
As it is mentioned before, financial risk estimated by leverage will be used as a 
control variable. For running the regression, leverage will be used as a continuous 
variable (the actual leverage ratios) assuming that there is a positive association 
between leverage and the cost of equity capital. 
Company Size 
Company size has been employed by previous researchers for studying its association 
with factors such as leverage (Long and Malitz 1985; Milton and Raviv 1991). 
Damodaran (1997) used company size as a proxy for business risk where the 
association between company size and the cost of equity capital have been 
investigated before by different empirical studies (Botosan 1997; Michael et at. 
2001). For this study, however, the association between company size as a proxy for 
business risk and the cost of equity capital will be explored since it could be argued 
that larger firms more likely to be diversified, have lower business risk and hence 
have a lower cost of equity c 
It could be argued that net sales revenue is a proxy could be used since large size 
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firms will have less business risk as a result of diversified portfolio effects as well as 
contractual stability. Therefore, logarithm net sales revenue as a proxy for business 
risk will be employed in this study. 
As it is mentioned before, company size as a proxy for business risk will be used as a 
control variable. For running the regression, company size will be used as a 
continuous variable estimated by logarithm net sales revenue assuming that there is a 
negative association between company size and the cost of equity capital. 
5.4.1.3 Data Analysis and Testing the Hypothesis 
To deten-nine whether there is an association between the dependent variable (cost of 
equity capital) and the independent variable (extent of disclosure) after controlling for 
the variables financial risk and business risk, the multiple regression will be run for 
each year under consideration (1996-2000) to test the following hypothesis: 
"HO7. - There is no association between the cost of equity capital and the extent of 
disclosure, the financial risk, and the business riskfor JIC listed on ASE and their 
shares traded during the totalperiod 1996-2000 ". 
The cost of equity capital was the dependent variable and the independent variables 
were business risk estimated by logarithm net sales revenue as a proxy for company 
size, financial risk estimated by leverage and company extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS. 
One of the problems of undertaking any multiple analyses is that there may be 
multicollinearity between independent variables 4see section 5.3.1.6'. Therefore, 
multicollinearity checked not only by testing for Pearson Correlation Coefficients as it 
has been adopted by previous empirical studies (Farrar and Glauber 1967; Judge et al. 
1985; Malone et al. 1993; Street and Bryant 2000; Wallace and Naser 1995; Wallace 
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22 
et al. 1994), but also by running the stepwise regression technique (Malone et al. 
1993; Neter and Kutner 1989). Moreover, a commonly used statistic for testing the 
existence of autocorrelation among residuals is the Durban-Watson (DW) statistic, 
which will be employed (Maddala 2001, P. 228; PP. 242-245). 
The regression equation used is as follows: 
Y(I-5) = aO + PiDi + P2D2+ P3D3 +e 
Where: 
Y(1.5) = Cost of equity capital (Yi for 1996, Y2 for 1997, Y3 for 1998, Y4 for 1999, 
Y5 for 2000) 
Di = Company Size (net sales revenue) 
D2 = Leverage (D/E) 
D3 = Extent of disclosure 
G= Error tenns (disturbance) 
ao = Intercept (constant) 
Pi = Coefficients of the explanatory variables 
The disturbance ten'n represents two sets of factors. First, it represents the effect on 
the dependent variable (cost of equity capital) of all variables other than the ones 
included in the study. Second, even if the variable included were the only identifiable 
variable influencing the dependent variable, it should not expected that the same level 
of dependent variable will stay year after year. e, therefore, is included to allow for 
the basic random unpredictability of human behaviour (Thomas 1997, P. 78). 
It is known that e (error terms or disturbance) are not observable and the true values 
22 When we test for the multicollinearity, we look at the correlation coefficients, which should not be 
considered harmful until it exceed 0.80 as it is argued by (Farrar and Glauber 1967; Judge et al. 1985) 
while (Street and Bryant 2000) argued that it should not exceed 0.90. (Wallace et al. 1994), however, 
considered coefficient of correlation exceeding 0.77 high enough to cause multicollinearity concern. 
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for a and P (population parameters) are not known as well. Therefore, from running 
the multiple regression by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS), the population 
parameters estimated by estimators and the residuals which is treated as estimates of 
the unknown disturbances will be achieved. This means that the previous equation 
will be modified to what is called simple regression equation. 
An important point to note is that, in order to undertake OLS multiple linear 
regression, the data must fulfil certain conditions, i. e. normality, homogeneity (equal 
variance), uncorrelated and linearity 'see section 5.3.1.6'. 
5.4.2Share Price Volatility 
Following the third objective of this study which is that the consequences of IAS as 
far as the financial market is concerned in developing countries by exploring, overall, 
whether it can be seen any reduction for JIC share price volatility included in this 
study. Such an assumption comes to mind since it may be argued that in a situation 
where there is high marker uncertainty about a firm's future, as reflected in the 
volatility in stock returns, increasing the extent of disclosure could reduce this 
volatility. 
One likely implication of the quality of disclosure in corporate annual reports is the 
degree of price dispersion in the securities market. The more superior the quality of 
corporate disclosure of information, the lesser the scope for speculation, and the 
narrower will be the price fluctuations. When companies give adequate information, 
speculative activities are minimised and public confidence is developed in the 
securities market. Moreover, since prices of corporate securities are based on the 
estimated earnings and the earnings are estimated on the basis of the infon-nation 
available about corporate operations, the price fluctuations are likely to be less wide 
with the better disclosure of information (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Bloomfield 
and Wilks 2000; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Knauss 1964; Sengupta 1998; 
Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Stigler 1961). More specifically, Singhvi and 
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Desai (197 1) reasoned that: 
"With full disclosure of information, one would expect less drastic shifts in 
estimates of expected profitability of a given issue, a greater scope for 
scientific investment analysis, a diminished reliance on and use of rumours, a 
reduction in the scale of manipulation practices, and a narrower dispersion 
between the intrinsic value and market price of a security ". 
Share price volatility has been used by prior studies as a proxy for information 
asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm. 1993; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). To the extent that 
smooth transactions in share prices suggest the absence of information asymmetries 
between the firm and shareholders, or among investors, low levels of volatility 
suggest fewer information asymmetries. 
It is argued, on the other hand, that volatility is influenced by many factors unrelated 
to information asymmetry and testing the effect of an international reporting strategy 
on volatility can be ambiguous - in particular for infrequently traded stocks (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). Bushee and Noe (2000) demonstrated that the effect of disclosure 
on volatility is complex and may depend on the type of investors attracted to the firm. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that it is not necessary complying with the IAS 
will reduce the share price volatility as the company will inter new markets which 
contain extra risk beside the risk she is experiencing in its own market. But, it can be 
said that this is not a significant issue in Jordan where most companies are working 
within the national level. According to the efficient financial market theory, however, 
share price reflects all information available and hence implementing the IAS is just 
part of this information. In other words, share price many factors could affect share 
prices in the financial market such as not only microeconomic but also 
macroeconomic factors. For these reasons, as a measure of information asymmetry, 
volatility is likely to be the least reliable proxy among the others in exploring the 
financial consequences of adopting the IAS in Jordan. 
Statistical or historical volatility is a measure of the movement in the underlying asset 
over a period of time. The measure is sometimes called historical volatility since it 
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takes into account movement in past prices. The most usual method, however, for 
calculating the historic volatility is the standard deviation of the share price returns - 
this procedure is fairly standard and can be found in most text books and applied by 
several previous empirical studies (Botosan 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Leuz 
and Verrecchia 2000; Sengupta 1998). Krueger (2000, P. 62) argued that volatility is 
many things; it is the relative rate at which the price of understanding security moves 
up or down, it measures the spread between the high and low of a contact. It is 
calculated by figuring the annualised. standard deviation of daily changes in price. He 
added, while each of these measures calculates volatility a different way, they all are 
highly correlated - that is, when one records a high level of volatility, the others tend 
to do as well. Of these measures, the standard deviation provides a statistical indicator 
of volatility. A high standard deviation occurs when there are relatively large price 
changes and a low standard deviation occurs when prices are more stable. The 
Monetary Department in the Bank of Israel (199) reported that the average share price 
volatility in the financial market for advanced economies is 20 percent, whereas it is 
54 percent in the emerging economies. They added that the lower the degree of 
volatility, the more efficient and important the stock market will become as an 
instrument through which private corporations will raise capital. 
It could be argued that since the new Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 forced Jordanian 
companies listed on the market to implement the IAS starting from the year 1998 in 
preparing and presenting their annual reports, the volatility for Jordanian companies 
share prices listed on ASE could be reduced. This might happen because of the fact 
that the more information disclosed by companies in their annual reports, the more 
confident investors are and as a consequence the less volatile the share prices will be. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that set out to assess the impact of the IAS on JIC share 
price volatility is: 
"H08: There is no change in the share price returns volatility regarding the 
compliance with the IAS in the annual reports of JIC listed on ASE and their shares 
traded over the period 1996-2000 ". 
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To be able to test the above hypothesis, the weekly JIC share price returns over the 
five years (1996-2000) were prepared using the data provided by ASE and share 
prices volatility changes over the period 1996-2000 estimated by standard deviation 
will be tested. 
5.4.2.1 Data Analysis and Testing the Hypothesis 
For testing the significance of the change in share price volatility returns over the 
period 1995-2000, number of statistical tests can be used. By taking into the nature of 
the data used in this study, 23 it was decided to conduct "two related samples tests" to 
test the hypothesis set out in section 5.4.2. 
As it is mentioned in section 5.2.2, there are two types of two-related-sample tests: 
parametric (e. g. the Paired-samples Mest) and non-parametric (e. g. the Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test and Sign test). To be able to determine whether the t- 
test can be used to test the hypothesis set out in section 5.4.2, non-nality tests of 
skewness and kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors were undertaken. The results of normality 
tests indicated that data (logarithm weekly share price returns volatility estimated by 
the standard deviation) for the period covered in this study appear to be normally 
distributed. Therefore, the paired-samples Mest was carried out to test the above 
hypothesis. A Wilcoxon test (the non-parametric alternative to the paired-samples t- 
test) was also run in testing the same hypothesis to check the results of parametric 
tests. 
For testing the significance different in means between pair of years over the period 
1995-2000, Univariate Analysis of Variance has been employed by using ANOVA 
and General Linear Model (GLM). if the test shows that the difference in means is 
significant in general among years, Tukey HSD procedures will be employed for 
" Data used for testing the hypothesis set out in the previous section are two observations from the 
same sample (i. e. two scores obtained from the same sample) and the suggested statistical test for such 
data is the two-related-samples statistical test (Siegel 1956). 
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finding out among which pair of years the difference in means was significant. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter provides details of the research methodology employed and the 
hypotheses developed in this study for achieving its objectives. The first objective 
needs to be achieved is that to test whether JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded 
during the period under consideration implement fully the IAS which has been 
estimated through disclosure indexes covering the period under consideration (1995- 
2000). The second objective is that where it has been found that JIC do not comply 
fully the IAS the research explains the compliance level differences among those 
companies by looking at company-specific factors that have been chosen. Moreover, 
the third objective, which might have not had that much attention, is the financial 
consequences of IAS as far as the financial market is concern in developing countries. 
Therefore, for exploring this issue, the following aspects will be investigated: 1) to 
what extent IAS adoption has reduced the systematic risk estimated by beta, 
unsystematic risk estimated by variance residuals, risk premium estimated by the 
difference between risk free rate and market return, and cost of equity capital 
estimated by the expected return? It is conceivable, however, that the cost of equity 
capital has been influenced by other changes taking place over the period other than 
the change in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. In particular, the firms 
may have been changing their business risk or their financial risk and this need to be 
controlled for in assessing the impact of the change in disclosure on the cost of equity 
capital, 2) Overall, can it be seen any reduction in JIC share price volatility estimated 
by standard deviation? 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE IN COMPLIANCE WITH IAS AND 
THE IMPACT OF COMPANY-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is presenting the results regarding the research hypothesis needs to be 
tested for achieving the study objectives. As introduced in Chapter 1, the first 
objective needs to be achieved is that to test whether Jordanian Industrial 
Companies (JIC) listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and their shares traded 
during the period 1995-2000 implement fully the IAS. That is not only by measuring 
the extent of disclosure through a disclosure index contains the IAS requirements 
during the period 1995-2000 but also by testing whether the change in the disclosure 
level, if it is founded, over the period were significant. More specifically, testing 
whether the change in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS after the 
enforcement of implying the IAS in September 1998 by the ASE for Jordanian 
companies listed on the financial market were significant compared with the period 
pre the IAS adoption. The second objective is that if those JIC do not comply fully 
the IAS the research will attempt to explain the compliance level differences, if it is 
found, among those companies by looking at company-specific factors that have 
been chosen. Therefore, the following sections will present the results, which help 
for testing those hypotheses and achieving the study first and second objectives. 
6.2 The Change in the Extent of Disclosure in Compliance with the IAS 
The primary concern of this study is to assess the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with the IAS in Jordan. This section presents the results of examinations carried out 
to seek answers to the following question (originally set out in Chapter 1) to explore 
the extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS: 
To what extent JIC listed on Amman Stock Exchange and their shares traded 
during the period under consideration complied with the mandatory 
requirement ofadopting the IAS? 
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In this study, a total of 50 JIC annual reports over the six years (1995,1996,1997, 
1998,1999, and 2000) were analysed. Each company's extent of disclosure in 
compliance with the IAS for each year was estimated by indexes 'see Appendix 1'. 
That was based on 137 items of information required to be disclosed by the IAS for 
the years 1995-1997,186 items for the year 1998,221 items for the year 1999, and 
219 items for the year 2000. The extent of disclosure scores for each company in the 
sample and each year covered in this study are shown in Appendix 3. Table 6.1 
shows the descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4521 0.4580 0.4703 0.5096 0.5409 0.5599 
Maximum 0.6441 0.6441 0.6780 0.7462 0.8965 0.9138 
Minimum 0.2712 0.2692 0.2878 0.3278 0.3333 0.1607 
Range 0.3729 0.3749 0.3902 0.4184 0.5632 0.7531 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0822 0.0838 0.0800 0.0958 0.1084 0.1344 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
-1.91 -0.206 0.043 -0.336 1.485 1.529 
Standardised 
Skew. 
0.017 -0.181 0.202 0.177 0.773 0.030 
K-S 
(Liffiefors) 
0.064 0.069 0.064 0.084 0.077 0.075 
The table above shows that none of the companies in the sample fully complied 
the IAS requirements which is a fact has been confirmed by the International 
Accounting Standards Board Secretariat in published annual reports for fiscal 
years ending 2000 excluding any of Jordanian companies as fully adopted the IAS 
(IASB, Annual Report, 2000). 
The extent of disclosure scores of Jordanian companies, as it can be seen from 
Table 6.1, varied within the range of 16% to 91% over the period 1995-2000. The 
proportion of the companies whose the extent of disclosure scores were more than 
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50% was 334%, 32%, 34%, 56%, 68%, and 72% in 1995,1996,1997,1998.199(), 
and 2000, respectively, and the rest of the companies' scores were within Ilic 
range of 16')/0 to 50% over the period 1995-2000. In addition, the nican score ()I 
tile extent ot'disclosure is Just over 45'ý/O In 1995 and 1996-, 4TVO in 1997,5 1 ", /o III 
1998-, 54% in 1999; and 56% in the most recent year (2000). 
As indicated by the above analysis and as can be seen froin Figure 6.1 which was 
developed on the basis of the mean score and changes in tile mean score of' the 
extent of disclosure that JIC included in the study were not I'dily implementing the 
IAS. In the same time there were a drift LIP (steady increase) In the level of 
disclosure over the years considered. 
Figure 6.1: The extent and changes in the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS (Average across all JIC) 
60% 
0 
U) 50% 
0 
E 40% Mean score for the 
S extent of disclosure 
U) 
00 
r 30% Change in mean 2 
X score for the extent of 20% disclosure 
10% 
M Q) 
2 0% 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Years 
In brief, the above analysis indicates that the sampled JIC extent of(fisclosure in 
compliance with the IAS increased over the period 1995-2000 \\, here tile change In 
means was positive for the total period. Moreover, although there Nýerc a drift tip 
in the level of disclosure over the period 1995-2000 as it can be seen froni Table 
6.1, the degree of the increase for the period post the mandatory action (1998- 
2000) of the IAS were higher than 50% comparing with the period pre the 
mandatory action (1995-1997). ]-his might gives an indication that the mandatory 
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action played a vital role in increasing the level of disclosure regarding the IAS. 
For Jordanian Industrial Sectors, however, Table 6.2 shows the descriptive statistics 
of the extent of disclosure. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for sectors for the 
total period 1995-2000 
Machinery Mining and Textile Food Chemical 
and Metal Building and 
Industry Equipment other 
Services 
Mean 0.4655 0.5409 0.4802 0.4775 0.5113 
Maximum 0.6717 0.9138 0.614 0.8928 0.6964 
Minimum 0.2727 0.1607 0.3333 0.2712 0.34 
Range 0.399 0.7531 0.2807 0.6216 0.3564 
Standard 0.0874 0.1357 0.0755 0.1082 0.0923 
Deviation 
Standardised 0.2133 1.0268 -0.8467 2.3064 -1.0077 
Kurt. 
Standardised 0.1688 0.3494 -0.1924 0.7901 0.0012 
Skew. 
K-S 0.1030 0.1135 0.1018 0.0745 0.0788 
(Lilliefors) 
I I I 
The table above shows that none of the sectors fully complied with the IAS 
requirements and the extent of disclosure scores of sectors varied within the range 
of 16% to 91%. The only sectors havin. g a mean score of the extent of disclosure 
over 50% are Mining and Building Equipment (54%) and Chemical (51%). 
However, the rest of sectors their mean score of disclosure is less than 50%. The 
higher degree of disclosure for Mining and Building Equipment and Chemical 
sectors comparing with other sectors might be justified by linking it to the need for 
international investments as it is the case in Jordan. 
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It can be concluded from Table 6.1 and 6.2 that the level of disclosure is quite low 
over not only pre but also post the mandatory action for implementing the IAS 
suggesting that the government and the ASE systems regarding the financial 
reporting in Jordan are loose. Therefore, it could be suggested that to increase the 
degree of compliance, the accounting profession in Jordan should strengthen its 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms after giving it more power through the 
Companies Act and the Securities Law increase awareness about the existing 
mandatory provisions by conducting training programs for its members on a 
regular basis working side by side with the ASE on a cooperative basis. In this 
regard, Ahmed (1994) argued that in developing countries while there are 
considerable incentives for voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports, there 
are also reasons for not complying with mandatory disclosure regulations, 
including inadequate regulatory framework and enforcement mechanisms, and a 
lack of both an effective capital market and an accounting profession. Therefore, 
the assumption that all companies will disclose all mandatory information may not 
be true in these countries. Empirically, Wallace (1988) examined 47 Stock 
Exchange listed companies in Nigeria and concluded that many companies in that 
country publish annual reports that do not adequately comply with minimum 
disclosure regulation. 
The following section will test the significance of the changes in the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with the IAS over the period 1995-2000 across all JIC 
and across sectors (HO I). 
Test of Hypothesis 1 (HOl) 
In order to test HOI "there are no changes in the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with the IAS in the annual reports of JIC listed on ASE and their 
shares traded over the period 1995-2000" across all companies, the extent of 
disclosure scores were grouped into five pairs (1995-1996; 1996-1997; 1997- 
1998; 1998-1999,1999-2000,1995-2000 and before/after the mandatory action), 
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and the parametric paired Mest was run. ' To be able to use the parametric t 
statistic, the assumption that the sample is drawn from a normally distributed 
population must be satisfied. As indicated by the Kurtosis and Skewness statistics 
and confirmed by the K-S Lilliefors tests of normality, the extent of disclosure 
scores for the total period appear to be normally distributed having a value for the 
normality tests between the range of +/- 1.96 'see Table 6.1. 
The test results are surnmarised in Table 6.3. 
1 The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test was also run and its results are presented together 
with the t-test results. 
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As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis was rejected for all of the 
pairs, except 1995-1996. However, there was a conflicting result for accepting or 
rejecting the null hypothesis for the pairs 1999-2000 between t-test and Wilcoxon 
test (the null hypothesis has been rejected by Wilcoxon while it has been accepted 
by West - although still near the boundary suggesting that to reject the hypothesis). 
As the changes in the extent of disclosure scores from one year to another were 
positive 'see Figure 6. V, the above results show that the sampled companies' 
extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS increased significantly over the 
period 1996 to 1999 (changes in these time intervals were significant at the 5% 
significance level). An important point to note is that even though an increase in 
the companies' extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS was for most of 
the pairs of years, except the pair between 1995-1996 and 1999-2000, over 76% of 
the observe overall increase 2 occurred during the years 1997 to 1999, which was 
the period that surrounds the year that the IAS were mandatory adopted. 
Given that there are indications as regards to the impact of the ASE law No. 23 of 
1997, the significant increase in the extent of disclosure in compliance with the 
IAS could be attributed mainly to the enactment of the ASE law No. 23 of 1997 
which required from all Jordanian companies listed on the financial market to 
comply the IAS in preparing their annual reports. This is clearly obvious from the 
result presented in Table 6.3 for both tests for the pair Before/After the mandatory 
action which shows a significant difference. An important point has to be 
mentioned, moreover, is that although the implementation for the IAS started in 
the year 1998 but the significant change started in the extent of disclosure before 
that year. This results could be attributable to many factors such as Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) who decided in its 
Ordinance No. 54 that IAS to be followed compulsory by the Jordanian public 
accountants during their course of examination of financial statements of the 
Jordanian Shareholding Companies (JSC) starting by December 1990 'see Chapter 
Three- section 3.5.1.1', pressure from companies liked with the international 
2 As can be seen from Table 6.1 (see mean, which shows changes in the mean score of the extent of 
disclosure) the total change in the mean score of the extent of disclosure between 1995 and 2000 was 10.7%, and 8.96% of this total change occurred during the years from 1998 to 2000. 
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market to implement early the IAS, the absence of national accounting standards, 
researchers and experts recommendations of implementing the IAS. As a 
consequence, it can be seen that their was a drift up in the extent of disclosure 
regarding the mandatory action in 1998 for implementing the IAS and not a jump 
up as expected to be seen 'see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1'. 
For supporting the above argument, General Linear Model (GLM) has been used 
by running the Univariate Analysis of Variance for testing whether the extent of 
disclosure scores over the period 1995-2000 were significantly different. The test 
shows that the difference among means over the period 1995-2000 is significant 
(F Ratio = 10.418 and F Prob. = 0.000). For showing between which pair of years 
the mean difference is significant, however, Tukey HSD has been used and its 
results summarised in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Summary for the mean difference in the extent of 
disclosure between each pair of years 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1995 0.0059 0.0182 0.0575* 0.0888* -0.1078* 
1996 0.0122 0.0515 0.0828* -0.1018* 
1997 0.0393 0.0706* 0.0895* 
1998 0.0313 0.0502 
1999 0.0189 
*= Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis was rejected for the pairs 
1995-1998; 1995-1999; 1995-2000; 1996-1999; 1996-2000; 1997-1999 and 1997- 
2000. On the other hand, the null hypothesis was accepted for the pairs 1995- 
1996; 1995-1997; 1996-1997; 1996-1998; 1997-998; 1998-1999; 1998-2000 and 
1999-2000. Therefore, it can be concluded that the null hypothesis was rejected 
when the Tukey HSD used to test the significance in Mean difference between pair 
of years one of them before the mandatory action which is 1995 until 1997 and 
another after the mandatory action which is 1998,1999 and 2000. This result 
indicates that the mean difference significance could be attributed mainly to the 
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enactment of the Securities Law No. 23 of 1997 argued earlier. Moreover, for the 
years after the mandatory action, the more recent the year is the more significant 
difference in means is with the years before the mandatory action confirming the 
above conclusion 'see Table 6.3'. 
In order to test the null hypothesis across sectors, the Univariate Analysis of 
Variance employed which shows that the difference is significant among industrial 
sectors (F Ratio = 5.287 and F Prob. = 0.000). For showing between which sectors 
the mean difference is significant, however, Tukey HSD has been used and its 
results summarised in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5: Summary for the mean difference in the extent of disclosure 
between each pair of sectors 
Mining and Textile Food and other Chemical 
Building Services 
Equipment 
Machinery -0.0712* -0.0148 -0.00965 -0.0439 
and Metal 
Industry 
Mining and 0.0564* 0.0616* 0.0273 
Building 
Equipment 
Textile 0.00517 -0.0291 
Food and -0.0343 
other 
Services 
*= ýiignilicant at UM level (two-tailed) 
As can be seen from the above table, the difference is significant between the 
Mining and Building Equipment sector and the other sectors except the Chemical 
sector where it is found not significant. One possible explanation for this result 
could be due to the fact that companies in this industry category relying heavily on 
the foreign investments particularly those large companies who are considered as the 
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biggest companies in the country such as Jordan Phosphate Mines, Jordan Cement 
Factories, Arab Potash, and Jordan Cement Factories. These companies, therefore, 
relatively faced higher pressure from the foreign investors and the outside world to 
disclose more information in comparison with other domestic and smaller size 
companies in the other industries. 
Finally it has to be mentioned that interact between sectors and years is not 
significantly different according to the Univariate Analysis of Variance test (F 
Ratio = 0.195 and F Prob. = 1.000). 
6.3 Company-Specific Factors and the Change in the Extent of Disclosure in 
Compliance with the IAS in Jordan 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the secondary objective of this study is to assess the 
impact of company-specific factors on the extent of disclosure in compliance with 
the IAS for JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1995-2000. In 
order to accomplish such an objective, the study looks at the association between 
selected five company-specific factors and the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with the IAS in the annual reports of JIC for six years: 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999 
and 2000. 
Five company-specific factors (independent variables) were selected on the basis of 
theoretical arguments, literature review and applicability to Jordanian Companies, 
are company size, audit firm, industry type, profitability and structure. As details 
were provided in Chapter Five (Research Methodology and Hypotheses Chapter), 
the extent of disclosure (dependent variable) was estimated by an index on the basis 
of 137 items for the years 1995-1997 of information representing the IAS applicable 
to JIC, 186 items for the year 1998,221 items for the year 1999 and 219 items for 
the year 2000. 
The possible link between the selected five company-specific factors and the extent 
of disclosure were discussed and accordingly one main hypothesis and five sub 
hypothesis were formulated in Chapter Five (Research Methodology and 
Hypotheses Chapter). This section reports the results of the univariate and 
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multivariate tests that were conducted to examine the association between the five 
variables and the extent of disclosure. 3 
6.3.1 Univariate Analysis 
As presented in the Research Methodology and Hypotheses chapter, to measure the 
association between selected variables and the extent of disclosure for each of the 
six years separately, two independent-sample t-test (for variables company size, 
audit firm, profitability and structure), and one-way ANOVA test (for variable 
industry type) were undertaken. The Kruskal Wallis test (a non-parametric 
alternative to ANOVA) for variable industry type and Mann-Whitney U test (a non- 
parametric alternative to t-test) for variables company size, audit firm, profitability 
and structure were also run to check the results of the parametric tests. The results 
with respect to each variable are discussed below. 
6.3.1.1 Association between company size -total assets- and the extent of 
disclosure 
A two independent-sample Mest was undertaken to test the null hypothesis "There 
is no association between company size -total assets- and the extent of disclosure in 
the annual reports of JRC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 
1995-2000 ". In order to use this test, the distribution of data (the extent of disclosure 
scores) for the two groups (the study classified these companies into two groups as 
companies with total assets equal or more than the mean were called "large 
companies" which is given one and companies with total assets less than the mean 
were called "small companies" which is given zero) must be approximately normal. 
The skewness, kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors normality tests were carried out separately 
on the basis of the extent of disclosure scores of the two groups for each of the six 
years covered in this study and the results did not indicate extreme non-nality. Table 
6.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for the large 
companies. 
3 The extent of disclosure scores for each company selected in this study over the period 1995-2000 
was provided in Appendix 3. 
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Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for large AC over 
the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4869 0.4979 0.5650 0.6209 0.6758 0.6763 
Maximum 0.6441 0.6441 0.678 0.7462 0.8965 0.9138 
Minimum 0.3333 0.3333 0.4324 0.4127 0.4193 0.4516 
Range 0.3108 0.3108 0.2456 0.3335 0.4772 0.4622 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.1129 0.1104 0.0961 0.1227 0.1736 0.1331 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
-0.9264 -0.4126 -0.8061 0.5763 -0.6207 0.6783 
Standardised 
Skew. 
0.0308 -0.3041 -0.4245 -1.1164 -0.3564 0.1972 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 
0.1758 
I 
0.1987 0.1915 0.2450 0.1715 
I 
0.1722 
The table above shows that none of the large companies estimated by total assets 
fully complied with the IAS requirements and the extent of disclosure scores of 
those companies varied within the range of 33% to 91% over the period 1995-2000. 
The proportion of the companies which the extent of disclosure scores were more 
than 50% was 50%, 60%, 83%, and 89% in 1995 and 1996,1997,1998 and 1999, 
and 2000, respectively. In addition, the mean score of the extent of disclosure is just 
over 48% in 1995,49% in 1996. However, the mean score of the extent of 
disclosure for those companies changed considerably to 56% in 1997,62% in 1998; 
67% in 1999 and 2000. It can be recognised that the mean score of the extent of 
disclosure for the most recent year (2000) is significantly different from the mean 
score in 1995 (the beginning of the period under consideration). 
For small companies, however, Table 6.7 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
extent of disclosure. 
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Table 6.7: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for small JIC over 
the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4473 0.4526 0.4598 0.4944 0.5225 0.53 
Maximum 0.5968 0.606 0.6094 0.629 0.6666 0.8928 
Minimum 0.2712 0.2692 0.2878 0.3278 0.3333 0.1607 
Range 0.3256 0.3368 0.3216 0.3012 0.3333 0.7321 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0775 0.0795 0.0717 0.0821 0.0837 0.1220 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
-0.1866 -0.1761 -0.2971 -0.9491 -0.7292 2.2900 
Standardised 
Skew. 
-0.1531 -0.3327 -0.1144 -0.3656 -0.2587 -0.2425 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 
0.0694 0.0645 0.0494 0.1349 0.0955 0.0814 
The table above shows that the proportion of the companies whose the extent of 
disclosure scores were more than 50% was 32%, 29%, 52%, 66%, and 68% in 1995, 
1996 and 1997,1998,1999, and 2000, respectively. In addition, the mean score of 
the extent of disclosure is just over 44% and 45% in 1995,1996 and 1997 
respectively. However, the mean score of the extent of disclosure for those 
companies changed gradually to just over 49%, 52% and 53% in 1998,1999 and 
2000 respectively. 
The two independent-sample Mest was run using SPSS for windows and in the 
output the SPSS produces two different versions of the West. One of them (Equal 
variance of t-test) assumes that the variance in the two populations are equal and the 
other (Unequal variance t-test) does not. In order to identify which one of these two 
tests is more appropriate to test the null hypothesis, the Levene test for homogeneity 
of variance was undertaken. The Levene test was found not to be significant at the 
0.05 level for each of the six years except for the year 1999 and for the total period 
together (1995-2000). Thus, it was decided to use the equal variance West to test the 
above hypothesis when the homogeneity of variance achieved and use the unequal 
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variance Mest when the homogeneity of variance was not achieved. The Mest results 
together with descriptive statistics, Levene test and Mann Whitney U test as a non- 
parametric test for checking the parametric test results are shown in Table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8 shows that the mean of disclosure level for large JIC was greater than 
small JIC in each of the six years covered in this study. By looking at the mean 
difference between the two groups over the period 1995-2000 it can be recognised 
from the Table above that the mean difference was increasing until 1999 (the mean 
difference was the highest in 1999) when the mean difference between the two 
groups decreased slightly down in 2000 from 0.15 to 0.14. 
As can be seen from Table 6.8 the observed two-tail significance from the 
equal/unequal variance t-test and Mann Whitney U was not significant at the 0.05 
level for the years 1995 and 1996. Therefore, the test results accept the null 
hypothesis for the years 1995 and 1996. For the years 1997 until 2000 and for the 
total period together (1995-2000), however, the tests results were significant at the 
level 0.05 recommending rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, it can be 
concluded in general that there is no association between company size -total assets- 
and the extent of disclosure for the JIC concerned for the years 1995 and 1996, 
while there is association between the company size -total assets- and the extent of 
disclosure for the years 1997,1998,1999,2000, and for the total period together 
(1995-2000). 
One thing has to be mentioned that, large and small size for companies is arguable 
issue. In other words, what might be considered as large company in developing 
countries such as Jordan it might be not in a developed country like USA or UK. 
This fact might influence the testing hypothesis results in different countries. Table 
6.9 shows JIC size considered in this study according to their book value of total 
assets over the period 1995-2000. 
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Chapter Six 
6.3.1.2 Association between audit firm and the extent of disclosure 
A two indepenclent-sample Mest was undertaken to test the null hypothesis "There 
is no association between audit firm and the extent of disclosure in the annual 
reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 ". 
In order to use this test, the distribution of data (the extent of disclosure scores) for 
the two groups (JIC their annual reports audited by one of the top five international 
audit firms which is given one and the second group is otherwise which is given 
zero) must be approximately normal. The skewness, kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors 
normality tests were carried out separately on the basis of the extent of disclosure 
scores of the two groups for each of the six years covered in this study and the 
results did not indicate extreme normality problems. Table 6.10 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for JIC their annual reports audited 
by one of the top five international audit finns. 
Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for JIC their 
annual reports audited by one of the top five international audit firms over 
the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4870 0.4985 0.5106 0.5723 0.6097 0.6154 
Maximum 0.6441 0.6441 0.678 0.7462 0.8965 0.9138 
Minimum 0.361 0.377 0.3968 0.4255 0.4255 0.1607 
Range 0.2831 0.2671 0.2812 0.3207 0.471 0.7531 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0800 0.0761 0.0826 0.0910 0.1215 0.1697 
Standardised 
Kurt. -0.6771 -0.7577 -0.6782 -0.5259 0.7732 3.2814 
Standardised 
Skew. 0.2261 0.1487 0.4996 0.3772 0.7604 -1.0973 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 0.1268 
1 
1 
0.1258 0.1379 0.1494 0.1378 0.2073 
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The table above shows that none of the companies their annual report audited by one 
of the top five international. audit firms in the sample fully complied the IAS 
requirements and the extent of disclosure scores of those companies varied within 
the range of 16% to 91% over the period 1995-2000. The proportion of the 
companies whose the extent of disclosure scores were more than 50% was 56%, 
56%, 50%, 80%, 88% and 87% in 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000, 
respectively. In addition, the mean score of the extent of disclosure is just over 48% 
in 1995; 49% in 1996 and 51% in 1997. However, the mean score of the extent of 
disclosure for those companies changed considerably to 57% in 1998; 60% in 1999; 
and 61% in the most recent year (2000). In addition, the standard deviation within 
each year increased starting from 8% in the beginning of the period covered (1995) 
to almost 17% in the most recent year (2000) suggesting that the extent of disclosure 
variation within the group increased over the period to reach its highest in 2000. 
For other companies their annual reports not audited by one of the big five 
intemational audit firms, however, Table 6.11 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
extent of disclosure. 
Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for JIC their 
annual reports not audited by one of the bigfive international audit firms 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4357 0.4372 0.4513 0.4827 0.5055 0.5361 
Maximum 0.591 0.5692 0.5738 0.6225 0.644 0.8928 
Minimum 0.2712 0.2692 0.2878 0.3278 0.3333 0.3333 
Range 0.3198 0.3 0.286 0.2947 0.3107 0.5595 
Standard 
Deviation 0.0789 0.0807 0.0723 0.0856 0.0825 0.1107 
Standardised 
Kurt. -0.2093 -0.4404 -0.4558 -1.2563 -0.8743 1.8285 
Standardised 
Skew. -0.0999 -0.3113 -0.1869 -0.1667 -0.1510 0.6675 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 0.0646 0.0702 0.0498 0.1490 0.1298 
1 
0.0818 
302 
Chapter Sbc 
The proportion of the companies whose the extent of disclosure scores were more 
than 50% was 23%, 21%, 26%, 46%, 58%, and 66% in 1995,1996,1997,1998, 
1999, and 2000, respectively. In addition, the mean score of the extent of disclosure 
is just over 43%, 43% and 45% in 1995,1996 and 1997 respectively. However, the 
mean score of the extent of disclosure for those companies changed gradually to just 
over 48%, 50% and 53% in 1998,1999 and 2000 respectively. It can be recognised 
that the mean score of the extent of disclosure for the most recent year (2000) quite 
different from the mean score in 1995 (the beginning of the period under 
consideration). 
For testing the null hypothesis, the methodology followed in section 6.3.1.1 will be 
employed. Therefore, Levene test was found not to be significant at the 0.05 level 
for each of the six years and also for the total period together (1995-2000). Thus, it 
was decided to use the equal variance t-test to test the above hypothesis since the 
homogeneity of variance achieved. The t-test results together with descriptive 
statistics, Levene test and Mann Whitney U test as a non-parametric test for 
checking the parametric test results are shown in Table 6.12. 
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Chapter Six 
Table 6.12 shows that the mean of disclosure level for JIC their annual reports 
audited by one of the big five international audit firms was greater than the JIC their 
annual reports not audited by one of the big five audit firms in each of the six years 
covered in this study. Although the mean of disclosure scores for both groups has 
increased from one year to another, the increase in mean score for the first group 
was greater than the second group before and after the mandatory action except for 
the pairs 1996/1997 and 1999/2000 (it was 0.0 11,0.0 13,0.061,0.03 7 and 0.006 for 
the first group for the years 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999 and 2000 respectively, 
while it was 0.002,0.014,0.031,0.023, and 0.031 for the second group). After the 
mandatory action, however, it can be seen that there was a drift up in the mean of 
disclosure for both groups; although it was expected to jump up as a consequence of 
implementing the IAS 'see section 6.2'. By looking at the mean difference between 
the two groups over the period 1995-2000 it can be seen from the Table above that 
the difference in means between the two groups was increasing until the year 1999 
when it reached its peak and then decreased for the pairs 1999/2000 (the most recent 
pair). 
As can be seen from Table 6.12 the observed two-tail significance from the equal t- 
test and Mann Whitney U was significant at the 0.05 level not only for each year 
separately but also for the total period together except for the year 2000. Therefore, 
the test results reject the null hypothesis for each year and also for the total period 
together except for the year 2000. One possible explanation for not being able to 
reject the null hypothesis for the year 2000 (the most recent year) is that the effort 
from Auditors, ASE (Securities Law) and the Jordanian Government (Companies 
Act) toward the implementation of the IAS and consequently the increase in the 
level of disclosure for both groups. Generally speaking, it can be said, therefore, that 
there is an association between audit finn and the extent of disclosure for the JIC 
included in this study. 
6.3.1.3 Association between industry type and the extent of disclosure 
As there were more than two industry groupings, a one-way ANOVA was 
undertaken to test the null hypothesis "There is no association between industry 
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tvne and the extent ofdisclosure in the annual reports ofJIC listed on Amman Stock .1 1- 
Market and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 
As discussed in the Research Methodology and Hypotheses Chapter, in order to 
undertake the one-way ANOVA procedures, the data (the extent of disclosure 
scores) must fulfil two conditions. Firstly, each of the groups must be a random 
sample from a normal distribution and secondly, the variance of all groups must be 
equal. In order to check the normality assumption for industry type groups, 
Skewness, Kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors normality tests were carried out for each of 
the six years covered in this study. Both the Skewness and Kurtosis were found to be 
within the range of +/- 1.96 and the K-S Lilliefors test were found to be greater than 
the 0.05 level for most of the industry type groups in each year indicating the 
normality assumption was approximately met. Furthermore, in order to detennine 
whether the equal-variance assumption was met, the "Levene test for homogeneity 
of variance" (Norusis 1995, PP. 261-262) was run for each of the six years 
separately and also for the total period together (1995-2000). The Levene test 
results, which were not significant at the 0.05 significant level, indicate that the 
equal variance assumption for the industry type groups is approximately met for the 
all years except for the total period together (1995-2000). However, using the 
Kruskal Wallis test as a non-parametric for confirmation will reduce the error of 
rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis when it is not. The one-way ANOVA 
statistics together with some descriptive statistics, Levene test and Kruskal Wallis 
results are shown in Table 6.13. 
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As shown in Table 6.13 five industry groupings are used in this study to examine the 
relationship between industry type and the extent and disclosure. The differences in 
mean for the extent of disclosure between industry group with a highest score and 
that with the lowest score were 0.08 in 1995,0.06 in 1996,0.085 in 1997,0.096 in 
1998,0.105 in 1999, and 0.06 in 2000. The industry group with the highest mean of 
disclosure score was the Mining and Building Equipment industry over the period 
under consideration. The Food and other Services industry, however, had the lowest 
mean of disclosure in 1995, while the Machinery and Metal industry had the lowest 
mean of disclosure in 1996,1997,1998, and 1999. In the most recent year (2000), 
moreover, the Textile industry had the lowest mean of disclosure. The average 
extent of disclosure of companies in Mining and Building Equipment and Chemical 
industries were greater than that of companies in Machinery and Metal industry, 
Textile, and Food and other Services over the six years. 
As Table 6.13 shows, the F ratios were 1.779 in 1995,0.959 in 1996,1.902 in 1997, 
1.57 in 1998,1.67 in 1999 and 0.26 in 2000, and the observed significant level (F 
Prob. ) was not significant at the 0.05 level for the all years under consideration 
(1995-2000). However, it was found that for the total period together the F ratio was 
5.334 and the observed significant level was significant (F Prob. =0.0001). Thus, the 
test results accept the null hypothesis which says there is no association between 
industry type and the extent of disclosure for each year separately, but the null 
hypothesis was rejected for the total period together suggesting that there is such 
association. 
In order to establish which of the five industry types are significantly different from 
each other for the total period together which caused the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, however, multiple comparison Tukey HSD procedure was carried out 
and its results summarised in Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14: Summary for the mean difference in the extent of disclosure 
between each pair of sectors 
1995-2000 Mining and Textile Food and Chemical 
Building other Services 
Equipment 
Machinery -0.07532* -0.01466 -0.01201 -0.04579 
and Metal 
Industry 
Mining and 0.060656* 0.06331* 0.029527 
Building 
Equipment 
Textile 0.002654 -0.03113 
Food and -0.03378 
other 
Services 
*= Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
As can be seen from the above table, this procedure showed significant differences 
at the 0.05 level between the Mining and Building Equipment sector and the other 
sectors except the Chemical sector where it is found not to be significant. As the 
mean of disclosure score for the Mining and Building Equipment was higher than 
that of other industries over the years5, it can be concluded that the extent of 
disclosure of companies operating in the Mining and Building Equipment sector 
taking into account the total period together was significantly greater than that of 
companies operating other sectors except Chemical sector. Van Wolferen (1989) 
argued that economy prospers because areas of industry that show promise are 
stimulated by fiscal policies favouring investments. Since Mining and Building 
Equipment is of fundamental importance to Jordan, it is possible that levels of 
disclosure in their corporate annual reports may differ from those in other business 
sectors. 
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6.3.1.4 Association between profitability -return on investment- and the 
extent of disclosure 
A two independent-sample Mest was undertaken to test the null hypothesis "There 
is no association between profitability -return on investment- and the extent of 
disclosure in the annual reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during 
the period 1995-2000 ". In order to use this test, the distribution of data (the extent 
of disclosure scores) for the two groups (companies with ROI equal or more than the 
average were called "high return on investment" which is given one and companies 
with ROI less than the average were called "low return on investment" which is 
given zero) must be approximately normal. The skewness, kurtosis and K-S 
Lilliefors normality tests were carried out separately on the basis of the extent of 
disclosure scores of the two groups for each of the six years covered in this study 
and the results did not indicate extreme normality problems. Table 6.15 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for the JIC their profitability (ROI) is 
equal or above the average ROL 
Table 6.15: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for high ROI JIC 
over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4602 0.4619 0.4950 0.5444 0.5857 0.5881 
Maximum 0.6441 0.5556 0.678 0.6949 0.807 0.8928 
Minimum 0.2727 0.2727 0.2878 0.3485 0.4 0.3729 
Range 0.3714 0.2829 0.3902 0.3464 0.407 0.5199 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0909 0.0878 0.0881 0.0871 0.0977 0.1133 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
0.4532 0.0576 0.6821 0.5256 0.5926 0.7098 
Standardised 
Skew. 
-0.1455 -0.8901 -0.2749 -0.3379 0.1072 0.3506 
5 The mean difference between Mining and Building Equipment sector and Chemical sector was the 
smallest over the period 1995-2000. 
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Table 6.15: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for high ROI JIC 
over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 
0.1023 0.2007 0.1250 0.1368 0.0978 0.0759 
The table above shows that none of the high return on investment companies fully 
complied with the IAS requirements and the extent of disclosure scores of those 
companies varied within the range of 27% to 89% over the period 1995-2000. The 
proportion of the companies whose the extent of disclosure scores were more than 
50% was 37.5%, 35.7%, 45%, 72%, 84%, and 81% in 1995,1996,1997,1998, 
1999, and 2000, respectively. In addition, the mean score of the extent of disclosure 
is just over 46% in 1995 and 1996; 49.5% in 1997. However, the mean score of the 
extent of disclosure for those companies changed considerably to just over 54% in 
1998; 58.5% in 1999; and 58.8% in the most recent year (2000). 
For low return on investment companies, however, Table 6.16 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the extent of disclosure. 
Table 6.16: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for low ROI AC 
over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4483 0.4565 0.4509 0.4900 0.5135 0.5097 
Maximum 0.5968 0.6441 0.6094 0.7462 0.8965 0.9138 
Minimum 0.2712 0.2692 0.3279 0.3278 0.3333 0.1607 
Range 0.3256 0.3749 0.2815 0.4184 0.5632 0.7531 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0788 0.0833 0.0684 0.0961 0.1069 0.1567 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
-0.4050 -0.058 -0.1585 0.0289 4.3154 2.489 
Standardised 
Skew. 
0.0789 0.0868 0.4477 0.4277 1.4229 0.3328 
K-S 0.1022 n non 0.0904 0.1134 10.1122 
_T 
0.1332 0.1356 L 
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Table 6.16: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for low ROI AC 
over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
(Lilliefors) 
'Me table above shows that the proportion of the companies whose the extent of 
disclosure scores were more than 50% was 32%, 30%, 25%, 46.8%, 58%, and 
55.5% in 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000, respectively. In addition, the 
mean score of the extent of disclosure is just over 44% in 1995 and 45% in 1996 and 
1997. However, the mean score of the extent of disclosure for those companies 
changed gradually to 49%, 51% in 1998 and 1999 respectively where in the most 
recent year (2000) the mean score of the extent of disclosure decreased to just over 
50%. 
For testing the null hypothesis "There is no association between profitability (ROI) 
and the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of JIC listed on Amman Stock 
Market and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 "., the methodology 
followed in section 6.3.1.1 will be employed. Therefore, Levene test was found not 
to be significant at the 0.05 level for each of the six years and also for the total 
period together (1995-2000), suggesting that the equal variance assumption is 
approximately met. Thus, it was decided to use the equal variance t-test to test the 
above hypothesis. The t-test results together with descriptive statistics, Levene test 
and Mann Whitney U test as a non-parametric test for checking the parametric test 
results for each year are shown in Table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 shows that the mean of disclosure level for high ROI was greater than the 
low ROI in each of the six years covered in this study. It is interesting to note that 
the mean of disclosure scores for both groups has increased from one year to another 
especially around the mandatory action where the increase was obvious comparing 
with the rest of the period under consideration. 
By looking at the mean difference between the two groups over the period 1995- 
2000, however, it can be seen from the Table above that the difference was 
increasing over the total period (it increased from 0.0 12 in 1995 to 0.078 in 2000). It 
could be argued that the cost argument rather than the IAS pressure caused the 
increase in the disclosure level which is an issue will be clarified in the following 
sections when using the multivariate analysis (regression model) for testing the 
influence for the extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS on the cost of 
equity capital after controlling for the variables business risk and financial risk. 
As can be seen from the above Table the observed two-tail significance from the 
equal variance t-test and Maim Whitney U was not significant at the 0.05 level for 
the years 1995 and 1996. Therefore, the test results accept the null hypothesis 
"There is no association between profitability and the extent of disclosure in the 
annual reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 1995- 
2000 " for those two years. For the years 1997 and 1998 there were conflicting 
results. The null hypothesis can be accepted according to the equal variance t-test 
but it has to be rejected according to Whitney U the 0.05 level of significant. For the 
years 1999,2000 and for the total period together (1995-2000), however, the tests 
results were significant at the 0.05 for the null hypothesis to be rejected. Therefore, it 
can be concluded in general that there is no association between profitability 
estimated by ROI and the extent of disclosure for the JIC concerned over the period 
1995 until 1998. For the years 1999,2000 and also for the total period together, 
however, there was an association between the profitability estimated by ROI and 
the extent of disclosure according to both tests equal variance t-test and Mann 
Whitney U. 
6.3.1.5 Association between capital structure -leverage- and the extent of 
disclosure 
319 
Chapter Sir 
A two indepenclent-sample Mest was undertaken to test the null hypothesis "There 
is no association between capital structure and the extent ofdisclosure in the annual 
reports ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 ". 
In order to use this test, the distribution of data (the extent of disclosure scores) for 
the two groups (companies with D/E equal or more than the average were called 
"high geared companies" which is given one and companies with D/E less than the 
average were called "low geared companies" which is given zero) must be 
approximately normal. The skewness, kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors normality tests 
were carried out separately on the basis of the extent of disclosure scores of the two 
groups for each of the six years covered in this study and the results did not indicate 
extreme normality problems. Table 6.18 shows the descriptive statistics of the extent 
of disclosure for the high geared JIC. 
Table 6.18: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for high geared 
JIC over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4507 0.4529 0.4646 0.4989 0.5262 0.5282 
Maximum 0.6441 0.6441 0.6094 0.7462 0.8965 0.9138 
Minimum 0.2712 0.2692 0.3279 0.3278 0.3333 0.1607 
Range 0.3729 0.3749 0.2815 
1 
0.4184 0.5632 0.7531 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0879 0.0952 0.0729 0.1001 0.1080 0.1471 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
0.0084 -0.3551 -0.5103 0.0629 4.3299 1.9332 
Standardised 
Skew. 
0.2891 0.1518 0.1350 0.2963 1.3578 0.0692 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 
0.1090 0.1226 
I 
0.1074 
I 
0.0988 
I 
0.1326 
I 
0.1098 
II 
The table above shows that none of the high geared companies fully complied with 
the IAS requirements and the extent of disclosure scores of those companies varied 
within the range of 16% to 91% over the period 1995-2000. The proportion of the 
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companies whose the extent of disclosure scores were more than 50% was 32%, 
30%, 35%, 56%, 67%, and 62% in 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000, 
respectively. In addition, the mean score of the extent of disclosure is just over 45% 
in 1995 and 1996; 46% in 1997. However, the mean score of the extent of disclosure 
for those companies changed considerably to 50% in 1998; 53% in 1999 and 2000. 
In addition, the standard deviation within each year increased starting from 8% in 
the beginning of the period covered (1995) to almost 15% in the most recent year 
(2000). 
For other companies their gearing is low, however, Table 6.19 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the extent of disclosure over the six years. 
Table 6.19: Descriptive statistics of the extent of disclosure for low geared 
over the six years 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.4534 0.4624 0.4751 0.5202 0.5582 0.5891 
Maximum 0.589 0.5625 0.678 0.6949 0.807 0.8928 
Minimum 0.2727 0.2727 0.2878 0.3485 0.3729 0.3548 
Range 0.3163 0.2898 0.3902 0.3464 0.4341 0.538 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0777 0.0741 0.0865 0.0921 0.1088 0.1170 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
-0.2746 0.1714 0.2893 -0.5063 -0.2010 1.0440 
Standardised 
Skew. 
-0.3607 -0.6541 0.1902 -0.0315 0.1952 0.4369 
K-S 
(Lilliefors) 
0.0852 
I 
0.0921 0.0903 0.1288 0.0874 0.1182 
The table above shows that the proportion of the companies whose the extent of 
disclosure scores were more than 50% was 36%, 33%, 33%, 56%, 69%, and 81% in 
1995,1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000, respectively. In addition, the mean score of 
the extent of disclosure is just over 45%, 46% and 47% in 1995,1996 and 1997 
respectively. However, the mean score of the extent of disclosure for those 
321 
Chapter Six 
companies changed gradually to 52%, 56% and 60% in 1998,1999 and 2000 
respectively. It can be recognised that the mean score of the extent of disclosure for 
the most recent year (2000) is significantly different from the mean score in 1995 
(the beginning of the period under consideration). 
The two independent-sample t-test was ran using SPSS for windows and in the 
output the SPSS produces two different versions of the West. One of them (Equal 
variance of t-test) assumes that the variance in the two populations are equal and the 
other (Unequal variance t-test) does not. In order to identify which one of these two 
tests is more appropriate to test the null hypothesis "There is no association between 
structure and the extent of disclosure in the annual reports ofJIC listed on Amman 
Stock Market and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 ", the Levene test 
for homogeneity of variance was undertaken. The Levene test was found not to be 
significant at the 0.05 level for each of the six years, suggesting that the equal 
variance assumption is approximately met. Thus, it was decided to use the equal 
variance t-test to test the above hypothesis. The t-test results together with 
descriptive statistics, Levene test and Mann Whitney U test as a non-parametric test 
for checking the parametric test results for each year are shown in Table 6.20. 
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Table 6.20 shows that the mean of disclosure level for low geared JIC was greater 
than high geared JIC in each of the six years covered in this study. By looking at the 
mean difference between the two groups over the period 1995-2000 it can be 
recognised from the Table above that the difference was increasing (it was 0.0027 in 
1995 to 0.061 in 2000). 
As can be seen from Table 6.20 the observed two-tail significance from the equal 
variance t-test and Mann Whitney U was not significant at the 0.05 level for the total 
period under consideration. The test results accept the null hypothesis "There is no 
association between structure and the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of 
JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 1995-2000 ". Therefore, 
it can be concluded that there was not an association between structure and the 
extent of disclosure for JIC over the period 1995-2000, each year separately and all 
the period together. 
Concerning this unexpected result that capital structure (leverage) is generally 
insignificant, this may be due, in part, to the role that banks play in Jordan. 
Specifically, JIC leverage over the period 1995-2000 was often linked to bank loans. 
As a result, more leverage would imply greater monitoring. Given that banks usually 
have direct access to information, such leverage needs not to imply a greater need 
for extensive external annual report disclosure in compliance with IAS. 
6.3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate analysis carried out in this study is multiple regression routines and 
stepwise regression technique. Multiple regression routines were conducted for each 
year using the extent of disclosure as the dependent and company size (as estimated 
by total assets), audit firm, industry type (based on five industry grouping), 
profitability and structure as independent variables. Such cross-sectional regressions 
allows us to identify not only if there is a significant association between selected 
company-specific factors and the extent of disclosure for each year, but also if such a 
relationship is consistent over time. On the other hand, stepwise regression was 
conducted in order to determine which independent variables were "best" in 
explaining extent of disclosure variation over the years 1995-2000. 
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One of the problems of undertaking any multiple regression analysis is that there 
may be multicollinearity between independent variables. The possible occurrence of 
multicollinearity was checked by testing the Person Correlation Coefficient 
suggested by Farrar (1967); Judge (1985); Street (2000); Wahlen (1994); Wallace 
(1994); Wallace (1995) which indicates that Person Correlation Coefficient was less 
than 0.80 confirming that a major multicollinearity problem was not observed 
among the independent variables in any of the six years covered in this study 'see 
Appendix 4'. Moreover, stepwise regression has been employed for confirming such 
results regarding multicollinearity concern as suggested by Malone (1993); Neter 
(1989) which suggested that "harmful" multicollinearity did not pose a problem. As 
the variables were removed from the model, the coefficients of these variables, their 
standard errors, and the mean-square error remained relatively stable 'see Appendix 
4'. 
A second problem is that since multiple regressions analysis is to be used, each 
category of the two independent variables audit finn and industry type requires 
dummy variables for every year covered in this study. Consequently, there are two 
dummy variables within the independent variable audit firm (JIC audited by one of 
big five international audit firms, otherwise). The five dummy variables within the 
independent variable industry type are: 1) Machinery and Metal industry; 2) Mining 
and Building Equipment; 3) Textile; 4) Food and other Services; and 5) Chemical. It 
should be noted that for each independent variable with dummies, one of the 
dummies is left out of the equation to avoid perfect collinearity 'see Chapter Fýve- 
section 5.3.1.6'. Therefore, it has been decided to exclude the Food and other 
Services sector from the multiple regression equation for the variable industry type 
because of the abroad definition for the Jordanian companies included in this sector 
and for avoiding the perfect collinearity effect while for the variable audit firm, JIC 
audited by other than the big five left outside the equation (Johnston 1972, P. 180). 
In order to undertake multiple linear regression, the data must fulfil certain 
conditions (i. e. normality, homoscedasticity (equal variance), uncorrelated and 
linearity). An examination of the scatterplots of the regression standardised 
predicted values against the residuals for each year did not indicate any relationship. 
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Hence, the conditions of linearity and homoscedasticity were not violated (Kinnear 
1995, P. 174). Furthermore, an examination of Q-Q plot of residuals for each 
regression model indicates that the distribution of residuals is approximately normal. 
The standard skewness, kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors tests of normality of residuals 
6 also confirmed that the distributions of residuals are approximately normal. Thus, 
the assumption of normality was also satisfied (Norusis 1995, Chapters 22 and 24). 
Finally, for checking that the residuals are uncorrelated, it is suggested by Maddala 
(2001, P. 244) to employ Durbin-Watson statistic by using its upper bound as the 
true significant point. The inconclusive region treated as a rejection region (Gujarati 
1995, P. 422). The D-W statistic results, however, shows that the residuals are 
uncoffelated (DW around 2) for each year separately and also for the total period 
together 1995-2000 'see Table 6.20'. 
The OLS regression models for each of the six years as well as for the total period 
together were conducted using the "enter all variables" routine. A summary of 
results is shown in Table 6.21. 
As can be seen in Table 6.21, presented below, the results of the multiple regression 
routines for 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999,2000 and the total period together (1995- 
2000) yielded F values of 1.3933,1.2693,1.7310,2.7341,4.4554,2.5291, and 
9.2307 respectively. The observed significance level (sig. F) was found to be 
higher than the 0.05 level for each of the years 1995,1996 and 1997 which means 
that collectively five independent variables can not significantly explain the 
variation in the extent of disclosure at 0.05 significance level for those years. 
Thus, the results accept the main null hypothesis suggesting that there is no 
significant association between a number of company-specific factors and the 
extent of disclosure in the annual reports of JIC for each of the years mentioned 
above. For the years 1998,1999 and for the total period together (1995-2000), 
however, the observed significance level (sig. F) was found to be less than the 
0.05 significance level which means that collectively five independent variables 
significantly explain the variation in the extent of disclosure at 0.05 significance 
6 For each of the six years, skewness and kurtosis were between +/- 1.96 ranges, and significance level 
of K-S Lilliefors was not significant at 0.05 level. 
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level for those periods. Thus, the results reject the main null hypothesis suggesting 
that there is significant association between a number of company-specific factors 
and the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of JIC for years 1998,1999, 
2000, which is the period representing post the mandatory action for implementing 
7 the IAS, and for the total period together (1995-2000). 
Beside the fact that the association between the extent of disclosure and the five 
variables (collectively) was found to be significant at the 0.05 level for the years 
1998,1999,2000 and for the total period together (1995-2000) which represents the 
period post the mandatory action for complying the IAS forced by ASE law No. 23 
of 1997, Table 6.21 reveals that the degree of explanation by the independent 
variables selected was different over the period under consideration. In terms of R2, 
the 1995 model explains 21.4 per cent of the variability in disclosure index, the 1996 
model 19.8 per cent (the lowest), the 1997 model 25 per cent, the 1998 model 34.8 
per cent, the 1999 model 46.5 per cent (the highest), the 2000 model 33 per cent and 
the total period model (1995-2000) 20 per cent. An interesting point to note is that 
while there was a slight decrease in the R2 in 1996 compared to 1995, there was a 
considerable increase in the years followed starting from 1998 and till the peak in 
1999 when the R2decreased again in the year 2000. A possible explanation for the 
shift in the explanatory power for the model used estimated by R2 is the 
macroeconomic effect for a country depending heavily on its neighbours 'see 
Chapter Two- Jordanian Economy Development', especially on Iraq which is the 
biggest trade partner for Jordan. Moreover, the region is suffering from a continuous 
conflict between Palestinian and Israelis because of the occupation for Palestinian 
lands, beside the continuous tension between Iraq and the USA and the UK since the 
Second Gulf War in 1991 and also between Iraq and Gulf Countries. The shifts in 
explanatory power of the independent variables over the years were also reported in 
similar previous longitudinal studies by Al-Modahki (1996); Amernic (1981); Soh 
(1996). 
Table 6.21: Results of multiple regression routines 
7 It can be recognised that the strongest rejection for the null hypothesis is for the total period together 
(1995-2000) were the sig. F is 0.000 1. 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1995- 
2000 
Multiple 
R 0.4623 0.4455 0.5024 0.5898 0.6819 0.5748 0.4498 
R2 0.2137 0.1985 0.2524 0.3478 0.4650 0.3304 0.2024 
Adjusted 
R2 0.0603 0.0421 0.1066 0.2206 0.3606 0.1997 0.1804 
Standar 
d Error 0.0796 0.0819 0.0755 0.0845 0.0867 0.1203 0.0967 
Durbin- 
Watson 2.1002 1.9128 2.2247 2.2299 2.3918 2.4956 1.7868 
F value 1.3933 1.2693 1.7310 2.7341 4.4554 2.5291 9.2307 
Sig. F 0.2283 0.2858 0.1201 0.0163 0.0006 0.0245 0.0001 
Table 6.21: Results of multiple regression routines 
Variables Year Coefficient (b) SE B T Sig. T 
Company size 1995 0.0046 0.0122 0.3810 0.7051 
1996 0.0062 0.0125 0.5015 0.6186 
1997 0.0068 0.0108 0.6309 0.5315 
1998 0.0203 0.0122 1.6580 0.1049 
1999 0.0323 0.0114 2.8349 0.0070 
2000 0.0537 0.0161 3.3299 0.0018 
1995-2000 0.0213 0.0055 3.8722 0.0001 
Audit firm 1995 0.0396 0.0284 1.3912 0.1716 
1996 0.0535 0.0284 1.8827 0.0668 
1997 0.0444 0.0259 1.7098 0.0948 
1998 0.0530 0.0318 1.6651 0.1035 
1999 0.0529 0.0305 1.7322 0.0907 
2000 0.0303 0.0444 0.6818 0.4991 
1995-2000 0.0450 0.0137 3.2725 0.0011 
Machinery and 
Metal industry 1995 0.0086 0.0372 0.2326 
1 
0.8171 
1996 L-O. 0250 0.0390 -0.6-4-1-8- 10.5245 
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Table 6.21: Results of multiple regression routines 
Variables Year Coefficient (b) SE B T Sig. T 
1997 -0.0306 0.0362 -0.8466 0.4021 
1998 -0.0280 0.0412 -0.6797 0.5004 
1999 -0.0162 0.0406 -0.4011 0.6904 
2000 -0.0148 0.0555 -0.2672 0.7906 
1995-2000 -0.0194 0.0184 -1.0532 0.2931 
Mining and 
Building 
Equipment 1995 0.0629 0.0382 1.6426 0.1080 
1996 0.0165 0.0397 0.4173 0.6786 
1997 0.0335 0.0372 0.9013 0.3726 
1998 0.0323 0.0409 0.7906 0.4336 
1999 0.0334 0.0422 0.7914 0.4332 
2000 -0.0229 0.0587 -0.3905 0.6981 
1995-2000 0.0203 0.0188 1.0778 0.2819 
Textile 1995 0.0167 0.0417 0.4012 0.6903 
1996 -0.0149 0.0449 -0.3329 0.7408 
1997 -0.0107 0.0405 -0.2652 0.7921 
1998 0.0043 0.0435 0.1004 0.9205 
1999 0.0025 0.0447 0.0576 0.9543 
2000 -0.0075 0.0637 -0.1188 0.9059 
1995-2000 -0.0014 0.0205 -0.0711 0.9433 
Chemical 1995 0.0499 0.0341 1.4611 0.1515 
1996 0.0240 0.0372 0.6451 0.5224 
1997 0.0329 0.0319 1.0295 0.3092 
1998 0.0222 0.0357 0.6219 0.5373 
1999 0.0331 0.0378 0.8751 0.3865 
2000 0.0060 0.0512 0.1176 0.9069 
1995-2000 0.0276 0.0168 
1 
1.6411 0.1018 
Profitability 1995 0.0689 0.1600 0.4308 0.6688 
1996 0.0060 0.1737 0.0348 0.9723 
1997 0.0370 0.1816, n )n-A 
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Table 6.21: Results of multiple regression routines 
Variables Year Coefficient (b) SE 0 T Sig. T 
1998 0.0736 0.1784 0.4128 0.6818 
1999 0.2626 0.1453 1.8071 0.0780 
2000 0.1237 0.1564 0.7907 0.4336 
1995-2000 0.0925 0.0680 1.3594 0.1750 
Structure 1995 -0.0642 0.1000 -0.6421 0.5243 
1996 -0.0639 0.0866 -0.7371 0.4652 
1997 -0.0256 0.0701 -0.3661 0.7161 
1998 -0.0479 0.0691 -0.6929 0.4922 
1999 0.0539 0.0616 0.8742 0.3870 
2000 -0.0668 0.0782 -0.8536 0.3982 
1995-2000 -0.0004 0.0308 -0.015 0.9880 
Constant 1995 0.3423 0.1853 1.8470 0.0719 
1996 0.3507 0.1887 1.8579 0.0703 
1997 0.3420 0.1662 2.0572 0.0460 
1998 0.1679 0.1884 0.8913 0.3779 
1999 -0.0344 0.1796 -0.1916 0.8489 
2000 -0.2881 0.2578 -1.1174 0.2703 
1995-2000 0.1287 0.0856 1.5025 0.1340 
An examination of regession statistics (i. e. T statistics and sig. ), the independent 
company size variable shows that total assets size was significantly associated with 
the extent of disclosure at the 0.05 level only in 1999,2000 and in the total period 
together (1995-2000). As the size variable has positive partial regression coefficient 
(B) for each year, which means that the extent of disclosure increases with increasing 
assets size. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a positive significant 
association between assets size and the extent of disclosure in the annual reports of 
JIC listed on ASE for 1999,2000 and for the total period together (1995-2000). An 
important point to note is that unlike the univariate test results, which indicate that 
assets size was significantly associated with the extent of disclosure for 1997,1998, 
1999,2000 and for the total period together (1995-2000), the regression model 
indicates significant association between the assets size and the extent of disclosure 
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for 1999,2000 and for the total period (1995-2000). This may be partially due to 
minor multicollinearity effects among the independent variables. 8 Another possible 
reason for this is that the JIC concerned were classified into groups on the basis of 
the means of yearly total assets and the univariate t-test was undertaken on the basis 
of such grouping, whereas multiple regression were conducted by using the actual 
value of total assets. Such different results between the univariate and multivariate 
analysis was also reported by Al-Mulhern (1997); Dumontier (1998); Hossain 
(1994); Raffoumier (1995); Singhvi (1971). For instance, in the study by Singhvi 
(1971), while the univariate chi square test revealed a significant relationship 
between assets size and the extent of disclosure, the regression coefficient for this 
variable was not significant. Thus, when the size variable was considered alone it 
was found to be significant related with the extent of disclosure for 1997,1998, 
1999,2000 and for the total period (1995-2000), but the multivariate results indicate 
significant association only for 1999,2000 and for the period (1995-2000). In 
developing countries, however, although a consistent significant positive association 
between company size and disclosure level has been reported, it is noted that a wide 
variation in results exists (Ahmed 1994; Chow 1987; Hossain 1994; Marston 1997; 
Tai 1990; Raghurarn and Zingales 1995). 
An important point to note is that, there was an increase in the B, t value and sig. T 
of the company size variable from one year to another, suggesting that there was an 
increase in explanatory power of the independent variable company size over the 
years. In other words, the higher the size of the JIC estimated by the total assets, the 
higher the extent of disclosure will be. Indeed, the univariate T-test results also 
indicate a similar trend (as discussed in section 6.3.1.1 differences in means of the 
extent of disclosure scores of large and small companies as well as the t values 
increased over the years suggesting that differences in the extent of disclosure 
between large and small companies have widen over the years). 
8 In multiple regression, conclusions about particular independent variables depend on the relationship 
of that variable both to the independent variable and other independent variables in the model 
(Norusis 1995, P. 480). 
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Furthermore, an examination of T statistics and its observed significance level of the 
independent variable audit firm 'see Table 6.21' showed that, audit firm was not 
significantly associated with the extent of disclosure at the 0.05 level for each year 
concerned separately except for the total period together which showed a positive 
significant association. The results are not in line with the results of univariate tests. 9 
Such conflicting results reported also by Raffoumier (1995) who used both 
approached univariate and multivariate analyses for testing the hypotheses. Since 
companies audited by one of the big five international audit firms were coded (1) 
and (0) otherwise when the dummy variable for audit firm was constructed, the later 
category which is left out of the equations is the yardstick against which the other 
(companies audited by one of the big six) is estimated. Since the B (partial regression 
coefficient) for the audit finn variable is positive for each of the years, it can be 
concluded that there is not significant positive higher disclosure in the first group 
when compared with the later group for each year concerned separately. For the total 
period together (1995-2000), however, it can be said that there is significantly higher 
disclosure in the first group (companies audited by one of the big five) when 
compared with the second group. 
As far as industry type is concerned, the regression statistics indicated that none of 
the industry categories were significantly associated with the extent of disclosure at 
the 0.05 level not only for each year separately but also for the total period together 
(1995-2000) which consist in general with the univariate result 'see section 6.3.1.3'. 
Conflicting results, however, for the profitability variable has been reported. An 
examination of T statistics and its observed significance level of the independent 
variable profitability 'see Table 6.2 V showed that, profitability was not significantly 
associated with the extent of disclosure at the 0.05 level for each year concerned 
separately and also for the total period together except for the year 1999 which 
showed a positive significant association. Since the B (partial regression coefficient) 
9 Unlike multiple regression, the univariate analysis indicates significant association between audit 
firin and the extent of disclosure for each year separately and for the total period together (1995-2000) 
except for the year 2000. For explanation see discussion mentioned before regarding the different in 
univariate and multivariate results for company size. 
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for the profitability variable is positive for each separately and for the total period 
together (1995-2000), it can be concluded that there is not significant positive 
between JIC profitability estimated by ROI and extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS. For the years 1997,1998,2000 and the total period together (1995-2000), 
however, univariate tests show significant association between profitability and the 
extent of disclosure whereas multivariate tests shows that the association was not 
significant. As with the size variable noted above, this may be due to minor 
multicollinearity effects between the independent variables and also because of the 
different approaches have been employed in univariate and multivariate tests for 
testing the association between profitability and the extent of disclosure (dummy 
variable approach in univariate tests and actual values in multivariate tests). Such 
conflicting results reported by also Raffoumier (1995) who used both approached 
univariate and multivariate analyses for testing the hypotheses. 
Like the univariate test results, the multiple regression results also not only did not 
show any significant association between the independent variable structure and the 
extent of disclosure at the 0.05 significance level in any of the years under 
consideration and also for the total period together (1995-2000) but also the 
association between capital structure and the extent of disclosure were negative 
since the B (partial regression coefficient) is negative. That is, a high geared 
company was of no negative significance in explaining the variability in the 
disclosure indexes in any of the six years covered in this study and also for the total 
period together 'see section 6.3.1.5'. 
For supporting the above results, stepwise regression technique was adopted and its 
results presented in Table 6.22 According to this method, the independent variable 
that is the most correlated with the dependent one is introduced first in the model. 
Subsequently, the other exogenous variables are included on the basis of the partial 
correlation coefficients. 
Table 6.22: Stepwise Regression Results 1995-2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t ratio 
Company Size 0.361 0.005 6.683 
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Table 6.22: Stepwise Regression Results 1995-2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard error t ratio 
Audit Firm 0.212 0.013 3.715 
Industry Type 0.125 0.015 2.357 
R2 18.4 Adjusted R2 17.6 
Standard error 0.097 Sum of squares 3.415 
The value of the t statistic gives the decision rule about including or not a new 
variable in the model. A new variable is included in the model only when its t 
statistic is not smaller than a critical value, and the t statistics of the other variables 
that are already in the model do not diminish below that value after the inclusion of 
the new variable. Following that process, the stepwise regression gives satisfactory 
results for the variables; company size, audit firm and industry type. The coefficients 
of all these variables are significant at the 0.05 level. Together they explain only 
18.4% of the total variance of the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS over 
the all period 1995-2000. The addition of more variables does not improve the 
explanatory power of the model. Therefore, the "best" explanatory variables in 
explaining the extent of disclosure variation in compliance with IAS among JIC 
over the period 1995-2000 were company size and, to a lesser extent, audit firm and 
industry type confirming the conclusion reached by running the multiple regression 
routines. 
6.3.3 Conclusion and Evaluation 
This chapter has reported on the results of the investigation of the extent of 
disclosure in regard of IAS and of the impact of five company-specific factors on the 
extent of disclosure in the annual reports of 50 JIC listed on ASE for six years1995 
until 2000 and also for the total period together 1995-2000. The extent of disclosure 
was estimated by an indexes consisting of 137 items of information for the years 
1995-1997,197 items for the year 1998,221 items for the year 1999, and 219 items 
for the year 2000. Over 76% of the observe overall increase in the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS occurred during the years 1997 to 1999, which 
was the period that surrounds the year that the IAS required to be followed. Given 
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that there are indications as regards to the impact of the ASE law No. 23 of 1997, the 
significant increase in the extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS could be 
attributed mainly to the enactment of the ASE law No. 23 of 1997 which required 
from all Jordanian companies listed on the financial market to comply the IAS in 
preparing their annual reports. Moreover, the implementation for the IAS started in 
the year 1998 but the significant change started in the extent of disclosure before that 
year. This results could be attributable to many factors such as Jordanian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) who decided in its Ordinance 
No. 54 that IAS to be followed compulsory by the Jordanian public accountants 
during their course of examination of financial statements of the Jordanian 
Shareholding Companies (JSC) starting by December, 1990, pressure from 
companies liked with the international market to implement early the IAS, the 
absence of national accounting standards, researchers and experts recommendations 
of implementing the IAS. As a consequence, it can be seen that there was a drift up 
in the extent of disclosure regarding the mandatory action in 1998 for imPlementing 
the IAS and not a jump up as expected to be seen. 
For testing whether a chosen company specific factors might explain the variation in 
the extent of disclosure, both univariate analysis (t-tests for variables company size, 
audit firm, profitability and structure and ANOVA for the variable industry type) 
and multivariate analysis (OLS multiple regression) were carried out not only for 
each of the six years but also for the total period together (1995-2000). It can be seen 
that there is a conflicting results using both tests (univariate and multivariate 
analyses). Such different results between the univariate and multivariate analyses 
were also reported by AI-Mulhern (1997); Durnontier (1998); Hossain (1994); 
Raffournier (1995); Singhvi (1971). The results are surnmarised in Table 6.23. 
Table 6.23: Summary of results 
Year Type of Variables found to be significant 
analysis 
Company Audit Industry Profitabi- Structure 
size firm type lity 
1995 Univariate 1.393362 
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Table 6.23: Summary of results 
Year Type of Variables found to be significant 
analysis 
Company Audit Industry Profitabi- Structure 
size firm type lity 
Multivariate - 
Sig. 0.23 
F =1.39 
R2= 0.214 0.228301 
1996 Univariate - - 
Multivariate - 
Sig. 0.285 
F=1.27 
R2= 0.198 
1997 Univariate 
Multivariate 
Sig. 0.12 
F=1.73 
R2= 0.25 
1998 Univariate 
Multivariate 
Sig. 0.016 
F=2.73 
R2= 0.348 
1999 Univariate 
Multivariate 
Sig. 0.0006 
F=4.45 
R2= 0.465 
2000 Univariate 
Multivariate 
Sig. 0.024 
F=2.53 
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Table 6.23: Summary of results 
Year Type of Variables found to be significant 
analysis 
Company Audit Industry Profitabi- Structure 
size firm type lity 
R2= 0.33 
1995 Univariate 
- (Mining 
2000 and 
Building 
Equipme 
nt 
Industry) 
Multivariate 
Sig. 0.0001 
F=9.23 
R2= 0.20 
*= Significant at 0.05 level -= Not significant at O. U5 level 
The results of the multiple regression routines (sig. F), which revealed that 
collectively five independent variables significantly explain the variations in the 
extent of disclosure for the years 1998,1999,2000 and the total period together 
(1995-2000), reject the main hypothesis H02 concerning the years 1998,1999, and 
2000. For the years 1995,1996 and 1997, however, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
As far as the individual variables are concerned, both univariate and multivariate 
analysis results revealed a significant positive relationship between asset size and the 
extent of disclosure for the years 1999,2000 and for the total period together (1995- 
2000). However, the univariate and multivariate tests produced contradictory results 
for the size variable for 1997 and 1998. For these two years, the univariate West 
results for the size variable were statistically significant, whereas the multivariate 
OLS model revealed otherwise. The test results also revealed that the extent of 
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disclosure by large companies was significantly higher than for small companies and 
differences in the extent of disclosure between large and small companies widened 
over the years. Such a result could be attributed to the fact that probably larger firms 
may need even more funds from the capital markets in order to continue to expand 
their activities at a rate which might not be possible with internal sources only and 
hence these firms would be more likely to disclose more information so as to be able 
to obtain the needed funds at reasonable cost. 
Audit firm was found to be significantly associated with the extent of disclosure for 
only the total period together (1995-2000) from both univariate and multivariate 
analysis. For each year separately, however, audit firm was found not to be 
significantly associated with the extent of disclosure multivariate OLS model 
(multiple regression) whereas it was found to be significantly associated according 
to the univariate Wests except for the year 2000. Furthermore, industry type has been 
revealed to be significantly associated with the extent of disclosure for the total 
period together by only univariate analysis showing that Mining and Building 
Equipment Industry was found to disclose higher information than the other types of 
industries. For each year separately, however, both kind of analysis have not 
revealed any significant association. Moreover, profitability has revealed to be 
significantly associated with the extent of disclosure by only univariate analysis for 
the years 1999,2000 and for the total period together. Finally, neither univariate nor 
multivariate analysis showed a significant association relationship between structure 
and the extent of disclosure not only in any of the six years covered in this study but 
also for the total period together. 
An important point to note is that there were shifts in explanatory power of the 
independent variables over the years. For example, as indicated by the multiple 
regression results, the variation in the extent of disclosure that was explained 
collectively by the selected five variables in terms of R2was about 0.214 in 1995, 
0.198 in 1996,0.25 in 1997,0.348 in 1998,0.465 in 1999,0.33 in 2000 and 0.20 for 
the total period together (1995-2000). In addition, generally speaking, while 
company size was the most significant variable in 1998,1999,2000, and for the 
total period together (1995-2000), audit firm, profitability and industry type can be 
ranked as a second in the degree of significance for explaining the variation in the 
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extent of disclosure. The shifts in explanatory power of the independent variables 
over the years were also reported in similar previous longitudinal studies by Al- 
Modahki (1996); Amemic (198 1); Soh (1996). 
In conclusion, the results discussed in this chapter suggest that there are considerable 
variations in the extent- of disclosure by JIC for each of the six years covered in this 
study. Company size and, to a lesser extent, audit firm and industry type appear to be 
important in explaining differences in the extent of annual reports disclosure 
between the JIC over the period 1995-2000. Hence, the above results tend to suggest 
that these four company-specific factors are amongst the factors affecting disclosure 
practices of JIC, a result supported by running stepwise regression technique. 
Regarding the mandatory implementation for the IAS, however, it can be concluded 
that there was a drift up and not a jump up, as it is expected, around the mandatory 
date in the extent of disclosure level which could be explained by company-specific 
factors mentioned considered in this study. The drift up could be attributable not 
only to macroeconomic effect for a country depending heavily on its neighbours, 'see 
Chapter Two- Jordanian Economy Development', but also to other factors such as 
Jordanian Association of Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) who decided in its 
Ordinance No. 54 that IAS to be followed compulsory by the Jordanian public 
accountants during their course of examination of financial statements of the 
Jordanian Shareholding Companies (JSC) starting by December 1990 'see Chapter 
Three- section 3.5.1.1', pressure from companies liked with the international market 
to implement early the IAS, the absence and clearly defined national GAAP, 
researchers and experts recommendations of implementing the IAS. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter presenting the results regarding the research hypothesis needs to be 
tested for achieving the study first and second objectives. As introduced in Chapter 
1, the first objective needs to be achieved is that to test whether JIC listed on ASE 
and their shares traded during the period under consideration implemented fully the 
IAS. That is not only by measuring the extent of disclosure through a disclosure 
index contains the IAS requirements during the period 1995-2000 but also by testing 
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whether the change in the disclosure level, if it is founded, over the period were 
significant. More specifically, after the enforcement of implying the IAS in 
September 1998 by the ASE for Jordanian companies listed on the financial market 
were significant. The second objective is that if those JIC do not comply fully the 
IAS the research will attempt to explain the compliance level differences, if it is 
found, among those companies by looking at company-specific factors that have 
been chosen. 
As long as the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS is concern, although 
the adoption for the IAS started in the year 1998, the study found that the 
significant change in the extent of disclosure started before that year. As a 
consequence, it can be seen that there was a drift up in the extent of disclosure 
regarding the mandatory action in 1998 for implementing the IAS and not a jump 
up as it expected to be seen 
The study has found that JIC are not fully adopting the IAS, which have been found 
also by other similar empirical studies (Street 1999; Street 2000; Street 2001). 
Chosen company specific factors (company size, audit firm, industry type, 
profitability and structure), therefore, were tested for possible explanation of the 
variation in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. The results revealed 
that there are considerable variations in the extent of disclosure by JIC for each of 
the six years covered in this study. Company size and, to a lesser extent, audit firm 
and industry type appear to be the best explanatory variables in explaining 
differences in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS among JIC included 
in this study over the period 1995-2000, a result reached not only by running the 
multiple regression routines but also by running the stepwise regression technique. 
Hence, the above results tend to suggest that these three company-specific factors 
are amongst the most important factors affecting disclosure practices of JIC in 
compliance with IAS. 
Concerning the adoption of the IAS, however, it can be concluded that there was a 
drift up and not a jump up, as it is expected, around the mandatory action date in the 
extent of disclosure which could be explained by company-specific factors 
mentioned above. Since R2 which explain the percentage of variation in the extent of 
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disclosure, therefore, ranged only between 46.5% and 19.8%, it might be argued that 
there are also macroeconomic factors influencing such extent (Chen et al. 1986; 
Fama and French 1989; Poon and Taylor 1991). 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF IAS ADOPTION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results regarding the research hypotheses that need to be 
tested for achieving the third study objective concerning the financial consequences 
of adopting the IAS in Jordan. The objective is to assess the change in the systematic 
risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility 
in relation with the IAS compliance in Jordan. As far as the cost of equity capital is 
concern, estimated by the expected return, however, clearly interpreting whether the 
cost of equity capital has changed, we have to control for those factors that may 
influence it, namely: business risk and financial risk. Therefore, the following 
sections will present the results, which help for testing those hypotheses and 
achieving the study third objective. 
7.2 The Change in Systematic Risk, Unsystematic Risk, Risk Premium, Cost of 
Equity Capital, and Share Price Volatility 
As it is explained earlier 'see Chapter Five- section 5.4.1', the difference in means 
between the JIC average extent of disclosure actively traded group and JIC average 
extent of disclosure lowest actively traded group were employed using Paired- 
Samples Mest to see whether testing for the financial consequences of extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS on JIC actively traded group and JIC less actively 
traded groups could be generalised for the all 50 JIC selected in this study. The test 
showed that the difference in means between the two groups is not significant (t 
value = -1.08,2-tailed sig. = 0.296) confirming the fact that investigating the 
financial consequences of adopting IAS could be generalised for all 50 JIC 
selected originally in this study and not just for those companies within the 
actively traded group and the less actively group. 
This section presents the results of examinations carried out to seek answers to the 
following question (originally set out in Chapter 1) to explore the change in relation 
with the IAS compliance: 
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To what extent XC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period under 
consideration their systematic risk unsystematic risk; risk premium, cost of equity 
capital, share price volatility influenced by its level ofdisclosure in compliance with 
LIS 
It is expected that after the mandatory action, the systematic, unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility has reduced! Therefore, 
the null hypotheses to be tested are as follows: 
H03: There are no changes in the systematic risk regarding the adoption of the IAS 
for XC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
H04: There are no changes in the unsystematic risk regarding the adoption of the 
IASfor JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
H05: There are no changes in the risk premium regarding the adoption of the MS 
for XC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
H06. ý There are no changes in the cost of equity capital regarding the adoption of 
the IASfor JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
H07. - There are no changes in the share price volatility regarding the adoption ofthe 
L4Sfbr JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
To be able to test the above hypotheses, betas, residuals variances, risk premiums, 
expected returns, and standard deviations for the selected JIC (i. e. actively traded 
and less actively traded groups) over the five years (1996-2000) as estimates for the 
systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and share 
price volatility, respectively, were estimated by employing the Market Model and the 
CAPM. 
1 It should be noted that investigating the influence of the increase in the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and 
share price volatility could be ambiguous. In this regards, it has been strongly argued that 
macroeconomic factors are among the factors influencing the expected return (Chen et al. 1986; Fama 
and French 1989; Poon and Taylor 199 1). 
344 
Chapter Seven 
The CAPM is only one of several models of asset pricing/cost of capital estimation. 
However it has been chosen here because it is the dominant model in the literature 
and is now widely used in the business community. Moreover there is much 
disagreement about the factors in the arbitrage pricing theory or APT model with 
some authors preferring macroeconomic factors while others prefer a modified 
CAPM with size and book to market value as additional factors to the market. 
The CAPM can be written as: 
(r. ) = r, + (E (r. ) - r) Re 
Where r, = the risk free rate 
(E (r. ) - r, ) = the market risk premium 
pe = beta, the systematic risk of the equity 
In an integrated world economy it is unlikely that disclosure will influence the risk 
free rate. This will be established by world market trading. However it is conceivable 
that disclosure can reduce the risk premium either by affecting the market risk 
premium or the beta or both. There is much controversy over the market risk 
premium with historical evidence showing that on average it is approximately 5-7%. 
Some authors feel that this historical evidence or ex post evidence is not what 
investors expect or a measure as the ex ante market risk premium, and feel that 
equities are showing these risk premia as a result of "good luck". However it has 
proved difficult to evaluate this measure for Jordan over the period concerned 
because the Jordanian economy has not issued sufficient Treasury Bills - there are 
no Treasury Bonds - to obtain a reliable measure of the risk free rate. Moreover, the 
stock market has been declining over some of the years. The results will be presented 
but since they do not constitute good evidence about the market risk premium in 
Jordan, the world risk premium as a proxy will be used, as will be explained in 
section 7.2.3. As a result the focus becomes beta for the impact of disclosure on the 
cost of equity capital within a CAPM framework. 
7.2.1 The Change in Systematic Risk in Relation with the Extent of Disclosure 
in Compliance with IAS 
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In this study, a total of 50 JIC weekly share price returns over the five years (1996, 
1997,1998,1999, and 2000) were analysed. Such an analysis showed that a thin 
trading problem in ASE existed and therefore the 50 JIC has been classified into 
three groups, namely: actively traded, less actively traded, and the lowest actively 
traded 'see Appendices 5 and 6'. Since thin trading problems influence the estimated 
beta 'see Chapter Five- section 5.4.1', systematic risk estimated by beta was 
investigated only for those JIC actively traded and less actively traded over the 
period 1996-2000 by employing the Market Model for each year considered in this 
study. The beta for each JIC included in the study is shown in Appendix 7 for each 
year considered. 
To run the market model for each company for each year requires a market index or 
equivalently the index of the market portfolio that is assumed to be held by investors. 
If the market portfolio was the portfolio of Jordanian equities then the market beta is 
by definition equal to one regardless of any disclosure aspects. The portfolio would 
have to be much wider than this if we wish to attempt to identify any influence of 
IAS on the equity betas of Jordanian companies. The portfolio that has been chosen 
here is the US dollar denominated FTSE All World Index. So the hypothesis being 
tested is whether the change in disclosure to IAS impacted upon the betas of 
Jordanian companies as assessed within a world index. Of course in using a world 
index measured in US dollars there is the possibility of foreign exchange risk being 
captured within the beta estimate. However in this case the Jordanian Diner is tied 
directly to the US dollar so preventing this effect influencing the results. 
A descriptive analysis for estimated beta presented in Table 7.1 which shows that the 
systematic risk estimated by beta of companies varied within the range of 0.999 to - 
2.64 over the period 1996-2000. 
Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of the systematic risk estimated by beta 
1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.24984 -0.0485 0.00789 0.11028 -0.1672 
Maximum 1.08232 0.588 0.54365 0.85889 0.26193 
Minimum - 1.5547 -0.681 -0.4557 -- FO. 484 -1. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of the systematic risk estimated by beta 
1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Range 2.637059 1.269041 0.99932 1.342844 1.439824 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.577 0.34962 0.22903 0.29829 0.33747 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
2.735047 -0.60943 0.211336 0.59844 2.068655 
Standardised 
Skew. 
-1.27417 0.181909 0.439511 0.317452 -1.34326 
K-S (Lilliefors) 0.141735 0.072434 0.106774 0.099239 ' 0.142869 
Moreover, although the minimum scores for each year considered in this study 
were negative as it is shown in the above table, these values were not statistically 
significant at the 5% level of significant for the years 1996 and 1997, but it is 
significant for the years 1998,1999, and 2000. The t values were -2.0011, -1.892, 
-2.434, -3.089 and -3.03 for the years 1996,1997,1998,1999 and 2000 
respectively. The significant values were 0.0512,0.064,0.018,0.003 and 0.0038, 
respectively. In addition, the mean score of the systematic risk estimated by beta 
is 0.25 in 1996; -0-05 in 1997; 0.008 in 1998; 0.11 in 1999; and -0.17 in the most 
recent year (2000). These results are not surprising. Given the use of a world 
index the degree of correlation can be expected to be much lower than against a 
domestic index. We would not expect the average beta to be approximately one. 
There are numerous negative betas. Where these are insignificantly different from 
zero it can be concluded in a statistical sense that the beta is zero. In an economic 
context it is difficult to conclude that the appropriate cost of equity is the risk free 
rate; there is just too much variation in the rates of return. Therefore it should be 
concluded that for both cases of significance and non-significance from zero that 
this evidence is not indicative of the future correlation between the company's 
rate of return and the FTSE All Share World Index. This time period has been a 
difficult one for the world economy with the index showing an overall negative 
growth and many periods of falling stock markets. It is unsurprising that the betas 
are negative. For the purposes of this objective of the thesis these betas will be 
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used as the benchmark for assessing the impact of disclosure because all that is 
required is the relative change. 
In brief, the above analysis indicates that the actively traded and the less actively 
traded JIC groups systematic risk decreased over the period 1996-2000 except for 
the year 1999 when it increased, which could be as a result of macroeconomic 
factors indicated previously. For the most recent year, however, it can be seen that 
the systematic risk was the lowest among the other years. 
The following section will test the significance of the changes in the systematic 
risk estimated by beta over the period 1996-2000 across actively traded and the 
less actively traded JIC groups. 
Test of Hypothesis 3 (H03) 
In order to test H03 "there are no changes in the systematic risk of JIC listed on 
ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000" across all companies 
within both groups: actively traded and less actively traded, the systematic risk 
estimated by beta values were grouped into five pairs (1996-1997; 1997-1998; 
1998-1999,1999-2000, and 1996-2000), and the parametric paired West was run. 
2 
To be able to use the parametric t statistic, the assumption that the sample is 
drawn from a normally distributed population must be satisfied. As indicated by 
the Kurtosis and Skewness statistics and confirmed by the K-S Lilliefors tests of 
normality, the systematic risk estimated by beta scores for the total period appear 
to be normally distributed having a value for the normality tests between the 
ranges of +/-1.96 'see Table 7.1'. The test results are summarised in Table 7.2. 
The Wilcoxon Mathched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test was also run and its results are presented together 
with the t-test results. 
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Chapter Seven 
As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes in 
the systematic risk estimated by beta ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded 
over the period 1996-2000" was accepted for the pairs 1996-1997,1997-1998, 
and 1998-1999 from both tests; West and Wilcoxon test while rejected for the 
pairs 1999-2000 and 1996-2000 from both tests. Exploring the systematic risk 
changes over the period 1996-2000, the above results show that the sampled 
companies' systematic risk was not decreasing significantly over the period 1996- 
1999 when there was a significant decrease in the year 2000 comparing with the 
year 1999. In addition, clearly it can be seen that over all the systematic risk 
decreased significantly over the total period 1996-2000 since the null hypothesis 
were rejected for the pair 1996-2000. An important point to note, therefore, is that 
the observed significant decrease in the systematic risk spread over the total 
period under consideration suggesting that the decrease were 'cumulative'. 
In conclusion, it can be said that, overall, the increase in the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS has influenced the systematic risk estimated by beta for all 
50 selected JIC listed on ASE over the period 1996-2000. Such an influence was 
not significant between each pair of years, however, could be a reflection of the 
gradual increase in the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS itself since 
such extent reached its peak by only 56% in average in the most recent year 
(2000) 'see Chapter Six- Table 6.1'. For supporting such argument, ANOVA and 
General Linear Model (GLM) have been employed. Both tests show that the 
difference among means over the period 1996-2000 is significant (F Ratio = 4.683 
and F Prob. = 0.0015). For showing between which pair of years the mean 
difference is significant, however, Tukey HSD has been used and its results 
surnmarised in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3: Summary for the mean difference in the systematic risk 
between each pair of years 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
1996 0.298 0.242 0.139 0.417* 
1997 -0.056 -0.158 0.118 
1998 -0.102 0.175 
1999 0.277 
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Table 7.3: Summary for the mean difference in the systematic Hsi- 
between each pair of years 
1 1997 1 1998 1999 2000 
*= The mean difference is significant at 0.005 level 
As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes in 
the systematic risk of JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 
1996-2000" was rejected for the pairs 1996-2000 confinning the above 
conclusion concerning the cumulative impact of the extent of disclosure on 
systematic risk for selected JIC listed on ASE. 
7.2.2 The Change in Unsystematic Risk in Relation with the Extent of 
Disclosure in Compliance with IAS 
Unsystematic risk were explored for only JIC which were actively traded over the 
total period 1996-2000 since investigating this issue required the residuals variance 
(i. e. estimated by employing the Market Model) for each selected company over the 
total period concerned 'see Appendix 8'. A total of 17 JIC weekly logarithm share 
price returns over the five years (1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000) were analysed. 
Residuals variance for each JIC included in the study is shown in Appendix 8 for 
each year. 
A descriptive analysis for residuals variance presented in Table 7.4 which shows that 
the unsystematic risk estimated by residuals variance of selected JIC varied within 
the range of 0.00288 to 0.0071 over the period 1996-2000. 
Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics of the unsystematic risk estimated by 
residuals variance 1996-2000 
1 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.002027 0.001452 0.002321 0.002941 0.002176 
Maximum 0.003914 0.004146 0.005481 0.007505 0.006056 
Minimum 0.001035 0.00032 0.000458 0.00044 0.000482 
Range 0.002879 0.003826 0.005022 0.007065 0.005575 
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Table 7.4: Descriptive statistics of the unsystematic risk estimated by 
residuals variance 1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Standard 0.000857 0.000914 0.001274 0.001933 0.001494 
Deviation 
I 
Moreover, the minimum score for the earliest year (1996) was higher than the 
minimum scores for the rest of the years. Whereas, the maximum score was 
lowest for the year 1996 compared with the rest of years suggesting that the 
residuals variance standard deviation in that year is lower than the rest. Overall, 
however, it can be seen that differences in residuals variance scores over the 
period 1996-2000 is not dramatic in terms of factors presented in the table above. 
In brief, the above analysis indicates that the actively traded JIC unsystematic risk 
stayed in general fixed over the period 1996-2000. 
The following section will test the significance of the changes in the unsystematic 
risk estimated by residuals variance over the period 1996-2000 across actively 
traded JIC group. 
Test of Hypothesis 4 (H04) 
In order to test H04 "there are no changes in the unsystematic risk of XC listed 
on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 " across all JIC 
actively traded, the unsystematic risk estimated by residuals variance for the 
period t-l for each company is divided by the residuals variance for the period t to 
test whether such ratio in significantly different from one. The results are 
surnmarised in Table 7.5. 
352 
i5 
ci 
.m "0 
W .. w 
> 
po 
.m 
wi 
ci 
4 
V., cl, 
. 
12 
w ce > 
ri 
00 CD 
e r- 
le 
m 
rn 
(1q 
cý 
ýn 
let 
qe 
V) 
CIN 
ýo 
r- 
c"i 
M 
00 
0, % rn 
00 
CD 
CD 
r- 
IND 
CD 
lIZ 
CD 
00 kn 
IZ 
") 
C> 
cu rA 
ci 
c 
0-9 
0 
rA 
CU 
p4 cý 
CJ 
ci 
= 
cl 
n le 
kn 
m 
-4 
1--4 "0 
"... i vý 
C> 
00 
C> 
rq 
00 
r- 
00 
m 
vi 
le 
(N 
ým 
c21ý 
ýo 
le 
rr) 
clý 
le 
CD 
") 
00 
". 4 rA 
(2 CN 
Z4 
CJ 
ci 
r. 
(X 
00 
M 
00 
m 
r, 1 
ým 
CD 
C> 
P--4 
(N 
kn 
cn 
"--q 
Glý 
kn 
kn 
clý 
kri 
lIZ 
cý 
00 
00 
(f) 
vi 
00 
r- 
(A 
,Z 
CN .. « w 
Ce 
F= 
.. 0 
%Z 
m 
.. « 
z« 
il 
= .. w 
rA 
CJ 
P% 
tý. 
äý 
cý 
". 4 
M m 
lw 
ce 
> 
(Z 00 
V) 
cý 
CD 
vi 
N 
0 
CD 
rn 
v-. ý 
00 
M 
kn 
rn 
C 
r- 
kn 
CD 
le 
kn 
cý 
00 
_A 
Vlb 
cq 
c; 
vi 
C) 
"0 
c; 
-u 
CJ 
M 
ce 
= .;; 
4.0 
Z« 
> 
ffl 
". 0 VI 
"0 
00 
00 
--4 
rg 
r- 
00 
-4 
m 
kn 
00 
m 
r- 
00 
(A 
ri 
-4 
00 
r9 
-4 
1%0 
00 
\M 
0, % 
ei No 
.m 
clý 
00 
clý 
M 
r- 
kn 
V--4 
krý 
CD 
M 
m 
C) 
mm a ýo 
:j 
"C 
-- 
k. 4 
1) 'ä 
;j 
2 
Z 
1Z2 9 
u 
R 2 
je 
m I, ) 
I . .1 Pzi N. m c4 > m Q = (= 
r42 
CU cý cý (9 -4 (Z 00 
kri 
c*N 
00 
oll 
t- 
r9 
kn 
CD 
P. -4 
C> 
"0 
C> 
r- 
;. .. w 
> 
wi 
ci c" C> 
N« 
Ce 
et 
ýo tn 
-4 
r- 
clý 
t- 
r- 
ýo 
\M 
C) 
m 
C> 
00 
-4 
00 
IC) CD 
C) 
rn 
Nt 
00 
(N 
CD 
> 
OCJ 
.M 
v2 
00 .. 2 NW "0 "-.. i 
CD 
00 
-4 
V--4 
ON 
C> 
00 
in 
M 
t- 
V) 
kn 
le 
vi 
00 
CD 
ýo 
"0 
cli 
C> 
le 
1110 
CL) 
CJ 
ci M C> 
00 
r- 
00 
00 
t- 
CD 
Z 
CN 
ci C> C> 
No 
.. 0 GA 
ýc 
cl 
.. d 
ce 
> 
CD rn 
ýo 
-4 
ýo 
ri nt 
4. W 
CD 
E 
E 
(X 
E--ý 
0 
u 
t% 
= 
ý-Ei 
>% 
"0 
< 
N 
>ý w 
ci 
9 
> 
u 
CU 
ýt" 
cu 
Z 
tn 
u 
cu 
-n 
,5 tn 
*jý 
ýD 
9 
+. & 
u 
e 
ci 
ce 44 
u 
w1--1 M 
' 
cu 
:i 
"CJ 
r_ 
9 
cu 
1 ci < '5 
rA 
Ný 
"Ci 
rZ 
It 
t05 cu 
w2 
ci 
cz 
ce 
ce 
ce 
Q cý 
ti 
c: 
(9 
ým 
cý 
M 
00 
M 
in 
ýn 
O= 
Z., 
CU 
l= m 
00 
c7, cý 
kn 
C% 
ci 
c4 92 
10 
.m 
02 
Cu 
= 
c: mý 
. tl m 
> 
CD 
c2, ý 
CD 
M 
4 
Q 
ci 
;g -, Z, e Glý le 
le 
:2 . 
r7 
Z 
Q 
NW 
c 
ce 
.. w 
Z 
cu 
Z 
c> 
Cl% 
t. ' 
.2 No 
in 
e' 00 
rq 
-4 
CD 
(9 0 el. 
cl 
u > 
rA I 
tn 
W) 
en 
Chapter Seven 
As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes in 
the unsystematic risk estimated by residuals variance of XC listed on ASE and 
their shares traded over the period 1996-2000" was accepted for the selected 
companies except for specific companies in specific years, namely: Jordan New 
Cable Company and Arab Investment and International Trade in 1996/1997, and 
Woollen Industries in 1996/2000. 
Overall, as residuals variance ratios were less than the F critical value (i. e. 4.00) 
'see Chapter Five- section 5.4.1.1', such results show that the sampled 
companies' unsystematic risk was not decreasing significantly over the period 
1996-2000 suggesting that the impact of IAS adoption might be influenced only 
the systematic risk of JIC listed on ASE over the period 1996-2000 and not the 
unsystematic risk. A possible explanation is that since JIC were not complying 
fully with the IAS, the reduction in these companies' unsystematic risk was not 
significant. 
7.2.3 The Change in Risk Premium in Relation with the Extent of 
Disclosure in Compliance with IAS 
The study extended its investigation to test whether the adoption of IAS has reduced 
the yearly risk premium in the ASE. Risk premium, therefore, has been estimated for 
each year (1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000) by deducting the yearly risk free rate 
on Treasury Bills provided by Jordanian Central Bank from the yearly logarithm 
market return (i. e. ASE Index Return) 'see Appendix 9'. Table 7.6 shows the yearly 
risk free rate, market retum, and premium risk over the period 1996-2000. 
Table 7.6: Risk Free Rate, Market Return, and Risk Premium 
1996-2000 
Year Rf Rm Risk Premium 
1996 0.0887 -0.0071 -0.0958 
1997 0.0800 0.0978 0.0178 
1998 0.0848 0.0053 -0.0796 
1999 0.0809 -0.0165 -0.0974 
2000 0.0608 -0.2294 -0.2901 
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From the above table, it can be seen that risk premiums are not realistic values on 
the long-run since the ASE General Index was failing over the period 1996-2000 
and Jordanian economy did not issue sufficient Treasury Bills - There were no 
Treasury Bonds - to obtain a reliable measure of the risk free rate, which end up 
with these negative values. Consequently, to test H05 "there are no changes in 
the risk premium of XC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 
1996-2000" is not possible in such circumstances. 3 In order to avoid the problem 
of using negative risk premium in estimating the expected return as a proxy for 
the cost of equity capital in the following section, therefore, risk premium over the 
last ten years for the All World was in average 5% will be employed (Dimson et 
al. 2002, P. 167). 
7.2.4 The Change in Cost of Equity Capital as a Result of Disclosure in 
Compliance with IAS 
As is mentioned earlier there is a thin trading problem in the ASE which is 
influencing the estimated beta and consequently the estimated expected return. As a 
result, the cost of equity capital was investigated only for those JIC actively traded 
and less actively traded over the period 1996-2000 by employing the CAPM for each 
year considered in this study. In addition, as noted previously, since the ASE 
General Index was failing over the period 1996-2000 and the risk premiums were 
negative values, the estimated risk premium for the .4 11 World is employed in order 
to estimate the expected return for each JIC included in the study 'see Appendix 10'. 
Table 7.7 shows the descriptive statistics of the cost of equity capital estimated by 
the expected return by employing the following CAPM formula: 
E(r. ) = r, + (E(r., ) - r, ) Pe 
Table 7.7: Descriptive statistics of the cost of equity capital estimated by 
expected return 1996-2000 
3 Political and economic conditions have varied over the years. It is recommended, therefore, using the 
longest possible data series in calculating the equity risk premium since this is more likely to 
encapsulate unusual events that may have current or future relevance (Dimson et al. 2002, P. 168). 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.103962 0.078524 0.085893 0.08448 0.052464 
Maximum 0.143 0.109 0.112 0.109 0.074 
Minimum 0.05 0.054 0.062 0.057 0.002 
Range 0.093 0.055 0.05 0.052 0.072 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.021269 0.016293 0.0116566 0.011822 0.016897 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
0.732652 -0.27662 -0.013938 0.263632 2.048845 
Standardised 
Skew. 
-0.32125 0.500363 0.2831605 -0.20106 -1.34617 
K-S (Lilliefors) 0.124377 0.108897 0.0924561 0.1044 0.145812* 
*= significant at 0.005 level. 
The table above shows that the cost of equity capital estimated by expected return 
of companies varied within the range of 0.05 to 0.093 over the period 1996-2000. 
In addition, the mean score of the cost of equity capital is 0.1,0.08,0.09,0.08, 
and 0.05 for the years 1996,1997,1998,1999 and 2000. 
As it can be seen from the above table, the cost of equity capital measure by 
expected return decreased over the period 1996-1997 and then slightly increased 
over the period 1997-1999 when it decreased again over the period 1999-2000. 
Although such a move could be contributed to macroeconomic factors mentioned 
earlier over the years 1998-1999, the increase in the level of disclosure in 
compliance with the IAS could be seen as another factor which influenced such 
cost, more specifically in the most recent year (2000) when such extent reached 
the highest level comparing with the years before. 
The following section will test the significance of the changes in the cost of equity 
capital estimated by expected return over the period 1996-2000 across JIC 
actively traded and less actively traded groups. 
Test of Hypothesis 6 (H06) 
In order to test H06 "there are no changes in the cost of equity capital of JIC 
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listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 " across all JIC 
actively traded and less actively traded, the cost of equity capital estimated by 
expected return were grouped into five pairs (1996-1997; 1997-1998; 1998-1999, 
and 1996-2000, and the parametric paired Mest was run. 4 To be able to use the 
parametric t statistic, the assumption that the sample is drawn from a normally 
distributed population must be satisfied. As indicated by the Kurtosis and 
Skewness statistics and confirmed by the K-S Lilliefors tests of normality, the 
cost of equity capital scores for the total period appear to be normally distributed 
'see Table 7.7' having a value for the normality tests between the ranges of 
1.96. The test results are summarised in Table 7.8. 
4 The Wilcoxon Mathched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test was also run and its results are presented together 
with the t-test results, since it is not required the data to be normally distributed. 
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As it can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes 
in the cost of equity capital estimated by expected return ofJIC listed on, 4SE and 
their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 " was accepted for the pairs 1997- 
1998, and 1998-1999 from both tests; Mest and Wilcoxon test while rejected for 
the pairs 1996-1997,1999-2000 and 1996-2000 from both tests. As the changes in 
the cost of equity capital, in means, were decreasing over the period 1996-1997, 
slightly increased over the period 1997-1998 when it decreased again over the 
period 199-2000. Table 7.8 shows that the sampled companies' cost of equity 
capital was not decreasing significantly over the period 1996-1997 neither 
increasing significantly over the period 1997-1999 when there was a significant 
decrease in the year 2000 comparing with the year 1999. In addition, clearly it can 
be seen that, overall, the cost of equity capital decreased significantly over the 
total period 1996-2000 since the null hypothesis were rejected for the pair 1996- 
2000. An important point to note, therefore, is that the observed significant 
decrease in the cost of equity capital spread over the total period under 
consideration suggesting that the decrease were 'cumulative'. The same result has 
been reported for the systematic risk as well. 
In conclusion, it can be said that, overall, the increase in the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS has influenced the cost of equity capital estimated by 
expected return for all 50 selected JIC listed on ASE over the period 1996-2000. 
Such an influence was not significant between each pair of years, however, could 
be a reflection of the gradual increase in the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS itself since such extent reached its peak by only 56% in average in the 
most recent year (2000) 'see Chapter Six- Table 6.1'. For supporting such 
argument, ANOVA and General Linear Model (GLM) have been employed. Both 
tests show that the difference among means over the period 1996-2000 is 
significant (F Ratio = 36.88 and F Prob. = 0.0001). For showing between which 
pair of years the mean difference is significant, however, Tukey HSD has been 
used and its results summarised in Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9: Summary for the mean difference in the cost of equity capital 
1996-2000 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
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Table 7.9: Summary for the mean difference in the cost of equity capital 
1996-2000 
1997 1998 1999 2000 
1996 0.025438* 0.018069* 0.019482* 0.051497* 
1997 -0.00737 -0.00596 0.02606* 
1998 0.001413 0.033429* 
1999 0.032016* 
*= The mean difference is significant at 0.005 level 
As it can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes 
in the cost of equity capital ofJIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the 
period 1996-2000" was rejected for any pair of years the year 1996 or 2000 is 
included confirming the fact that the means difference between the most recent 
year (2000) and the rest of the years is significantly different and also the same for 
the difference in means between the year 1996 and the rest of the years 
considered. Such results confirming the above conclusion concerning the impact 
of the extent of disclosure on cost of equity capital for selected JIC listed on ASE. 
7.2.4.1 The Extent of Disclosure in Compliance with the IAS, Financial Risk, 
and Business Risk and the Change in the Cost of Equity Capital 
We have seen that the change in disclosure has had a cumulative effect upon the beta 
of the company and hence the cost of equity capital over the period 1996 - 2000. 
However it is conceivable that the cost of equity capital has been influenced by other 
changes taking place over this period. In particular the firms may have been 
changing their business risk or their financial risk and this need to be controlled for 
in assessing the impact of the change in disclosure. It is also conceivable that the 
firms have responded to the change in disclosure by changing their business and 
financial risks. These effects were introduced in Chapter 1, where the third objective 
of this study was to assess the impact of disclosure in compliance with IAS, the 
business risk and the fmancial risk of the JIC listed on the ASE. In order to 
accomplish such an objective the study looks at the association between these three 
variables and the cost of equity capital for the five years 1996 to 2000. 
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Business risk and financial risk factors (independent variables) were selected on the 
basis of theoretical arguments and literature review whereas the extent of disclosure 
in compliance with the IAS has been considered as a third factor (independent 
variable) which, at the best knowledge of the researcher, its relationship with the cost 
of equity capital has not been explored experimentally in developing countries. As it 
is explained in Chapter Five - Research Methodology and Hypotheses, the cost of 
equity capital (dependent variable) was estimated by employing the Market Model 
and the CAPM. 
The possible link between the selected three factors and the cost of equity capital 
were discussed and accordingly the following hypothesis: "H07: There is no 
association between the cost of equity capital and the extent of disclosure, the 
financial risk; and the business riskfor JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded 
during the total period 1996-2000" formulated in Chapter Five - Research 
Methodology and Hypotheses will be tested. The following section reports the 
results of the multivariate tests that were conducted to examine the association 
between the three variables and the cost of equity capital. 
7.2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate analysis carried out in this study is multiple regression. Multiple 
regression routines were conducted for each year using the cost of equity capital as 
the dependent and business risk estimated by logarithm net sales revenue, financial 
risk estimated by leverage ratio and the extent of disclosure in compliance with the 
IAS as independent variables. Such cross-sectional regressions allows us to identify 
not only if there is a significant association between selected factors and the cost of 
equity capital for each year started from 1996 until 2000, but also if such a 
relationship is consistent over time. 
One of the problems of undertaking any multiple regression analysis is that there 
may be multicollinearity between the independent variables. The possible occurrence 
of multicollinearity was checked by testing Pearson Correlation Coefficient as 
suggested by Farrar and Glauber (1967); Judge et al. (1985); Street and Bryant 
(2000); Wahlen (1994); Wallace and Naser (1995); Wallace et al. (1994) which 
363 
Chapter Seven 
indicates that the Pearson Correlation Coefficient was less than 0.80 confirming that 
a major multicollinearity problem was not observed among the independent 
variables in any of the five years covered in this study 'see Appendix 11'. 
In order to undertake multiple linear regression, the data must fulfil certain 
conditions (i. e. normality, homoscedasticity (equal variance) and linearity). An 
examination of the scatterplots of the regression standardised predicted values 
against the residuals for each year did not indicate any relationship. Hence, the 
conditions of linearity and homoscedasticity were not violated (Kinnear and Gray 
1995, P. 174). Furthermore, an examination of Q-Q plot of residuals for each 
regression model indicates that the distribution of residuals is approximately normal. 
The standard skewness, kurtosis and K-S Lilliefors tests of normality of residuals 
also confirmed that the distributions of residuals are approximately normal. 5 Thus, 
the assumption of normality was also satisfied (Norusis 1995, Chapters 22 and 24). 
Finally, for checking that the residuals are uncorrelated, it is suggested by Maddala 
(2001, P. 244) to employ Durbin-Watson statistic by using its upper bound (dU) as 
the true significant point treating the inconclusive region as a rejection region 'see 
section 5.3.1.6 - Footnote 14'. The D-W statistic results, however, shows that the 
residuals were not autocorrelated except for the year 2000 and the total period 1996- 
2000 'see Table 7.10'. referring to the DW tables with k=4 which is the number of 
variables in the model and n---250 which is the number of observation for the 5% 
significant level, it can be seen that dU = 1,715 (Gujarati 1995, P. 820). since the 
observed dU for the year 2000 and for the total period 1996-2000 were less than dU, 
the null hypothesis (p = 0) has to be rejected at the 5% level suggesting that there is 
an evidence of positive autocorrelation among residuals for the year 2000 and for the 
total period 1996-2000 (Gujarati 1995, P. 422). In such a situation the residual 
variance d' is likely to underestimate the true (12 and as a result R2 will be 
overestimated. Even if Cy2 is not underestimated, var(B' ) may underestimate var (B' ) 
ARI its variance under first-order autocorrelation. Therefore, the usual t and F tests 
significant are no longer valid, and if applied, are likely to give seriously misleading 
conclusions about the statistical significance of the estimated regression coefficient 
(Gujarati 1995, P. 41 1). As suggested by Gujarati (1995, P. 428), however, 
concerning the existence of the autocorrelation problem (p: t- 0) is to apply the first- 
5 For each of the five years, skewness and kurtosis were between +/-1.96 range, and significance level 
of K-S Lilliefors were not significant at 0.05 level. 
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difference method for each variable included in the model (take the A for dependent 
and each explanatory variables). It has been found that applying the first difference 
for each variable included in this study for only the year 2000 data improved the DW 
values by being around 2 'see Table 7.10. 
The OLS regression models for each of the five years were conducted using the 
"enter all variables " routine. A summary of results is shown in Table 7.10. 
As can be seen in Table 7.10, presented below, the results of the multiple regression 
routines for 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000 and 1996-2000 yielded F values of 0.645, 
0.236,0.223,0.737,1.087, and 76.728, respectively. The observed significance 
level (sig. F) was found to be less than the 0.05 significance level for only the 
total period 1996-2000 which means that collectively the three independent 
variables can significantly explain the variation in the extent of disclosure at 5% 
significance level for the period 1996-2000. Thus, the results reject the main null 
hypothesis suggesting that there is significant association between the selected 
factors and the cost of equity capital of JIC for only the total period 1996-2000 
and accepting the null hypothesis for each year separately suggesting that there is 
no association between the selected factors and the cost of equity capital. 
Beside the fact that the association between the cost of equity capital and the three 
variables (collectively) was to be significant at the 0.05 level for only the total period 
1996-2000, Table 7.10 reveals that the degree of explanation by the independent 
variables selected was different over the period under consideration. In terms of R2, 
the 1996 model explains 8 per cent of the variability in cost of equity capital, the 
1997 model 4 per cent, the 1998 model 3 per cent, the 1999 model 9 per cent, the 
2000 model II per cent and the total period model (1995-2000) 65 per cent. 6 An 
interesting point to note, therefore, is that while low per cent of the cost of equity 
capital variability could be explain in each year separately, such per cent increasing 
dramatically when the data over the total period 1996-2000 is used. The explanatory 
power for the included factors is quite low for each year separately, moreover, 
6 Stepwise regression technique, as its results presented in Appendix II for the total period together 
1996-2000, shows that business risk has the most explanatory power in explaining the cost of equity 
capital fluctuation and, to less extent, the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. In tenns of R2, 
these variables explain 65% of the cost of equity capital fluctuation. 
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suggesting the fact that there are other factors might be on the macroeconomic level 
should be considered in future research for explaining such variation. Such an 
argument supported by the constant factor being significant over each year 
separately and also over the total period 1996-2000 except for the year 2000 'see 
Table 7.10'. 
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An examination of regression statistics (i. e. T statistics and sig. ), the independent 
extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS was not significantly associated with 
the cost of equity capital at the 0.05 level for each year separately, while for the total 
period 1996-2000 the extent of disclosure was significantly associated with the cost 
of equity capital for JIC actively and less actively groups. Such a result consistent 
with the argument mentioned earlier concerning the impact of the extent of 
disclosure on systematic risk that the impact extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS "cumulative ". As the extent of disclosure variable has negative partial 
regession coefficient (B) for each year separately and also for the total period 1996- 
2000 except for the years 1998,1999 which means when the extent of disclosure 
increased, the cost of equity capital decreased except for the years 1998,1999 
increased. Such results as would be predicted (i. e. it is of the correct sign). In 
addition, business risk is another factor influencing the cost of equity capital in ASE. 
Since the B (partial regression coefficient) for the business risk variable estimated by 
logarithm net sales revenue as a proxy for company size is negative, this means that 
the larger JIC size is, the lower its cost of equity capital. Such a result consistent with 
the theoretical argument suggesting that large companies are being able to finance 
their activities at reasonable cost of equity capital comparing with small ones 'see 
Chapter Five- section 5.3.1.1'. A possible explanation for the extent of disclosure 
not being significantly negative associated with the cost of equity capital over each 
year separately especially after the adoption of IAS in 1998, however, is the low 
extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS 'see Chapter Six- section 6.2' when 
the highest mean extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS was in the most recent 
year (2000) only 55%. 
As far as financial risk is concerned, there was not significant association with the 
cost of equity capital at the 0.05 level not only for each year separately considered in 
this study but also for the total period 1996-2000. As financial risk variable 
estimated by leverage has positive partial regression coefficient (B) for each year 
separately and also for the total period except for the year 2000, which means that 
the cost of equity capital decreased with the decrease in the financial risk, a result 
consistent with the theoretical argument 'see Chapter Five- section 5.3.1.5'. 
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What the above evidence suggests, therefore, is that there is a very weak empirical 
relationship between financial risk estimated by financial leverage and the cost of 
equity capital, while such association is significant between the business risk 
estimated by logarithm net sales revenue and the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS and the cost of equity capital for the total period 1996-2000 supporting the 
earlier argument that the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS influence on 
the cost of equity capital was cumulative. 
7.2.5 The Change in Share Price Volatility in Following the Change in 
Disclosure in Compliance with IAS 
Following the objective of exploring, overall, whether it can be seen any 
significant changes for JIC included in this study share prices fluctuation over the 
period 1996-2000, the following question has to be answered: 
To what extent XC listed on ASE and their shares traded during the period 1996- 
2000 its share price volatility has been changed 
A conventional test on the volatility, however, will be to look at the behaviour of the 
variance in ASE Index over the time period 1996-2000. Figure 7.1 shows such 
behaviour over the period under consideration. 
Figure 7.1 
Amman Stock Exchange General Index Weekly Return 
1996-2000 
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As it can be seen from the above figure there was not that much 11LICtUatlOll III the 
ASE index weekly return over the period 1996-2000. For testing such in argument, 
tile estimated unconditional variance of tile ASF1 index weekly return over the first 
and the last 52 weeks over tile period 1996-2000 were calculated assuming that ASF 
expected ý, veekly return is zero (i. e. tile strongest test is by comparing tile estimated 
unconditional variance for the year 1996 with the year 2000). 'File result shows that 
the estimated unconditional variance in 1996 was 0.00022 while I'Or the year 2000 
was 0.0002332. Dividing the estimated unconditional variance in 2000 by the 
estimated unconditional variance in 1996, the ratio was 0.054559 called 'calculated 
F. Such a value compared with the T critical' at 0.05 level of'signi I lcance, NI- 52 
weeks - 1, and N2 = 52 weeks -1. F critical is 1.6 and therefore comparing tile 
calculated F with the critical F, it can be argued that the null IlypOtIlCSIS Should be 
rejected which means the estimated unconditional variance ofthe ASF weekly return 
has not changed over the period of adopting the IAS. For confirmatioll, allother 
approach has been used by estimating the unconditional variance of' ASF index 
weekly return assuming that the mean of ASE weekly return is not equal to zero. The 
result shows that the estimated unconditional variance in 1996 was 0.00022 \\71111C 
for tile year 2000 was 0.000219. Dividing the estimated unconditional variance Ill 
2000 by the estimated unconditional variance in 1996, the ratio , vas 0.991999 called 
I calculated F. Such a value compared with tile 'F critical' at 0.05 level ol' 
significance, NI = 52 weeks - 1, and N2 = 52 weeks -1. F critical is 1.6 and 
therefore comparing the calculated F with tile critical F, it call be argued that tile 111.111 
hypothesis Should be re ected which IIII JI means the estimated 1.111COnditiOnal VarialICC 01' 
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the ASE weekly return has not changed over the period of adopting the IAS 
confmning the result presented earlier. 
Generally speaking, it could be argued that adopting IAS in Jordan has not affected 
ASE General Index volatility from doing the strongest test by comparing 1996 with 
2000 weekly return. This result, however, is misleading since thin trading problem 
exists in the Amman emerging market. Too many companies exhibit thin trading and 
as a result the measure of variance in the ASE index is biased downwards. An 
alternative way of looking at the volatility issue, therefore, is to look at JIC that do 
not exhibit thin trading which will be the issue to explore in the following. It is 
expected that after the mandatory action, the share price volatility will decrease. 7 
Therefore, the null hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
H08: There are no changes in the share price volatility for JIC listed on ASE and 
their shares traded over the period 1996-2000. 
To be able to test the above hypotheses, however, a total of 50 JIC logarithm weekly 
share price retums over the five years (1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000) were 
analysed, as explained in the methodology chapter, and each company's share price 
return volatility estimated by standard deviation was found 'see Appendix 12'. Only 
JIC actively traded and the less actively traded groups, however, were considered in 
testing the null hypothesis. Table 7.11 shows the descriptive statistics of the share 
prices return volatility estimated by standard deviation. 
Table 7.11: Descriptive statistics of the share prices return volatility estimated 
by standard deviation 1996-2000 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Mean 0.04556 0.03715 0.04583 0.04933 0.04887 
Maximum 0.081173 0.06509 0.07404 0.086925 0.105335 
7 It should be noted that it is not definite that the implementation of the IAS will decrease the share 
price volatility estimated by the standard deviation. That is because might the macroeconomic factors 
influencing the share prices volatility in a region experienced over the last fifty years four terrible wars 
and a continuous conflict between Palestinian and Israelis since 1948 which means lack of stability 
and more risk. Moreover, it can be added that implementing the IAS means ability for JIC to be listed 
on the international financial markets, which means, as a consequence, new risk to take. But where the 
later is not an important issue for JIC, the first factor mentioned should be taken into account. 
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Minimum 0.026557 0.017877 0.021598 0.021348 0.022248 
Range 0.054616 0.047212 0.052443 0.065577 0.083086 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.012761 0.010039 0.012667 0.016748 0.01867 
Standardised 
Kurt. 
1.067838 2.243495 -0.47032 -0.30997 1.832923 
Standardised 
Skew. 
1.074642 0.961741 0.110235 0.476643 1.198541 
K-S (Lilliefors) 0.160564 0.228899* 0.078211 0.141975 0.190729* 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.923132 0.920519 0.984697 0.96575 0.908649 
*= Significant at O. U5 level 
The table above shows that the share prices return volatility estimated by standard 
deviation varied within the range of 0.0831 to 0.0472 over the period 1996-2000. 
In addition, the mean score of the share price volatility is 0.0456,0.0372,0.0458, 
0.0493, and 0.0489 in 1996,1997,1998,1999, and 2000, respectively. 
The following section will test the significance of the changes in the share price 
volatility estimated by standard deviation over the period 1996-2000 across 
actively traded and the less actively traded JIC groups. 
Test of Hypothesis 8 (H08) 
In order to test H08 "there are no changes in the share prices return volatility of 
JIC listed on ASE and their shares traded over the period 1996-2000 " across all 
companies within both groups: actively traded and less actively traded, the share 
prices return volatility estimated by standard deviation values were grouped into 
five pairs (1996-1997; 1997-1998; 1998-1999,1999-2000, and 1996-2000), and 
the parametric paired Mest was run. 8 To be able to use the parametric t statistic, 
the assumption that the sample is drawn from a normally distributed population 
must be satisfied. As indicated by the Kurtosis and Skewness statistics and 
confirmed by the K-S Lilliefors and Shapiro-Wilk tests of normality, the standard 
deviation scores for the total period appear to be normally distributed except for 
8 The Wilcoxon Mathched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test was also run and its results are presented together 
with the t-test results. 
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the year 1997 and 2000 having a value for the non-nality tests between the ranges 
of +/-1.96 'see Table 7.11'. As K-S Lilliefors p-value were less than 0.05 for the 
years 1997 and 2000, such a result confirming that the standard deviation scores 
over these years was not normally distributed, which has not been confirmed by 
Shapiro-Wilk normality test showing that p-value over the years 1997 and 2000 
was higher than 0.05. To avoid any errors in accepting or rejecting the null 
hypothesis while its not, however, both: parametric and nonparametric tests will 
be employed and the tests results are summarised in Table 7.12. 
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As can be seen from the above table, the null hypothesis "there are no changes in 
the share price volatility estimated by standard deviation ofJIC listed on 4SE and 
their shares traded over the period 1996-2000" was rejected for the pairs 1996- 
1997 and 1997-1998 from both tests; Mest and Wilcoxon test. As it shown earlier 
'see Table 7.12' share price fluctuation for actively traded and less actively traded 
JIC decreased over the period 1996-1997 and increased over the period 1997- 
1998. Such a change, therefore, could be confirmed as statistically significant. 
Whereas, the share price volatility changes over the period 1998-2000 and over 
the total period 1996-2000 is not statistically significant suggesting that the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. 
To sum up, such results concluded that the fluctuation in JIC share prices has been 
influenced by other factors (e. g. the conflict between Iraq and the United Nations, 
the death of King Hussein, the continuous conflict between Palestinian and 
Israelis). It could be argued, therefore, that the adoption of IAS was not the only 
factor influencing share prices fluctuation. Such an argument is supported by 
many previous empirical researches 'see Chapter Five- section 5.4.2'. 9 
7.3 Summary 
This chapter presents the results regarding the research hypothesis concerning the 
financial consequences of adopting IAS. Therefore, for exploring these issues, the 
relationship between the extent of disclosure and the systematic risk, unsystematic 
risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, and share price volatility estimated by beta, 
'To confirm such an argument, the multiple linear regression routine was employed using included 
JIC share price volatility estimated by standard deviation as a dependent variable and the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS as an independent variable after controlling for the cost of equity 
capital variable estimated by expected return for the years 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000, and for the 
total period 1996-2000. Controlling for the cost of equity capital has been considered since it is 
believed that the change in the cost of equity capital over the period 1996-2000 could influence the 
share price volatility. The results show that such explanatory variables did not influence significantly 
the JIC share price fluctuation not only over each year separately but also over the total period 1996- 
2000. The extent of disclosure coefficients were 0.043, -0.014, -0.001, -0.01,0.018, and 0.0 15 and it is 
significance at 0.05 level were 0.19,0.61,0.96,0.72,0.47, and 0.20 in 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000, 
and the total period 1996-2000, respectively. The cost of equity capital coefficients, however, were 
0.00 1,0.18,0.20,0.24, -0.39, and -0 16 and it is significance at 0.05 level were 0.99,0.21,0.3 5,0.42, 
0.06, and 0.78 in 1996,1997,1998,1999,2000, and the total period 1996-2000, respectively. In 
addition, stepwise regression was employed and the results showed that neither the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS nor the cost of equity capital were statistically significant in 
explaining the share price volatility over the total period 1996-2000 and both explanatory variables 
were removed. 
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residuals variance, the difference between market return and risk free rate, expected 
return, and standard deviation, respectively, has been tested over the period 1996- 
2000. 
For generalising the research results, however, the difference in means between the 
JIC average extent of disclosure actively traded group and JIC average extent of 
disclosure lowest actively traded group were employed using Paired-Samples Mest 
to see whether testing for the financial consequences of extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS on JIC actively traded group and JIC less actively traded 
groups could be generalised for the all 50 JIC selected in this study. The test showed 
that the difference in means between the two groups is not significant confirming 
the fact that investigating the financial consequences of adopting IAS could be 
genarlised for all 50 JIC selected originally in this study and not just for those 
companies within the actively traded group and the less actively group. 
The systematic risk and cost of equity capital, to some extent, found to be 
influenced by the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. Such an influence 
described as a 'cumulative' influence. Whereas, it has not been found that 
unsystematic risk, and share price volatility significantly influenced by the 
adoption of IAS. It could be argued that such a result might be as a consequence 
of many factors, namely: 1) JIC were not fully complying the IAS, 2) 
recommending the IAS by accounting professions (JACPA) to be adopted in 
1990,3) Jordanian economy dependency on its neighbours, 4) region suffering 
continuous conflict between Palestinian and Israelis, 5) continuous tension 
between Iraq and the USA and the UK since the Second Gulf War in 1991 and 
also between Iraq and Gulf Countries, 6) the sickness of King Hussein who was 
the longest serving executive head of state in the world and ultimate death in 
February 7.1999,6) the eviction of the United Nation for Monitoring, Verification 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 1998 which led to a big attack 
operation by USA and UK on Iraq, the biggest trade partner for Jordan, 7) and 
last, but not least, ASE efficiency, however, might made testing the change in JIC 
share price volatility as a consequence of adopting the IAS in Jordan ambiguous. 
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Multiple regression routines were employed by testing whether the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS has influenced significantly the cost of equity 
capital after controlling for the variables business risk and financial risk. The test 
results revealed that, over the total period 1996-2000, business risk and the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS are the most explanatory variable having 
significant association with the cost of equity capital among the others included in 
this study, an argument confirmed by running the stepwise regression 'see Appendix 
11'. The explanatory variables included in the regression model has not been found 
significantly associated with the cost of equity capital over each year separately, 
however, confirming the fact that the impact of the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS on JIC cost of equity capital were "cumulative ". 
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CHAPTEREIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS, BOUNDARIES AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Little is known about the impact of the IAS on the extent of disclosure, their 
impact on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost of equity capital, 
and share price volatility, or the effect on international trade. In particular, there is 
no empirical evidence, that investigates the impact of all related and relevant IAS 
on the extent of disclosure, systematic risk, unsystematic risk, risk premium, cost 
of equity capital, and share prices volatility for companies listed in the stock 
market in a country like Jordan. In addition, from a micro (company) perspective, 
it has been suggested that there are company-specific factors that may affect the 
extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS. Although the association has long 
been recognised, the results of the previous studies carried out in different 
countries have been mixed, to a certain extent inconsistent and sometimes 
contradictory. Hence, a further investigation into the impact of company-specific 
factors of the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS in a country, which was 
not subject to such a previous study, may contribute to efforts that have been 
made to identify the factors affecting the extent of disclosure of companies. 
Jordanian companies have not been covered in the previous disclosure studies in 
compliance with all related IAS, (as far as this research is aware), and therefore 
the impact of company-specific factors on the extent of disclosure in compliance 
with all related and relevant IAS is not known. 
For the accounting years ending December 1998, IAS was made mandatory 
through the Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities law No. 23 of 1997 for 
all Jordanian public companies. Unfortunately there was no institutional change to 
check on compliance. However, it does create an opportunity to test if there were 
any factors, which systematically affected or were associated with the degree of 
compliance. 
Jordan is chosen as the focus of this study for several reasons. Firstly, it is an open 
economy in the Middle East especially to EU members and USA. Secondly, the 
Amman Stock Exchange is growing rapidly and this creates a possibility of testing 
cost of capital propositions. Thirdly, so far, however, little is known about the 
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impact of the extent in compliance with IAS on systematic risk, unsystematic risk, 
risk premium, cost of equity capital, and on share price volatility not only in 
developed countries but also in developing countries as well. Fourthly, the sudden 
imposition of IAS by the Jordanian Companies Act and the Securities law creates 
an opportunity for stronger tests of the propositions about disclosure and the cost 
of capital. To test the propositions, a sample of only Jordanian industrial 
companies was selected. These companies had existed for the six years period 
1995-2000. They had to have a full set of company accounts and they had to have 
been continuously trading over the whole period. 
8.1 Conclusions 
The study analysis indicates the following: 
1. The sampled JIC extent of disclosure in compliance with the IAS 
increased over the period 1995-2000 where the change in means was 
positive for the total period. 
2. Although there was a drift up in the level of disclosure over the period 
1995-2000, the degree of the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
for the period post the mandatory action (1998-2000) were higher than 
50% comparing with the period pre the mandatory action. This might give 
an indication that the mandatory action played a vital role in increasing the 
level of disclosure regarding the IAS. 
3. Overall, the extent of disclosure is quite low over not only pre but also 
post the mandatory action of adopting the IAS. 
4. An important point has to be mentioned, moreover, is that although the 
adoption for the IAS started in the year 1998 but the significant change 
started in the extent of disclosure since 1997. This ambiguity could be 
attributable to many factors, namely; Jordanian Association of Certified 
Public Accountants (JACPA) who decided in its Ordinance No. 54 that 
IAS was to be followed compulsory by the Jordanian public accountants 
during their course of examination of financial statements of the Jordanian 
Shareholding Companies (JSCs) starting by December 1990, pressure 
from companies liked with the international market to implement early the 
IAS, the absence of national accounting standards, researchers and experts 
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recommendations of implementing the IAS. As a consequence, it can be 
seen that a drift up in the extent of disclosure regarding the mandatory 
action in 1998 for implementing the IAS and not a jump up as expected to 
be seen around the adoption date. In addition, the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS changes over the period 1995-2000 could be 
influenced by a macroeconomic factors, an issue argued by many 
researches (Chen 1983; Fama and French 1989; Poon and Taylor 199 1). 
5. An analysis of the relationship between the level of disclosure and 
characteristics of reporting firms will not only extend our knowledge of 
significant factors influencing the extent of disclosure, but may also be of 
use to regulatory authorities. This could be done by selecting an 
appropriate course of action for setting up new or modifying existing 
regulations. In this regard, it could be argued that the main conclusion of 
this study is that the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
systematically varies depending upon company size and, to a lesser extent, 
audit firm and industry type (Mining and Building Equipment) in 
explaining differences in the extent of annual reports disclosure between 
the JIC over the period 1995-2000. 
6. As far as the industry type is concerned, the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS of the Mining and Building Equipment sector was 
found to be significantly different from others. One possible explanation 
for this result could be due to the fact that companies in this industry 
category rely heavily on the foreign investments particularly those large 
companies who are considered as the biggest companies in the country, 
such as Jordan Phosphate Mines, Jordan Cement Factories, Arab Potash, 
and Jordan Cement Factories. These companies, therefore, (relatively) 
faced higher pressure from the foreign investors and the outside world to 
disclose more information in comparison with the companies in the other 
industries. 
7. Concerning the financial consequences of adopting IAS, the results of this 
study suggested that systematic risk and cost of equity capital, to some 
extent, was found to be influenced by extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS. Such an influence was described as a 'cumulative' influence. 
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8. Multiple regression routines were employed by testing whether the extent 
of disclosure in compliance with IAS has influenced significantly the cost 
of equity capital after controlling for the variables business risk and 
financial risk. The test results revealed that, over the total period 1996- 
2000 only, business risk and the extent of disclosure in compliance with 
IAS found to have negative and significant association with the cost of 
equity capital where financial risk had positive but not significant 
association with the cost of equity capital over the total period 1996-2000, 
a result confirmed by running the stepwise regression showing that the 
extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS and business risk are the only 
explanatory variables explain the variation in the cost of equity capital 
only over the total period 1996-2000. Such a result confirming the fact 
argued before that the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS 
influences on cost of equity capital were 'cumulative'. 
9. On the other hand, it has not been found that unsystematic risk, risk 
premium, and share price volatility significantly influenced by the 
adoption of IAS. 
10. It could be argued that such financial consequences of adopting the IAS 
might be influenced by factors, namely: 1) JIC were not fully complying 
with the IAS (i. e. the higher mean extent of disclosure over the period 
1995-2000 was 0.56 in the most recent year 2000), 2) recommending the 
IAS by accounting professions (JACPA) to be adopted in 1990,3) 
Jordanian economy dependency, regionally and internationally, 4) region 
suffering continuous conflict between Palestinian and Israelis, 5) 
continuous tension between Iraq and the USA and the UK since the 
Second Gulf War in 1991 and also between Iraq and Gulf Countries, 6) the 
sickness of King Hussein who was the longest serving executive head of 
state in the world and his ultimate death in February 7.1999,7) and last, 
but not least, the eviction of the United Nation for Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 1998 which led 
to a big attack operation by USA and UK on Iraq, the biggest trade partner 
for Jordan. 
8.2 Boundaries 
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There are a number of boundaries of this type of research. 
First, the focus of disclosure discussed in this study has been on corporate annual 
reports, which are only a part of the information set by companies. 
Second, it is clear from the review of the literature that construction of an index is 
a difficult matter that generally involves subjective judgment on the part of the 
researchers. In other words, developing this study indices are limited to items 
where compliance is visible and therefore the research inevitably ends up testing 
disclosure more than measurement and accounting policy statements more than 
accounting practice. The indices are therefore a proxy for compliance and in some 
ways a slightly biased proxy. In particular, in measuring the extent of disclosure 
in compliance with IAS, the study is reliant on the fact that companies making 
clear statements of accounting policy and making them honestly. In addition, 
awarding scores to companies also seems to involve subjective judgment in many 
cases. Therefore, measuring company information disclosure cannot be carried out 
in a precise scientific way. Researcher subjectivity cannot be completely removed, 
nor is it reasonable to expect that it can be. Consequently, the value of the 
resulting disclosure scores and their subsequent use in testing hypotheses cannot, 
therefore, be viewed uncritically. 
Third, in the context of Jordan, external finance has often been raised from local 
banks and these institutions have the power to demand inside information. Casual 
empiricism suggests that this had the effect in not recognising a jump up in the 
extent of disclosure after the adoption of IAS by Amman Stock Exchange in 1998 
since there is no need for raising such finance from international capital markets. 
This issue could be confirmed by looking at the relationship between the extent of 
disclosure and leverage which wa§ not significant over the period 1995-2000. 
Fourth, since the, results revealed that there was not a jump up in the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS for the period post the mandatory action of 
adopting the IAS forced by Companies Act No. 22 of 1997 and Securities Law 
No. 23 of 1997 compared with the period pre the adoption, it is suggested that 
macroeconomic factors influencing significantly the Middle-East region 
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S 
mentioned in the Research Methodology and Hypotheses Chapter could be the 
reason for the ambiguity in supporting the theoretical arguments concerning the 
financial consequences of increasing the disclosure. 
Fifth, data availability limited our ability to study some factors that have been 
found to be important theoretically or empirically in other disclosure studies (e. g. 
bid-ask spread, ownership structure, foreign investment influence, etc). As 
additional information becomes available about Jordanian companies, the effect of 
such factors should be investigated. 
Sixth, JIC listed on ASE were featured by being thinly traded which created 
economic problems in estimating the systematic risk, unsystematic risk, and the 
cost of equity capital. This feature forced the selected JIC into three groups, 
namely: actively traded, less actively traded, and lowest actively traded groups. 
Only, the first two groups, therefore, were considered to explore the financial 
consequences of adopting IAS. 
Seventh, In testing the impact of extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS on 
JIC share price volatility, it has to be remembered that share price volatility is 
influenced by many factors related to information asymmetry and testing the 
effect of adopting new reporting strategy on volatility could be ambiguous - in 
particular for infrequently traded stocks as it is the case for JIC. For this reason, 
volatility is likely to be the least reliable proxy among the others in exploring the 
financial consequences of adopting the IAS. 
8.3 Recommendations 
Overall, the extent of disclosure is quite low over not only pre but also post the 
mandatory action of adopting the IAS suggesting that the Government and the 
ASE systems regarding the financial reporting in Jordan are loose. Therefore, it 
could be suggested that to increase the degree of compliance, the accounting 
profession in Jordan should strengthen its monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms after giving it more power through the Companies Act and increase 
awareness about the existing mandatory provisions by conducting training 
programs for its members on a regular basis working side by side with the ASE on 
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a cooperative basis. Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) argued that in developing 
countries while there are considerable incentives for voluntary disclosure in 
corporate annual reports, there are also reasons for not complying with mandatory 
disclosure regulations, including inadequate regulatory framework and 
enforcement mechanisms, and a lack of both an effective capital market and an 
accounting profession. Therefore, the assumption that all companies will disclose 
all mandatory information may not be true in these countries. Empirically, 
Wallace (1988) examined 47 Stock Exchange listed companies in Nigeria and 
concluded that many companies in that country publish annual reports that did not 
adequately comply with minimum disclosure regulation. 
To improve the extent of disclosure in compliance with IAS, moreover, the 
Amman Stock Exchange and JAPCA should strengthen its continuing 
professional education courses on new development. It should also compile a 
checklist incorporating all the disclosure requirements applicable in compliance 
with IAS. The checklist should be updated periodically and whenever new 
disclosure requirements are promulgated by the IASB. 
Although JIC were not complying fully with IAS, it is always reported by 
companies' auditors that the company complying fully with the IAS. Therefore, it 
could be recommended that the Companies Act, Amman Stock Exchange and 
JAPCA should require auditing firms to maintain quality control programs and 
provide an active and practical penalty system for auditors whose work proves to 
be negligent for fraudulent beside giving more power to the JAPCA in supervising 
and controlling the profession. 
A possible policy implication of this finding may be that policymakers in Jordan 
should focus more closely on the disclosure needs of users of smaller firms' 
annual reports, firms not audited by one of the big auditing firms, and firms not 
one of the Mining and Building Equipment sector since such company size, audit 
firm and industry type factors found influencing significantly the extent of 
disclosure in compliance with IAS in Jordan. However, in so doing, policyrnakers 
in Jordan would need to consider the costs, as well as the benefits, associated with 
increased disclosure in compliance with IAS by smaller companies, firms audited 
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by not one of the big auditing firms, and firms not one of the Mining and Building 
Equipment sector. 
It is obvious that there is contradictory, to some extent, between the IAS 
requirements and the Income Tax Law in Jordan. For example, IAS requirements 
allowed an entity to revalue its assets if it is not using the historical cost approach 
in reporting such assets, where the Income Tax Law in Jordan prohibited such 
treatment and allowing only for the use of historical cost approach. Moreover, the 
Income Tax Law in Jordan forced Jordanian companies to use the straight-line 
method only for depreciating its assets, whereas IAS permitted beside the above 
method using the declining depreciation and the accelerating depreciation 
methods. If Jordanian companies asked to adopt fully the IAS, such a 
contradiction between requirements should be removed. 
8.4 Future Research 
As mentioned earlier, the focus of disclosure discussed in this study has been on 
corporate annual reports, which are only a part of the information set by 
companies. Future research, therefore, should examine the factors associated with 
disclosure through various alternative media such as the financial press, proxy 
statements, and quarterly and interim financial data issued by the firm. 
Moreover, it can be said that there are implications for future research on 
disclosure in compliance with IAS. For example, since R2 ranged from 20% to a 
maximum of 46.5%, there are obviously additional factors influencing the extent 
of disclosure in compliance with IAS. Therefore, future research can explore the 
influence of variables such as frequency of international financing, stability of 
growth in earnings, degree of competition, ownership structure, foreign 
investment influence, and state of development on the extent of disclosure in 
compliance with IAS. An interesting point to note, in addition, is that the 
explanatory power for the included factors (extent of disclosure in compliance 
with IAS, business risk, and financial risk) in explaining the cost of equity 
variation is quite low since R2 ranged from 3% to a maximum of 65% suggesting 
the fact that there are other factors, might be on the macroeconomic level, should 
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be considered in future research for explaining such variation. Such an argument 
supported by the constant factor being significant over the period under 
consideration except over the year 2000. 
It could be considered that there is scope for further research in the field of 
corporate disclosure and the financial consequences of adopting the IAS in 
emerging capital markets. For instance, research could be extend this study 
involve comparative studies with other Middle Eastern countries. Such studies 
will help to validate the conclusions of this study. 
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Appendix 2 
APPENDIX 2 
History of international accounting standards concerned 
Exposure Draft and Final IAS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
El Disclosure of IAS I Disclosure of 1.1.1975 Reformatted in 1994, 
Accounting Policies Accounting Policies Superseded by IAS I 
(March 1974) (January 1975) Presentation of 
Financial Statements 
(Effective 1.7.1998) 
E2 Valuation and IAS 2 Valuation and 1.1.1976 Superseded by IAS 2 
Presentation of Presentation of Inventories 
Inventories in the Inventories in the (Effective 1.1.1995) 
Context of the Context of the 
Historical Cost Historical Cost 
System System 
(September 1974) (October 1975) 
E3 Consolidated IAS3 Consolidated 1.1.1977 Superseded by IAS 
Financial Statements Financial Statements 27 and IAS 28 
and the Equity (June 1976) (Effective 1.1.1990) 
Method of Accounting 
(December 1974) 
E4 Depreciation IAS 4 Depreciation 1.1.1977 Reformatted in 1994 
Accounting Accounting 
(June 1975) (June 1976) 
E5 Information to be IAS 5 Information to 1.1.1977 Reformatted in 1995 
Disclosed in Financial be Disclosed in Superseded by IAS I 
Statements Financial Statements Presentation of 
(June 1975) (October 1976) Financial Statements 
(Effective 1.7.1998) 
E6 Accounting IAS 6 Accounting 1.1.1978 Superseded by IAS 
Treatment of Response to Changing 15 
Changing Prices Prices (Effective 1.1.1983) 
(January 1976) (Janu 1977) 
E7 Statement of IAS 7 Statement of 1.1.1979 Superseded by IAS 7 
Source and Changes in Financial Cash Flow 
Application of Funds Position Statements 
(June 1976) (October 1977) (Effective 1.1.1994) 
E8 The Treatment in IAS 8 Unusual and 1.1.1979 Superseded by IAS 
the Income Statement Prior Period Items and 8, Net Profit or Loss 
of Unusual Items and Changes in for the period. 
Changing in Accounting Policies Fundamental Errors 
Accounting Estimates (February 1978) and Changesin 
and Accounting Accounting Policies. 
Policies (Effective 1.1.1995) 
(October 1976) 
425 
AppendU 2 
Exposure Draft and Final TAS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
E9 Accounting for IAS 9 Accounting for 1.1-1980 Supcrscded by IAS 
Research and Research and 9, Research and 
Development Costs. Development Development Costs 
(February 1977) Activities. (Effective 1.1.1995) 
(July 1978) 
E 10 Contingencies IAS 10 Contingencies 1.1.1980 Reformatted in 1995 
and Events Occurring and Events Occurring 
After the Balance After the Balance 
Sheet Date (July Sheet Date (October 
1977) 1978) 
El I Accounting for Rc-draftcd and re- 
Foreign Transactions exposed as E23 
and Translation of 
Foreign Financial 
Statements 
(December 1977) 
E12 Accounting for IAS II Accounting 1.1.1980 Superseded by IAS 
Construction for Construction 11, Construction 
Contracts Contracts Contracts 
(December 1977) (March 1979) (Effective 1.1.1995) 
E13 Accounting for IAS 12 Accounting 1.1.1981 Reformatted in 1995 
Taxes on Income for Taxes on Income Superseded by IAS 
(April 1978) (July 1979) 12, Income Taxes 
(Effective 1.1.1998) 
E14 Current Assets IAS 13 Presentation of 1.1.1981 Reformatted in 1995 
and Current Liabilities Current Assets and Superseded by IAS 
(July 1978) Current Liabilities 1, Presentation of 
(November 1979) Financial Statements 
(Effective 1.7.1998) 
E 15 Reporting IAS 14 Reporting 1.1.1983 Reformatted in 1995 
Financial Information Financial Information Superseded by IAS 
by Segment by Segment 14, Segment 
(March 1980) (August 1981) Reporting (Effective 
1.7.1998) 
E 16 Accounting for IAS 19 Accounting 1.1.1985 Superseded by IAS 
Retirement Benefits in for Retirement 19, Retirement 
the Financial Benefits in the Benefit Costs 
Statements of Financial Statements (Effective 1.1.1995) 
Employers of Employers 
(April 1980) (January 1983) 
E17 Information IAS 15 E17 1.1.1983 Reformatted in 1995 
Reflecting the Effects Information 
of Changing Prices Reflecting the Effects 
(August 1980) of Changing Prices 
(November 8 1) 
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Exposure Draft and Final 1AS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
E 18 Accounting for IAS 16 Accounting 1.1.1983 Superseded by IAS 
Property, Plant and for Property, Plant and 16, Property, Plant 
Equipment in the Equipment and Equipment 
Context of the (March 1982) (Effective 1.1.1995) 
Historical Cost 
System 
(August 1980) 
E 19 Accounting for IAS 17 Accounting 1.1.1984 Reformatted in 1995 
Leases for Leases 'See also E56' 
(October 1980) (September 1982) 
E20 Revenue IAS 18 Revenue 1.1.1984 Superseded by IAS 
Recognition Recognition 18, Revenue 
(April 1981) (December 1982) (Effective 1.1.1995) 
E21 Accounting for IAS 20 Accounting 1.1.1984 Reformatted in 1995 
Government Grants for Government 
and Disclosure of Grants and Disclosure 
Government of Government 
Assistance Assistance 
(September 1981) (April 1983) 
E22 Accounting for IAS 22 Accounting 1.1.1985 Superseded by IAS 
Business for Business 22, Business 
Combinations Combinations Combinations 
(September 1981) (November 1983) (Effective 1.1.1995) 
E23 Accounting for IAS 21 Accounting 1.1.1985 Superseded by IAS 
the Effects of Changes for the Effects of 2 1, The Effects of 
in Foreign Exchange Changes in Foreign Changes in Foreign 
Rates Exchange Rates Exchange Rates, 
(March 1982) (July 1983) (Effective 1.1.1995) 
E24 Capitalisation of IAS 23 Capitalisation 1.1.1986 Superseded by IAS 
Borrowing Costs of Borrowing Costs 23, 
(November 1982) (March 1984) Borrowing Costs 
(Effective 
1.1.1995) 
E25 Disclosure of IAS 24 Related Party 1.1.1986 Reformatted in 1995 
Related Party Disclosures 
Transactions (July 1984) 
(March 1983) 
E26 Accounting for IAS 25 Accounting 1.1.1987 Reformatted in 1995 
Investments for Investments Revision proposed in 
(October 1984) (March 1986) E62 
E27 Accounting and IAS 26 Accounting 1.1.1988 Reformatted in 1995 
Reporting by and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Retirement Benefit 
Plans Plans 
(July 1985) (Janu. 1987) 
E28 Accounting for IAS 28 Accounting 1.1.1990 Reformatted in 1995 
Investments in for Investments in Consequential 
Associates and Joint Associates amendments a998 as 
Ventures (April 1989) result of IAS 38 
(July 1986) 
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Exposure Draft and Final TAS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
I 
E29 Disclosure in the Re-drafted and re- 
Financial Statements exposcd as E34 
of Banks 
(April 1987) 
E30 Consolidated IAS 27 Consolidated 1.1.1990 Reformatted in 1995 
Financial Statements Financial Statements 
and Accounting for and Accounting for 
Investments in Investments in 
Subsidiaries Subsidiaries 
(September 1987) (April 1989) 
E31 Financial IAS 29 Financial 1.1.1990 Reformatted in 1995 
reporting in reporting in 
Hyperinflationary Hyperinflationary 
Economies Economies 
(November 1987) (July 1989) 
E32 Comparability of Statement of Intent on Ten revised 
Financial Statements Comparability of International 
(January 1989) Financial Statements Accounting 
(July 1990) Standards published 
December 1993 
E33 Accounting for Re-drafted and re- 
Taxes on Income exposed as E49 
(January 1989) 
E34 Disclosures in the IAS 30 Disclosures in 1.1.1991 Re-formatted for 
Financial Statements the Financial International 
of Banks and Similar Statements of Banks Accounting 
Financial Institutions and Similar Financial Standards 
(July 1989) Institutions (Effective 1.1-1995) 
(August 1990) 
E35 Financial IAS 31 Financial 1.1.1992 Reformatted in 1995 
Reporting of Interests Reporting of Interests Consequential 
in Joint Ventures in Joint Ventures amendments 1998 as 
(December 1989) (December 1990) a result of IAS 38 
E36 Cash Flow IAS 7 (Revised 1992) 1.1.1994 Superseded IAS 7, 
Statements Cash Flow Statements Statement of 
(July 1991) (December 1992) Changes in Financial 
Position 
E37 Research and IAS 9 (Revised 1993) 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Development Research and which formed part of 
Activities Development Costs the Comparability/ 
(August 1991) (December 1993) Improvements 
Project Superseded 
by IAS 38, effective 
1.7.1999 
E38 Inventories IAS 2 (Revised 1992) 1.1.1995- Revised Standard 
(August 1991) Inventories which formed part of 
(December 1993) the Comparability/ 
Improvements 
Project 
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Exposure Draft and Final 1AS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
E39 Capabilities of IAS 23 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Borrowing Costs 1992) Borrowing which formed part of 
(August 1991) Costs the Comparability/ 
(December 1993) Improvements 
Project 
E40 Financial Re-drafted and re- 
Instruments exposed as E48 
(September 1991) 
E41 Revenue IAS 18 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Recognition 1993) Revenue which formed part of 
(May 1992) (December 1993) the Comparability/ 
Improvements 
Project 
E42 Construction IAS 16 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Contracts 1993) Construction which formed part of 
(May 1992) Contracts the Comparability/ 
(December 1993) Improvements 
Project 
E43 Property, Plant IAS 16 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
and Equipment 1993) Property, Plant which formed part of 
(May 1992) and Equipment the Comparability/ 
(December 1993) Improvements 
Project 
Consequential 
amendments as a 
result of IAS 38, 
effective 1.7.1999 
E44 The Effects of IAS 21 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Changes in Foreign 1993) The Effects of which formed part of 
Exchange Rates Changes in Foreign the Comparability/ 
(May 1992) Exchange Rates Improvements 
(December 1993) Project 
E45 Business IAS 23 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Combination 1993) Business which formed part of 
(June 1992) Combination the Comparability/ 
(December 1993) Improvements 
Project 
E46 Extraordinary IAS 8 (Revised 1993) 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Items, Fundamental Net Profit or Loss for which formed part of 
Errors and Changes in the Period, the Comparability/ 
Accounting Policies Fundamental Errors Improvements 
(July 1992) and Changes in Project 
Accounting Policies 
(December 1993) 
E47 Retirement IAS 19 (Revised 1.1.1995 Revised Standard 
Benefit Costs 1993) Retirement which formed part of 
(December 1992) Benefit Costs the Comparability/ 
(December 1993) Improvements 
Project 
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Exposure Draft and Final 1AS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
E48 Financial IAS 32 Financial 1.1.1996 This portion of E48 
Instruments instruments: relating to disclosure 
(January 1994) Disclosure and and presentation 
Presentation were finalised in IAS 
(June 1995) 32 
E62 addresses the 
recognition and 
measurements issues 
not covered in IAS 
32. 
E49 Income Taxes IAS 12 (Revised 1.1.1998 Revised Standard 
(October 1994) 1996) Income Taxes supersedes IAS 12, 
(October 1996) Accounting Taxes 
on Income. 
'See also E33' 
E50 Intangible Assets Re-drafted and re- 
(June 1995) exposed as E60 
E51 Reporting IAS 14 (Revised 1.7.1998 Revised Standard 
Financial Information 1997) Segment supersedes IAS 14, 
by Segment Reporting Reporting Financial 
(December 1995) (August 1997) Information by 
Segment 
E52 Earnings Per IAS 33 Earnings Per 1.1.1998 
Share Share 
(January 1996) (February 1997) 
E53 Presentation of IAS I (Revised 1997) 1.7.1998 Revised Standard 
Financial Statements Presentation of supersedes IAS 12, 
(July 1996) Financial Statements IAS 5 and IAS 13. 
(August 1997) 
E54 Employee IAS 19 (Revised 1.1.1999 Revised Standard 
Benefits 1998) Employee supersedes IAS 19, 
(October 1996) Benefits Retirement Benefit 
(February 1998) Costs. 
E55 Impairment of IAS 36 E55 1.7.1999 
Assets Impairment of Assets 
(May 1997) (June 1998) 
E56 Leases IAS 17 (Revised 1.1.1999 
(April 1997) 1997) 
Leases 
(December 1997) 
E58 Discontinuing IAS 35 Discontinuing 1.1.1999 Supersedes 
Operations Operations paragraphs 19-22 of 
(August 1997) (June 1998) IAS 8. 
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Exposure Draft and Final 1AS and Effective Comments 
Publication Date Publication Date 
E59 Provisions, IAS 37 Provisions, 1.7.1999 Supersedes those 
Contingent Liabilities Contingent Liabilities parts of IAS 10 that 
and Contingent Assets and Contingent Assets deal with 
(August 1997) (September 1998) contingencies. 
Events after balance 
sheet date are being 
addressed in a 
separate IASC 
project. 
E60 Intangible Assets IAS 38 Intangible 1.7.1999 Supersedes by IAS 
(August 1997) Assets 9. 
(September 1998) Also resulted in 
consequential 
amendments to IAS 
16,28, and 31 
relating to IAS 38. 
E61 Business IAS 22 Business 1.7.1999 Limited changes to 
Combinations Combinations IAS 22, Business 
(August 1997) (September 1998) Combinations, 
relating to IAS 38 
E62 Financial Comments due by 30 
Instruments: September 1998. 
Recognition and 
Measurements 
(June 1998) 
Sources: Adopted from Cairns (1995 and 1998), Epstein & Mirza (1999) and 
IASC (1998) 
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Stepwise regression Results 1995-2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t ratio 
Company Size 0.361 0.005 6.683 
Audit Firm 0.212 0.013 3.715 
Industry Type 0.125 0.015 2.357 
R2 0.184 Adjusted R2 0.176 
Standard Error 0.097 Sum of squares 3.415 
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APPENDIX 5 
JIC LOGARITHM WLLKLY REATRNS CIIARTS 
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APPENDIX 6 
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Append& 11 
APPENDIX 11 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 
VARIABLES (EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE, BUSINESS 
RISK, AND FINANCIAL RISK) AND STEPWISE 
REGRESSION RESULTS 
1996-2000 
Ppaircan rnrrpl§itinn Cnefficients - 1996* 
Business Risk Financial Risk 
Disclosure -0.17037 0.052865 
(0.405342) (0.797579) 
Business Risk 10.210122 1 (0.302877) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are provided in parentheses 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients - 1997* 
Business Risk Financial Risk 
Disclosure -0.35491 0.183428 
(0.114401) (0.426097) 
Business Risk 0.035884 
1 (0.877277) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are provided in parentheses 
Pearmn Correlation Coefficients - 1998* 
Business Risk Financial Risk 
Disclosure 0.560564 0.058253 
(0.001918) (0.768421) 
Business Risk -0.0477 
(0.809528) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (wo-tailed) are provided in parentheses 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients - 1999* 
Business Risk Financial Risk 
Disclosure 0.459457 0.181987 
(0.0208 6) (0.383943) 
Business Risk 1-0.21746 1 (0.296404) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are provided in parentheses 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients - 2000* 
Business Risk Financial Risk 
Disclosure 0.710271 -0.11427 
(3.32E-05) (0.570345 
Business Risk 0.07578 
(0.707164) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are provided in parentheses 
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients - 1996-2000* 
Business Risk F inancial Risk 
Disclosure 0.521161 - 0.070816 
(3.23E-10) (0.428851) 
Business Risk 
1 . 0.06644 1 (0.457996) 
P-values at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) are provided in parenth 
Stepwise rearession Results 1996-2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Extent of Disclosure -0.0388 0.017709 -2.1909* 
R2 0.036698 A justed R2 0.029052 
IS tandard Error 1 0.022964 Sum of Squares 0.068976 
"' F-value at UM level (two-tailed) statistically significant (Sig. 0.03) 
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